Threat Intelligence Sources

To meet the threat intelligence sources requirement, you must establish reliable threat-intel sharing inputs, make sure they are actually received by your organization, and run a repeatable evaluation workflow that turns relevant intel into action (triage, detection updates, patching, third-party notifications, or risk decisions). Document the sources, intake, evaluation criteria, decisions, and follow-through.
(Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)

Key takeaways:

• You need more than subscriptions; you need provable receipt, triage, and decisions tied to operational actions. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)
• Define “relevant sources” for your sector and environment, then map each source to an owner, an intake channel, and an evaluation SLA you can execute. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)
• Keep evidence that intel was received, evaluated, and either acted on or consciously dispositioned. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)

Threat intelligence sources are a control point that auditors and assessors use to distinguish “we occasionally read security news” from “we maintain current awareness of threat actor activity and respond predictably.” The requirement is narrow but operational: threat information from threat-intelligence sharing sources must be received and evaluated. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)

For a Compliance Officer, CCO, or GRC lead, the fastest path to operationalizing this requirement is to treat it like an intake-and-triage program with explicit ownership and evidence. You need to (1) name your sources, (2) prove the organization receives their outputs, (3) define evaluation criteria and routing, and (4) show what changed as a result (or why nothing changed). That last part is where most programs fail: lots of feeds, little decision-making.

This page gives you requirement-level implementation guidance you can hand to a SOC lead, IR lead, or OT security manager and then test via artifacts. It also highlights common audit hangups: “What sources do you use?”, “How do you know you received the intel?”, “How do you decide what matters?”, and “Show me an example where intel changed your controls.” (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)

Regulatory text

Requirement (excerpt): “Threat information from cybersecurity threat intelligence sharing sources is received and evaluated.” (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)

Operator interpretation:
You must have one or more external threat-intelligence sharing sources, an intake mechanism that reliably brings that information into your organization, and an evaluation process that determines relevance and required action. “Evaluated” means a documented triage decision, not just passive receipt. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)

---

Plain-English interpretation (what this means in practice)

A compliant program answers four questions with evidence:

1. Which sharing sources do you rely on, and why are they relevant to your environment?
2. How is threat intel received (where does it land), and who owns intake?
3. How do you evaluate it (criteria + routing) and decide what to do?
4. What actions happened (or why not), and how do you track closure?

This is an operational requirement. If you cannot show examples of intel flowing into tickets, detections, patch decisions, IR readiness actions, or third-party communications, your “evaluation” will look theoretical. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)

---

Who it applies to (entity and operational context)

Primary applicability: Energy sector organizations and critical infrastructure operators. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)

Operational contexts where this requirement is examined hardest:

• Security operations (SOC) and incident response: turning intel into detection content and response readiness.
• Vulnerability and patch management: prioritizing remediation based on active exploitation signals.
• OT/ICS security: assessing operational impact and compensating controls when patching is constrained.
• Third-party risk management: notifying and coordinating with critical third parties when threats target shared technologies or service providers.

If you have a hybrid IT/OT environment, align ownership across both. Auditors will flag gaps where IT receives intel but OT teams do not see it, or where OT receives intel but there is no evaluation record. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)

---

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

1) Define “threat intelligence sharing sources” for your program

Create a short, approved list of sources that fits your environment. Your list can include:

• Government or sector information-sharing channels
• ISAC/ISAO sharing
• Threat intel vendors
• Coordinated disclosure channels relevant to your technology stack
• Key third parties that share security advisories (cloud providers, critical SaaS, MSSPs)

Decision rule: If a source produces information that could change your detection, response, patching, segmentation, access controls, or third-party actions, treat it as in-scope.

Artifact to produce: Threat Intelligence Sources Register (owner, scope, delivery method, coverage notes). (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)

2) Prove receipt: establish intake channels that are auditable

Pick intake mechanisms you can evidence without heroics:

• Shared mailbox (e.g., threatintel@)
• Ticketing queue
• SIEM/SOAR ingestion
• Portal access with download logs

For each source, document:

• Where it arrives
• Who monitors it
• Backup coverage
• What happens if intake fails (missed emails, expired credentials, feed outage)

Minimum expectation: you can show a consistent trail of “received items” over time, even if many are dispositioned as not relevant. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)

3) Build a simple evaluation workflow (triage + routing + decision)

Write a one-page procedure with:

• Triage criteria (relevance to your assets, credibility, exploitability signals, proximity to your sector)
• Severity categories (your internal categories are fine; keep them consistent)
• Routing rules (SOC for detections, VM team for patch prioritization, OT for plant impact review, IAM for credential threats, TPRM for third-party outreach)
• Disposition codes (e.g., “actioned,” “monitor,” “not applicable,” “duplicate,” “insufficient confidence”)

Operational tip: Require a documented disposition for every item sampled for evidence. Auditors don’t need perfection; they need a working process with traceability. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)

4) Convert relevant intel into actions with owners and closure

Your evaluation must trigger at least one of these actions when warranted:

• Create or tune detections (IOCs, behavioral rules, alert thresholds)
• Block/allow decisions (domains, IPs, hashes) where appropriate and controlled
• Patch/mitigation acceleration or compensating controls
• IR playbook updates (new TTPs, data sources to collect, containment steps)
• Targeted awareness to admins or OT operators
• Third-party outreach (request attestations, status updates, or mitigation confirmation)

Track actions in tickets with a clear link back to the intel item. If you decide “no action,” document why (e.g., not in tech stack, already mitigated, low confidence). (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)

5) Establish governance: ownership, cadence, and reporting

Assign a named role for:

