Annex A 8.18: Use Of Privileged Utility Programs

Annex a 8.18: use of privileged utility programs requirement means you must tightly control any tool that can bypass normal application and OS controls (for example, admin consoles, debuggers, registry editors, password dump tools, backup/restore utilities). Operationalize it by inventorying these utilities, restricting who can run them, requiring approval and logging, and producing repeatable evidence for auditors. ¹

Key takeaways:

• Define “privileged utility programs” in your environment, then maintain an owned inventory mapped to systems and admins.
• Enforce allow-listing, just-in-time elevation, and monitored execution for every privileged utility.
• Make evidence automatic: approvals, session logs, and periodic reviews packaged for ISO assessment. ²

Privileged utility programs are a quiet failure mode in many security programs. You can have strong identity controls, MFA, and patching, then lose control because a small set of tools can override file permissions, read memory, alter audit logs, reset passwords, or extract data outside standard workflows. Annex a 8.18: use of privileged utility programs requirement exists to stop that class of bypass.

For a Compliance Officer, CCO, or GRC lead, the shortest path to compliance is to treat these utilities as a distinct “high-risk toolchain” with clear governance: name what counts, control distribution and execution, require pre-approval where feasible, log each use, and review that use for legitimacy. Your assessor will look for two things: (1) the control is designed to prevent abuse of privileged utilities, and (2) you can prove it operates consistently.

This page gives requirement-level implementation guidance you can hand to IT, Security, and Internal Audit, with concrete artifacts to collect and a practical execution plan. The goal is fast operationalization and clean assessment readiness under ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A 8.18. ¹

Regulatory text

Framework requirement (excerpt/summary): “ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A control 8.18 implementation expectation (Use Of Privileged Utility Programs).” ¹

What the operator must do (plain-English):
You must control privileged utility programs so they are only available to authorized personnel, used only for approved purposes, and monitored. In practice, that means you:

• Identify which utilities in your environment can bypass normal controls.
• Restrict installation, access, and execution to a minimal set of administrators and approved workflows.
• Log and review their use so misuse is detectable and investigated.
• Retain evidence that the controls exist and run consistently for audit. ²

Plain-English interpretation of the requirement

A “privileged utility program” is any tool that can do one or more of the following without going through standard application controls:

• Modify protected system settings, security configuration, or access control mechanisms.
• Access sensitive data directly (disk, memory, registries, database files, backups).
• Circumvent auditing (disable logs, tamper with event stores, clear traces).
• Escalate privileges or reset credentials.

Examples differ by stack, but typically include OS admin tools, domain admin utilities, database admin consoles, backup/restore tools, scripting frameworks with admin context, remote administration tools, and diagnostic/debug tooling.

Your compliance objective is not to ban these tools. Your objective is to make their presence intentional, their usage attributable, and their risk managed. ²

Who it applies to (entity and operational context)

This control applies to any organization operating an ISMS where privileged tools exist, which is almost every environment with:

• System administrators (Windows/Linux/macOS), cloud administrators, network engineers
• Database administrators, platform/SRE teams, security engineers
• IT operations and service desk functions that can reset accounts or access endpoints
• Third parties with admin access (managed service providers, incident response retainers, consultants)

Operationally, it applies wherever privileged utilities can be installed or executed:

• Endpoints (especially IT/admin workstations)
• Servers (production and non-production)
• Cloud control planes and SaaS admin consoles
• Network/security appliances
• Backup infrastructure and admin portals ¹

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

1) Write a tight definition and scope statement

Create a one-page standard that answers:

• What counts as a privileged utility in your environment
• Which environments are in scope (prod/non-prod, endpoints, cloud, network)
• Which roles may use them
• Which use cases are approved vs prohibited

Make the definition testable. If a tool can bypass normal authorization checks or directly access protected stores, treat it as privileged. ²

2) Build and own the privileged utilities inventory

Create a living register with, at minimum:

• Utility name and category (OS, DB, cloud, network, backup, diagnostics)
• Where it can run (hosts, groups, cloud accounts)
• Who owns it (system owner and control owner)
• Approved users/roles
• Control method (allow-listing, PAM session control, admin workstation only)
• Logging source and retention location

Assign a named control owner (often IAM/PAM owner) and a named operational owner per platform. ¹

3) Restrict availability: distribution and installation controls

Implement guardrails to stop “random installs”:

• Standardize admin tooling on hardened admin workstations (separate from daily email/browsing).
• Remove local admin rights from standard user endpoints where feasible.
• Control software distribution via managed packages; block unsigned/unapproved executables where feasible.
• For servers, use configuration management to control what’s installed and detect drift.

