DE.AE-07: Cyber threat intelligence and other contextual information are integrated into the analysis

DE.AE-07 requires you to feed cyber threat intelligence (CTI) and business/technical context into detection analysis so alerts are prioritized, investigated, and escalated based on likely adversaries, exposed assets, and current risk. Operationalize it by defining CTI sources, mapping them to detection use cases, and proving CTI influences triage decisions and tuning outcomes.

Key takeaways:

• Define which CTI and contextual signals you trust, who owns them, and how they enter your analysis workflow.
• Make CTI actionable by mapping it to assets, vulnerabilities, identity context, and business criticality, then to specific detection rules and triage steps.
• Keep evidence that CTI changed decisions (priority, scope, containment actions, tuning) and that leadership reviews gaps and exceptions.

The target keyword, de.ae-07: cyber threat intelligence and other contextual information are integrated into the analysis requirement, reads simple but fails in practice for a consistent reason: teams “receive” CTI without proving it changed detection outcomes. Under NIST CSF 2.0, DE.AE-07 expects CTI and context to be operational inputs to analysis, not passive reading material (NIST CSF 2.0). For a CCO or GRC lead, the fastest path is to treat DE.AE-07 like an auditable decision workflow: defined inputs, defined decision points, measurable outputs, and an evidence bundle per review cycle.

“Contextual information” is broader than threat feeds. It includes what you know about your environment: crown-jewel systems, third parties, exposed services, vulnerability and patch status, identity privilege, change windows, and business events. Your analysts should be able to answer, with documentation, “Why was this alert prioritized?” using CTI plus internal context, and show how detection content and triage guidance changed after new intelligence.

Regulatory text

Text: “Cyber threat intelligence and other contextual information are integrated into the analysis” (NIST CSWP 29; NIST CSF 1.1 to 2.0 Core Transition Changes).

Operator interpretation: You must implement a repeatable process where CTI and internal context are embedded into detection engineering and SOC triage so they materially influence:

• alert severity and routing,
• investigative scope (which systems, users, and third parties to check),
• containment recommendations,
• detection tuning and backlog prioritization.

A workable test: pick recent investigations and show that CTI/context was referenced in the case record and changed at least one decision (priority, scope, escalation path, or tuning action). That’s what “integrated into the analysis” looks like in evidence.

Plain-English interpretation (requirement-level)

DE.AE-07 means your detection and analysis function must not treat alerts as isolated technical signals. Analysts need enough adversary and environment context to interpret signals correctly and act faster. Practically, you are building a “context-enriched triage” capability:

• CTI answers: Who might do this? What tactics/techniques are relevant? What IOCs/TTPs are current?
• Internal context answers: Is the affected asset critical? Is it internet-facing? Is the user privileged? Is there a known vulnerability? Is a third party involved? Was there a planned change?

Your compliance goal is to ensure this context consistently enters the workflow and is reviewed for effectiveness (NIST CSF 2.0).

Who it applies to

Entity types (typical):

• Critical infrastructure operators and regulated enterprises running a cybersecurity program (NIST CSF 2.0).
• Service organizations handling customer data, operating shared infrastructure, or providing managed services where detection decisions affect clients (NIST CSF 2.0).

Operational contexts where auditors will probe hardest:

• A centralized SOC (internal or managed) that triages alerts.
• Cloud-heavy environments where identity, misconfiguration, and exposure context drive risk.
• Organizations dependent on third parties (SaaS, MSP/MSSP, hosting, software supply chain) where CTI must inform monitoring and incident handling for external dependencies.
• High-value business processes (payments, trading, healthcare delivery, OT operations) where “criticality context” must be reflected in prioritization.

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

1) Define CTI and context inputs (and owners)

Create a one-page register of inputs and ownership:

• CTI sources: ISAC/ISAO reporting, government advisories, commercial feeds, internal incident learnings, MSSP bulletins, threat research.
• Context sources: CMDB/asset inventory, business criticality tiers, vulnerability scanner results, EDR coverage, identity directory/privileged access lists, external attack surface inventory, third-party inventory, change management calendar.

Assign owners: typically Threat Intel lead (or SOC manager), Detection Engineering, Vulnerability Management, and GRC for oversight. Tie each input to a refresh cadence you can meet and evidence.

2) Translate intelligence into “actionable analysis hooks”

Most CTI is unusable until you map it to your environment. Build a minimal translation layer:

• Threat-to-asset mapping: Which business services, apps, cloud accounts, and third parties are in-scope for the intel?
• Threat-to-technique mapping: Which log sources and detections can observe the TTPs described?
• Threat-to-control mapping: Which preventive and detective controls should be tuned or prioritized?

Deliverable: a short “Intel-to-Detection Impact Note” template (can be a ticket type) that records what changed.

3) Embed CTI/context into triage decision points

Update your SOC triage runbooks so analysts must consider:

• Asset criticality and exposure (internet-facing, production, regulated data).
• Identity privilege and anomalous access patterns.
• Vulnerability and patch status for the affected asset.
• Relevant active threats (campaigns, exploited vulnerabilities, targeted sectors).
• Third-party involvement (hosted system, vendor tool, MSP access path).

Make this operational by adding required fields to case management (SIEM/SOAR/ticketing): “Relevant intel,” “Asset criticality,” “Known vuln/exposure,” “Third party involved,” “Reason for priority.”

4) Integrate CTI into detection content management

Run a lightweight “detection backlog triage” meeting where CTI and context drive priorities:

• Add/modify correlation rules based on current campaigns.
• Add watchlists for high-risk identities, admin roles, service accounts, and vendor remote access accounts.
• Tune alert thresholds based on critical assets and business hours.
• Confirm logging coverage for the assets implicated by current threats.

This is where compliance teams often win: show the meeting notes and tickets that link CTI to rule changes (NIST CSF 2.0).

5) Measure and review control performance (with exceptions)

Define measurable indicators that show integration is real, for example:

• % of investigations with documented CTI/context fields completed.
• Number of CTI-driven detection changes per review cycle.
• Aging of CTI-driven tuning backlog.
• Exceptions: missing context feeds (no asset tiering, incomplete third-party inventory) with remediation dates.

Hold a periodic review with SOC + GRC leadership. Record decisions and risk acceptance where gaps persist (NIST CSF 2.0).

6) Package the evidence bundle (make audits easy)

Keep a concise bundle per review cycle:

• CTI/context source register and owners.
• Triage runbooks with required context fields.
• Samples of closed investigations showing CTI/context influenced priority/scope.
• Detection change tickets linked to specific intelligence.
• Review meeting minutes, metrics, and exceptions with remediation dates (NIST CSF 2.0).

Daydream note: if you manage requirements in Daydream, store the above as a single “DE.AE-07 evidence bundle” with an owner, review frequency, and cross-links to tickets and case samples, so audits become retrieval work instead of archaeology.

Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Use this checklist as your minimum auditable set:

Artifact	What it proves	Good enough looks like
CTI & context inputs register	Defined inputs and ownership	Named sources, owners, refresh expectations
SOC triage SOP/runbooks	CTI/context is required in analysis	Decision tree includes intel + asset/user context
Case management fields/screenshots	Analysts actually used context	Completed fields on sampled cases
3–5 case samples per cycle	CTI/context changed outcomes	Priority/escalation/tuning rationale references context
Detection engineering tickets	CTI drove detection changes	Ticket links to intel note/advisory and rule change
Review meeting notes + metrics	Governance and continuous improvement	Exceptions, decisions, follow-ups, due dates

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

• “Show me an investigation where threat intel changed what you did.” Expect to produce a case with documented rationale.
• “Which CTI sources do you rely on, and how do you validate relevance?” Auditors want ownership and a repeatable intake path.
• “How do you ensure intel reaches detection engineering and not just the SOC inbox?” Show the handoff mechanism (ticket type, backlog triage).
• “How do you handle third-party-related intelligence?” Show that vendor/third-party access paths and dependencies are part of context fields and triage.
• “What happens when context is missing (no asset tier, unknown owner)?” Have an exception workflow, not ad hoc improvisation.

Frequent implementation mistakes (and fixes)

1. Mistake: CTI as a newsletter.
   Fix: require an “Intel-to-Detection Impact Note” for material items, even when the action is “no change,” with a reason.

2. Mistake: Analysts can’t access context fast.
   Fix: embed context in the tools they already use (case fields, SOAR enrichment, SIEM entity pages). If enrichment is manual, define a standard lookup path.

3. Mistake: No linkage between intel and tuning.
   Fix: every detection change ticket needs a reference to the intel that triggered it and the validation outcome after deployment.

4. Mistake: Context is inconsistent across teams (CMDB vs cloud inventory vs app owners).
   Fix: pick a system of record for criticality and ownership, document it, and record exceptions with remediation.

5. Mistake: Third parties left out.
   Fix: treat key third parties as “assets” in context: vendor tools with elevated access, SaaS holding regulated data, MSP remote administration, and critical suppliers.

Enforcement context and risk implications

No public enforcement cases were provided in the source catalog for this requirement. Treat DE.AE-07 as a maturity and defensibility requirement under NIST CSF 2.0: if you cannot show CTI/context influenced analysis, your program can look reactive and hard to govern (NIST CSF 2.0). The risk outcome is practical: mis-prioritized alerts, slower containment, and missed patterns across business services and third parties.

Practical 30/60/90-day execution plan

First 30 days (stand up the operating model)

• Name an owner for DE.AE-07 and map stakeholders (SOC, Threat Intel, Vuln Mgmt, IAM, IT Ops, Third-Party Risk).
• Build the CTI/context inputs register with owners and access paths.
• Add required context fields to case management (even if analysts fill them manually).
• Publish a triage SOP addendum: minimum context checks for high-severity alerts.

By 60 days (make it repeatable and provable)

• Implement the “Intel-to-Detection Impact Note” template and require it for material intelligence.
• Run a first detection backlog triage meeting driven by current intel and internal exposure.
• Capture a small set of case samples where context drove prioritization or scope.
• Define metrics and an exceptions log with remediation owners and due dates.

By 90 days (operationalize governance and continuous improvement)

• Automate key enrichments where feasible (asset criticality, identity privilege, vuln status, third-party tags).
• Formalize periodic control performance reviews and keep minutes and decisions.
• Validate detection changes with a post-change check (false positives, coverage, routing).
• Package a clean evidence bundle for internal audit, customer diligence, or regulator conversations (NIST CSF 2.0).

Frequently Asked Questions

What counts as “other contextual information” besides threat intelligence?

Anything that changes how you interpret an alert: asset criticality, internet exposure, vulnerability status, identity privilege, third-party dependencies, and change windows. Document which context signals your SOC must check for specific alert types.

Do we need a dedicated threat intelligence team to meet DE.AE-07?

No. You need defined CTI sources and a repeatable intake-to-action workflow. Small teams often assign CTI intake to the SOC manager or detection engineer with a documented review cadence.

How do we prove CTI was “integrated” rather than merely received?

Show case samples where CTI/context changed prioritization, investigation scope, escalation, or tuning. Tie detection engineering tickets to an intel note and keep post-change validation evidence.

Our CMDB is incomplete. Can we still comply?

Yes, if you document the system of record you do have, define how analysts obtain ownership/criticality, and log exceptions with remediation actions. Auditors usually accept incremental maturity if gaps are tracked and reviewed.

How should third-party risk connect to DE.AE-07?

Treat key third parties as part of the context layer: vendor remote access accounts, SaaS holding regulated data, and outsourced operations. Your triage runbooks should require analysts to identify third-party involvement and follow the right escalation path.

What’s the minimum “evidence bundle” a CCO can ask for each review cycle?

A current inputs register, triage SOP/runbook, a few representative cases showing CTI/context-driven decisions, detection change records tied to intel, and review notes with metrics and exceptions (NIST CSF 2.0).