SI-2(2): Automated Flaw Remediation Status

The si-2(2): automated flaw remediation status requirement is about visibility you can defend. Auditors and assessors are not asking whether you intend to patch; they ask whether you can determine, using automation, which endpoints, servers, network devices, and firmware-bearing components are missing applicable security updates, and how you know.

This enhancement sits inside the broader SI-2 (Flaw Remediation) control family in NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5. SI-2(2) narrows the focus to automated determination of installation status, which forces rigor in four places: your asset inventory, your sources of truth for “applicable updates,” your automation coverage (including firmware), and your evidence quality.

If you run federal information systems or you are a contractor handling federal data, SI-2(2) often becomes a gating item in security assessments because it’s measurable: either you have automated status determination with defined parameters, or you don’t. The fastest path is to translate the control’s two open parameters into explicit operational decisions, then build recurring evidence from the tools you already run. ¹

Regulatory text

Control statement (excerpt): “Determine if system components have applicable security-relevant software and firmware updates installed using {{ insert: param, si-02.02_odp.01 }} {{ insert: param, si-02.02_odp.02 }}.” ²

What the operator must do

To satisfy this text in practice, you must:

1. Define the organization parameters embedded in the control (the two si-02.02_odp inserts). These typically represent (a) the automated mechanism(s) you will use and (b) the frequency/conditions under which you run them.
2. Use automation to determine update installation status for system components (not just user workstations), including software and firmware.
3. Demonstrate that the updates are “applicable” and “security-relevant.” That requires an authoritative source (vendor catalogs, OS repositories, device vendor advisories) and a way to map advisories/patches to your asset set.

Plain-English interpretation

You need a repeatable, automated way to answer: “For every in-scope component, are the security-relevant updates that apply to it installed?” The emphasis is status determination, not the act of patching itself. Assessors still expect the status output to feed remediation workflows, but SI-2(2) is primarily about automated verification and reporting.

Who it applies to (entity and operational context)

Typical applicability:

• Federal information systems implementing NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 controls. ¹
• Contractor systems handling federal data where 800-53 controls flow down through contracts, system security plans, or agency overlays. ¹

Operational contexts where SI-2(2) becomes hard:

• Hybrid fleets (on-prem + IaaS + SaaS-managed endpoints).
• Network/security appliances with firmware (firewalls, load balancers, switches).
• “Shadow IT” and unmanaged endpoints that are missing from inventory.

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

Step 1: Set the control parameters (make the inserts real)

Document, approve, and publish:

• Automated mechanisms (ODP 01): which tools determine patch/firmware status (e.g., endpoint management, vulnerability scanner, cloud native config/patch services).
• Frequency/trigger (ODP 02): how often status determination runs and what triggers ad-hoc runs (new critical vendor advisory, newly onboarded assets, post-maintenance windows).

Output artifact: SI-2(2) control implementation procedure with the two parameters explicitly filled in. ²

Step 2: Define scope based on “system components”

Create a scope statement that ties to your inventory:

• Endpoints (corporate + privileged/admin workstations).
• Servers (VMs, bare metal, containers where patching is OS/base image).
• Network devices and appliances (firmware).
• Cloud images/templates and golden builds.

Practical rule: if it runs code and you depend on it, treat it as a component unless you have a documented exclusion.

Step 3: Establish “applicable security-relevant updates”

You need a defensible method for applicability:

• Authoritative sources: vendor update catalogs, OS repositories, vendor security advisories.
• Applicability logic: product/version match, platform match, deployment ring eligibility, and required prerequisites.

Keep this simple and assessable: document which source(s) your tooling uses and how you validate that those sources are current.

Step 4: Implement automated status checks (coverage first, perfection later)

Implement automation in layers:

1. Primary status system per platform (Windows, Linux, macOS, network OS, hypervisor, firmware).
2. Fallback for gaps (scan-based detection where agent-based management is not feasible).
3. Firmware tracking: for devices where firmware status is not visible in standard endpoint tooling, use vendor APIs, network management platforms, or authenticated scans.

Your goal is a consistent status output: compliant (installed), non-compliant (missing), unknown (not reporting), not applicable (not in scope or no relevant update).

Step 5: Tie status to remediation and exception handling

Even though SI-2(2) is about determination, auditors will test whether determination results are acted on. Build:

• Auto-created tickets for missing updates.
• SLA targets by severity (your own policy targets; avoid promising what you cannot meet).
• A documented waiver process for operational constraints (downtime windows, vendor incompatibility, compensating controls).

Step 6: Operationalize reporting for GRC and audit

Create recurring reports that a control tester can re-run:

• Fleet compliance snapshots by platform and criticality.
• “Unknown/not reporting” list as a first-class risk item.
• Aging reports for missing updates (by release date or detection date).

If you use Daydream for control operations, map SI-2(2) to a named control owner, a written procedure, and a recurring evidence checklist so your monthly or quarterly evidence pull becomes a push-button workflow. This aligns with the recommended practice to map SI-2(2) to owner, procedure, and recurring artifacts. ²

Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Keep evidence that proves definition, operation, and repeatability:

Control definition artifacts

• SI-2(2) procedure with the two organization-defined parameters filled.
• In-scope asset/component categories and inclusion/exclusion criteria.
• Approved sources of update intelligence (vendor catalogs/advisories) and how tools ingest them.

