DE.AE-06: Information on adverse events is provided to authorized staff and tools

To meet the de.ae-06: information on adverse events is provided to authorized staff and tools requirement, you must ensure that security-relevant “adverse event” data (alerts, anomalies, incident indicators) is routed quickly and reliably to the right people and the right systems, with access controls and auditability. Operationalize it by defining event categories, authorized recipients, delivery paths, and evidence that the routing works end to end.

Key takeaways:

• Define what counts as an “adverse event,” who is authorized to receive it, and which tools must ingest it.
• Build controlled, monitored distribution paths (SIEM/SOAR/ticketing/on-call) with role-based access and logging.
• Retain proof of operation: routing rules, access reviews, sample alerts, and incident records showing the right handoffs.

DE.AE-06 sits in the “Detect – Adverse Events” area of NIST CSF 2.0 and focuses on a deceptively simple outcome: adverse event information reaches authorized staff and tools. In practice, this requirement is where many detection programs fail. Teams buy monitoring tools, but alerts land in the wrong queue, reach too many people, or never arrive with the context responders need.

For a Compliance Officer, CCO, or GRC lead, the operational challenge is to turn this one-line outcome into something testable: named roles, specific tools, controlled access, and repeatable evidence that routing and escalation work. You are proving two things: (1) the organization can detect and communicate adverse events to responders and decision-makers, and (2) it does so in a way that respects least privilege and avoids uncontrolled dissemination of sensitive security data.

This page provides requirement-level implementation guidance you can execute quickly: scoping, control design, step-by-step rollout, evidence to keep, audit questions to expect, and a practical execution plan. Primary references: NIST CSF 2.0 and the CSF 2.0 publication materials. ¹

Regulatory text

Requirement (excerpt): “Information on adverse events is provided to authorized staff and tools.” ²

Operator interpretation (what you must do):

1. Identify adverse event information sources (security tools, platforms, third parties, logs) and the event types you treat as adverse.
2. Define authorized recipients (roles/teams) and authorized tools (SIEM, SOAR, ticketing, paging, case management) that must receive those events.
3. Implement controlled distribution so that events flow to recipients/tools reliably, with access controls and an audit trail.
4. Demonstrate ongoing operation via monitoring, periodic reviews, and evidence bundles showing correct routing and follow-through. ³

Plain-English interpretation of the requirement

DE.AE-06 means: when something bad or suspicious happens, the right people and systems find out fast enough to act, and nobody else gets unnecessary access. You are not just collecting logs; you are operating an “adverse event communications” capability with:

• Defined triggers (what events matter),
• Defined audiences (who can see what),
• Defined delivery (how events are sent, tracked, and acknowledged),
• Proof (records that the workflow worked).

Who it applies to

Entity types (typical):

• Critical infrastructure operators
• Organizations running formal cybersecurity programs
• Service organizations that must show customers detection and incident workflows ³

Operational context (where auditors look):

• SOC operations (internal or outsourced)
• Incident response and on-call rotation
• Central logging/SIEM and alert triage
• Identity and access management for security tools
• Ticketing/case management (service desk, IR platform)
• Third-party relationships where event data must be shared (MSSP, IR retainer, cloud provider notifications)

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

1) Define “adverse event” categories you will route

Create a short taxonomy that is actionable for routing. Keep it small; route by severity and domain.

• Examples: suspected malware, unauthorized access, data exfil indicators, privileged account anomaly, critical control failure (e.g., logging disabled), third-party breach notification.
• Map each category to: source systems, severity threshold, required recipients, and required tools.

Artifact: Adverse Event Routing Matrix (one page is fine).

2) Identify “authorized staff” by role, not by name

Define roles and groups, then map individuals through IAM.

• SOC analyst, IR lead, on-call engineer, CISO/exec duty officer, legal/privacy, IT operations, application owner.
• Add constraints: “need-to-know” scope (e.g., only IR team sees forensic artifacts; executives get summarized updates).

