RC.RP-03: The integrity of backups and other restoration assets is verified before using them for restoration

RC.RP-03 requires you to verify the integrity of backups and any other restoration assets (images, golden builds, infrastructure-as-code, keys, configs) before you use them to restore systems. Operationalize it by implementing pre-restore integrity checks (hash/signature/immutability validation), malware scanning where appropriate, documented restore test results, and audit-ready evidence that the checks were performed and acted on.

Key takeaways:

• Define “restoration assets” broadly, not just backup files, and inventory them with owners and verification methods.
• Make integrity verification a hard gate in the restore runbook, with automated checks and documented exceptions.
• Keep evidence that proves checks occurred before restoration, plus outcomes, failures, and remediation actions.

RC.RP-03 is a recovery requirement that fails quietly until you need it most. If you restore from a corrupted, incomplete, tampered, or malware-laced backup, you can reintroduce the original incident, expand impact, or destroy forensic value. For a Compliance Officer, CCO, or GRC lead, the goal is simple: make integrity verification a mandatory control step before any restoration event and make it provable.

This requirement is part of NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0’s Recover function. The wording is short, but the operational scope is wide. “Backups and other restoration assets” includes data backups, system images, cloud snapshots, container registries, deployment artifacts, configuration baselines, and even secrets used to bring environments back online. You need a defined verification method per asset type, a workflow that enforces it under time pressure, and evidence that stands up in audits and post-incident reviews.

This page gives requirement-level implementation guidance you can hand to IT Ops, SRE, SecOps, and IR teams, then track with recurring evidence collection and control ownership. Source basis: NIST CSF 2.0 and the CSF 1.1 to 2.0 transition materials. (NIST CSWP 29; NIST CSF 1.1 to 2.0 Core Transition Changes)

Regulatory text

Excerpt (RC.RP-03): “The integrity of backups and other restoration assets is verified before using them for restoration.” (NIST CSWP 29; NIST CSF 1.1 to 2.0 Core Transition Changes)

What an operator must do:
You must implement a pre-restore verification step that checks whether a backup or restoration asset is complete, uncorrupted, and untampered, and you must perform that step before any restoration action proceeds. “Verified” needs to be more than “the job succeeded.” It requires a defined integrity mechanism (for example, cryptographic hashes, signed artifacts, immutability validation, or controlled provenance) and recorded results tied to the restoration event.

Plain-English interpretation (what RC.RP-03 means in practice)

• Treat every restoration input as potentially unsafe until proven otherwise.
• Integrity checks are a gate: restore only after the check passes or an approved exception is recorded.
• Verification must cover data (can we read it and does it match expected checksums) and provenance (did it come from the right place, at the right time, with the right chain of custody).
• The control extends beyond backup repositories to “other restoration assets,” which often include items teams forget to govern: OS images, “golden” AMIs, VM templates, container base images, IaC modules, configuration bundles, and recovery scripts.

Who it applies to

Entities: Any organization operating a cybersecurity program aligned to NIST CSF 2.0, especially those with formal incident response, disaster recovery, or business continuity requirements. (NIST CSWP 29)

Operational contexts where RC.RP-03 matters most:

• Ransomware recovery: attackers commonly target backup systems, hypervisors, or admin tooling.
• Cloud recovery: snapshots, images, and templates can drift or be replaced if controls are weak.
• DevOps-based rebuilds: teams “restore” by redeploying from pipelines, registries, and IaC, not by restoring files. Those artifacts are restoration assets.
• Third-party hosted platforms: your recovery may depend on a third party’s backups or export mechanisms. Your obligation becomes contractual plus operational: you still need integrity assurances before importing or restoring.

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

Step 1: Define restoration assets and scope them into the control

Create a scoped list of restoration asset categories, with an owner per category:

• Backup types: database dumps, file-level backups, image-based backups, SaaS exports
• Infrastructure artifacts: VM templates, cloud images, snapshots, container images
• Deployment artifacts: signed build artifacts, release bundles
• Configuration and security assets: baseline configs, certificates, keys, recovery scripts

Deliverable: “Restoration Assets Inventory” with asset type, storage location, owner, verification method, and required evidence.