• Threat intel program owner (often SOC manager or IR lead)
• GRC oversight (you, to set expectations and test evidence)
• Stakeholder points of contact (VM, OT, IAM, TPRM)

Create lightweight reporting:

• List of sources and health (active, expired, not monitored)
• Volume by disposition category
• A short list of “intel-driven changes” since the last review

If you use Daydream to manage third-party risk workflows, connect threat intel to third-party records: when intel indicates a widely exploited vulnerability in a critical supplier’s product, Daydream can issue targeted questionnaires, track supplier responses, and keep evidence tied to the third party and the triggering intel. Keep the audit trail in one place. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)

---

Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Auditors will ask for proof of receipt, evaluation, and follow-through. Retain:

1. Threat Intelligence Sources Register (sources, owners, intake method, start date, access control). (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)
2. Threat Intel Intake Procedure / SOP (triage steps, routing rules, disposition codes). (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)
3. System evidence of receipt (mailbox logs, SIEM ingestion logs, portal download history, ticket creation history). (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)
4. Evaluation records (tickets, SOAR cases, analyst notes) showing disposition and rationale. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)
5. Action evidence (change tickets for detection rules, patch prioritization notes, compensating control approvals, third-party outreach threads). (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)
6. Periodic review evidence (meeting notes, metrics snapshots, decisions to add/remove sources). (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)

---

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

Use these as your internal test script:

• “What are your threat intelligence sources? Why those?”
  Hangup: no rationale, or sources are named but not actually monitored. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)

• “Show me how intel is received.”
  Hangup: it goes to a personal inbox; no continuity coverage. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)

• “How do you evaluate relevance and credibility?”
  Hangup: “analyst judgment” with no documented criteria or disposition categories. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)

• “Provide examples where intel changed your posture.”
  Hangup: no linkage from intel item to action ticket; teams did work but didn’t document traceability. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)

• “How do OT teams receive and evaluate intel?” (if applicable)
  Hangup: IT-only workflow; OT is outside intake and routing. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)

---

Frequent implementation mistakes (and how to avoid them)

1. Collecting feeds without evaluation capacity
   Fix: start with fewer sources and a consistent triage workflow; expand only when you can evidence evaluation. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)

2. No “closed loop” to operations
   Fix: require an action ticket or a documented “no action” disposition for items deemed relevant. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)

3. Unowned intake channels
   Fix: assign primary and backup owners, and document handoffs for coverage gaps. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)

4. Third-party blind spot
   Fix: add a routing rule: if intel affects critical third-party products/services, notify TPRM and create a third-party follow-up record (Daydream can centralize this). (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)

5. Evidence scattered across tools
   Fix: standardize on a “system of record” (ticketing/SOAR) for evaluation decisions; link out to supporting logs rather than relying on screenshots. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)

---

Enforcement context and risk implications

No public enforcement cases were provided for this requirement in the source catalog. Practically, the risk shows up as operational exposure: missed exploitation signals, slow prioritization of mitigations, inconsistent response posture, and weak third-party coordination. In assessments aligned to C2M2, the common failure mode is “receipt without evaluation,” which reads as a paper control. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)

---

Practical execution plan (30/60/90-day)

Because the source material does not specify timelines, treat these phases as a planning aid you can tailor to your environment. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)

First 30 days (stand up the minimum viable control)

• Inventory current sources (even informal ones) and consolidate into a Sources Register. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)
• Choose official intake channels and assign owners and backups. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)
• Publish a one-page triage SOP with disposition codes and routing. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)
• Start capturing evaluation evidence in tickets or SOAR cases. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)

By 60 days (make it repeatable and auditable)

• Add stakeholder routing rules (VM, OT, IAM, TPRM) and test them with sample intel items. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)
• Define what “relevant” means for your asset inventory (tech stack mapping or crown-jewel alignment). (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)
• Produce a first management report: sources health + intel dispositions + examples of actions taken. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)

By 90 days (optimize and integrate with risk workflows)

• Confirm closed-loop actions are tracked to completion and are searchable by intel item. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)
• Add QA sampling: periodically select recent intel items and verify disposition quality and evidence completeness. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)
• Integrate third-party workflows: for supplier-implicating intel, track outreach, responses, and compensating controls in your third-party risk system (Daydream can hold the thread and artifacts). (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)

Frequently Asked Questions

What counts as a “threat intelligence sharing source” under this requirement?

Any external channel that provides actionable cybersecurity threat information relevant to your environment can qualify, as long as you can show it is received and evaluated. Your key burden is proving intake and triage, not naming a specific industry feed. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)

Do we need a paid threat intel subscription to meet the requirement?

The text does not require paid sources. You do need sources that are relevant and a process that reliably receives and evaluates what they publish. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)

What does “evaluated” mean in an audit?

“Evaluated” should result in a documented disposition and, when warranted, an action with an owner (detection update, mitigation, outreach, or a recorded “no action” rationale). Passive receipt is usually not enough. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)

How do we show evidence without overwhelming the SOC with paperwork?

Make the ticket or SOAR case the system of record, and keep the evaluation fields minimal (source, summary, relevance, disposition, routed team, action link). Evidence should be a byproduct of operations. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)

How should third-party risk tie into threat intel evaluation?

Add a routing rule for supplier-impacting intel and create a tracked follow-up with the third party for status and mitigations. Tools like Daydream can keep communications, attestations, and closure evidence tied to the third party and the triggering intel item. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)

What if we receive high volumes of low-quality intel?

Reduce sources, tighten relevance criteria, and document “not applicable/low confidence” dispositions so you can prove evaluation without creating noise-driven work. Expand only after the triage workflow stays stable. (Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model v2.1)