CMMC Level 2 Practice 3.3.4: Alert in the event of an audit logging process failure

To meet the cmmc level 2 practice 3.3.4: alert in the event of an audit logging process failure requirement, you must detect when audit logging stops or degrades (agents down, forwarding breaks, storage fills, time sync fails) and generate timely alerts to the right responders, with documented triage and restoration. Treat logging as a monitored security service with defined failure conditions and evidence.

Key takeaways:

• Define “audit logging process failure” in operational terms (collection, forwarding, storage, correlation, and time sync) and map each to an alert.
• Route alerts to an owned on-call path, track them as incidents/tickets, and prove corrective action.
• Keep recurring evidence: alert rules, test results, sample incidents, and monitoring coverage across the CUI boundary.

CMMC Level 2 Practice 3.3.4 is a narrow requirement with a common failure mode: teams collect logs, but they don’t reliably know when log collection breaks. Assessors look for the ability to detect and respond when audit logging is not working, because missing logs remove your ability to investigate incidents, support accountability, and demonstrate control operation.

Operationalizing this practice means you treat audit logging like any other production service. You define what “healthy logging” means for the systems in scope for Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI), you implement monitoring that detects logging failures, and you prove that alerts reach the right people and result in restoration actions. The goal is not to generate more logs; it is to prevent blind spots.

This page gives requirement-level guidance you can implement quickly: scope, failure conditions to monitor, recommended alert rules, responder workflows, and the evidence an assessor will ask for. Sources are limited to the CMMC program rule and guidance and NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2, which CMMC Level 2 maps to for this practice (32 CFR Part 170; DoD CMMC Program Guidance; NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2).

Regulatory text

Regulatory excerpt (as provided): “CMMC Level 2 practice mapped to NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2 requirement 3.3.4 (Alert in the event of an audit logging process failure).” (NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2; DoD CMMC Program Guidance; 32 CFR Part 170)

Operator interpretation: You must implement monitoring that detects failures in the audit logging process and generates alerts so staff can correct the issue. “Audit logging process” includes the end-to-end pipeline: event generation on the source system, collection/agent operation, forwarding/transport, ingestion into your log platform/SIEM, storage/retention availability, and time synchronization needed to make logs usable. (NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2; DoD CMMC Program Guidance)

Plain-English interpretation (what the requirement really demands)

You need two things working together:

1. Detection: You can tell when expected audit logs stop arriving or become unreliable.
2. Response: Someone receives an alert and takes action to restore logging, and you can prove it happened.

If you only have a policy that says “we monitor logs,” you will struggle. If you only have a SIEM, but no health monitoring for agents, collectors, or storage, you will also struggle. CMMC Level 2 assessments tend to focus on whether your logging pipeline can fail silently.

Who it applies to (entity and operational context)

This practice applies to organizations seeking CMMC Level 2 certification that handle CUI for DoD contracts, and specifically to the systems and services in the CUI environment (the defined assessment scope boundary) where audit logs are required or relied upon. (32 CFR Part 170; DoD CMMC Program Guidance)

Operationally, it touches multiple teams:

• Security operations / IR: owns detection and response to logging failures.
• IT operations / infrastructure: fixes agents, collectors, endpoints, and storage.
• Cloud/platform teams: fixes API ingestion, permissions, and service health.
• GRC/compliance: maintains control narrative, test cadence, and evidence.

It also applies to third parties that provide log collection, SIEM, MDR, or managed infrastructure services inside your CUI boundary. If a third party runs your logging platform, you still need alerts and evidence that failures are detected and acted on.

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

Step 1: Define scope and “logging health” requirements

Create a logging health inventory for in-scope systems:

• Log sources: endpoints, servers, directory services, network devices, cloud control plane, critical applications.
• Collection method: agent, syslog, API pull, cloud-native integration.
• Destination: SIEM/log platform.
• Expected heartbeat: what “normal” looks like (e.g., continuous, periodic, or event-driven).

Define what qualifies as a “failure” for your environment. Use categories that map to real outages:

• Source failure: audit policy disabled, service stopped, agent uninstalled.
• Transport failure: forwarding blocked, TLS cert expired, DNS failure.
• Ingestion failure: connector errors, auth failures, parsing pipeline down.
• Storage/retention failure: disk full, index frozen, retention jobs failing.
• Time sync failure: NTP drift or time source unreachable (logs become hard to correlate).

Tie each category to an owner team and severity level that triggers response.

Step 2: Implement technical alerting for logging pipeline failures

Build alerts in the tool that has the best visibility (SIEM, log platform, monitoring system). At minimum, implement alerts for:

A. Log source silence / heartbeat loss

• Alert when a critical source stops sending logs (host not reporting).
• Cover domain controllers/IdP, privileged access systems, boundary devices, and CUI repositories first.

B. Collector/agent health

• Alert when agents are offline, queue is backed up, or forwarding is disabled.
• Alert on high drop rates if your tooling provides it.

C. Ingestion errors

• Alert on connector failures (API auth failures, rate limit failures, permission changes).
• Alert on ingestion pipeline errors (parsing failures that result in dropped events).

D. Storage/retention health

• Alert on low disk/index capacity, failed retention jobs, or failed backups (if logs are backed up separately).

E. Time synchronization

• Alert on time drift beyond your operational tolerance for systems that produce audit logs.

Practical coverage rule: don’t rely on a single point of monitoring. If your SIEM generates the alert, ensure the alert does not depend on the same failing component you are trying to detect (for example, if ingestion stops entirely, you still need an out-of-band health signal such as agent/collector status or platform health telemetry).

Step 3: Route alerts to a real response path

Define and document:

• Primary and secondary recipients (SOC queue, on-call rotation, service desk).
• Escalation if unacknowledged.
• Required response actions (restore logging, validate recovery, document cause).

Connect alerts to ticketing. Assessors like to see that alerts create work items with timestamps and resolution notes. Your goal is a clear audit trail: failure detected → alert generated → acknowledged → remediated → verified.

Step 4: Create a repeatable triage and restoration runbook

Write a short runbook per failure category:

• “Agent down on endpoint/server”
• “Syslog forwarding failure”
• “Cloud connector auth failure”
• “SIEM ingestion pipeline failure”
• “Disk/index capacity threshold exceeded”
• “NTP/time drift issue”

Each runbook should include:

• How to confirm the failure (screenshots/commands).
• Likely causes.
• Immediate containment (restore log flow).
• Follow-up corrective action (config hardening, change control, monitoring improvements).

Step 5: Test the control and capture recurring evidence

You need proof it works in practice. Build a test that does not create risk:

• Disable a non-production log source or pause a test agent and verify the alert fires.
• Trigger a benign connector error in a sandbox integration.
• Simulate low storage threshold warnings.

Record:

• Date/time of test
• Alert content
• Who received it
• Ticket/incident reference
• Verification that logs resumed

Repeat on a defined cadence and after major changes to the logging stack.

Step 6: Document the control in your CMMC/NIST control narrative

In your SSP/control description, state:

• What constitutes an audit logging process failure in your environment
• Monitoring/alerting mechanisms
• Response workflow and ownership
• Evidence types and review cadence

This is where tools like Daydream fit naturally: you can map CMMC Level 2 Practice 3.3.4 to a documented control operation, assign owners, and schedule recurring evidence capture so you are not rebuilding proof right before assessment (DoD CMMC Program Guidance; NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2).

Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Keep evidence that proves design and operation:

Design evidence (what you built)

• Logging architecture diagram (sources → collectors → SIEM → storage)
• Alert rule configurations (screenshots or exported rules)
• Monitoring coverage list (critical log sources and their health checks)
• Runbooks for logging failure triage
• Roles/responsibilities (RACI or on-call procedure)

Operational evidence (proof it runs)

• Sample alerts (with timestamps)
• Tickets/incidents created from alerts and their closure notes
• Test records for logging failure simulations
• Change records showing monitoring updated after logging changes
• Review records (periodic review of alert health, false positives, tuning)

A common assessor hangup is “show me that this alert fired and someone acted on it.” Store at least a few examples across different failure types (agent, connector, storage).

Common exam/audit questions and hangups (what assessors probe)

Expect questions like:

• “How do you know audit logging is working across your CUI boundary?” (NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2)
• “What alerts do you have for logging failures, and who receives them?”
• “Show an example from the last period where a logging failure occurred and how you restored service.”
• “How do you handle logging failures in cloud services or third-party managed SIEM?”
• “How do you prevent a single point of failure where the SIEM must be healthy to detect SIEM ingestion failure?”

Hangups that cause delays:

• Alerts exist but go to an unmonitored mailbox.
• No ticket trail; fixes happen in chat without records.
• Scope gaps: endpoints or key services in the CUI enclave have no heartbeat monitoring.

Frequent implementation mistakes (and how to avoid them)

Mistake	Why it fails assessments	Fix
Treating “SIEM is running” as proof logging works	Logging can fail at sources, agents, connectors, or storage	Implement source heartbeat and connector health alerts
Only monitoring security detections, not pipeline health	You can miss silent log loss	Add explicit “no logs received” and “agent offline” alerts
Alerts routed to the wrong team	No response, no closure evidence	Route to SOC/service desk with escalation and ownership
No evidence of operation	Assessors need artifacts	Save sample alerts + tickets + test logs in a control evidence folder
Ignoring third-party logging components	You still own compliance outcomes	Require health reporting + incident records from the third party; integrate into your ticketing

Enforcement context and risk implications

No public enforcement cases were provided in the source catalog for this specific practice. Operationally, the risk is straightforward: if audit logging fails silently, your incident investigations can stall, you may not be able to establish timelines, and you may not be able to demonstrate control operation during a CMMC assessment. CMMC Level 2 is tied to DoD contracting requirements, so gaps can become eligibility and delivery risks under the CMMC program framework. (32 CFR Part 170; DoD CMMC Program Guidance)

Practical 30/60/90-day execution plan

First 30 days (stabilize and define)

• Confirm the CUI boundary and inventory critical log sources in scope. (DoD CMMC Program Guidance)
• Define “audit logging process failure” categories and assign owners.
• Implement basic heartbeat alerts for the most critical sources and ensure alerts reach an owned queue.
• Stand up a simple runbook and ticket workflow for “logging failure.”

By 60 days (expand coverage and prove operation)

• Add connector/ingestion error alerts and storage capacity alerts.
• Create or refine runbooks for the top failure modes.
• Run a controlled test of each alert type and save evidence (alert + ticket + verification).
• Add a recurring review to tune alert noise and confirm coverage after changes.

By 90 days (assessment-ready)

• Close remaining scope gaps for endpoints, network devices, and cloud control plane logs.
• Demonstrate at least one real or simulated logging-failure incident end-to-end with complete artifacts.
• Update SSP/control narrative to reflect the implemented monitoring, routing, and evidence approach. (NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2)
• Operationalize evidence capture in Daydream (or your GRC system) so artifacts are collected continuously rather than assembled right before assessment. (DoD CMMC Program Guidance)

Frequently Asked Questions

What counts as an “audit logging process failure” for CMMC Level 2 Practice 3.3.4?

Treat it as any condition where audit logs are not being generated, collected, forwarded, ingested, stored, or time-aligned reliably enough to support accountability and investigations. Document your specific failure conditions and map each to an alert. (NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2)

Do I need a SIEM to satisfy this requirement?

No specific tool is mandated. You need reliable detection and alerting when logging fails, plus proof of response; that can be achieved with a SIEM, centralized logging, or monitoring tooling if it covers the end-to-end pipeline. (NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2)

If a third party provides our MDR/SIEM, can we rely on them for 3.3.4?

You can contract for monitoring and alerting, but you still need evidence that failures are detected and acted on within your environment and scope. Ask the third party for incident/ticket records, health reports, and alert configuration evidence tied to your in-scope systems. (DoD CMMC Program Guidance)

How do we prove operation if we rarely have logging outages?

Run controlled tests that simulate a logging failure (for example, stop a test agent) and capture the alert and ticket trail. Keep the test plan, results, and restoration verification as recurring evidence. (NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2)

What’s the minimum evidence assessors typically accept for this practice?

Expect to show alert rules, an example alert, and a documented response record (ticket/incident) that demonstrates restoration and verification. Pair that with a logging architecture/coverage inventory so the assessor can see you covered the CUI boundary. (DoD CMMC Program Guidance)

How do we avoid a single point of failure where the SIEM must be working to detect SIEM failures?

Add out-of-band health signals such as agent/collector heartbeat monitoring, platform health telemetry, and storage capacity monitoring that can alert even when log ingestion is degraded. Document the design so an assessor can follow the logic. (NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2)