Step 2: Standardize integrity verification methods by asset type

You need a documented method that is feasible during an outage.

A practical decision matrix:

Asset type	Minimum integrity checks (pre-restore)	Notes
File/database backups	Verify checksum/hash; verify backup job completeness; test read/restore to isolated environment	Hash validation must be against known-good metadata stored separately
Images/templates/snapshots	Verify provenance (account/project, tags, creation pipeline); validate signatures if supported; confirm immutability/retention lock status	Treat “latest” tags as risky; prefer versioned, signed images
Container images	Verify image digest; enforce signed images (where supported); scan before promotion to recovery registry	Use immutable digests, not mutable tags
IaC/modules/scripts	Verify commit/tag signature; validate repo integrity; verify artifacts match approved release	Recovery scripts are a common infection path
SaaS exports	Validate export completion; validate file integrity; store checksums at export time	Include chain-of-custody controls

Document these in a “Pre-Restore Integrity Verification Standard” and map it to RC.RP-03. (NIST CSWP 29)

Step 3: Build the “pre-restore gate” into runbooks and tooling

Make the verification a required step in:

• Disaster recovery runbooks
• Incident response restoration procedures
• Change management emergency procedures

Implementation pattern that works under pressure:

• A checklist item that must be marked complete with a link to evidence (hash report, signed artifact verification output, restore test log).
• A technical gate where possible (pipeline step, scripted validation, policy-as-code) so restores cannot proceed without a pass result.

Step 4: Operationalize restore testing that proves integrity, not just availability

Integrity verification is strongest when you can show controlled restore tests:

• Restore to an isolated environment.
• Validate the restored system boots/starts and data can be read.
• Validate integrity signals (hash match, signature verification, provenance checks).
• Record failures and corrective actions (reseed backups, fix retention lock, correct metadata).

Keep tests focused on critical systems and tier-1 restoration paths. Tie results to the asset inventory so you can demonstrate coverage.

Step 5: Define exception handling for real incidents

Sometimes you restore under extreme time constraints. Auditors will still ask what happened.

Define:

• Who can approve bypassing a failed integrity check.
• What compensating controls apply (for example, restore into quarantine, enhanced monitoring, forensic capture first).
• What gets documented (risk acceptance, time, scope, rationale).
• Post-incident remediation requirements (rebuild clean backups, rotate secrets, validate endpoints).

Step 6: Make it auditable with ownership and recurring evidence

Assign a control owner (usually Infrastructure/IT Ops with Security oversight) and set an evidence cadence:

• Evidence per restoration event (including tests).
• Periodic sampling evidence even when no incidents occur (for example, restore drills and integrity reports).

If you use Daydream, treat RC.RP-03 as a mapped requirement with a named owner, a procedure link, and an evidence request schedule so the evidence is collected continuously instead of assembled during an audit.

Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Auditors typically want to see proof that integrity checks occurred before restoration and that you can reproduce the process.

Retain:

• Policy/standard: Pre-Restore Integrity Verification Standard mapped to RC.RP-03 (NIST CSWP 29)
• Runbooks: DR/IR restore runbooks showing integrity verification as a required step
• Restoration assets inventory: categories, owners, verification methods
• Technical outputs: checksum/hash verification logs, signature verification output, immutability/retention lock status screenshots or logs, artifact provenance records
• Restore test records: date, system, backup set/artifact version, validation steps, result, ticket/approval references
• Tickets and approvals: change tickets or incident tickets linking to evidence, including exceptions and risk acceptance
• Access/control evidence (supporting): who can modify backup repositories, image registries, IaC repos (supporting integrity assumptions)

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

1. “Define ‘other restoration assets’ for your environment.” If you only talk about backup files, you will look incomplete.
2. “Show me evidence from a real restore event.” A tabletop is not the same as a logged restore with integrity checks.
3. “How do you know the hash you compare against wasn’t modified?” You need protected metadata, separation of duties, or signed manifests.
4. “What happens if verification fails?” Auditors expect a decision path, not ad hoc behavior.
5. “Do you test restores from offline/immutable backups?” If ransomware is in scope, they will ask how backups resist tampering.

Frequent implementation mistakes (and how to avoid them)

• Mistake: Treating “backup job success” as integrity verification.
  Fix: Require independent validation (hash/signature/provenance) and a test restore record.
• Mistake: No inventory of restoration assets beyond backups.
  Fix: Inventory images, templates, registries, IaC, and recovery scripts, with owners and checks.
• Mistake: Integrity checks exist but are optional under pressure.
  Fix: Put the gate into the runbook and automate it where possible. Require documented exceptions.
• Mistake: Evidence is screenshots with no linkage to the restoration event.
  Fix: Link logs and outputs to a ticket or incident record, with timestamps.
• Mistake: Third-party recovery assumptions are undocumented.
  Fix: Add contract clauses and operational procedures for validating exports and imported backups before restoring.

Enforcement context and risk implications

No public enforcement cases were provided in the source catalog for this specific NIST CSF subcategory, so you should treat it as a control expectation rather than a standalone enforcement trigger.

Risk-wise, RC.RP-03 is a “secondary impact” control: failures often worsen an incident that already occurred. Typical consequences include reinfection after ransomware, extended downtime due to repeated failed restores, and inability to prove data integrity after recovery. From a governance angle, the gap that draws scrutiny is usually simple: teams cannot produce objective evidence that integrity checks were completed before restore actions. (NIST CSWP 29)

Practical 30/60/90-day execution plan

First 30 days (stabilize and make it enforceable)

• Name a control owner and backups/restoration SMEs (Ops + Security).
• Publish a one-page standard: asset types in scope, minimum integrity checks, and required evidence mapped to RC.RP-03. (NIST CSWP 29)
• Update DR/IR runbooks to add a mandatory “pre-restore integrity gate” step with evidence links.
• Identify where integrity metadata is stored and who can modify it.

Days 31–60 (prove it works with real artifacts)

• Build the restoration assets inventory with owners and verification methods.
• Implement automated checks for the most common restore paths (scripts, pipeline stages, or backup platform validations).
• Run at least one restore test per critical restoration path and retain the full evidence package (logs + ticket + result).

Days 61–90 (harden and make it repeatable)

• Add exception workflow with approvals and compensating controls.
• Expand verification coverage to “other restoration assets” (images, registries, IaC modules, recovery scripts).
• Establish recurring evidence collection in your GRC workflow (for example, scheduled evidence requests and sampling). Daydream can track the mapping, assign ownership, and request evidence on a schedule so RC.RP-03 stays continuously audit-ready.

Frequently Asked Questions

What counts as “other restoration assets” besides backups?

Anything you rely on to rebuild systems or data: VM templates, cloud images, container base images, IaC modules, configuration baselines, recovery scripts, and sometimes SaaS exports. If it can restore service, it belongs in scope for RC.RP-03. (NIST CSWP 29)

Is a successful restore test enough to meet RC.RP-03?

It’s strong evidence, but you still need an integrity check method and recorded results tied to the specific backup/artifact version. A restore that “works” can still reintroduce tampered or infected content if you never validated provenance or integrity.

How do we verify integrity if our backup tool doesn’t provide cryptographic validation?

Add an external control: generate and store hashes/manifests at backup creation time in a protected location, and validate before restore. If you cannot implement cryptographic validation quickly, require isolated test restores and documented acceptance until you close the tooling gap.

What do auditors want to see for “verified before using them”?

Timestamped evidence that the verification occurred prior to restoration actions, plus the result and the decision. Tie the evidence to a ticket or incident record so sequencing is clear.

How should we handle integrity check failures during an active incident?

Use an exception process with named approvers, documented rationale, and compensating controls such as restoring into quarantine and increasing monitoring. After recovery, require remediation to re-establish clean restoration assets and close the root cause.

How does this apply to third-party managed backups or DRaaS?

You still need integrity assurance before importing or restoring data in your environment. Contractually require integrity controls and provide operational procedures to validate exports, hashes, or signed artifacts before you restore.