Safeguard 17.2: Establish and Maintain Contact Information for Reporting Security Incidents

Safeguard 17.2 requires you to establish and maintain accurate, easy-to-find contact information so employees and other stakeholders can report suspected security incidents quickly through approved channels. Operationalize it by publishing a single “how to report an incident” contact path, backing it with ownership, verification cadence, and evidence that it stays current. ¹

Key takeaways:

• Maintain a clear, always-available incident reporting contact path (internal and, when needed, external). ¹
• Assign an owner, define update triggers, and run a recurring verification so contact details do not drift. ¹
• Keep audit-ready evidence: published contacts, review records, and test results showing reports route to the right team. ¹

Safeguard 17.2: establish and maintain contact information for reporting security incidents requirement sounds simple, but it fails in predictable ways: buried intranet pages, shared inboxes no one monitors, stale phone trees, and unclear “after-hours” escalation. When a user sees a suspicious email, a third party reports compromise indicators, or a monitoring tool flags a critical alert, you need one thing to be true: the reporter can reach the right security response function fast, using a channel your organization actually monitors and triages.

For a Compliance Officer, CCO, or GRC lead, the fastest path to a defensible implementation is to treat this as a requirement-level control with (1) documented ownership, (2) defined reporting channels, (3) published instructions that are easy to find, (4) maintenance triggers, and (5) periodic verification. Your evidence should prove two things: the contact information exists and people can use it successfully to get an incident into your response workflow. ²

This page gives you an operator’s runbook: who should own the requirement, the minimum set of reporting channels, how to publish and keep information current, what to retain for audits and customer diligence, and a practical execution plan you can start immediately. ¹

Regulatory text

Framework requirement (excerpted from provided source): “CIS Controls v8 safeguard 17.2 implementation expectation (Establish and Maintain Contact Information for Reporting Security Incidents).” ¹

Operator interpretation: You must (a) define how security incidents are reported to your organization, (b) make that contact information accessible to the right audiences, and (c) keep it current over time through an owned maintenance process. Your proof burden is operational: contact details must route to a monitored intake that leads to triage and response, not a dead end. ¹

Plain-English interpretation (what the requirement really means)

• People need a known, trusted way to report suspicious activity or confirmed incidents.
• The organization needs a reliable intake (email, portal, hotline, ticket entry, or on-call path) that is monitored and tied to incident handling.
• The organization must maintain those details: changes in staff, org structure, tools, or outsourcing cannot break the reporting path. ²

Who it applies to

Entity scope: Any enterprise or technology organization implementing CIS Controls v8. ¹

Operational contexts where auditors and customers care most:

• Central security team or virtual SOC receives reports from employees and IT.
• Outsourced monitoring or incident response where a third party provides a helpdesk/SOC function.
• Customer-facing or partner-facing environments where external parties may need to report suspected compromise impacting shared data or services.
• Distributed workforces and high-turnover environments where contact drift is common. ¹

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

Step 1: Write a control card (design the control so it can run)

Create a short, operator-facing “control card” for safeguard 17.2 with:

• Objective: Provide accurate reporting contacts for security incidents.
• Owner: Named role (not a team name), plus backup.
• Audiences: Employees, contractors, key third parties (as applicable), customers (as applicable).
• Reporting channels: Primary and alternate.
• Triggers: Org changes, tool changes, outsourcing changes, M&A, rebrand/domain change.
• Cadence: Recurring verification and after-change verification.
• Exception rules: What happens if a channel is down or after-hours coverage changes. ¹

Practical note: Put this under your GRC control library, but make it readable by the incident response manager who has to operate it.

Step 2: Define the minimum viable “reporting contact path”

Keep it simple. A defensible baseline includes:

• Primary intake: A monitored channel that creates a trackable record (ticket, case, or incident).
• After-hours path: On-call contact or paging route for high-severity issues.
• Alternate intake: A fallback if primary email/portal is unavailable. ¹

Decide what “report a security incident” means for your org. Include at least: suspected phishing, lost/stolen device, suspected credential compromise, malware alert, unauthorized access, and sensitive data exposure.

Step 3: Publish the contact information where people will actually look

Publish in locations aligned to your audiences:

• Internal: Intranet security page, employee handbook, acceptable use policy appendix, corporate directory entry for “Security Incident Reporting,” and your standard onboarding materials.
• IT-facing: Runbooks in ITSM/ops knowledge base and alerting tool references.
• Third party-facing (as needed): Contract addenda, third party security requirements, or partner portal guidance when those parties are expected to report. ²

Make it scannable:

• “If you suspect a security incident: contact X / submit Y / call Z after hours.”
• “What to include” (time, system, screenshot, email headers where relevant).
• “What not to do” (don’t forward suspected malware to large lists; don’t investigate on your own if it risks evidence destruction).

Step 4: Integrate reporting channels into incident handling intake

This is where many programs fail: the contact details exist, but the messages go nowhere.

Minimum operational wiring:

• Email to case creation: If you use an inbox, ensure messages create a case/ticket automatically or are triaged under a defined SLA by a monitored team mailbox.
• Portal/ticket: Ensure the “security incident” category routes to the incident response queue.
• Hotline/on-call: Ensure the number/pager is owned, tested, and has an escalation path. ¹

If you outsource monitoring/IR, document who receives first contact, how they notify you, and what constitutes an escalation.