Operating evidence (tool-generated, time-stamped)

• Scheduled job configurations or policy screenshots/exports showing automated status checks.
• Exported compliance reports showing installed/missing/unknown counts and device lists.
• Authenticated scan configurations (where used) and scan result extracts.
• Firmware status reports for network devices/appliances.

Remediation workflow evidence

• Tickets created from non-compliance findings (sample set across platforms).
• Change records for patch/firmware deployments (where required).
• Exception/waiver approvals with expiry dates and compensating controls.

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

Expect testers to ask:

• “Show me the mechanism and schedule that performs the automated determination.” ²
• “How do you know the update is applicable to this device model/version?”
• “How do you cover firmware, not just OS patches?” ²
• “What happens when devices stop reporting?”
• “Show evidence from two different time periods to prove it runs recurrently.”

Hangups that cause findings:

• Inventory mismatch (tools report on a subset; you can’t quantify coverage).
• “Unknown” is ignored rather than treated as a remediation queue.
• Firmware is out-of-scope by omission, not by documented decision.

Frequent implementation mistakes and how to avoid them

Mistake	Why it fails SI-2(2)	Avoid it by
Relying on manual spreadsheets to confirm patch status	SI-2(2) calls for automated determination 2	Produce tool-generated reports and keep the job/policy config evidence
Treating vulnerability scanning as patch compliance without mapping “applicable updates”	Scanners find CVEs; auditors ask about applicable software/firmware updates	Document authoritative update sources and how findings map to patches
Excluding firmware silently	Control explicitly includes firmware updates 2	Add a firmware coverage plan per device class and track gaps
No documented parameters for ODP inserts	Assessors cannot evaluate what you committed to	Publish mechanism(s) and frequency/trigger decisions in the procedure
“Unknown” devices not triaged	You cannot determine status for the fleet	Put unknowns into an operations queue with owners and deadlines

Enforcement context and risk implications

No public enforcement cases were provided in the source catalog for this requirement, so you should treat enforcement risk as indirect: SI-2(2) failures commonly appear as control deficiencies during assessments, and they amplify breach impact when unpatched systems are exploited. The practical risk is straightforward: if you cannot reliably determine update status, you will miss exposed components and you will struggle to prove due diligence to customers, agencies, and auditors. ¹

A practical 30/60/90-day execution plan

First 30 days (stabilize the definition and visibility)

• Name a control owner and back-up owner for SI-2(2).
• Write the SI-2(2) procedure and fill in the two organization-defined parameters (mechanism and frequency/trigger). ²
• Confirm the authoritative inventory sources and reconcile to what your tools can actually see.
• Produce a first baseline report with categories: installed/missing/unknown.

Days 31–60 (expand coverage and close obvious gaps)

• Extend automated status determination to at least one hard platform (Linux servers or network firmware).
• Implement “unknown device” remediation workflow (assign ownership: IT ops, endpoint team, network team).
• Start capturing recurring evidence on a cadence (reports + configurations + ticket samples).

Days 61–90 (make it audit-proof and operationally boring)

• Add exception/waiver workflow with expirations and required compensating controls.
• Build a standard evidence package: two time periods of reports, job schedules, and remediation records.
• Put SI-2(2) into your GRC control testing calendar and automate evidence collection where possible (Daydream can track ownership, procedures, and recurring artifacts so evidence stays consistent across quarters). ²

Frequently Asked Questions

Does SI-2(2) require automatic patch deployment?

The text requires automated determination of whether applicable security-relevant updates are installed. Patch deployment is addressed elsewhere in flaw remediation, but assessors often expect your status results to feed a remediation process. ²

What counts as “system components” for SI-2(2)?

Treat endpoints, servers, appliances, and any device with software or firmware that affects security as in scope unless you document an explicit exclusion. The control explicitly calls out software and firmware updates. ²

If we run vulnerability scans, is that enough?

Sometimes it can be part of your mechanism, but you still must show you can determine whether applicable updates are installed. Document how scan findings map to vendor patches/firmware and how you handle false positives and unknowns. ²

How do we handle devices that are offline or not reporting?

Track “unknown” as a separate status with an owner and a defined remediation path (re-enroll agent, investigate decommissioning, or isolate). Auditors will treat persistent unknowns as a control failure because you cannot determine update status.

Do we need to include third-party managed devices or SaaS?

If the component is part of your system boundary, you need a method to determine update status or document the shared responsibility model and how the third party provides status evidence. Use contract terms or third-party attestations to support your determination where you cannot directly measure.

What evidence is most persuasive in an assessment?

Time-stamped automated reports showing installed/missing/unknown, plus configuration evidence showing the scheduled mechanism, plus remediation tickets or change records tied back to the findings. This directly demonstrates “determine … installed using” the defined automation. ²

Footnotes

1. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5

2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON