ID.RA-02: Cyber threat intelligence is received from information sharing forums and sources

To meet the id.ra-02: cyber threat intelligence is received from information sharing forums and sources requirement, you must formally subscribe to relevant threat intel sources, routinely ingest the intel, and show how it is triaged and turned into actions (detections, blocking, patching priorities, third-party due diligence triggers). Keep evidence of receipt, review, and resulting decisions. ¹

Key takeaways:

• You need defined sources, a cadence, and a triage workflow that proves threat intel is actually received and reviewed. ¹
• The control passes audits when you can trace intel → ticket/change → implemented outcome (or documented “no action” rationale).
• “We get newsletters” is not enough without ownership, logging, retention, and operational linkage to risk assessment. ¹

ID.RA-02 is a requirement about operationalizing inbound cyber threat intelligence, not collecting interesting reading. NIST CSF 2.0 expects that your organization receives threat intelligence from information-sharing forums and other sources and can demonstrate that the information reaches the teams who can act on it. ¹

For a Compliance Officer, CCO, or GRC lead, the fastest path is to treat ID.RA-02 like a traceability control: define which threat intel sources are approved, assign an owner accountable for intake, document a repeatable triage and escalation process, and preserve evidence that intel was received, reviewed, and either drove an action or was formally dispositioned. That evidence must be consistent over time, not assembled at the end of an audit cycle.

This requirement also intersects with third-party risk management and vendor due diligence. Threat intel often includes supplier compromise patterns, exploited vulnerabilities in widely used products, and indicators of compromise tied to third-party software. Your program should show how inbound intel triggers targeted third-party follow-ups (for example, confirming patch status, requesting incident disclosures, or restricting connectivity) when appropriate.

Regulatory text

Excerpt: “Cyber threat intelligence is received from information sharing forums and sources.” ²

What an operator must do:
You must (1) identify and connect to external threat intelligence sources and information-sharing forums relevant to your environment, (2) receive intel on an ongoing basis, (3) route it into an internal process where it is reviewed and triaged, and (4) produce audit-ready records proving the intake and the outcomes of review. ¹

Plain-English interpretation (what auditors expect you to mean)

ID.RA-02 means your risk assessment and security operations cannot be isolated from the outside world. You need a reliable “inbox” for threat intelligence that is monitored, documented, and connected to decision-making.

A defensible implementation has three traits:

1. Repeatable intake: named sources, documented access, and a defined cadence for reviewing what comes in.
2. Triage with accountability: a clear owner and a method to classify intel (informational vs. relevant vs. urgent).
3. Action linkage: evidence that relevant intel becomes operational work (detection engineering, vulnerability prioritization, third-party inquiries, user communications) or is dispositioned with rationale.

Who it applies to

Entity scope: Any organization operating a cybersecurity program and aligning to NIST CSF 2.0, including regulated firms that use CSF to demonstrate “reasonable security.” ¹

Operational context where it matters most:

• You operate internet-facing systems, cloud workloads, or SaaS productivity stacks.
• You have material third-party dependencies (SaaS, MSP/MSSP, critical software suppliers, payment processors).
• You maintain incident response, vulnerability management, and detection/monitoring functions that need external context.
• You have a board or executive risk reporting process and need defensible inputs to “what changed” in the threat landscape.

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

1) Assign ownership and define “threat intel” for your program

• Control owner: name a function (Security Operations, IR, or GRC) accountable for intake and evidence.
• Definition: document what counts as threat intel for you (advisories, IOCs, TTP reports, vuln exploit alerts, sector bulletins, vendor security advisories).
• Recipients: list the internal teams who must receive relevant intel (SOC, vulnerability management, IT ops, appsec, third-party risk, executive stakeholders).

Deliverable: “Threat Intelligence Intake & Triage Procedure” mapped to ID.RA-02. ¹

2) Approve and subscribe to sources (make it explicit)

Build a Threat Intel Source Register. Include:

• Source name and type (ISAC/ISAO, government, vendor advisory, commercial feed, open-source).
• Access method (email list, portal, API, TAXII server, ticket integration).
• Relevance (what systems/vendors/sector it covers).
• Authentication/entitlement proof (account owner, group mailbox, license reference if applicable).
• Intake channel (where messages land and how they are logged).

Practical guidance: include at least one source tied to (a) your industry/sector, (b) your critical technology providers, and (c) general vulnerability exploitation reporting. Keep the rationale short and testable.

3) Build the intake pipeline (centralize and log)

Choose an intake mechanism that creates durable records:

• A monitored distribution list archived in your email system.
• A ticketing queue (ServiceNow/Jira) where intel items are created as tickets.
• A SIEM/SOAR or threat intel platform ingestion feed that logs receipt events.

Minimum expectation for auditability: show date received, source, summary, triage decision, assignee, and closure evidence.

4) Triage and disposition every relevant item

Create a triage rubric that yields consistent decisions:

• Not applicable: document why (tech stack mismatch, already mitigated, duplicate).
• Monitor: track but no immediate change; set a review trigger.
• Action required: create work items with due dates and owners (patch, block, detection rule, hunt, third-party outreach).

Avoid “tribal knowledge.” Put the rubric in the procedure and make analysts use a consistent set of fields.

5) Tie intel to operational controls (prove it changed something)

Auditors will ask: “So what?” Build traceability to:

• Vulnerability management: link intel items to vulnerability tickets, emergency change records, patch exceptions, compensating controls.
• Detection & response: link to SIEM rules, EDR blocks, indicator lists, hunting notes, incident records.
• Third-party risk: when intel implicates a supplier or widely used product, create a third-party follow-up record (questionnaire addendum, attestation request, ticket to vendor manager, connectivity restriction decision).

A practical pattern: require that each “Action required” intel ticket links to at least one downstream ticket/change, or includes a documented reason no downstream work was needed.

