CMMC Level 2 Practice 3.14.2: Provide protection from malicious code at designated locations within organizational systems

To meet the cmmc level 2 practice 3.14.2: provide protection from malicious code at designated locations within organizational systems requirement, you must deploy and operate anti-malware protections at the system locations where malware can enter or execute (endpoints, email, web, servers, and file transfer paths), and keep evidence that coverage is complete and working. Scope it to your CUI environment and prove continuous operation. ¹

Key takeaways:

• “Designated locations” must be explicitly defined, justified, and mapped to all ingress/egress and execution points for your environment. ¹
• Assessors look for operational proof: coverage, configurations, alerts, response actions, and exception handling, not tool purchase receipts. ²
• The fastest path is a coverage map + standard configuration + recurring evidence capture aligned to your CUI boundary. ¹

CMMC Level 2 Practice 3.14.2 is a “do you actually run anti-malware where it matters” control, and it is commonly failed on evidence and scoping rather than technology. The practice is mapped to NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2 control 3.14.2, so your job is to translate one sentence into a defensible operating model: where malicious code can be introduced, where it can execute, and how you prevent, detect, and respond in those places. ¹

For a CCO or GRC lead, operationalizing this quickly means making two things unambiguous: (1) the “designated locations” decision and (2) the evidence trail that protections are active and maintained. The first is a scope and architecture exercise across endpoints, servers, email, web access, and file movement. The second is a cadence: configuration standards, health/coverage reporting, alert triage records, and exception approvals that survive staff turnover and audits. ²

This page gives you a requirement-level implementation approach you can hand to IT and security operations, then audit against, with a concrete evidence checklist and the questions assessors tend to press hardest.

Requirement summary (plain English)

You must protect your organizational systems from malicious code by deploying and operating anti-malware controls at the specific places you designate as in-scope locations. Those locations should be the points where malware commonly enters (email, web downloads, removable media, external file transfer) or runs (endpoints and servers). You also need to show those protections are kept current and functioning, with exceptions controlled and documented. ¹

Why assessors care

CMMC Level 2 assessments are evidence-driven. An assessor can accept different technical implementations, but they will not accept “we have antivirus” without a clear scope statement, coverage proof, and operational records that show the control works over time. ²

Regulatory text

Regulatory excerpt (provided): “CMMC Level 2 practice mapped to NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2 requirement 3.14.2 (Provide protection from malicious code at designated locations within organizational systems).” ¹

What the operator must do

1. Define “designated locations” for malicious code protection in your environment, tied to realistic malware entry/execution paths. ¹
2. Implement protections at those locations (endpoint, server, email, web, file transfer, etc.) and configure them to detect/prevent malicious code. ¹
3. Operate and maintain the protections (updates, monitoring, alert handling, exception control) and retain evidence for assessment. ²

Who it applies to (entity + operational context)

Entity types

• Defense contractors and subcontractors handling CUI.
• Federal contractors handling CUI in systems expected to meet CMMC Level 2 practices. ³

Operational scope

Apply this practice to:

• Systems within your CUI boundary (your defined environment where CUI is processed, stored, or transmitted).
• Supporting infrastructure that directly provides security services to that boundary (for example: centralized endpoint security management, email security gateways, or logging that supports malware detection), if it is part of how you deliver the control. ¹

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

Step 1: Define “designated locations” with a coverage map

Create a one-page “Malicious Code Protection Coverage Map” that lists each location category and your chosen control(s).

Minimum location categories most environments must decide on:

• User endpoints (workstations, laptops)
• Servers (file servers, app servers)
• Email (inbound scanning, attachment detonation or filtering)
• Web access (URL filtering, download scanning)
• File transfer paths (SFTP portals, collaboration tools, EDR scan-on-write, storage scanning)
• Removable media handling (if allowed)
• Remote access entry points (VDI/jump hosts where files may be introduced)

Your map must also mark what is in-scope for CUI versus out-of-scope corporate IT, and explain why. The assessor is looking for intent and completeness. ¹

Deliverable: Coverage map + CUI boundary diagram cross-reference. ¹

Step 2: Standardize configurations (baseline)

Document a baseline configuration standard for each designated location, such as:

• Real-time protection enabled
• Tamper protection enabled
• Automatic signature/engine updates enabled
• Scanning of downloads and attachments enabled (where applicable)
• Centralized management and reporting enabled
• Alert severity thresholds and notification routing defined

Keep this as a security standard, not a tool manual. You want “what must be true” so you can swap tools without rewriting compliance. ¹

Deliverable: “Malicious Code Protection Standard” with required settings by asset class. ¹

Step 3: Implement and prove coverage (the exam-critical part)

Operationalize coverage verification:

• Produce an asset inventory export (endpoints/servers) for the CUI boundary.
• Produce an agent/deployment report from your endpoint protection/EDR console that shows installed and healthy agents.
• Reconcile the two lists and resolve gaps (missing agents, unmanaged hosts, stale check-ins).

If you have exceptions (legacy systems, isolated lab equipment), document the compensating control (application allowlisting, network isolation, restricted file ingress, heightened monitoring) and formal approval. ¹

Deliverable: Coverage reconciliation worksheet and documented exceptions. ²

Step 4: Run it like a control (monitoring + response)

Define a simple operating rhythm:

• Monitor anti-malware alerts.
• Triage and document actions.
• Escalate confirmed malicious code to incident handling workflows.
• Track recurring detections to root cause (phishing training gaps, vulnerable software, unsafe file transfer practices).