Artifact: RACI for adverse event communications + IAM group list.

3) Identify “authorized tools” and their purpose

List the tools that must receive adverse event information and what they do with it:

• SIEM: aggregate, correlate, retain alerts.
• SOAR (if you have it): automate enrichment and response playbooks.
• Ticketing/case management: assign, track SLAs, record decisions.
• Paging/on-call: ensure human acknowledgment.
• Threat intel platform (optional): store indicators and context.

Control requirement: only approved tools ingest or store adverse event data; block ad hoc forwarding to personal email/chat.

Artifact: Tool inventory entry for each system + data flow diagram for alert routing.

4) Build controlled routing paths (and remove shadow paths)

Implement routing rules that are deterministic and reviewable:

• Configure alert forwarding from sources to SIEM (or central collector).
• Configure SIEM detections to create cases/tickets and page on-call for defined severities.
• Restrict who can change routing rules; log changes.

Common operational pattern:

1. Source tool generates alert
2. SIEM receives and correlates
3. SOAR enriches + creates ticket
4. Ticket routes to owning queue
5. Pager notifies on-call for urgent events
6. IR lead acknowledges and initiates playbook

Artifact: Screenshots/exports of routing rules and integrations, plus change control records.

5) Enforce least privilege for adverse event visibility

This requirement explicitly says “authorized.” That implies access control and governance.

• Use role-based access control in SIEM/SOAR/ticketing.
• Segment sensitive cases (e.g., insider risk, executive incidents) into restricted queues.
• Review access periodically and remove stale accounts (especially for third-party SOC analysts and contractors).

Artifacts: Access control policy for security tools, access review results, and evidence of deprovisioning.

6) Make the workflow testable with routine “known signal” checks

You need repeatable assurance that routing works.

• Send test alerts from a controlled source (or use vendor test events) and confirm: SIEM ingestion, ticket creation, correct queue assignment, paging, acknowledgment, and closure documentation.
• Track exceptions: missed pages, wrong queue, broken integration.

Artifacts: Test records, screenshots of alert-to-ticket chain, and exception log with remediation.

7) Run periodic control performance reviews (management-visible)

Treat DE.AE-06 like an operational control, not a project.

• Review metrics that show whether adverse events reached staff/tools (e.g., alert ingestion failures, ticket routing errors, unassigned critical alerts).
• Capture decisions and follow-ups.

This aligns to a practical governance loop recommended for CSF outcomes: define outcomes and indicators, review performance, and retain a concise evidence bundle. ³

Artifacts: Monthly/quarterly review minutes, KPI/KRI snapshot, remediation plan and due dates.

Required evidence and artifacts to retain (audit-ready)

Keep an “evidence bundle” per review cycle. Minimum set:

• Adverse Event Routing Matrix (categories → recipients/tools)
• RACI + on-call roster mapping (roles/groups → individuals)
• Security tool access list and last access review results
• Data flow diagram for alert routing (source → SIEM → ticket/pager)
• Routing/integration configurations (exports/screenshots) and change logs
• Sample adverse event records showing end-to-end flow (alert → case/ticket → notification → acknowledgment → disposition)
• Exception log (missed/late routing, integration failures) with remediation and closure evidence
• Control performance review pack (metrics, decisions, action items)

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

Auditors and customer security reviewers tend to probe:

• “Define adverse event for your environment. What’s in scope vs out?”
• “Who is authorized to see raw alerts, packet captures, and forensic artifacts?”
• “Show me an example where an alert generated a ticket and paged on-call.”
• “How do you ensure routing rules weren’t changed without approval?”
• “How do you handle adverse event notifications from third parties (cloud provider, SaaS, MSSP)?”
• “What happens if the SIEM integration is down? How do responders learn about events?”

Hangups usually appear as missing evidence (you can describe it, but can’t show it), or uncontrolled access (too many admins in SIEM/SOAR).

Frequent implementation mistakes and how to avoid them

1. Alert spam with no routing logic
   Fix: route only defined adverse event categories to human queues; keep informational alerts in dashboards.

