SC-30: Concealment and Misdirection

To meet the sc-30: concealment and misdirection requirement, you must deliberately deploy approved deception techniques (for defined systems/components and locations) that mislead adversaries, then document scope, authorization, runbooks, and test evidence that the deception works and does not break operations ¹. Focus on controlled, monitored deception, not ad hoc “security by obscurity.”

Key takeaways:

• Define what you will deceive (assets), where (environments), and how (approved techniques) before you deploy anything ¹.
• Treat deception as an engineered control: authorization, change control, monitoring, and periodic validation are the audit center of gravity.
• Evidence must show design decisions, safe operation, and ongoing effectiveness, not just a one-time configuration screenshot.

SC-30 is one of the few NIST SP 800-53 controls that explicitly calls for security deception: concealment and misdirection techniques that confuse and mislead adversaries ¹. For a CCO or GRC lead, the operational challenge is predictable. Security teams may experiment with honeypots, decoy accounts, misleading banners, or network misdirection, but those efforts often lack defined scope, formal approval, safety guardrails, and repeatable evidence. That is how you end up with a control that “exists” but cannot pass an audit.

Operationalizing SC-30 means you make three decisions and lock them into governance: (1) which systems/components are in scope for deception, (2) which environments/locations are approved, and (3) which specific concealment/misdirection techniques you will use ¹. Then you build a runbook that production teams can execute safely, with monitoring so SOC analysts can distinguish real assets from decoys. Done well, SC-30 improves adversary detection and raises attacker cost. Done poorly, it creates outages, false positives, and messy incident response.

Regulatory text

NIST control excerpt (SC-30): “Employ the following concealment and misdirection techniques for [organization-defined information systems/components] at [organization-defined locations] to confuse and mislead adversaries: [organization-defined concealment and misdirection techniques].” ¹

What the operator must do: you must (a) define the scope (systems/components), (b) define where the techniques apply (locations/environments), and (c) implement specific deception techniques that you can name, operate, and evidence ¹. The requirement is not satisfied by general statements like “we hide internal IPs,” unless you can show the defined techniques, where they run, and that they are intentionally designed to mislead adversaries (not just coincidental architecture).

Plain-English interpretation (what SC-30 really asks for)

SC-30 requires intentional deception. You deploy decoys, misleading signals, or concealment methods so an attacker wastes time, exposes tools, or trips monitoring while you protect real assets.

A practical interpretation that auditors accept:

• Concealment: reduce reliable attacker visibility into real assets (for example, hiding management interfaces behind controlled access paths; masking service fingerprints where appropriate).
• Misdirection: present believable but fake targets, paths, or identities (for example, decoy credentials that alert when used; honeypot services that look real to scanning).

Your job in GRC is to make this safe and governable: approved patterns, change control, telemetry, and periodic validation.

Who it applies to (entity and operational context)

SC-30 is commonly applicable to:

• Federal information systems and programs aligned to NIST SP 800-53 ².
• Contractor systems handling federal data where the security plan inherits or implements NIST 800-53 controls ².

Operational contexts where SC-30 is most realistic:

• Internet-facing services, shared hosting environments, and remote access planes.
• High-value internal segments (identity systems, build systems, privileged admin planes).
• Environments with a SOC capability that can monitor deception telemetry and respond.

Where SC-30 often becomes “not applicable” in practice: very small footprints with no central monitoring, or systems where deception adds unacceptable safety risk. If you claim that position, document the rationale and compensating controls in your SSP.

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

1) Write the SC-30 control card (make it runnable)

Create a one-page “control card” that answers the questions auditors ask first:

• Objective: confuse and mislead adversaries using defined deception techniques.
• Owner: Security Engineering (primary), SOC (monitoring), GRC (governance).
• In-scope assets: name the system/components categories (for example, external web tier, identity endpoints, admin interfaces).
• Approved locations: specify environments (production, staging, lab) and network zones.
• Approved techniques: list allowed techniques with short descriptions and where used.
• Trigger events: new internet-facing service, new VPC/VNET, major architecture change, post-incident hardening.
• Exception rules: when deception is prohibited (life/safety systems, regulated test constraints, contractual restrictions). This directly maps to the SC-30 “organization-defined” placeholders ¹.

2) Choose techniques that your SOC can monitor and your ops teams can support

Build an approved “deception pattern library” with at least a small set of patterns you can operate consistently. Examples (choose what fits your environment):

• Decoy services (honeypots/honeyports): emulate common services in monitored segments; alert on interaction.
• Decoy credentials (honeytokens): seeded in places attackers search (config repos, file shares) with alerting on use.
• Decoy hosts or directories: believable naming conventions that are not used by production workloads.
• Misdirection via network segmentation and controlled paths: steer unknown traffic into monitored choke points.
• Concealment of sensitive service metadata: reduce banner leakage where it does not harm operations.

GRC deliverable: a list of approved techniques, with owner sign-off, and explicit monitoring/response requirements.

3) Engineer guardrails (so deception doesn’t become operational debt)

Controls that keep SC-30 from breaking production:

• Asset labeling: tag decoys in CMDB/cloud tags; ensure SOC dashboards distinguish decoy vs real.
• Change control: treat deception deployments like security infrastructure with peer review and rollout plans.
• Access boundaries: ensure decoys cannot reach sensitive resources; default deny egress from decoys.
• Incident handling: playbook steps for “decoy alert,” including triage, containment, and evidence capture.