Step 5: Establish maintenance and verification (prove it stays current)

Define two verification modes:

• Event-driven: Any time the owner, email domain, IR vendor, on-call tool, or org structure changes.
• Recurring health check: A scheduled review where you validate that every published location still has correct details and that messages route correctly. ¹

Verification should include a functional test:

• Send a test report through each channel.
• Confirm it lands in the right queue.
• Confirm the right people are notified.
• Confirm you can produce the resulting record. ¹

Step 6: Define your minimum evidence bundle (make audits easy)

For each execution cycle (and after material changes), retain:

• Screenshot/PDF export of the published “report an incident” page(s) and the last-updated timestamp.
• Control card with owner, cadence, triggers, and channels.
• Test records (email sent, ticket/case created, routing proof, on-call acknowledgement).
• Change log showing updates to contact details and approvals.
• Training/onboarding reference showing employees are directed to the reporting path. ¹

Store evidence in a named, durable location with a consistent folder structure. If you use Daydream, link the control to its evidence tasks so ownership, due dates, and artifacts stay tied to the requirement over time.

Required evidence and artifacts to retain (audit-ready checklist)

Artifact	What it proves	Owner
Safeguard 17.2 control card	Defined ownership, cadence, triggers, and procedure	GRC / Security Governance
Published contact locations (exports/screenshots)	Accessibility and clarity of reporting path	Security Ops + GRC
Routing test results 1	The channel works end-to-end	Security Ops / IR
On-call roster/process reference	After-hours reporting is supported	Security Ops
Change approvals / update log	Contact info is maintained, not ad hoc	Control owner
Ticket/case samples (sanitized)	Reports become actionable work items	Security Ops
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Common exam/audit questions and hangups

Expect questions like:

• “Where is incident reporting contact information published for employees?” ¹
• “How do contractors or key third parties report security incidents?” ¹
• “Who owns the contact info and how do you keep it current?” ¹
• “Show evidence you tested the reporting channels.” ¹
• “What happens after-hours?” ¹

Hangups that slow audits:

• Multiple conflicting contact points across documents.
• Shared inbox with no documented monitoring coverage.
• No proof of periodic verification; only a policy statement.

Frequent implementation mistakes (and how to avoid them)

1. Publishing an inbox that nobody monitors.
   Fix: assign primary/backup triage, define expectations, and test with real routing evidence. ¹

2. Burying instructions in a long policy.
   Fix: create a short “Report a security incident” page and link it from onboarding, ITSM, and the intranet homepage security tile. ²

3. No after-hours path.
   Fix: document an on-call escalation route for high-severity reports and test it. ¹

4. Stale contacts after org changes or outsourcing.
   Fix: add change triggers to your control card and make updates part of offboarding, vendor transition, and domain changes. ¹

5. No evidence bundle.
   Fix: define the minimum evidence once, then collect it every cycle; automate reminders in your GRC workflow (Daydream fits well here). ¹

Enforcement context and risk implications

No public enforcement cases were provided in the supplied source catalog for this safeguard, so you should treat this as a control expectation tied to auditability and operational resilience rather than a cited enforcement pattern in this write-up. ¹

Risk implications are straightforward:

• Reports that do not reach responders fast create avoidable dwell time and complicate containment.
• Unclear channels drive shadow reporting via informal chats, which reduces traceability and weakens incident records needed for executive decisions, customer notifications, and post-incident reviews. ¹

Practical 30/60/90-day execution plan

First 30 days (stand up the minimum viable control)

• Assign a control owner and backup; draft the safeguard 17.2 control card. ¹
• Decide primary, alternate, and after-hours reporting channels; confirm monitoring coverage. ¹
• Publish a single “Report a Security Incident” page internally; link it from onboarding and ITSM knowledge base. ²
• Run an end-to-end routing test for each channel; capture evidence. ¹

Days 31–60 (reduce drift and make it auditable)

• Add event-driven triggers to change management and offboarding checklists (owner change, mailbox change, IR vendor change). ¹
• Create the minimum evidence bundle template and storage location; standardize naming. ¹
• Align with third party management: document whether key third parties have a reporting path and where it is communicated. ¹

Days 61–90 (operationalize and harden)

• Run the first recurring control health check; verify every published location is current and consistent. ¹
• Validate after-hours escalation with an on-call acknowledgement test; keep proof. ¹
• Track findings to closure with owners and due dates; retain remediation evidence. ¹

Ongoing: repeat verification on your defined cadence, plus after every material change.

Frequently Asked Questions

Do we need a phone hotline to meet safeguard 17.2?

CIS v8 safeguard 17.2 focuses on establishing and maintaining contact information for reporting incidents, not mandating a specific channel. Use channels that your organization can monitor and triage reliably, and keep evidence that they work. ¹

Can we use a shared mailbox like security@company.com?

Yes, if it is monitored, has documented ownership/backup coverage, and feeds into a trackable workflow (case or ticket). Test it and retain the routing proof as evidence. ¹

How do we handle third parties who might need to report incidents?

Decide which third parties are expected to report to you (for example, outsourced IT, cloud providers, or processors), then provide them a clear reporting path in contracts, onboarding, or a partner portal. Keep the published contact point consistent with internal guidance. ¹

What evidence do auditors usually accept for “maintain”?

A record of periodic review plus a functional test is stronger than a policy statement. Keep screenshots/exports of published contacts, review sign-off, and sample tickets created by test submissions. ¹

We have multiple business units. Do we need separate contacts for each?

You can centralize intake if routing is reliable, or publish unit-specific contacts if your operating model requires it. Avoid conflicting guidance by documenting the primary path and how it triages to each unit. ¹

How does Daydream help with safeguard 17.2?

Daydream is useful when this requirement fails due to missing ownership and missing evidence. Track the control card, verification tasks, and the minimum evidence bundle in one place so you can show consistent operation during audits and customer diligence. ¹

Footnotes

1. CIS Controls v8

2. CIS Controls Navigator v8