6) Establish governance and reporting (keep it light but regular)

• Hold a recurring intel review meeting or async review cycle with defined attendees.
• Report themes to risk leadership: emerging campaigns, exploited products you depend on, notable third-party exposures.
• Periodically validate source coverage: remove dead feeds, add sources based on new technologies or market shifts.

7) Map the requirement to policy, procedure, owner, and recurring evidence

Implement the recommended control explicitly: map ID.RA-02 to a policy statement, the operating procedure, a control owner, and an evidence collection rhythm so you are not scrambling at audit time. ²

If you run Daydream for control management, capture ID.RA-02 as a requirement with an assigned owner, attach the procedure, and schedule recurring evidence requests (source register export, sample intel tickets, meeting notes, and traceability samples).

Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Use this as your audit-ready checklist:

Core governance

• Threat Intelligence Policy or standard (high level).
• Threat Intelligence Intake & Triage Procedure mapped to ID.RA-02. ¹
• RACI or role assignment showing accountable owner and backups.

Source evidence

• Threat Intel Source Register (current version + change history).
• Proof of membership/subscription where applicable (screenshots, emails, portal access logs).

Operational evidence

• Intake logs (mailbox archive exports, SIEM/TIP ingestion logs, or ticket queue).
• Sampled intel records showing triage fields populated and closure notes.
• Evidence of downstream actions: patch tickets, detection changes, firewall blocks, hunt reports, third-party outreach records.

Oversight

• Meeting agenda/notes or documented async approvals.
• Metrics dashboards if you track volume and disposition (optional, but useful).

Retention note: keep evidence long enough to cover your audit window and incident lookback needs; align to your organization’s retention policy.

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

What auditors ask

• “Which sources do you receive threat intel from, and why those?”
• “How do you prove you actually received intel, not just that you could?”
• “Show me three examples where intel drove a control change.”
• “Who reviews intel, and what happens if they are out?”
• “How does intel feed your risk assessment and third-party risk process?” ¹

Hangups

• No centralized record of receipt; intel is scattered across inboxes.
• Triage decisions are undocumented; only verbal.
• Actions happen, but there is no link between intel and the change record.

Frequent implementation mistakes (and how to avoid them)

1. Mistake: treating threat intel as a newsletter subscription.
   Fix: require every relevant item to be logged and dispositioned in a system of record.

2. Mistake: too many sources, no signal.
   Fix: start with a curated register tied to your tech stack and sector, then expand based on gaps discovered during incidents and risk reviews.

3. Mistake: SOC receives intel but GRC cannot evidence it.
   Fix: design evidence capture into the workflow (ticket fields, automated ingestion logs, recurring exports).

4. Mistake: intel doesn’t touch third-party risk.
   Fix: add a triage outcome: “Third-party follow-up required,” with a standard playbook for outreach and documentation.

Enforcement context and risk implications

NIST CSF is a framework, not a regulator. Your risk is indirect: failure to operationalize ID.RA-02 often shows up as delayed vulnerability response, weaker detection posture, and poor narrative after an incident (“we were unaware of active exploitation”). That narrative becomes high-friction in regulatory exams, customer security reviews, cyber insurance underwriting, and litigation discovery. ¹

Practical 30/60/90-day execution plan

First 30 days (stand up the minimum viable control)

• Assign control owner and backups; write a one-page intake/triage procedure.
• Create the Threat Intel Source Register and approve initial sources.
• Centralize intake (group mailbox or ticket queue) and confirm archiving/logging.
• Run a pilot triage cycle and generate a small sample set of completed records.

Days 31–60 (make it operational and traceable)

• Add triage rubric fields and required dispositions.
• Integrate with vulnerability management and detection engineering workflows (linking tickets).
• Add a third-party follow-up playbook and templates for supplier outreach.
• Start a recurring review cadence and preserve agendas/notes.

Days 61–90 (audit harden and reduce manual work)

• Perform an internal control test: pick samples and verify end-to-end traceability.
• Tune sources (remove noise, add missing coverage for critical technologies).
• Formalize recurring evidence collection in your GRC system (Daydream or equivalent): source register export, sample tickets, meeting records, downstream links.
• Prepare an “audit packet” that a reviewer can validate without interviews.

Frequently Asked Questions

What counts as an “information sharing forum” for ID.RA-02?

Any external mechanism where threat information is shared and you can receive it in a repeatable way, including sector groups, vendor advisory programs, and government or community channels. Your register should name the forum, access method, and internal owner. ¹

Do we need a paid threat intel feed to comply?

No specific source type is mandated. Compliance comes from proving receipt, triage, and actionability using sources relevant to your environment. ¹

How do we prove we “received” threat intelligence during an audit?

Keep system-of-record evidence such as archived mailbox messages, portal notifications captured in tickets, or ingestion logs from a TIP/SIEM. Pair receipt evidence with a triage record and closure notes.

Who should own ID.RA-02: SOC, IR, or GRC?

Put operational ownership with the team that can triage daily (often SOC or IR) and make GRC accountable for mapping, oversight, and evidence quality. The audit failure mode is unclear ownership, so document the RACI. ¹

How do we connect threat intel to third-party risk without overreacting?

Add a triage decision point: “third-party follow-up required” only when intel names a supplier/product you run, maps to your integrations, or indicates active exploitation relevant to your environment. Document the decision and the outreach outcome.

What if we review intel but decide no action is required most of the time?

That can be acceptable if you document the rationale consistently (not applicable, duplicate, already mitigated) and show the review was real. Auditors usually object to missing records, not to “no action” outcomes. ¹

Footnotes

1. NIST CSWP 29

2. NIST CSWP 29; NIST CSF 1.1 to 2.0 Core Transition Changes