SI-3(1): Central Management

SI-3(1): Central Management requires you to centrally manage anti-malware and malicious code protection so policies, updates, scanning actions, and alerting are consistent and provable across the environment. Operationalize it by standardizing on centrally administered tools, enforcing endpoint/server coverage, and retaining evidence that central controls push configuration and receive status telemetry. ¹

Key takeaways:

• Centralize configuration, updates, scanning, and reporting for malicious code protection across in-scope assets.
• Prove coverage and consistency with telemetry, dashboards, and change records from the central console.
• Auditors look for gaps: unmanaged endpoints, drift from baseline, stale signatures, and missing exceptions governance.

The si-3(1): central management requirement is a design-and-operations control: your organization must run malicious code protection from a central point that sets policy and collects status, rather than relying on local-only settings managed ad hoc by admins or end users. This matters most in distributed environments where endpoints, servers, virtual machines, and cloud workloads can drift, miss updates, or fall outside reporting.

For a Compliance Officer, CCO, or GRC lead, the fastest path is to treat SI-3(1) as a “central console + enforced baseline + evidence-ready reporting” requirement. Your goal is not to pick a specific anti-malware product; your goal is to demonstrate centralized administration and visibility for the tools you use, with documented scope, defined exceptions, and repeatable evidence collection.

This page gives requirement-level implementation guidance you can hand to security operations and infrastructure teams: who owns what, what to configure, how to measure coverage, and what artifacts to retain so you can answer assessor questions without scrambling. The authoritative reference is NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5. ²

Regulatory text

Control: “NIST SP 800-53 control SI-3.1.” ¹

Operator interpretation of the excerpt: SI-3(1) is the enhancement commonly titled “Central Management.” In practice, the operator obligation is to ensure malicious code protection mechanisms are centrally administered and monitored so you can (a) push consistent configuration, (b) manage updates, and (c) verify status and coverage across the system. Your implementation must be demonstrable during assessment through console configuration, policy baselines, and reporting outputs. ¹

Plain-English interpretation (what SI-3(1) is asking for)

You must run anti-malware and malicious code defenses in a way that:

• Central policy is authoritative (endpoints and servers inherit and cannot silently deviate).
• Updates are centrally controlled (engine/signature/content updates are pushed or enforced).
• Monitoring is centralized (you can see coverage, last check-in, and detections in one place).
• Exceptions are governed (if something cannot run the agent, you document compensating controls and approval).

A good mental model: if your central console goes down, you may lose management capability, but you should still be able to show what the baseline was, which assets were in scope, and what the last reported state was.

Who it applies to

Entity types

• Federal information systems and programs aligned to NIST SP 800-53.
• Contractors and service providers operating systems that handle federal data and must meet NIST-aligned requirements. ²

Operational context

• Enterprise endpoints (Windows/macOS/Linux), servers, VDI, and privileged admin workstations.
• Cloud workloads (VMs, containers, managed services where applicable).
• Remote workforce and BYOD (if in scope for the system boundary).
• High-availability or regulated environments where local admin rights are restricted and policy enforcement must be consistent.

If your environment includes subsidiaries, multiple domains/tenants, or segmented networks, SI-3(1) effectively requires you to reconcile those boundaries with a centralized administration model (single console, federated consoles, or a documented hierarchy) and still produce enterprise-wide evidence.

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

Use this sequence to operationalize quickly and avoid audit dead ends.

Step 1: Define the control boundary and ownership

1. Name the control owner (usually SecOps for tooling, IT for endpoint management, and GRC for oversight).
2. Define “in-scope assets”: endpoints, servers, cloud workloads, and network segments included in the system boundary.
3. Define “central management” for your environment: one console, multiple consoles with centralized reporting, or managed service with a single administrative plane.

Deliverable: a one-page control card that states objective, owner, scope, and how evidence is produced each cycle (recommended practice aligned to the provided guidance). ¹

Step 2: Standardize the centrally managed toolset

1. Select the anti-malware/EDR/endpoint protection platforms approved for in-scope systems.
2. Confirm each platform supports:
   • Central policy administration
   • Central update management
   • Central reporting (asset inventory, health, detections)
3. Eliminate “shadow” tools that run locally and do not report centrally, or formally document them as exceptions with compensating controls.

