CMMC Level 2 Practice 3.1.16: Authorize wireless access prior to allowing such connections
CMMC Level 2 Practice 3.1.16 requires you to explicitly authorize wireless access before any device, user, or system is allowed to connect via Wi‑Fi or other wireless methods to networks that store, process, or transmit CUI. To operationalize it, you need a written authorization rule, a controlled onboarding workflow, and technical enforcement that blocks unknown or unapproved wireless connections. 1
Key takeaways:
- Define what “wireless” means in your environment and make wireless access “deny by default.”
- Approve wireless access through a documented workflow tied to inventory, roles, and configuration baselines.
- Retain assessor-ready evidence: authorization records, WLAN configs, NAC/MDM allowlists, and logs showing enforcement.
Footnotes
The fastest way to pass an assessment for the cmmc level 2 practice 3.1.16: authorize wireless access prior to allowing such connections requirement is to treat wireless like a controlled interface into your CUI environment. Assessors will look for two things: (1) a clear decision that wireless access is either permitted under defined conditions or prohibited, and (2) proof that only approved wireless connections are technically possible in practice. 1
This practice is often misunderstood as “we have Wi‑Fi passwords.” That’s not enough. Authorization is a governance and operations requirement: you must decide who can connect wirelessly, with what devices, to which SSIDs/VLANs, under what security settings, and with what approvals. Then you must enforce that decision so “shadow” access points, ad hoc hotspots, and unmanaged devices do not become an undocumented path into CUI. 1
The guidance below is written for a Compliance Officer, CCO, or GRC lead who needs to assign owners, define the workflow, and collect evidence that will survive a CMMC Level 2 assessment performed against NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2 expectations. 2
Regulatory text
Excerpt (as provided): “CMMC Level 2 practice mapped to NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2 requirement 3.1.16 (Authorize wireless access prior to allowing such connections).” 1
Operator meaning: Before any wireless connection is allowed into networks within your CMMC Level 2 / CUI scope, you must have an approval decision and a mechanism that enforces it. Authorization must be more than informal permission; it should be documented, attributable (who approved), and connected to a defined access method (approved SSID, certificate, device posture, and network segmentation). 1
Regulatory context: CMMC Level 2 aligns to NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2 for protecting CUI in non-federal systems, and is implemented through the DoD CMMC Program and codified in the CMMC Program rule structure. 2 3
Plain-English interpretation
You must control wireless connections the same way you control accounts: no one connects “just because Wi‑Fi exists.” Wireless access must be:
- Explicitly permitted (or explicitly prohibited) for defined populations and use cases
- Approved before connection (not after the fact)
- Technically enforced so unauthorized wireless access attempts fail
- Auditable with evidence that approvals and enforcement happened
Think in three layers:
- Policy decision: “Wireless is allowed for these networks and these roles, under these controls.”
- Operational workflow: “Here is how a device/user gets approved.”
- Technical gates: “Unapproved devices/users cannot join the CUI-relevant WLAN or traverse into the CUI enclave.” 1
Who it applies to
Entity scope
Operational scope
- Corporate Wi‑Fi, site Wi‑Fi, and any wireless connectivity that can reach in-scope systems (including guest networks if routing, misconfiguration, or shared infrastructure could provide a path).
- Warehouses, manufacturing floors, labs, and offices where wireless is used for scanners, IoT/OT, tablets, laptops, or conference-room devices.
- Remote work patterns that introduce wireless bridging risks (employees using phone hotspots, travel routers, or home Wi‑Fi into VPN). This practice focuses on wireless access control; you should treat “hotspot bridging” as a wireless risk scenario in your procedures and training.
What you actually need to do (step-by-step)
Step 1: Define “wireless” and the authorization boundary
Write a short standard that defines what you control:
- Wi‑Fi (802.11)
- Bluetooth (if used for connectivity to in-scope endpoints)
- Cellular hotspots/tethering (as a prohibited or controlled method)
- Any site-specific wireless bridges or point-to-point links
Then define the boundary: “Wireless access into the CUI environment is only permitted through approved SSIDs and segmented networks.” 1
Step 2: Decide your allowed wireless use cases
Create an allowlist of wireless use cases, for example:
- Corporate-managed laptops on “Corp-Secure” SSID with enterprise authentication
- Approved handheld scanners on “Ops-Secure” SSID, isolated from CUI enclave unless required
- Prohibit BYOD on any SSID that touches the CUI environment
If wireless is not needed for CUI at all, the cleanest path is “wireless prohibited for CUI networks” plus segmentation that makes that statement true. 1
Step 3: Establish an approval workflow (the “authorize prior” mechanism)
Your workflow should answer: who approves, what gets approved, and what proof exists.
