Safeguard 8.2: Collect Audit Logs

To meet the safeguard 8.2: collect audit logs requirement, you must define which systems generate security-relevant audit logs, enable logging at the source, centralize collection, and retain logs with integrity so they are available for detection, investigation, and audit review ¹. Operationalize it by building a log source inventory, onboarding sources to your SIEM/log platform, and running recurring evidence capture that proves logs are continuously collected.

Key takeaways:

• You need a documented scope of “audit logs” and “in-scope systems,” not just a SIEM tool ¹.
• Collection must be verifiable: show configured sources, successful ingestion, and retention/integrity controls ¹.
• Treat evidence as a first-class deliverable: screenshots, exports, configs, and runbooks mapped to 8.2 ¹.

Safeguard 8.2 sits in the part of CIS Controls v8 that expects you to collect audit logs as a foundational detection and response capability ¹. For a Compliance Officer, CCO, or GRC lead, the fastest path is to turn “collect logs” into a measurable control: clear scope, clear ownership, clear technical configuration, and repeatable proof.

The common failure mode is not the absence of a logging tool. It’s ambiguity. Teams cannot answer basic questions like: Which systems are in scope? What events are collected? Are logs centralized? How do we know collection is continuous? How long are logs retained? Who can change logging settings? Auditors and assessors read that ambiguity as control weakness because it prevents reliable detection and makes incident reconstruction fragile.

This requirement page gives you requirement-level implementation guidance you can assign and track. It focuses on what to build, how to prove it works, and which artifacts to retain so you can pass a security assessment without heroic log hunts the week before fieldwork. All references are to CIS Controls v8 and the CIS Controls Navigator v8 ¹.

Regulatory text

Excerpt (framework expectation): “CIS Controls v8 safeguard 8.2 implementation expectation (Collect Audit Logs).” ¹

Operator interpretation: CIS expects you to collect audit logs relevant to security and operational accountability from your environment in a way that supports monitoring and investigation ¹. In practice, that means:

• You decide and document which systems must produce audit logs.
• You enable and configure logging at those systems.
• You collect those logs centrally (or in a governed platform) so they are accessible and protected.
• You can prove collection and retention work consistently through evidence.

This is not a “buy a SIEM” requirement. It’s a control operation requirement: defined scope, implemented configurations, and recurring validation that logs are present and trustworthy ¹.

Plain-English interpretation (what 8.2 is really asking)

Safeguard 8.2 asks: “If something bad happens, can you reconstruct what occurred from your logs, and can you show that you continuously collect those logs?” ¹

A practical way to define success:

• Coverage: Your critical systems are logging the events your security monitoring depends on.
• Centralization: Logs are aggregated so responders don’t need to log into every endpoint to investigate.
• Integrity: Logs are protected from tampering and loss.
• Auditability: You can produce evidence quickly without building it during the audit.

Who it applies to

Entity types: Enterprises and technology organizations adopting CIS Controls v8 ¹.

Operational context (where this shows up):

• Any environment with identity systems, endpoints, servers, network devices, cloud control planes, or customer-facing applications.
• Organizations with incident response expectations (internal, customer-driven, or contractual).
• Teams using third parties that host systems or provide security platforms; you still own the control outcome, even if collection is outsourced.

Typical owners: Security Operations (implementation), IT/Cloud Ops (source configuration), GRC/Compliance (scope definition, evidence, control testing), and App/Platform Engineering (application/audit events).

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

Use this as a build sheet you can assign in a ticketing system.

Step 1: Define “audit logs” for your program

Write a one-page “Audit Logging Standard” that answers:

• What counts as an audit log (security-relevant events, admin actions, authentication, authorization changes, policy/config changes).
• Minimum fields expected (timestamp, actor, target, action, result, source IP/device, correlation IDs where relevant).
• Time synchronization requirement (so timestamps can be correlated).
• Ownership and change control for log settings.

Deliverable: approved standard mapped to the safeguard 8.2: collect audit logs requirement ¹.

