Safeguard 7.6: Perform Automated Vulnerability Scans of Externally-Exposed Enterprise Assets

Safeguard 7.6 requires you to run automated vulnerability scans against your externally exposed enterprise assets (internet-facing IPs, domains, cloud services, and remote access entry points) on a defined cadence, then track remediation to verified closure with auditable evidence. Operationalize it by inventorying external attack surface, scanning with authenticated profiles where possible, prioritizing by severity and exposure, and proving fixes.

Key takeaways:

  • Scope and continuously update your external attack surface, then scan it automatically on a documented schedule.
  • Treat findings as tracked remediation work, with defined SLAs, exceptions, and validation scans.
  • Keep a tight evidence bundle per scan cycle: scope, configuration, results, tickets, retest proof, and governance sign-off.

“Externally exposed” assets are the fastest path from “unknown vulnerability” to “material incident,” because attackers do not need internal access to find and exploit them. Safeguard 7.6 in CIS Controls v8 focuses on a simple operational expectation: you must routinely and automatically scan what the internet can reach, and you must act on what you find 1.

For a Compliance Officer, CCO, or GRC lead, the hard part is rarely buying a scanner. The hard part is getting clean scope (what counts as external), making scans reliable (credentials, rate limits, cloud edge cases), and proving sustained operation (evidence, tickets, retests, exceptions). Auditors and customer due diligence teams typically look for control ownership, scan cadence, remediation governance, and proof that “critical” findings don’t sit open indefinitely.

This page translates Safeguard 7.6 into a requirement you can assign, run, measure, and evidence. It includes a step-by-step runbook, an evidence checklist, common audit questions, and a practical execution plan you can start immediately.

Requirement: safeguard 7.6: perform automated vulnerability scans of externally-exposed enterprise assets requirement

Objective: Detect and remediate known vulnerabilities on internet-facing enterprise assets through automated scanning and tracked remediation, with evidence that the control runs as designed 1.

Plain-English interpretation

You must:

  1. Know which assets are externally reachable (or could become externally reachable through misconfiguration),
  2. Run automated vulnerability scans against them on a defined schedule and after meaningful change,
  3. Triage results, fix issues, and validate the fix with a rescan,
  4. Keep evidence that proves the scans ran, what they covered, what they found, and how findings were closed 2.

This is an operational control. A policy that says “we scan” without proof of execution and remediation will not satisfy serious diligence expectations.

Regulatory text

Framework requirement (provided excerpt): “CIS Controls v8 safeguard 7.6 implementation expectation (Perform Automated Vulnerability Scans of Externally-Exposed Enterprise Assets).” 1

What the operator must do: Implement an automated scanning process specifically for externally exposed enterprise assets, run it on an established cadence, and integrate results into remediation workflows so you can demonstrate risk reduction over time 2.

Who it applies to

Entity scope

  • Any enterprise or technology organization that operates internet-facing systems, whether hosted on-prem, in cloud environments, or delivered via third parties 1.

Operational scope (what counts as “externally exposed”)

Include assets reachable from the public internet or untrusted networks, such as:

  • Public IP ranges, domains, and subdomains you own
  • Internet-facing web apps, APIs, and gateways
  • Cloud assets with public exposure (public load balancers, storage endpoints, public Kubernetes ingress)
  • Remote access entry points (VPN portals, VDI, SSH/RDP exposure, SSO endpoints)
  • Third-party hosted services where you control configuration that affects exposure (for example, SaaS tenant settings, WAF/CDN origin exposure)

A practical scoping rule: if an external attacker can connect to it directly, it belongs in the external scan scope.

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

Step 1: Assign control ownership and define success criteria

Create a control “card” (a one-page runbook) with:

  • Control owner: Security Operations, Vulnerability Management, or Infrastructure Security
  • Accountable executive: CIO/CISO (or delegated security leader)
  • Scope statement: “Externally exposed enterprise assets”
  • Cadence: how often scans run, plus required scans after significant changes (new internet-facing service, DNS changes, firewall/WAF changes)
  • Severity handling: how you prioritize and escalate
  • Exceptions: who can approve, how long they last, compensating controls required
    This aligns with the operational expectation in CIS Controls v8 and avoids “orphan controls” that no one runs 2.

Step 2: Build and maintain the external asset inventory (attack surface)

You cannot scan what you do not know exists. Create an authoritative scope list that merges:

  • DNS zone exports and certificate transparency monitoring outputs (where available)
  • Cloud inventory (subscriptions/accounts/projects) filtered for public exposure
  • IP allocations (owned ranges, hosted ranges, CDN/WAF ranges that map to your origins)
  • Web app and API catalogs from engineering

Operator tip: Make scope management a workflow. Every new internet-facing service should trigger “add to external scanning scope” as a launch requirement.

Step 3: Select and configure automated scanning

Minimum configuration checklist:

  • Scanner coverage: network and web vulnerability scanning for public targets
  • Authenticated scanning where feasible: especially for internet-facing hosts you manage; unauthenticated-only scans miss patches and local misconfigurations
  • Safe scanning settings: avoid denial-of-service conditions; coordinate with SRE on rate limits
  • Environment tagging: production vs non-production, business owner, data sensitivity
  • Output integration: export findings into your ticketing system and metrics dashboard

Step 4: Define the scanning cadence and triggers (and document them)

Set:

  • Recurring scans: routine automated runs against the full external scope
  • Triggered scans: after deployments, firewall rule changes, WAF/CDN configuration changes, new DNS records, new public endpoints, or major patch cycles

Document the cadence and triggers in the control card and your vulnerability management standard. CIS is testing that you do this as an operating practice, not an ad hoc activity 2.

Step 5: Triage findings and create remediation tickets

Create a consistent triage workflow:

  1. De-duplicate and validate: confirm asset ownership and whether the finding is real for that endpoint
  2. Classify: vulnerability type, severity, exploitability context (public exposure), affected system owner
  3. Ticket: generate a ticket with required fields (asset, finding, severity, due date, fix guidance, retest requirement)
  4. Escalate: define escalation rules for critical/high findings on production internet-facing assets

Hangup to preempt: “We sent an email to the app team” is not remediation tracking. Use a system of record (ticketing) with status history.

Step 6: Remediate with accountable closure

Remediation expectations you should enforce:

  • Fix by patching, configuration change, compensating control (WAF rule), or decommissioning exposure
  • Require evidence of closure: patch record, config change record, or change ticket plus technical validation
  • Require retest: rescan or targeted verification that the vulnerability no longer appears

Step 7: Run control health checks (prove sustained operation)

On a recurring basis, review:

  • Scan job success rates and coverage drift (new assets, missed assets)
  • Open finding aging, exception counts, overdue remediation
  • High-risk patterns (recurring misconfigurations, vulnerable components in CI/CD)

Track improvement items to closure. This is the difference between “we have a scanner” and “we run a control” 2.

Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Maintain an evidence bundle per scan cycle. Auditors typically want reproducible proof, not screenshots alone.

Minimum evidence bundle 2:

  • Scope evidence: list of externally exposed assets in-scope at scan time (export or report)
  • Scanner configuration: scan policy/profile, authenticated settings (if applicable), and exclusions with rationale
  • Execution logs: job start/end times, targets scanned, failures/timeouts
  • Results: findings report with severity and affected assets
  • Remediation tracking: tickets created from findings, assignment, due dates, status changes
  • Closure evidence: patch/change records plus retest output showing resolution
  • Exceptions: risk acceptance approvals, compensating controls, expiry/review dates
  • Governance: periodic metrics report and meeting notes (VM review board, security ops review)

Retention location: a named system of record (GRC repository, ticketing system, or evidence vault) with consistent naming. Daydream can help by turning this into a repeatable control packet with pre-defined evidence requests and a standard “minimum bundle” checklist so teams stop reinventing evidence collection each cycle.

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

Expect these questions from customers, internal audit, and assessors mapping to CIS:

  • “Show me your current list of externally exposed assets and how it stays current.”
  • “What is your scan cadence for internet-facing assets? Who approves changes to cadence?”
  • “Are scans authenticated? If not, why, and what compensating steps exist?”
  • “Show the last scan results and the corresponding remediation tickets.”
  • “Pick a critical/high finding from last quarter. Walk me from detection to verified closure.”
  • “How do you handle third-party hosted internet-facing systems where you own configuration?”

Common hangup: teams can produce a scan report but cannot prove that every externally exposed asset is in scope, or that findings were tracked and retested.

Frequent implementation mistakes (and how to avoid them)

Mistake Why it fails Avoid it by
Scanning only known web apps, ignoring IPs, portals, and cloud edge Leaves blind spots attackers find first Build scope from DNS + cloud public exposure + IP allocations
No documented cadence or triggers Control becomes “best effort” Put cadence and triggers in a control card and VM standard
Treating findings as “FYI” No closure proof Require tickets, due dates, and retest evidence
Too many permanent exceptions Normalizes risk Set exception expiry and require compensating controls
Ignoring scan failures/timeouts False comfort Track scan job health and coverage drift as KPIs
Mixing internal and external scan evidence Confuses assessors Separate control evidence: external-only scope and results for 7.6

Enforcement context and risk implications

No specific public enforcement cases were provided in the source catalog for this requirement. Practically, externally exposed vulnerabilities are a common pathway for security incidents, and auditors treat weak vulnerability management on internet-facing assets as a high-signal control gap. Your risk is less about “missing a scan” and more about failing to detect and remediate an exploitable exposure you could have found with routine scanning 2.

Practical 30/60/90-day execution plan

First 30 days: Stand up the control and prove first run

  • Assign owner and publish the control card (scope, cadence, triggers, exceptions).
  • Produce the initial external asset scope list (DNS, cloud public endpoints, IP ranges).
  • Configure the scanner and run an initial scan against the full external scope.
  • Create tickets for findings and define retest requirements.
  • Set up the evidence bundle folder/structure and store the first cycle artifacts.

By 60 days: Stabilize operations and remediation governance

  • Reduce scan failures and close coverage gaps (missed assets, bad targets, stale DNS).
  • Implement authenticated scanning for manageable external hosts where feasible.
  • Establish a recurring triage meeting and an escalation path for high-risk findings.
  • Formalize exception workflow (approval, expiry, compensating controls).
  • Produce a management report showing findings opened vs closed and aging.

By 90 days: Make it durable and audit-ready

  • Add change-based triggers (new public endpoints automatically added to scope).
  • Add control health checks (coverage drift, scan success, overdue items).
  • Test evidence retrieval: pick a finding and compile the full chain (detect → ticket → fix → retest).
  • Run a tabletop with Security + SRE to validate ownership during incidents tied to external exposures.
  • If you use Daydream, convert the control card and evidence bundle into a repeatable assessment workflow so evidence collection is consistent across quarters and teams.

Frequently Asked Questions

What exactly counts as “externally exposed” for Safeguard 7.6?

Treat any asset reachable from the public internet as externally exposed: public IPs, domains/subdomains, web apps, APIs, VPN/SSO portals, and cloud services with public endpoints. If an unauthenticated external user can connect to it, include it in scope 2.

Do we need authenticated scans to meet this safeguard?

CIS 7.6 focuses on automated scans of externally exposed assets; authenticated scanning is a practical way to improve accuracy and depth for hosts you manage. If you cannot authenticate, document why, and add compensating verification steps 2.

How do we handle externally exposed assets run by a third party?

If the third party hosts it but you control configuration that affects exposure, include it in your external scanning program and track remediation with the third party. If you cannot scan directly, require equivalent scan evidence and remediation reporting contractually.

Can we use multiple tools (ASM + vulnerability scanner + WAF reports)?

Yes, and it often works better. Keep one authoritative scope list, document which tool covers which asset classes, and ensure findings funnel into a single remediation workflow with consistent evidence.

What evidence do auditors typically reject?

Standalone screenshots and undated exports without scope context commonly fail. Keep machine-generated reports/logs, scope-at-time-of-scan, ticket history, and retest output that proves closure.

How do we prevent scope drift as engineering moves fast?

Add a launch gate: new internet-facing endpoints must be registered in the app/service catalog and automatically added to the external scan scope. Pair that with a recurring reconciliation between DNS/cloud inventory and the scanner target list.

Footnotes

  1. CIS Controls v8; CIS Controls Navigator v8

  2. CIS Controls v8

Frequently Asked Questions

What exactly counts as “externally exposed” for Safeguard 7.6?

Treat any asset reachable from the public internet as externally exposed: public IPs, domains/subdomains, web apps, APIs, VPN/SSO portals, and cloud services with public endpoints. If an unauthenticated external user can connect to it, include it in scope (Source: CIS Controls v8).

Do we need authenticated scans to meet this safeguard?

CIS 7.6 focuses on automated scans of externally exposed assets; authenticated scanning is a practical way to improve accuracy and depth for hosts you manage. If you cannot authenticate, document why, and add compensating verification steps (Source: CIS Controls v8).

How do we handle externally exposed assets run by a third party?

If the third party hosts it but you control configuration that affects exposure, include it in your external scanning program and track remediation with the third party. If you cannot scan directly, require equivalent scan evidence and remediation reporting contractually.

Can we use multiple tools (ASM + vulnerability scanner + WAF reports)?

Yes, and it often works better. Keep one authoritative scope list, document which tool covers which asset classes, and ensure findings funnel into a single remediation workflow with consistent evidence.

What evidence do auditors typically reject?

Standalone screenshots and undated exports without scope context commonly fail. Keep machine-generated reports/logs, scope-at-time-of-scan, ticket history, and retest output that proves closure.

How do we prevent scope drift as engineering moves fast?

Add a launch gate: new internet-facing endpoints must be registered in the app/service catalog and automatically added to the external scan scope. Pair that with a recurring reconciliation between DNS/cloud inventory and the scanner target list.

Operationalize this requirement

Map requirement text to controls, owners, evidence, and review workflows inside Daydream.

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