Minimum workflow fields:
- Requestor, device identity, owner, business justification
- In-scope network/SSID requested
- Security prerequisites (managed device, encryption settings, patch posture, certificate present)
- Approver (IT/security), approval date/time, expiration or review trigger
- Implementation confirmation (SSID added, NAC rule applied, MDM profile pushed)
Make it operational:
- New device? Approval required before Wi‑Fi profile is deployed.
- New site? Wireless design review required before SSID goes live.
- New third party onsite? Approval required before temporary credentials are issued, or require guest network isolation that cannot reach CUI. 1
Step 4: Implement technical enforcement (deny by default)
Assessors expect more than a spreadsheet. Put in one or more gates:
Preferred controls (pick what matches your environment):
- Enterprise Wi‑Fi authentication (per-user or per-device) so shared passwords do not equal “authorization.”
- Network Access Control (NAC) to allow only known devices (by certificate, device ID, posture).
- MDM-managed Wi‑Fi profiles so only enrolled endpoints receive the “secure SSID” configuration.
- Segmentation so even authorized wireless connects only to the right VLANs and cannot laterally move into CUI systems except through defined paths. 1
Operational rule: if a device is not approved, it should not be able to associate to the CUI-relevant SSID, and it should not be able to route to CUI assets from any other SSID.
Step 5: Control and monitor for rogue wireless
Authorization breaks down when unauthorized wireless infrastructure appears.
- Detect and remove unauthorized access points (including consumer routers plugged into office ports).
- Monitor wireless controller logs (associations, authentication failures, new devices).
- Add an incident path: “rogue AP detected” becomes a ticket with containment steps and closure evidence. 1
Step 6: Make it assessable: map the practice to control operation and evidence capture
Treat 3.1.16 as a recurring control with recurring evidence:
- Monthly or quarterly exports of approved device lists / NAC allowlists
- Change records for wireless configs (SSIDs, auth modes, VLAN mappings)
- Samples of approved requests and completed implementations
This is where tools like Daydream can help: map 3.1.16 to your wireless authorization workflow, assign owners (IT network + security), and schedule recurring evidence pulls so you’re not assembling proof during the assessment week. 2
Required evidence and artifacts to retain
Keep evidence that shows policy + approval + enforcement + operation:
- Wireless access control policy/standard covering authorization requirements and prohibited methods 1
- Wireless network architecture diagram showing SSIDs, VLANs, routing boundaries, and where CUI networks sit
- Authorization records (tickets/forms): request, approval, implementation confirmation
- Wireless controller configuration snapshots (sanitized) showing SSID settings and enterprise auth configuration
- NAC/MDM evidence: device enrollment rules, allowlists, compliance policies, sample device profile showing Wi‑Fi configuration
- Rogue AP detection process and outputs: scans, alerts, investigation tickets, remediation notes
- Access logs: authentication logs, association logs, failed attempts, and admin changes to wireless configs (change history)
Evidence quality test: an assessor should be able to pick a device on Wi‑Fi and trace back to an approval record and a technical control that enforces that approval. 1
Common exam/audit questions and hangups
Expect questions like:
- “Show me how wireless access is approved before a device connects. Where is it documented?” 1
- “Which SSIDs can reach the CUI enclave? Prove guest Wi‑Fi cannot.”
- “Do you use shared PSKs? If yes, how do you prove authorization and removal when someone leaves?”
- “How do you prevent employees from adding a rogue AP to a wired port?”
- “What happens when a new facility is brought online?”
Hangups that stall teams:
- No clear CUI boundary, so nobody can state which wireless networks are “in scope.”
- Approvals exist, but enforcement is weak (anyone with the password can join).
- Enforcement exists, but evidence is missing (no ticket trail or log retention). 1
Frequent implementation mistakes and how to avoid them
-
Mistake: Treating “knowing the Wi‑Fi password” as authorization
Fix: move to enterprise auth, device certificates, NAC, or MDM-controlled profiles; require a recorded approval event. 1 -
Mistake: Guest SSID shares infrastructure and can route to internal networks
Fix: enforce segmentation and firewall rules; document and test that guest cannot reach in-scope assets. -
Mistake: No offboarding tie-in
Fix: when a user/device is deprovisioned, wireless authorization must be revoked through the same identity/device lifecycle process. -
Mistake: Ignoring “non-IT” wireless (conference room gear, printers, scanners, lab devices)
Fix: require the same authorization record and device inventory entry for every wireless-capable asset that can touch internal networks. -
Mistake: Evidence created only for the assessment
Fix: schedule recurring evidence capture (config backups, allowlist exports, ticket samples) and store it in a controlled repository; Daydream can track the evidence cadence and owners so it doesn’t rely on one engineer’s memory.