Step 2: Build an in-scope log source inventory

Create (or extend) an inventory that lists:

• System/service name and owner.
• Environment (prod/non-prod) and criticality.
• Log types generated.
• Collection method (agent, API, syslog, cloud-native export).
• Destination (SIEM/log lake) and parser status.
• Onboarding status and last validation date.

Tip: Start with your “crown jewels” and the systems that control access: identity provider, endpoint security platform, EDR, privileged access tooling, directory services, VPN/remote access, cloud audit trails, firewall/WAF, and key SaaS admin consoles ¹.

Step 3: Enable logging at the source (don’t assume defaults)

For each source, capture:

• The logging setting/config that proves it is enabled.
• The event categories selected (sign-ins, admin actions, policy changes, data access where relevant).
• Any filters that drop events (and the business justification).

Common operational requirement: lock down who can disable logging. If “logging off” is one admin toggle, treat that as a high-risk configuration and control it through privileged access and change management.

Step 4: Centralize collection and validate ingestion

Decide your “system of record” for logs (SIEM, log analytics platform, or managed detection provider’s platform). Then, for each source:

• Onboard it (agent/API/syslog).
• Confirm ingestion (events arrive, time-stamped correctly).
• Confirm parsing/normalization for key sources (so detections and investigations work).
• Document troubleshooting steps for ingestion failures.

Validation is where auditors push. Keep objective proof that logs are arriving, not just that connectors exist.

Step 5: Set retention and integrity controls

Define:

• Where logs are stored (hot vs archive).
• Access controls (least privilege; separation between administrators and reviewers where feasible).
• Integrity controls (immutable storage options, write-once configurations, or equivalent platform features).
• Backup/recovery expectations for the logging platform itself.

Your retention decision should be documented and defensible. CIS 8.2 focuses on collection, but retention and integrity are inseparable in an audit conversation because missing history defeats investigations ¹.

Step 6: Operationalize recurring evidence capture and control testing

Create a lightweight monthly (or similarly regular) control check:

• Pick a sample of in-scope sources.
• Pull ingestion dashboards showing continued collection.
• Export a small set of recent events from each sampled source.
• Log exceptions (sources offline, ingestion delayed) and track remediation.

This is the “prove it runs” step that turns policy into an auditable control ¹. If you use Daydream, this is where teams typically map the safeguard to an evidence schedule, assign owners, and store recurring exports and screenshots so audits don’t turn into a scramble.

Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Keep artifacts in an audit-ready folder structure that mirrors your log source inventory.

Control design evidence (static):

• Audit Logging Standard (approved, versioned).
• Log source inventory (exportable list with owners and status).
• Architecture diagram of log flow (sources → collectors → SIEM/log store → archive).
• Access control matrix for the logging platform (who can administer, who can view, who can export).

Control operation evidence (recurring):

• Screenshots/exports showing logging enabled on key platforms.
• SIEM ingestion status dashboards or connector health reports.
• Sample log exports showing required fields present (timestamp, actor, action, result).
• Retention configuration screenshots or platform policy exports.
• Change tickets for logging configuration changes (enable/disable, filter changes, destination changes).
• Exception register and remediation tickets for missing log sources.

Third-party evidence (where applicable):

• Contract/SOW language showing the third party provides logs or log access.
• Attestations or service reports you rely on, plus your internal mapping of what that covers.
• Evidence that you can retrieve logs promptly (a real export during testing beats a contractual promise).

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

Expect these questions in any serious assessment of the safeguard 8.2: collect audit logs requirement:

1. “Show me your list of in-scope systems and which logs you collect.”
   Hangup: teams have a SIEM list that doesn’t match the asset inventory.

2. “Prove logs are continuously collected.”
   Hangup: one-time onboarding screenshots without ongoing health evidence.

3. “Who can turn logging off or change what’s collected?”
   Hangup: shared admin accounts or no change tracking.

4. “How do you know timestamps are reliable?”
   Hangup: time sync not documented; events arrive out of order.