Auditors care that the tooling set is curated, not opportunistic. ²

4) Restrict execution: allow-listing and privilege boundaries

For each privileged utility category, enforce at least one strong execution control:

• Application allow-listing for admin endpoints and jump hosts.
• PAM-controlled elevation (check-out, just-in-time role activation, or brokered sessions).
• Role-based access control in cloud/SaaS admin consoles with least privilege.
• Network segmentation so admin tools can only reach intended targets.

Document the control per platform, not as a generic statement. ²

5) Require approval for high-risk actions (not everything)

Not every admin command needs a ticket, but certain actions should require pre-approval or post-approval review:

• Credential resets for privileged accounts
• Direct database file access or export
• Backup restore operations that expose production data
• Security control changes (logging off, EDR tamper actions, firewall rule broadening)

Pick a workable approval model and stick to it. A small set of “approval-required” actions is easier to enforce than a blanket rule nobody follows. ²

6) Log privileged utility use and make it attributable

Your logging design should answer: who did what, where, and when.

• Centralize logs (SIEM or log platform) for admin endpoints, jump hosts, servers, and cloud admin actions.
• Capture PAM session recordings or command logs where available.
• Correlate privileged utility events to a ticket/approval reference where applicable.

If you cannot technically log a legacy platform well, document compensating monitoring and restrict access further. ¹

7) Run a periodic review with outcomes, not checkboxes

Operate a review cadence that produces decisions:

• Review the privileged utilities inventory for completeness and relevance.
• Review a sample of privileged utility executions for legitimacy and approvals.
• Review membership in privileged roles permitted to run these utilities.

Each review should produce: findings, action items, owner, and closure evidence. ²

8) Extend the control to third parties with privileged access

For any third party that may use privileged utilities:

• Put the tool and access boundaries in the contract/SOW (what they can access, how they connect, how sessions are logged).
• Require PAM-brokered access or supervised sessions where feasible.
• Ensure offboarding removes their accounts, keys, and access paths.

Assessment teams regularly test whether third-party admin access is “equivalent control” to internal admin access. ¹

Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Keep evidence that proves both design and operation:

Governance

• Privileged Utility Programs standard (definition, scope, roles, prohibited actions)
• RACI for control ownership (GRC, IAM/PAM, platform owners)
• Exception process and risk acceptance template ¹

Inventory and access

• Privileged utilities register (current + change history)
• List of systems where privileged utilities run (jump hosts, admin workstations)
• Privileged role/group membership exports and review sign-offs ²

Operational logs and approvals

• Tickets/approvals for “approval-required” actions
• PAM session logs/recordings or command logs (where available)
• SIEM queries and saved reports showing privileged utility events
• Evidence of investigations for anomalous use (case notes, closure) ²

Control testing

• Periodic review reports with findings and remediation tracking
• Screenshots/config exports for allow-listing, endpoint controls, and logging configuration
• Exception list with expiry dates and compensating controls ¹

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

Auditors and ISO assessors tend to probe these angles:

1. “Show me your definition.” If your definition is vague, your inventory becomes arbitrary.
2. “How do you know you found them all?” Expect questions about discovery methods (EDR software inventory, package managers, golden images, CMDB).
3. “Who can run these tools today?” They will ask for group membership, cloud role assignments, and evidence of periodic review.
4. “Can you reconstruct an admin session?” They will want attribution and traceability from request to execution to outcome.
5. “What about third parties?” They will test whether MSP access is logged and time-bounded. ²