4) Implement with a repeatable runbook (and test what you deployed)

For each technique, maintain a runbook with:

• Deployment steps (IaC where possible).
• Monitoring hooks (SIEM rules, alert routing, severity).
• Test procedure (what action proves it works, what log proves it fired).
• Rollback procedure.

Then run a controlled validation: have an internal tester perform a benign “attacker action” against the decoy and confirm the SOC receives a clear alert and can trace it back to the deception asset.

5) Prove ongoing operation (control health checks)

SC-30 is easy to “set and forget,” which creates evidence drift. Put a recurring control health check in your GRC calendar:

• Confirm decoys still exist.
• Confirm logging is still enabled and alerts still route.
• Confirm decoys are still isolated and do not create new access paths. Track findings to closure with dated remediation evidence.

Daydream can help by turning SC-30 into an assigned control card, defining the minimum evidence bundle, and tracking control health checks and remediation to closure in one place, instead of scattered docs and screenshots.

Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Auditors typically want design, authorization, and proof of operation. Retain:

• SC-30 control card (scope, locations, approved techniques, owner, exceptions).
• Architecture diagrams showing where decoys sit and how they are isolated.
• Runbooks for each deception technique (deploy, monitor, test, rollback).
• Change records (tickets/PRs) approving deployment and updates.
• Monitoring evidence: SIEM rule logic, alert samples, routing configuration.
• Test records: dated validation steps and resulting logs/alerts.
• Asset inventory evidence: CMDB/cloud tags for deception assets.
• Exception approvals where SC-30 is restricted for a system, with rationale.

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

Expect these:

• “What exactly are your SC-30 techniques?” Name them and show where they run ¹.
• “Which systems/components are covered?” Provide the scoped list and rationale.
• “How do you prevent decoys from becoming pivot points?” Show isolation and egress restrictions.
• “How do you know it works?” Provide test logs and SOC alert evidence.
• “How do you keep it current?” Show the health check cadence and recent results.
• “Who can approve exceptions?” Point to your control card and exception workflow.

Frequent implementation mistakes (and how to avoid them)

1. Calling obscurity “deception.” Hiding version strings without intent, monitoring, or defined scope rarely satisfies SC-30. Fix: document the technique, where it applies, and how it misleads adversaries ¹.

2. Deploying honeypots without SOC ownership. Alerts go nowhere, or analysts can’t tell decoy from real. Fix: route alerts to an owned queue, label assets, and add an IR playbook.

3. Letting decoys touch production data. This creates data exposure risk and incident ambiguity. Fix: hard isolation, no sensitive data, default deny egress.

4. No change control. Decoys drift, get decommissioned, or conflict with new network designs. Fix: manage deception assets like any other security infrastructure.

5. Evidence gaps. Screenshots without dates, no runbooks, no tests. Fix: define a minimum evidence bundle and store it in a known repository with retention rules.

Enforcement context and risk implications

No public enforcement cases were provided in the source catalog for SC-30, so treat this as a program assurance control rather than an enforcement-driven requirement in this write-up. The risk is still real: poorly governed deception can cause operational incidents, confuse responders, and create audit findings for lack of defined scope, approval, and evidence ¹. Your safest posture is controlled deployment plus strong telemetry and documentation.

Practical 30/60/90-day execution plan

Days 0–30: Define, approve, and design

• Publish the SC-30 control card with scope, locations, techniques, owners, and exception rules.
• Select an initial deception pattern set your SOC can monitor.
• Define the minimum evidence bundle and storage location (SSP/control repository).
• Produce a simple architecture diagram and isolation requirements for each pattern.

Days 31–60: Implement and validate

• Deploy one or more approved techniques in a controlled environment (start where monitoring is strongest).
• Implement SIEM detections and alert routing; create the “decoy alert” playbook.
• Run a validation test for each technique and save logs/alerts as evidence.
• Record changes through tickets/PRs and link them to SC-30 evidence.

Days 61–90: Operationalize and harden

• Expand coverage to additional in-scope systems/components based on risk.
• Add health checks to your GRC calendar and assign ownership for completion and follow-up.
• Review exceptions and document compensating controls where SC-30 is constrained.
• Conduct a tabletop: confirm SOC, IR, and ops understand what decoys exist and how to respond.

Frequently Asked Questions

Do we have to deploy honeypots to satisfy SC-30?

No. SC-30 requires defined concealment and misdirection techniques, but the specific techniques are organization-defined ¹. Choose techniques you can safely operate and monitor.

Can SC-30 apply only to production?

It can, but you must define the approved “locations” (environments/zones) in your control documentation ¹. Many teams start in non-production to validate monitoring and safety, then expand.

What’s the minimum proof an auditor will accept?

Expect to show defined scope/techniques, an approved runbook, and evidence that deception produces monitored signals (alerts/logs) plus change records. A one-time screenshot rarely survives scrutiny.

How do we prevent deception assets from increasing our attack surface?

Isolate them. Default deny egress, block access to sensitive networks, and avoid real credentials or production data in decoys. Treat decoys as hostile if compromised.

What if our SOC can’t take additional alerts?

Reduce noise by narrowing placement, tuning rules, and routing to a specific triage queue with a clear playbook. If you cannot monitor deception, document the constraint and choose lower-noise concealment patterns until monitoring is ready.

How should we document SC-30 in the SSP?

Fill in the organization-defined placeholders explicitly: systems/components, locations, and the specific techniques you deploy ¹. Link to runbooks, diagrams, test results, and recurring health check records.

Footnotes

1. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON

2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5