Control intent: central manageability and attestable visibility, not a specific brand.

Step 3: Establish a baseline policy and enforce it

Build a baseline configuration that is set in the central console and applied via groups/tags:

• Real-time protection settings (where supported)
• Scheduled scans (cadence and triggers)
• Update sources and behavior
• Tamper protection and local override restrictions
• Logging and alerting destinations

Operational requirement: ensure the baseline is the default, and drift is controlled through change management, not local edits.

Step 4: Prove asset coverage and enrollment

Create an authoritative enrollment mechanism:

• Endpoint management integration (MDM/UEM) for laptops/desktops
• Imaging or configuration management for servers
• Cloud automation for new instances (golden images, bootstrap scripts, or agent injection)

Then produce a recurring coverage report:

• Total in-scope assets (from CMDB, cloud inventory, or endpoint manager)
• Total protected assets (from the security console)
• Identified gaps and tickets to remediate

This is where audits often succeed or fail: you need a reconciled list that shows you know what should be protected and what is actually reporting.

Step 5: Centralize monitoring and incident workflow

1. Configure detections/health alerts to route to a shared queue (SIEM, ticketing, or the security console’s case management).
2. Define triage SLAs internally (as a policy choice) and map severity to response steps.
3. Ensure events are retained according to your logging/retention requirements for the system.

Keep it operational: auditors will ask for examples of detections and what you did next.

Step 6: Govern exceptions with time bounds and compensating controls

Common exceptions: legacy systems, specialized appliances, OT, systems where agents break workflows, or disconnected enclaves. Your exception process should require:

• Business justification
• Risk acceptance approval
• Compensating control description (network segmentation, application allowlisting, restricted execution, increased monitoring)
• Expiration date and review trigger

Keep the exception list short and actively managed. A stale exception register is an audit magnet.

Step 7: Run control health checks and track closure

Set a recurring “control health” review:

• Review coverage and drift
• Review signature/engine update health
• Review top detections and false positives
• Validate that exceptions are current and approved

Track findings to closure with due dates and validation evidence (recommended practice aligned to the provided guidance). ¹

Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Build an “evidence bundle” that you can export on demand (recommended practice aligned to the provided guidance). ¹

Core artifacts

• SI-3(1) control card/runbook: objective, scope, owner, cadence, tools, exception rules.
• System boundary and asset inventory extracts: in-scope endpoints/servers/workloads.
• Central console screenshots/exports showing:
  • Policy baseline and group assignments
  • Update management configuration
  • Tamper protection / local override settings (as applicable)
  • Health dashboards (last check-in, outdated agents/signatures)
• Coverage reconciliation report: in-scope vs reporting assets, with remediation tickets.
• Change records for baseline modifications (approvals + implementation evidence).
• Exception register: approvals, compensating controls, review dates.
• Sample incident/detection tickets: alert, triage notes, containment actions, closure.

Retention location

• Store evidence in a controlled repository (GRC tool, evidence vault, or ticketing exports) with access controls and versioning.

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

Expect these questions and prepare “show me” answers:

1. “What do you mean by central management?”
   Have a diagram or short narrative: console(s), admin roles, policy push, reporting, and how remote assets check in.

2. “Show me coverage.”
   Provide the reconciliation report and explain how you detect unmanaged assets.

3. “How do you prevent local users from disabling protection?”
   Show tamper protection settings, least privilege controls, and monitoring for agent stoppage.

4. “How do you handle systems that can’t run the agent?”
   Show exception approvals and compensating controls.

5. “How do you know updates are current?”
   Show update policy plus a health report that identifies outdated definitions/engines and remediation actions.

Hangup pattern: teams can show policy screenshots but cannot show continuous operation (coverage trends, drift tickets, exception reviews).

