Annex A 8.14: Redundancy Of Information Processing Facilities

Annex A 8.14 sits in the “Technological controls” family of ISO/IEC 27001:2022 and focuses on keeping information processing available when something breaks. Auditors read this control as a reliability and resilience requirement: you should not have single points of failure for services that matter to your ISMS scope, your customers, or your regulated operations.

For a CCO, GRC lead, or compliance officer, the fastest way to operationalize 8.14 is to treat it as a control that links business impact analysis (BIA) outputs to concrete engineering decisions. Your job is to make sure the organization can demonstrate (1) it identified critical processing facilities, (2) it engineered appropriate redundancy for those facilities, (3) it monitors and tests failover, and (4) it can show evidence over time.

This page gives requirement-level implementation guidance you can hand to IT operations, cloud engineering, and continuity owners, then collect the artifacts an ISO 27001 assessor will ask for. Source context is from ISO’s overview of ISO/IEC 27001 and a public Annex A control index summary. ¹

Regulatory text

Control topic (provided excerpt): “ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A control 8.14 implementation expectation (Redundancy Of Information Processing Facilities).” ¹

Operator interpretation (what you must do):

• Establish redundancy for information processing facilities that support critical business processes and in-scope information services.
• Ensure the redundancy is appropriate to the organization’s availability needs and risk profile, and that it remains effective through testing, monitoring, and change management.
• Maintain evidence that redundancy is designed, implemented, and operating as intended for the ISMS scope. ¹

Plain-English interpretation of the requirement

If a critical server, database, network path, cloud region, identity provider, power feed, or core platform fails, you need alternate capacity and a tested way to switch over without unacceptable interruption or data loss. “Redundancy” can mean active-active, active-passive, clustering, multi-zone, multi-region, replicated data stores, redundant network links, redundant power and cooling, or contractual redundancy provided by a third party. What matters is that it matches your stated recovery objectives and you can prove it works.

Who it applies to (entity and operational context)

Applies to any organization running an ISMS under ISO/IEC 27001:2022, especially service organizations delivering customer-facing systems where downtime becomes a security and contractual issue. ²

Operationally, it applies wherever your organization processes, stores, or transmits in-scope information, including:

• On-prem data centers, co-location, and office server rooms
• Cloud IaaS/PaaS workloads (compute, storage, databases, network)
• SaaS platforms that are critical dependencies (identity, ticketing, payments, CRM) as third parties
• Shared infrastructure: DNS, PKI, secrets management, CI/CD, logging/SIEM, backup platforms
• OT/edge processing facilities, if in scope

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

Step 1: Set the scope and define “critical”

1. Pull your ISMS scope statement and asset/service inventory.
2. Create a short list of “critical information processing facilities” by mapping:
   • Critical business processes (from BIA or continuity planning)
   • Supporting applications and infrastructure
   • Data classification and customer commitments
3. Assign an owner for each critical service (system owner) and each facility/platform (infra owner).

Output: “Critical Processing Services Register” with owners, dependencies, and criticality rationale.

Step 2: Define recovery objectives and tolerances (RTO/RPO)

1. For each critical service, document:
   • RTO (maximum tolerable downtime)
   • RPO (maximum tolerable data loss)
   • Maximum tolerable degradation (performance/latency) if you operate in “degraded mode”
2. Align targets to business commitments (SLAs, customer contracts) and your risk assessment.

Operator tip: Auditors accept different targets per service if the rationale is documented and consistent with risk treatment. They reject “we are redundant” with no stated objectives.

Output: BIA/RTO-RPO worksheet tied to each critical service.

Step 3: Identify single points of failure (SPOFs) across the stack

Run a structured dependency review for each critical service:

• Compute: instance groups, cluster managers, autoscaling config
• Data: primary DB nodes, storage backends, replication mode, encryption key availability
• Network: NAT gateways, load balancers, VPN/Direct Connect, DNS
• Identity: SSO/IdP, MFA provider, privileged access tooling
• Observability: logging pipeline, alerting, on-call paging
• People/process: “only one admin knows failover,” undocumented runbooks

Output: “SPOF and Resilience Gap Log” with risk ratings and remediation plan.