Tie this to your incident handling controls so malware detections become auditable events with closure. ¹

Deliverable: Ticketing workflow evidence (alert → triage → containment/remediation → closure). ²

Step 5: Recurring evidence capture (assessment readiness)

This practice fails when teams cannot show “ongoing.” Set recurring evidence capture that produces:

• Current policy/standard
• Coverage reports
• Update status reports
• Alert/ticket samples
• Exception register

Daydream (or any GRC system you already run) fits here as the control record: map the practice to owners, systems, evidence types, and an evidence schedule so you can produce artifacts on demand without last-minute scrambles. ²

Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Use this checklist to build an assessor-ready packet:

Governance and scope

• CUI boundary definition and diagram showing in-scope networks and systems. ¹
• “Designated locations” coverage map with rationale. ¹
• Malicious code protection policy/standard with required configurations. ¹

Technical implementation

• Endpoint/server protection console screenshots or exports showing active coverage and health status for in-scope assets. ²
• Email/web security configuration evidence (screenshots, config exports, or admin settings reports) for scanning/filtering at designated points. ¹
• Update status evidence showing signatures/engines are current (reports or console status). ¹

Operations

• Alert samples with timestamps, triage notes, and closure actions in tickets. ²
• Exception register for systems without standard protection, with approvals and compensating controls. ¹
• Change management records for major configuration changes that affect protection at designated locations. ²

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

Assessors tend to probe these areas:

1. “What are your designated locations, and why those?” Have the coverage map ready, tied to ingress/execution paths. ¹
2. “Show me your coverage for the CUI enclave.” Expect a drill-down to a sample endpoint/server and proof it is protected and managed. ²
3. “How do you know protections are working?” Provide alert samples, test detections (if you do controlled tests), and evidence of follow-through. ²
4. “What about systems that can’t run the agent?” Exception discipline matters: risk acceptance, compensating controls, and periodic review. ¹

Frequent implementation mistakes (and how to avoid them)

Mistake	Why it fails	Fix
Defining “designated locations” as “all computers” with no mapping	Sounds broad but produces poor evidence and missed ingress points like email/web	Create a location-by-location coverage map tied to CUI boundary. 1
Tool installed, but unmanaged endpoints exist	Assessors will compare inventories and find gaps	Reconcile asset inventory to security console coverage and track exceptions. 2
No exception process for non-standard systems	Leads to silent noncompliance	Maintain an exception register with compensating controls and approvals. 1
No operational records (alerts/tickets)	Control looks “static” rather than operating	Keep ticket samples and alert-handling SOPs; show closure actions. 2
Treating email/web controls as “nice to have”	Malware often enters through these paths	Explicitly include email/web/file transfer locations in “designated locations.” 1

Enforcement context and risk implications

CMMC Level 2 is implemented through the DoD CMMC program structure and is tied to contractor obligations for protecting CUI. Your practical risk is assessment failure, remediation delays, and contractual impacts if you cannot demonstrate required practices with evidence. Keep your statements conservative: focus on assessment readiness and the operational security risk of malware in the CUI environment. ^{3 2}

Practical execution plan (30/60/90-day structure, without calendar claims)

Use these phases as a playbook; adjust to your internal change windows.

First 30 days (Immediate: scope + minimum viable evidence)

• Confirm the CUI boundary and produce a boundary diagram suitable for assessment. ¹
• Draft the “designated locations” coverage map and get IT/security sign-off.
• Inventory in-scope endpoints/servers; pull protection console reports; identify coverage gaps.
• Stand up an exception register template and route approvals through security governance.

Next 60 days (Near-term: standardization + operational workflow)

• Publish the malicious code protection configuration standard by asset class.
• Remediate coverage gaps and enforce centralized management for in-scope assets.
• Connect alerting to a ticketing workflow; document triage steps and escalation criteria.
• Start recurring evidence capture in a system of record (Daydream or your existing GRC tool): coverage reports, update status, alert samples, exception reviews. ²

Next 90 days (Ongoing: prove durability)

• Run an internal control check: sample devices across each designated location and verify settings match the standard.
• Review exceptions for continued need and adequacy of compensating controls.
• Conduct a tabletop for malware detection → response flow to confirm handoffs are clean.
• Package assessor-ready evidence by practice so you can respond quickly to requests. ²

Frequently Asked Questions

What counts as “designated locations” for 3.14.2?

The locations you explicitly define where anti-malware must run or be enforced, based on where malware can enter or execute in your environment. Document them and tie them to your CUI boundary and ingress paths. ¹

Do we need endpoint protection on every corporate device?

The requirement is assessed for the systems in scope for CMMC Level 2, which is driven by where CUI is processed, stored, or transmitted. If corporate devices can access the CUI environment, they often become in-scope by architecture and must be addressed. ¹

Is “antivirus installed” enough evidence?

No. Expect to show managed coverage, health status, update status, and operational records like alerts and tickets that demonstrate ongoing protection. ²

How do we handle systems that cannot run an EDR/AV agent?

Treat them as exceptions with a documented rationale and compensating controls such as isolation, strict inbound file controls, and enhanced monitoring. Keep approvals and periodic review evidence. ¹

Do email and web filters matter for this practice?

They often do, because email and web downloads are common entry points for malicious code. If those are part of your environment’s ingress paths, include them as designated locations and retain configuration evidence. ¹

What is the fastest way to stay audit-ready over time?

Create a recurring evidence schedule and store exports/screenshots, tickets, and exception approvals in a control record tied to 3.14.2 so you can reproduce proof on demand. Daydream helps by structuring the mapping and evidence capture, but the key is the cadence and completeness. ²

Footnotes

1. NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2

2. DoD CMMC Program Guidance

3. 32 CFR Part 170