Enforcement context and risk implications
No public enforcement cases were provided in the source catalog for this specific practice, so this page does not cite enforcement outcomes.
Risk-wise, unauthorized wireless paths are a common way controls fail quietly: an unmanaged device on Wi‑Fi can bypass endpoint hardening, introduce rogue services, or bridge networks. For CUI environments, this becomes an access control problem, not a networking preference. The practical implication for a CMMC assessment is straightforward: if you cannot prove prior authorization and technical blocking of unauthorized wireless access, you risk failing the practice. 1 2
Practical 30/60/90-day execution plan
First 30 days (stabilize and define)
- Name an owner: Network/Wireless admin for technical control, Security/GRC for policy and evidence.
- Define in-scope SSIDs and networks that can reach CUI assets; document the boundary.
- Publish a wireless authorization standard: allowed SSIDs, prohibited methods, and approval authority. 1
- Turn on logging and confirm you can export: auth logs, admin changes, device associations.
Days 31–60 (implement enforceable authorization)
- Stand up the approval workflow in your ticketing system with mandatory fields and approver roles.
- Implement deny-by-default enforcement for the CUI-relevant SSID(s): enterprise auth, NAC, or MDM enrollment gating.
- Segment guest and IoT/OT SSIDs away from CUI; document firewall rules and validate access paths.
- Start rogue AP detection operations and a remediation runbook. 1
Days 61–90 (prove operation and get assessment-ready)
- Run an internal mini-assessment: pick sample devices and trace approval → configuration → logs.
- Collect an evidence pack: policy, diagrams, tickets, controller configs, allowlist exports, and monitoring outputs.
- Add recurring evidence tasks and ownership tracking in Daydream so the control remains operable after staff changes.
- Train helpdesk/IT: “no Wi‑Fi access without approval” and “no exceptions without documented risk acceptance.” 1
Frequently Asked Questions
Does “authorize wireless access” mean I must allow wireless?
No. You can prohibit wireless for in-scope/CUI networks, but you still need to document that decision and enforce it through segmentation and configuration controls. 1
Are shared Wi‑Fi passwords (PSKs) acceptable for 3.1.16?
Shared PSKs make it hard to prove individual authorization and revocation. If you use PSKs, you need compensating process evidence showing who was authorized, how the PSK is protected, and how access is removed. 1
How do we handle third parties who need onsite network access?
Default to a guest network that cannot reach CUI assets. If a third party must access in-scope resources, require the same prior authorization workflow and issue time-bound credentials tied to an accountable sponsor. 1
Does this apply to employee phone hotspots and tethering?
Treat hotspots/tethering as wireless connectivity methods that can bypass your managed WLAN controls. Many programs prohibit bridging to corporate devices; document your rule and enforce it through endpoint policy where possible. 1
What evidence is most persuasive to an assessor?
A chain of proof: policy requiring prior authorization, tickets showing approvals, controller/NAC/MDM configs that enforce the decision, and logs showing devices authenticate as expected. 1
We have multiple sites. Do we need a separate wireless authorization process per site?
You need consistent governance across sites and site-specific configurations and evidence. A single process is fine if it captures which site/SSID/network is being approved and you can produce site-level configs and logs on request. 1
Footnotes
Frequently Asked Questions
Does “authorize wireless access” mean I must allow wireless?
No. You can prohibit wireless for in-scope/CUI networks, but you still need to document that decision and enforce it through segmentation and configuration controls. (Source: NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2)
Are shared Wi‑Fi passwords (PSKs) acceptable for 3.1.16?
Shared PSKs make it hard to prove individual authorization and revocation. If you use PSKs, you need compensating process evidence showing who was authorized, how the PSK is protected, and how access is removed. (Source: NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2)
How do we handle third parties who need onsite network access?
Default to a guest network that cannot reach CUI assets. If a third party must access in-scope resources, require the same prior authorization workflow and issue time-bound credentials tied to an accountable sponsor. (Source: NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2)
Does this apply to employee phone hotspots and tethering?
Treat hotspots/tethering as wireless connectivity methods that can bypass your managed WLAN controls. Many programs prohibit bridging to corporate devices; document your rule and enforce it through endpoint policy where possible. (Source: NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2)
What evidence is most persuasive to an assessor?
A chain of proof: policy requiring prior authorization, tickets showing approvals, controller/NAC/MDM configs that enforce the decision, and logs showing devices authenticate as expected. (Source: NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2)
We have multiple sites. Do we need a separate wireless authorization process per site?
You need consistent governance across sites and site-specific configurations and evidence. A single process is fine if it captures which site/SSID/network is being approved and you can produce site-level configs and logs on request. (Source: NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2)
Operationalize this requirement
Map requirement text to controls, owners, evidence, and review workflows inside Daydream.
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