Frequent implementation mistakes and how to avoid them

Mistake	Why it fails in audits	Fix
Inventory exists but is not owned	No evidence it stays current	Assign a control owner and require updates via change management
Blanket policy: “All privileged use requires approval”	Teams bypass it; evidence is inconsistent	Define a short list of approval-required actions, enforce those
Logging is enabled but not reviewed	Control may exist on paper only	Produce periodic review reports with findings and closures
Third-party access handled “case by case”	Hard to prove consistent control	Standardize third-party privileged access via PAM/jump hosts and contracts
Exceptions never expire	“Temporary” becomes permanent	Add expiry dates and compensating controls; track closure 1

Enforcement context and risk implications

ISO 27001 is a certifiable standard rather than a regulator with direct fines. Your practical risk is assessment failure, surveillance audit findings, and customer trust impacts when you cannot prove control of high-risk admin tooling. Many real incidents start with misuse of admin tools (legitimate or malicious) because they bypass typical guardrails; Annex A 8.18 pushes you to reduce that exposure through restriction and evidence. ¹

30/60/90-day execution plan

Use phases as a delivery tool. Adjust based on your environment and change control constraints.

First 30 days (foundation and discovery)

• Publish the privileged utility definition and scope standard.
• Identify primary platforms and owners (endpoints, servers, cloud, network, database, backup).
• Create the initial utilities inventory using existing sources (EDR inventory, admin tool lists, jump host baselines).
• Confirm where logs will live (SIEM/log platform) and what sources exist today. ²

Days 31–60 (controls live for highest-risk paths)

• Implement or tighten admin workstation/jump host approach for privileged utilities.
• Put allow-listing or execution restrictions in place for the top privileged utilities per platform.
• Route high-risk actions through an approval workflow; train admins on what requires approval.
• Start capturing PAM/session logs or equivalent admin activity logs for in-scope systems. ¹

Days 61–90 (evidence, review, and audit readiness)

• Run the first periodic review: inventory completeness, privileged access review, and sample usage review.
• Close gaps: remove unapproved tools, reduce role memberships, fix missing logging.
• Formalize third-party privileged access patterns (contracts/SOW language, supervised access, offboarding checklist).
• Package your “audit binder”: policy, inventory, access reviews, log samples, exceptions register, and review outcomes. ²

How Daydream fits (without adding process friction)

Most teams struggle with Annex A 8.18 because evidence is scattered across tickets, IAM, PAM, EDR, and SIEM. Daydream becomes useful when you treat it as the system of record for the requirement: it keeps the control narrative, maps ownership, schedules recurring evidence pulls, and stores the artifacts so your assessment package is always current. That directly addresses a common gap for this control: missing implementation evidence. ²

Frequently Asked Questions

What counts as a “privileged utility program” in practice?

Treat any tool that can bypass normal application or OS controls as privileged, including admin consoles, debuggers, backup/restore tools, and direct database maintenance tools. Document your definition and apply it consistently across platforms. ²

Do we need a ticket for every admin command?

No, but you should require approval for a defined set of high-risk actions where misuse has outsized impact (credential resets, data restores, disabling logging, broad security changes). Then log all privileged utility use and review it. ¹

How do we handle cloud “utilities” that are really permissions in a console?

Treat cloud admin consoles and APIs as privileged utilities and control them with least-privilege roles, just-in-time elevation where possible, and centralized logging of admin actions. Keep role assignment reviews as core evidence. ²

We can’t technically record every privileged session. Is that an automatic fail?

Not automatically. Document the limitation, restrict access more tightly, and implement compensating monitoring (central logs, alerts, and stronger approvals) with a time-bound remediation plan. ¹

How should we manage third-party admin access under this control?

Standardize third-party privileged access through a controlled path (PAM or jump host), contractually define allowed actions, and keep attributable logs. Offboarding must remove all access methods, not just primary accounts. ²

What evidence format do ISO assessors accept for 8.18?

They typically accept a combination of policy/standard, an inventory/register, access review records, and operational log samples tied to approvals or tickets. The key is consistency and traceability from request to execution. ¹

Footnotes

1. ISO/IEC 27001 overview

2. ISMS.online Annex A control index