5. “Can you produce logs for an investigation window quickly?”
   Hangup: data is spread across tools, or retention is unclear.

Frequent implementation mistakes (and how to avoid them)

• Mistake: Treating “we have a SIEM” as compliance.
  Fix: document scope and show collection at the source plus ingestion evidence ¹.

• Mistake: Collecting only firewall logs and calling it done.
  Fix: prioritize identity, endpoint, cloud control plane, and admin activity logs, then expand systematically.

• Mistake: No owner for each log source.
  Fix: assign accountable owners in the inventory; make ingestion failures route to a named team.

• Mistake: Dropping “noisy” events without a record.
  Fix: document filters with rationale and approval, and test that detection use cases still work.

• Mistake: Evidence assembled during the audit.
  Fix: set recurring evidence capture. Daydream-style evidence schedules work well because the control becomes a routine operational cadence rather than a one-off document push.

Risk implications (why auditors care)

If you cannot collect audit logs reliably, you may not detect attacks early, cannot reconstruct incidents, and cannot demonstrate due care to customers, regulators, or counterparties ¹. From a governance standpoint, weak logging also undermines other controls because you lose the ability to validate administrative actions, access changes, and policy drift.

A practical 30/60/90-day execution plan

No sourced timelines exist in the provided references, so treat these phases as a planning structure rather than a guaranteed delivery schedule.

First 30 days (Immediate: scope + minimum viable proof)

• Publish an Audit Logging Standard and get approval ¹.
• Build the initial log source inventory focusing on critical systems and identity/admin layers.
• Identify the central logging platform and confirm it can ingest from your top sources.
• Collect “starter evidence”: logging enabled + ingestion proof for a small set of priority sources.
• Create an exceptions register for anything not yet onboarded.

Days 31–60 (Near-term: coverage expansion + integrity)

• Onboard remaining high-priority sources from the inventory and fix parsing gaps for the ones security relies on.
• Implement tighter access controls for logging administration and export permissions.
• Document retention settings and where archives live.
• Create a recurring control test procedure (who runs it, what they capture, where it’s stored).

Days 61–90 (Operational: steady state + audit readiness)

• Expand onboarding to the rest of in-scope sources and formalize criteria for new systems to be onboarded at deployment time.
• Run the recurring control check and log the results as evidence.
• Perform a tabletop “audit log retrieval drill”: can you retrieve the right logs for a defined time window and system set, with chain-of-custody notes.
• Map the safeguard 8.2: collect audit logs requirement to your control library and evidence calendar so it stays current ¹.

Frequently Asked Questions

What counts as an “audit log” for Safeguard 8.2?

Treat audit logs as records of security-relevant events and administrative actions that let you answer who did what, when, and from where. Define this in your Audit Logging Standard and map it to in-scope systems ¹.

Do we have to centralize logs to meet 8.2?

Centralization is the practical way to prove collection and support investigations, even if CIS text is high-level ¹. If some logs remain local, document the exception and how you retrieve and protect them.

How do I prove “logs are being collected” to an auditor?

Keep evidence that shows logging enabled at the source and ingestion/health evidence in the destination platform, plus sample event exports. Recurring evidence capture is stronger than a one-time screenshot ¹.

What if a third party hosts the system and won’t provide raw logs?

Document the shared responsibility boundary, require log access or meaningful audit exports in the contract/SOW, and keep evidence you can retrieve logs on request. Track gaps as exceptions with compensating monitoring where possible.

How should we handle sensitive data in logs?

Define what must be masked or excluded (for example, secrets) and enforce access controls for log viewing and export. If you filter events, document the decision and confirm it doesn’t break investigations.

We’re small. What’s the smallest acceptable implementation?

Start with identity/admin activity, endpoint security events, and cloud/SaaS audit trails, then expand from your inventory. Keep the scope explicit and maintain proof that the chosen sources are continuously collected ¹.

Footnotes

1. CIS Controls v8; CIS Controls Navigator v8