2. “Authorized staff” not defined, only assumed
   Fix: document roles/groups and enforce via RBAC; keep an access review trail.

3. Tool sprawl and ad hoc forwarding (email, chat exports)
   Fix: designate authorized tools, restrict exports, and make the ticketing system the system of record.

4. No proof of end-to-end flow
   Fix: maintain a small library of redacted alert-to-case examples and periodic routing tests.

5. Third-party SOC/MSSP access not governed
   Fix: time-bound accounts, scoped roles, and contractual expectations for notification and escalation paths.

Enforcement context and risk implications

No public enforcement cases were provided in the supplied source catalog for this specific CSF outcome, so you should treat DE.AE-06 as a program expectation that commonly surfaces in examinations, customer due diligence, and post-incident reviews rather than as a standalone enforcement hook. Your practical risk is operational: if adverse event information does not reach the right staff/tools, you get delayed containment, inconsistent incident records, and weak defensibility when stakeholders ask what happened and when you knew it. ³

Practical 30/60/90-day execution plan

Days 1–30 (Foundation and scope)

• Name an owner for adverse event routing (often SOC manager or IR lead) and a GRC coordinator.
• Draft the Adverse Event Routing Matrix (categories, severities, recipients, tools).
• Inventory current alert sources, integrations, and handoffs; identify shadow forwarding paths.
• Define “authorized staff” groups and current access state for SIEM/SOAR/ticketing.

Days 31–60 (Implement and control)

• Implement or clean up routing rules (SIEM → ticketing → paging).
• Enforce RBAC and reduce admin access; start an access review cadence.
• Put routing changes under change control and ensure logs are retained.
• Run a first routing test and document results and fixes.

Days 61–90 (Prove operation and make it durable)

• Produce an evidence bundle with two or more end-to-end examples (redacted as needed).
• Start periodic control performance reviews; track exceptions and remediation.
• Validate third-party notification paths and escalation contacts (MSSP, cloud, key SaaS).
• Prepare an audit-ready narrative: definitions, tooling, routing, authorization, and proof.

Where Daydream fits naturally If you struggle to keep artifacts consistent across cycles, Daydream can act as the control workspace where you store the routing matrix, access reviews, test evidence, and review minutes in one place, then generate a clean evidence bundle for audits and customer due diligence.

Frequently Asked Questions

What qualifies as an “adverse event” for DE.AE-06?

Treat it as an event that requires human awareness and potential response, not every log entry. Define categories and thresholds that trigger routing to responders and case management, and keep that definition version-controlled.

Do I need a SIEM and SOAR to satisfy DE.AE-06?

No specific technology is mandated by the text. You do need authorized tools that reliably receive and track adverse event information, and you must be able to show controlled access and an audit trail.

How do I demonstrate “authorized staff” in an audit?

Show role definitions (RACI), IAM groups mapped to those roles, and evidence of periodic access reviews. Pair that with a redacted case where notifications went to the correct groups.

We use an MSSP. Who is “authorized staff” then?

The MSSP can be authorized staff if their access is scoped, approved, and reviewed. Document notification and escalation paths so internal owners still receive adverse event information and can make decisions.

What evidence is most persuasive for DE.AE-06?

End-to-end examples: alert in the monitoring tool, ingestion in SIEM, ticket creation, page to on-call, and recorded acknowledgment and disposition. Add routing rule exports and access review records to prove it’s controlled.

How do we handle sensitive incidents (insider risk, executive devices) without violating DE.AE-06?

Create restricted routing paths and restricted case queues so the right specialists receive the data without broad distribution. Document the exception handling rules and approvals.

Footnotes

1. NIST CSF 2.0; NIST CSWP 29; NIST CSF 1.1 to 2.0 Core Transition Changes

2. NIST CSWP 29; NIST CSF 1.1 to 2.0 Core Transition Changes

3. NIST CSF 2.0