Step 4: Choose a redundancy pattern that matches the objectives

Use a decision matrix per service:

Service requirement	Typical redundancy pattern	Evidence you must be able to show
Low downtime tolerance	Multi-zone or clustered design	Architecture diagram + health checks + failover test results
Low data loss tolerance	Synchronous replication / quorum designs	Replication settings + monitoring + test evidence
Facility outage tolerance	Multi-site or multi-region capability	DR design + restore/failover procedure + exercise report
Third-party dependency	Contractual resilience + contingency plan	SLA/contract clauses + vendor due diligence + fallback procedures

Important: If you rely on a third party’s redundancy (cloud/SaaS), 8.14 still expects you to manage the dependency. That means contract review, assurance evidence, and your own continuity workaround where feasible.

Step 5: Implement, document, and operationalize

For each critical service:

1. Build or configure redundancy (infra-as-code where possible).
2. Document:
   • Current-state architecture diagram (zones/regions/sites)
   • Failover/restore runbook (who does what, in what order)
   • Monitoring and alerting thresholds tied to failover criteria
3. Put change control around the redundancy design:
   • Any change that creates a SPOF must be reviewed and either blocked or risk-accepted.

Output: Runbooks, diagrams, change records, monitoring dashboards.

Step 6: Test failover and prove it works

1. Define test scenarios:
   • Component failure (node/instance)
   • Network path failure
   • Zone/site failure (where applicable)
   • Data restore integrity test
2. Execute tests and capture results:
   • Evidence of failover time vs. RTO
   • Evidence of restored data state vs. RPO
   • Issues found and remediations tracked to closure
3. Repeat on a cadence that matches service criticality and change frequency (set the cadence internally and enforce it).

Output: Resilience/DR exercise reports, tickets, post-test reviews.

Step 7: Make it auditable (recurring evidence capture)

A common ISO 27001 failure mode is “good engineering, weak evidence.” For Annex A 8.14, set up recurring evidence collection:

• Monthly export/screenshot of monitoring showing redundancy health (cluster status, replication lag, multi-AZ status)
• Change management samples showing redundancy review
• Last failover/restore test report per critical service
• Incident reports where redundancy was used (or failed)

Daydream can help by mapping Annex A 8.14 to a control narrative, assigning owners, and running an evidence request schedule so you collect proof continuously instead of at audit time. ¹

Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Keep artifacts tied to ISMS scope and version-controlled where possible:

Governance and design

• Control narrative for Annex A 8.14 (purpose, scope, roles, how it operates)
• Critical Processing Services Register + dependency mapping
• BIA outputs with RTO/RPO per service
• Resilience architecture diagrams (dated, with owners)

Operational proof

• Failover/restore runbooks and on-call procedures
• Monitoring dashboards/alerts configuration (screenshots or exports)
• Tickets/changes approving redundancy-impacting changes
• Test plans and completed exercise reports (including issues and remediation)
• Backup/restore test evidence where backups are part of resilience strategy

Third-party proof

• Contract/SLA clauses related to availability/resilience (as applicable)
• Third-party assurance materials you already collect (e.g., availability commitments, continuity statements)
• Your internal contingency plan if the third party fails (workarounds, alternate providers, manual processes)

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

Auditors and internal reviewers tend to focus on these:

1. “Show me your critical services list and how you decided.”
   Hangup: teams present an app inventory with no criticality logic.

2. “Where are the RTO/RPO targets, and are they realistic?”
   Hangup: RTO/RPO exist but do not match actual design (e.g., multi-region claimed, single-region built).

3. “Prove redundancy works.”
   Hangup: diagrams exist, but no executed failover tests or no retained results.

4. “What changed since last assessment?”
   Hangup: redundancy degraded over time due to cost-cutting or refactors without resilience review.

5. “What about your third parties?”
   Hangup: reliance on SaaS without documented dependency risk treatment.

Frequent implementation mistakes and how to avoid them

• Mistake: Treating backups as redundancy. Backups help recovery, but they do not equal continuous processing capacity. Document where backups fit (RPO/RTO) and where you need active redundancy.
• Mistake: Redundant compute with a non-redundant dependency. Common culprits: single database primary, single KMS/key store path, single NAT gateway, single IdP. Use the SPOF log and track to closure.
• Mistake: “Multi-region” claims without operational readiness. If failover requires tribal knowledge or risky manual steps, your redundancy is not operational. Write runbooks, train on-call staff, and test.
• Mistake: Evidence only at go-live. ISO assessors look for ongoing operation. Put recurring evidence capture on a calendar and bind it to control ownership.
• Mistake: No linkage to risk treatment. If you accept a SPOF, record it as a risk acceptance with a business owner and review trigger.

Risk implications (why compliance should care)

Redundancy gaps create availability incidents that turn into security incidents when they affect access control systems, monitoring, incident response tooling, or data integrity. They also create contractual exposure if you commit to uptime or recovery capabilities you cannot support. From an ISMS perspective, weak redundancy can undermine multiple control objectives: incident handling, continuity, supplier dependency management, and operational resilience. ²

Practical 30/60/90-day execution plan

First 30 days (establish control and visibility)

• Name the Annex A 8.14 control owner and define in-scope services/facilities.
• Build the Critical Processing Services Register with owners and dependencies.
• Document RTO/RPO targets for each critical service and get business sign-off.
• Open the SPOF and Resilience Gap Log and prioritize the top risks.

Days 31–60 (implement and document redundancy)

• For top-priority services, implement the selected redundancy patterns (or formalize third-party reliance plus contingency).
• Write or update runbooks for failover/restore, including access requirements and escalation paths.
• Add monitoring and alerts that verify redundancy health (replication, cluster quorum, zone health).
• Put a resilience review step into change management for systems in the critical register.

Days 61–90 (test, prove, and operationalize evidence)

• Run at least one failover/restore exercise per top-priority critical service.
• Capture test results, gaps, and remediation tickets through closure or formal risk acceptance.
• Establish recurring evidence collection (monitoring exports, change samples, test schedule).
• Implement a simple dashboard for compliance: critical services coverage, last test date, open resilience gaps.

Frequently Asked Questions

Does Annex A 8.14 require multi-region or a second data center?

No fixed architecture is mandated in the provided control summary; the expectation is “appropriate” redundancy for your critical processing needs. Document your rationale based on service criticality and recovery objectives. ¹

Can we rely on our cloud provider’s availability features as “redundancy”?

Yes, if you can show how the provider’s design maps to your RTO/RPO and you have operational procedures and evidence (monitoring and tests) that confirm it works for your workloads. Keep third-party assurance and your internal dependency risk treatment.

What evidence do auditors ask for most often?

They ask for a critical services list, RTO/RPO targets, architecture showing redundant components, and executed failover/restore test results. They also ask for change records that show you prevent new single points of failure.

We have redundancy, but failover is manual. Is that acceptable?

It can be, but only if your documented RTO accounts for manual steps and you test the procedure with the people who will execute it. If the manual process is fragile, treat it as a resilience gap and track remediation.

How do we handle redundancy for SaaS tools like identity providers or ticketing systems?

Start with dependency mapping and a contingency plan (alternate access path, break-glass accounts, offline procedures) aligned to the business impact if the SaaS is down. Record the approach in your critical services register and retain relevant contract/SLA language where available.

How can Daydream help with Annex A 8.14 without turning this into a paperwork exercise?

Use Daydream to maintain the control narrative, assign system owners, and automate recurring evidence requests (test reports, monitoring exports, change samples) so you can show ongoing operation at audit time. ¹

Footnotes

1. ISO/IEC 27001 overview; ISMS.online Annex A control index

2. ISO/IEC 27001 overview