SC-42(1): Reporting to Authorized Individuals or Roles

SC-42(1) requires you to configure any monitoring or data-collection capability covered by SC-42 so the information it collects is reported only to authorized individuals or approved roles. To operationalize it, define “authorized recipients,” enforce role-based access and distribution controls in the tooling, and retain evidence that reporting paths and permissions are reviewed and working ¹.

Key takeaways:

• Treat “reporting” as a technical distribution problem: who can receive, view, and export the collected data.
• Authorization must be role- or identity-bound, enforced in the system configuration, and provable with audit logs and access reviews.
• Evidence matters as much as configuration: map ownership, procedures, and recurring artifacts so you can demonstrate ongoing control operation.

The sc-42(1): reporting to authorized individuals or roles requirement is easy to misunderstand because it sounds like a policy statement, but it is assessed as a configuration outcome. Assessors expect you to show that data collected by monitoring or other SC-42 collection mechanisms does not “fan out” to broad audiences by default, land in open channels, or become accessible through dashboards, alerts, exports, tickets, email distribution lists, or integrations that bypass access controls ¹.

For a Compliance Officer, CCO, or GRC lead, the fastest path is to translate the requirement into three operator decisions: (1) what information is collected under SC-42 in your environment, (2) which roles are authorized to receive each reporting output, and (3) which technical controls prevent anyone else from receiving it. Then build a tight evidence loop: document the authorization model, prove the tool configuration matches it, and show recurring review artifacts so the control remains true after staffing, tooling, or integration changes.

This page gives requirement-level implementation guidance you can hand to an engineer or control owner and then audit with confidence, without turning SC-42(1) into an abstract “least privilege” slogan ².

Regulatory text

Requirement (verbatim): “Verify that the system is configured so that data or information collected by the {{ insert: param, sc-42.01_odp }} is only reported to authorized individuals or roles.” ¹

Operator interpretation (what you must be able to show)

• You have identified the “data or information collected” by the relevant SC-42 collection mechanism(s) in your environment ¹.
• Your systems are configured so reporting goes only to authorized recipients (named individuals or, preferably, roles/groups) ¹.
• You can verify it, meaning you can produce configuration evidence and operational evidence (logs, access reviews, tests) that demonstrate the restriction actually works ¹.

“Reported” should be read broadly in implementation: dashboards, alerts, scheduled reports, email/SMS/pager notifications, ticket creation, chat integrations, webhooks, SIEM forwarding, API exports, and any shared storage destination where the collected data is written.

Plain-English meaning of SC-42(1)

If your system collects monitoring or sensitive operational data under SC-42, that data cannot be broadcast to whoever happens to have access to a tool, a channel, a mailbox, or an integration. You must constrain visibility and distribution so only approved roles (and the people currently in those roles) can receive or view it, and you must be able to prove those constraints are configured and maintained ¹.

Who it applies to (scope and operational context)

In-scope entities

• Federal information systems and contractor systems handling federal data implementing NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 controls ².

In-scope systems and workflows (practical)

SC-42(1) commonly becomes relevant in:

• Centralized monitoring (SIEM, APM, EDR) where alerts include payloads, hostnames, usernames, or other sensitive context.
• Privacy/security telemetry that could expose personal data, authentication artifacts, or internal network details.
• Incident response workflows where alerts auto-create tickets and notify broad operational groups.
• Third-party managed services where reporting is shared with external support teams.

If any integration or automated workflow can forward collected data outside your authorization boundary, that workflow is part of the control surface.

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

1) Identify the SC-42 collection sources and outputs

Create (or update) a simple register:

• Collection source (tool/sensor/module)
• Data collected (types, sensitivity notes)
• Reporting outputs (dashboards, alerts, exports, integrations)
• Current recipients (roles/groups/individuals)
• Owner (control owner + technical admin)

This is where most teams find hidden reporting paths: legacy email reports, old Slack channels, and vendor support portals with broad access.

2) Define “authorized individuals or roles” as an access model

Document an authorization matrix that ties reporting outputs to roles. Keep it tight.

• Prefer roles/groups over named people.
• Define break-glass access and who can approve it.
• Include third-party roles explicitly (for example, “MSSP Tier 2 Analysts”) and ensure contracts and access provisioning align.

A workable artifact is a one-page table:

Reporting output	Data sensitivity	Authorized roles	Delivery mechanism	Approval owner
SIEM high-severity alerts	Sensitive security telemetry	SOC Analysts, IR Lead	Pager + SIEM console	SOC Manager
Weekly monitoring report	Operational metrics	SRE Leads	Email to group	SRE Manager
Raw event export	High sensitivity	SecEng only	Restricted S3 bucket	Security Director

3) Implement technical enforcement in the systems (not just policy)

Your control should fail closed: if someone is not in an authorized role, they cannot receive or view the report.

Common enforcement points:

• RBAC in the monitoring/SIEM tool: restrict dashboards, saved searches, incident queues, and report generation to specific roles.
• Distribution list governance: group membership managed through IAM, not ad hoc email lists.
• ChatOps controls: restrict posting of sensitive alerts to private channels with controlled membership; disable “public channel” alerting for sensitive events.
• Ticketing integrations: ensure tickets containing sensitive telemetry are created in restricted projects/queues with limited viewers.
• Storage destinations: if reports land in object storage or shared drives, enforce IAM policies and remove public links.

4) Add preventive checks for new reporting paths

You need a mechanism to keep the control true during change:

• Require a security review for new alert destinations, new integrations, and new report schedules.
• Add a configuration checklist to change tickets: “Does this report expose collected SC-42 data? If yes, what authorized role receives it?”
• Treat “new integration token” or “new webhook” as a privileged change.

5) Validate and “verify” with repeatable tests

Verification should be simple and demonstrable:

• Attempt access with a non-authorized test account and record the denial.
• Confirm alerts do not deliver to non-authorized channels or queues.
• Review tool audit logs for report access and export events.

6) Operationalize ownership and recurring evidence

SC-42(1) fails in practice when nobody owns the reporting configuration long-term. Assign:

• Control owner (accountable for compliance)
• System owner/admin (config authority)
• Reviewer (performs access review and evidence capture)

Daydream fits well here as a lightweight system of record: map SC-42(1) to an owner, a short implementation procedure, and a recurring evidence checklist so you can produce assessor-ready artifacts without rebuilding the story each cycle ¹.

Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Keep evidence that covers design, implementation, and ongoing operation:

Design artifacts

• Authorization matrix for SC-42 reporting recipients (roles/groups).
• Data flow diagram (even simplified) showing reporting outputs and destinations.
• Procedure: “How we approve and configure new reporting destinations.”

Implementation artifacts (screenshots or exports)

• Tool RBAC configuration exports (roles, permissions, group mappings).
• Alert routing rules showing destinations and filters.
• Integration configurations (ticketing, chat, email) with restricted endpoints.

Operating artifacts (recurring)

• Access reviews for the authorized groups/roles.
• Audit logs showing who accessed/exported reports.
• Change records for any new reports/integrations with approvals.

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

Expect these questions in a NIST 800-53 assessment:

1. “What information is collected by SC-42 mechanisms here?” If you can’t name it, you can’t prove controlled reporting ¹.
2. “Show me where the system enforces authorized reporting.” Auditors will ask for the configuration, not a policy statement ¹.
3. “How do you prevent report forwarding to broad audiences?” They will look at email lists, shared channels, and ticket queues.
4. “How do you keep this correct after org changes?” Offboarding and role changes often break authorization.

Hangup to plan for: assessors may treat “export capability” as “reporting.” If any user can export raw collected data, your authorized role model must cover export permissions too.

Frequent implementation mistakes (and how to avoid them)

1. Relying on tool login only. If anyone with a license can view all dashboards, reporting is not restricted. Fix: implement least-privilege RBAC aligned to roles ¹.
2. Using public chat channels for alerts. Sensitive telemetry ends up visible to broad groups. Fix: private channels, restricted membership, and message redaction where possible.
3. Ignoring downstream systems. A SIEM alert that creates an unrestricted ticket still “reports” the data broadly. Fix: secure the whole delivery chain.
4. No evidence of verification. Teams configure RBAC once and never capture proof. Fix: scheduled access reviews and a simple negative test with evidence capture ¹.
5. Third-party access sprawl. External support teams get blanket access “temporarily,” then it persists. Fix: role-based third-party access with time-bound approvals and logging.

Enforcement context and risk implications

No public enforcement cases were provided in the source catalog for SC-42(1), so this page does not cite enforcement actions. Operationally, the risk is straightforward: unauthorized reporting expands the audience for sensitive monitoring data, which can increase insider risk, enable lateral movement by compromised accounts, and create unnecessary disclosure exposure. Your strongest risk reduction comes from RBAC, secure destinations, and routine verification evidence ¹.

Practical execution plan (30/60/90-style, without hard timing claims)

Phase 1: Immediate stabilization

• Assign the SC-42(1) control owner and system admin owner.
• Inventory reporting outputs for SC-42-collected data: dashboards, alerts, exports, integrations.
• Remove obviously unsafe destinations (broad mailing lists, public channels) and document emergency changes.

Phase 2: Near-term hardening

• Publish the authorization matrix and get sign-off from Security and IT operations leadership.
• Implement RBAC and group-based access across tooling; eliminate individual-based exceptions where possible.
• Add change control gates for new reporting paths (tickets + checklist + approval).

Phase 3: Ongoing control operation

• Schedule recurring access reviews for authorized roles/groups and retain reviewer sign-off.
• Collect audit logs and sample evidence of denied access for non-authorized users.
• Use Daydream (or your GRC system) to keep the control mapping, procedure, and evidence checklist in one place so assessments do not turn into a document scramble ¹.

Frequently Asked Questions

Does SC-42(1) mean I need to encrypt reports?

SC-42(1) focuses on restricting reporting to authorized individuals or roles, not encryption requirements ¹. Encryption may still be appropriate, but it does not replace authorization controls.

Are “authorized individuals” acceptable, or do I need formal roles?

The text allows individuals or roles, but roles are easier to manage and audit over time ¹. Use individual authorization only for narrow exceptions with documented approval and review.

What counts as “reported” in practice?

Treat any distribution or exposure path as reporting: dashboards, email, chat alerts, ticket creation, exports, and API access to report data ¹. If a user can access the collected data through a tool feature, it is in scope.

How do I handle third-party managed security providers who need access to alerts?

Define the third party’s authorized roles explicitly, provision access through named roles/groups, and restrict them to the minimum report sets required ¹. Retain contracts/access approvals and audit logs as evidence.

What evidence do auditors ask for most often?

They typically want the RBAC configuration, alert/report routing rules, group membership evidence, and proof of recurring access review or verification testing ¹. Policies alone usually fail this control.

We have one SIEM role that can see everything. Is that noncompliant?

It can be, if that role is broadly assigned or includes users who are not authorized recipients for all collected data ¹. Split roles by function and sensitivity, and limit assignment to trained staff with a business need.

Footnotes

1. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON

2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5