Frequent implementation mistakes (and how to avoid them)

• Mistake: Treating SI-3(1) as “we bought AV.”
  Fix: document central administration, enforcement, and reporting. Procurement is not evidence of operation.

• Mistake: No authoritative inventory for “what should be protected.”
  Fix: pick a source of truth (CMDB, endpoint manager, cloud inventory) and reconcile to the security console on a cadence.

• Mistake: Multiple consoles with no unified reporting.
  Fix: consolidate where possible; otherwise, produce an aggregated report and document the governance model.

• Mistake: Exceptions live in email threads.
  Fix: maintain an exception register with approvals, compensating controls, and expirations.

• Mistake: Baseline changes are undocumented.
  Fix: route baseline policy edits through change management with approvals and a rollback plan.

Enforcement context and risk implications

No public enforcement cases were provided in the source catalog for this requirement, so this page does not cite enforcement outcomes.

Risk-wise, weak central management usually shows up as:

• Unmanaged or off-network endpoints missing protection
• Stale updates and inconsistent policies across segments
• Inability to prove control operation during an assessment

Those conditions increase incident likelihood and also increase assessment risk because assessors can validate the gap quickly through spot checks and inventory reconciliation.

A practical 30/60/90-day execution plan

Use this as an operator plan; adjust sequencing based on your tooling and system boundary.

First 30 days (stabilize scope and management plane)

• Assign SI-3(1) owner(s) and publish the control card (objective, scope, cadence, exceptions).
• Define in-scope asset sources and produce a first-pass inventory extract.
• Confirm the central console(s) and administrative roles; restrict who can change baseline policies.
• Export initial health/coverage dashboards and identify unmanaged/out-of-date assets.
• Stand up the exception register with an approval workflow.

Days 31–60 (enforce baseline and close coverage gaps)

• Implement baseline policy settings in the central console and roll out by groups.
• Integrate enrollment into build/MDM workflows so new assets auto-enroll.
• Establish alert routing into ticketing/SIEM and document triage procedures.
• Run a coverage reconciliation cycle and track remediation items through closure with evidence.

Days 61–90 (operationalize evidence and continuous monitoring)

• Formalize recurring control health checks with documented outputs (coverage, drift, exceptions review).
• Test evidence production: generate an “audit packet” from the last cycle in under a day.
• Validate exception compensating controls and remove expired exceptions.
• If you run multiple consoles, implement centralized reporting or a documented aggregation process.

Where Daydream fits (without changing your tools)

If your team struggles to keep SI-3(1) evidence consistent across cycles, Daydream can act as the control system of record: a control card, recurring evidence requests, and a standard evidence bundle definition tied to your central console exports and tickets. That reduces scramble during audits and customer diligence while keeping ownership with SecOps and IT.

Frequently Asked Questions

What counts as “central management” for SI-3(1) in a hybrid environment?

A central console (or governed set of consoles) must push policy and collect health/detection status across on-prem and cloud assets. If you have multiple consoles, you need documented administration boundaries and a way to produce consolidated coverage evidence.

Do I need one anti-malware tool across the entire enterprise?

No. You need centralized administration and monitoring for the tools in scope. If different platforms exist by segment, document why, who manages each, and how you aggregate coverage and exceptions.

How do we handle endpoints that are frequently off-network?

Require the agent to check in over the internet to the central management plane (directly or via a managed service) and monitor “last seen” status. Treat long-unseen devices as a coverage gap with a ticketed follow-up.

Are servers and cloud workloads in scope, or only user endpoints?

Scope follows your system boundary and asset inventory. If servers and workloads process or store in-scope data, include them and prove they receive centrally managed policies and report status.

What evidence is most persuasive to auditors?

A reconciled coverage report (in-scope vs reporting), baseline policy exports from the console, and tickets showing you remediated gaps. Add an exception register with approvals for anything that cannot be centrally managed.

How should we document exceptions without creating audit friction?

Use a standardized exception template with business justification, compensating controls, approval, and an expiration/review trigger. Keep it in a register you can export as part of the SI-3(1) evidence bundle.

Footnotes

1. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON

2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5