Safeguard 13.7: Deploy a Host-Based Intrusion Prevention Solution

To meet the safeguard 13.7: deploy a host-based intrusion prevention solution requirement, you must implement host-based intrusion prevention (HIPS) on in-scope endpoints and servers, centrally manage it, and prove it is operating (policies applied, alerts generated, responses tracked). Your fastest path is to standardize an approved HIPS tool, define enforcement modes, and retain recurring evidence of coverage and tuning. ¹

Key takeaways:

• Treat 13.7 as an “agent-on-host + managed policy + monitored alerts” control, not a one-time install. ¹
• Scope first: you cannot defend what you cannot inventory, so tie deployment to your endpoint/server inventory and ownership model. ¹
• Audit readiness depends on evidence that HIPS is enforced and maintained, not screenshots of a console. ¹

Safeguard 13.7 focuses on stopping malicious behavior on the host itself by deploying a host-based intrusion prevention solution (HIPS). Operationally, this means more than installing an endpoint agent. You need a prevention capability that can block or contain suspicious activity, a centralized way to configure and update protections, and a process to review and respond to what the tool detects. ¹

For a Compliance Officer, CCO, or GRC lead, the main challenge is translating “deploy HIPS” into an auditable, repeatable control. Examiners will test whether deployment is complete for defined in-scope systems, whether exceptions are controlled, and whether the program is tuned so it reduces risk rather than generating noise that gets ignored. ¹

This page gives requirement-level guidance you can hand to security operations: scoping decisions, minimum configuration expectations, evidence to retain, and the operational rhythm that proves the control works. It also highlights the most common implementation mistakes that cause “paper compliance” and how to avoid them.

Regulatory text

Requirement (framework expectation): “CIS Controls v8 safeguard 13.7 implementation expectation (Deploy a Host-Based Intrusion Prevention Solution).” ¹

Operator interpretation of what you must do:

• Deploy a HIPS capability on hosts that matter to your risk posture (endpoints and servers in scope).
• Manage it as a security control: standard policies, updates, monitoring, and exceptions.
• Prove operation through recurring evidence capture tied to the control, not ad hoc screenshots. ¹

Plain-English interpretation

HIPS is prevention on the endpoint/server. You are putting a control on the host that can detect suspicious activity and block it, based on rules, behavior, or exploit techniques. If your tooling is “detection-only” and your organization never enables prevention actions (block, isolate, kill process), you should expect pushback during an assessment of safeguard 13.7. ¹

Who it applies to

Entity types: Enterprises and technology organizations adopting CIS Controls v8 as a security baseline. ¹

Operational contexts where 13.7 is usually in scope:

• Corporate endpoints (Windows/macOS/Linux laptops and desktops)
• Server fleets (on-prem and cloud VMs)
• Persistent VDI and managed workstations
• High-risk engineering/admin workstations (“privileged endpoints”)
• Systems supporting regulated data, critical business services, or production operations (as defined in your system classification)

Where scope disputes happen in practice:

• Ephemeral compute (autoscaled nodes, short-lived containers): you still need prevention, but the implementation may be image-based controls plus runtime protection on the node/host. Document your approach and map it to the requirement intent. ¹
• BYOD: if you allow unmanaged devices onto sensitive resources, define whether HIPS is required (via MDM enrollment) or whether access is restricted to reduce risk.

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

1) Define “HIPS” for your environment (decision + documentation)

Create a one-page control definition that answers:

• What product(s) count as HIPS in your program (endpoint security agent, EDR with prevention, host firewall with IPS features, workload protection agent).
• Which prevention actions are required (block/quarantine/isolate) versus optional.
• What “healthy” means (agent installed, running, current policy, recent heartbeat).
  This becomes your assessment anchor and prevents tool sprawl arguments later. ¹

2) Establish scope using your asset inventory

Build the deployment target list from authoritative sources (CMDB, endpoint management, cloud inventory). Minimum scoping fields you need:

• Asset ID/hostname
• Owner/business unit
• Environment (prod/non-prod)
• OS/platform
• Connectivity pattern (always-on, intermittent, offline)
• Criticality/data sensitivity tier

Then define in-scope populations (for example: “all corporate-managed endpoints and all servers in production”). Avoid vague scope like “critical assets” unless you can deterministically list them. ¹

3) Standardize deployment mechanics

Pick a deployment method per platform:

• Endpoints: MDM/UEM, software management, golden image, or enrollment package
• Servers: configuration management, bake into images, cloud-init, or agent install via CI/CD for base images

Hard requirement for auditability: you need to show coverage (installed where required) and enforcement (policies applied). Align this with your endpoint management and IAM ownership model so exceptions can’t silently proliferate. ¹

4) Configure baseline prevention policies (start conservative, then ratchet)

Define baseline policies by host class:

• User endpoints: exploit prevention, malicious behavior blocking, ransomware protections where supported
• Servers: tighter change control, allow-listing where feasible, exclusions only by documented need
• Admin workstations: stricter policy, higher telemetry retention, aggressive blocking for known bad behaviors

Implementation tips that reduce friction:

• Start with “block high-confidence” categories first, then move to more aggressive rules after tuning.
• Require justification, approval, and expiry for exclusions. Exclusions without expiry become permanent risk acceptances by accident.

5) Centralize logging, alerting, and response

A deployed HIPS tool that no one monitors degrades into shelfware. Set up:

• Central console access control (least privilege, admin actions logged)
• Alert routing to the SOC or ticketing queue
• A triage runbook: severity definitions, containment steps, and escalation paths
• A feedback loop for tuning (false positives, performance impacts)

Tie alerts to incident management so you can prove response occurred. ¹

6) Define exception handling and compensating controls

You will have systems where HIPS cannot run (legacy OS, vendor-managed appliances, operational technology constraints). Your exception standard should require:

• Business justification
• Risk acceptance owner
• Compensating controls (network isolation, application allow-listing at another layer, enhanced monitoring)
• Target date to remediate or retire

This is where many programs fail audits: “we can’t install the agent” is not a control; it’s a risk statement that needs governance.

7) Operationalize recurring evidence capture (make audits boring)

CIS mapping guidance in your provided data emphasizes documenting control operation and recurring evidence capture. Translate that into a monthly or quarterly evidence packet that includes:

• Coverage reports by asset class
• Policy compliance and enforcement mode
• Alert summaries and sample investigations
• Exception register with approvals and expirations ¹

If you use Daydream to manage control mappings, assign safeguard 13.7 to a control owner, schedule recurring evidence tasks, and keep artifacts tied to the requirement so assessments don’t turn into a document scavenger hunt. ¹

Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Keep artifacts that prove design, coverage, and operation:

Design evidence

• Control narrative for safeguard 13.7 (what counts as HIPS, scope statement) ¹
• Standard(s): endpoint security standard, server baseline standard
• Exception procedure and risk acceptance workflow

Coverage evidence

• Exported device inventory with HIPS agent status fields
• Deployment policy/configuration from MDM/config management
• Report showing in-scope vs covered systems, with documented gaps and remediation tickets

Operational evidence

• Policy configuration snapshots (versioned), including prevention settings
• Update/definition status reporting (proof protections are current)
• Alert logs and tickets showing triage and closure
• Sample investigation records (what happened, what was blocked, lessons learned)
• Exclusion list with approvals and expiry dates

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

Expect these lines of questioning:

1. “Show me your scope.” Auditors want a list, not a paragraph. If you cannot enumerate in-scope endpoints/servers, you cannot prove deployment.
2. “Is this prevention or detection?” If you run EDR in detect-only, document why and what prevention controls exist elsewhere, but understand the requirement language points to prevention. ¹
3. “How do you handle exceptions?” Missing expiry and owner approval is a frequent finding.
4. “Prove it works.” They will ask for examples: an alert, a block action, a ticket, and evidence of follow-up actions.
5. “Who can disable it?” Console and local tamper protection controls often get scrutinized.

Frequent implementation mistakes and how to avoid them

Mistake	Why it fails	How to avoid it
Treating “agent installed” as compliance	Installation does not prove prevention settings or monitoring	Require evidence of policy enforcement mode and alert routing 1
No authoritative scope list	You can’t measure coverage	Derive scope from asset inventory and name the data sources 1
Permanent exclusions	Creates silent blind spots	Add approval + expiry + review cadence; track exclusions like risk acceptances
Rolling out aggressive blocking without tuning	Business disruption leads to disablement	Start with high-confidence blocks, expand after operational validation
Console access too broad	Admin misuse can disable protections	Implement RBAC, MFA, logging, and change control for policy edits

Enforcement context and risk implications

No public enforcement cases were provided in the source catalog for this requirement, so you should treat safeguard 13.7 primarily as a control expectation under CIS Controls v8 rather than a directly enforced regulation in this dataset. ¹

That said, the operational risk is straightforward: without host-based prevention, attackers that reach an endpoint or server can execute payloads, escalate privileges, and persist more easily. From a governance lens, the biggest compliance risk is the evidence gap: teams often deploy a tool but cannot produce repeatable proof of coverage, enforcement, and response. ¹

Practical 30/60/90-day execution plan

First 30 days (baseline the control)

• Assign a control owner and publish a safeguard 13.7 control narrative and scope statement. ¹
• Select the approved HIPS technology stack per platform and document what counts as “HIPS” internally.
• Produce the first in-scope asset list and identify coverage gaps.
• Stand up centralized console access controls and basic alert routing to the SOC/ticketing system.

By 60 days (deploy + enforce)

• Complete deployment to the highest-priority host classes (admin workstations, production servers, corporate endpoints).
• Implement baseline prevention policies and tamper protection.
• Establish the exception register and require approvals + expirations.
• Run a tuning cycle: review false positives, create documented exclusions with owners, and update runbooks.

By 90 days (operate + evidence)

• Reach steady-state reporting: coverage, policy compliance, alert trends, and exceptions.
• Demonstrate end-to-end operation with sampled alerts mapped to incident tickets.
• Schedule recurring evidence collection aligned to your assessment cadence; track it in your GRC workflow (Daydream or equivalent) so artifacts remain tied to safeguard 13.7. ¹

Frequently Asked Questions

Does an EDR agent satisfy safeguard 13.7 if we run it in detection-only mode?

Detection-only is hard to defend under a requirement explicitly framed as “intrusion prevention.” If you must run detect-only, document the rationale, approvals, and what other controls provide prevention, then plan a roadmap to enable prevention actions. ¹

What systems should be in scope first?

Start with corporate-managed endpoints, admin workstations, and production servers because they are common paths to privilege and persistence. Use your asset inventory to define scope in a way you can measure and report. ¹

How do we handle legacy servers where the agent can’t be installed?

Treat them as formal exceptions with compensating controls and an owner-approved risk acceptance. Track an exit plan (upgrade, isolate, retire) and set an expiry so the exception gets revisited.

What evidence is most persuasive in an audit?

Coverage reports tied to an authoritative inventory, policy enforcement settings, and a small set of alert-to-ticket examples that show triage and closure. Keep exceptions and exclusions in a register with approvals and expiry dates. ¹

How do we prevent teams from disabling the HIPS agent during incidents?

Restrict who can change policies, enable tamper protection, and log all admin actions in the console. Require change control for policy changes outside emergency procedures, and review admin activity as part of security monitoring.

We’re cloud-native. Does this apply to containers?

Safeguard 13.7 is host-based, so map it to the worker nodes/VMs and any persistent hosts that run workloads. If your workloads are ephemeral, document how you achieve equivalent prevention through node agents and hardened images, and retain evidence that enforcement is active. ¹

Footnotes

1. CIS Controls v8; CIS Controls Navigator v8