SI-3(6): Testing and Verification

SI-3(6): Testing and Verification requires you to prove your malicious code protection actually detects and responds as designed by safely introducing known benign “test” code and validating the expected alerting, blocking, logging, and reporting outcomes. Operationalize it by defining a test procedure, running it on a defined cadence and after material changes, and retaining repeatable evidence. ¹

Key takeaways:

• Treat SI-3(6) as an outcome-based test: “show me it fires,” not “show me you bought a tool.”
• Use benign test artifacts and controlled deployment paths to validate detection, quarantine/block, and telemetry end-to-end.
• Evidence matters as much as execution: preserve test plans, run logs, alerts, and remediation tickets tied to scope.

Compliance teams often accept “we have EDR/AV” as sufficient for malicious code controls, then struggle during assessments when asked to prove it works in the real environment. The si-3(6): testing and verification requirement closes that gap. It expects an operator to perform safe, controlled testing of malicious code protection mechanisms by introducing known benign code and verifying the protection mechanisms behave as intended. ¹

For a CCO, Compliance Officer, or GRC lead, the fastest path is to translate this into a repeatable control routine with clear scope: which systems are in scope, which protection mechanisms you are validating (endpoint, email, web, container/image scanning, CI/CD scanning), what “pass” looks like, and what evidence will satisfy an assessor. You also need a governance decision: who owns test execution (Security Operations, Endpoint Engineering, IT), who attests to results (Control Owner), and how failures are tracked to closure.

This page gives requirement-level implementation guidance you can hand to operators, then use to build an assessment-ready evidence packet.

Requirement: SI-3(6) Testing and Verification (malicious code protection)

Plain-English interpretation

You must periodically test your malware protection stack by introducing safe, known benign test code (for example, standardized test strings or harmless files) and verify the tools and processes respond correctly. “Respond correctly” usually means the mechanism detects the artifact, applies the configured action (alert, quarantine, block), and produces logs/telemetry that your monitoring and incident workflows can see and act on. ¹

This is not a penetration test requirement. It is a control-operational verification requirement for malicious code defenses.

Regulatory text

“Test malicious code protection mechanisms [organization-defined parameters] by introducing known benign code into the system; and” ¹

What the operator must do with this text:

• Define the missing “organization-defined” parameters (scope, methods, frequency/trigger, success criteria).
• Introduce benign test code through realistic paths (endpoint execution, email attachment, web download, CI artifact, removable media where relevant).
• Verify the mechanism performs the expected detection and handling, and that alerts/logs reach your monitoring stack. ¹

Who it applies to

Entity types

• Federal information systems.
• Contractor systems handling federal data. ¹

Operational context (where auditors focus)

• Endpoints (workstations, servers) with EDR/AV.
• Email security controls (attachment and URL scanning).
• Web gateways/proxies and DNS security (download blocking, category controls).
• File storage and collaboration platforms (malware scanning).
• Container registries and CI/CD pipelines (artifact/image scanning).
• Remote access and VDI environments (where endpoint agents behave differently).

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

Step 1: Set control scope and ownership

1. Name the control owner (often SecOps or Endpoint Security) and the compliance accountable party (GRC).
2. Define in-scope mechanisms (EDR/AV, email gateway, secure web gateway, file scanning, CI scanning).
3. Define in-scope assets (asset groups, system boundaries, enclaves, high-impact systems).

Deliverable: a one-page SI-3(6) control implementation record that lists owner, scope, tools, and evidence to collect.

Step 2: Define “organization-defined parameters” as testable statements

Write parameters so a tester can produce a pass/fail result:

• Test paths: endpoint download, email attachment, browser download, shared drive upload, build pipeline artifact.
• Expected control action: alert only, quarantine, block execution, delete attachment, deny upload.
• Telemetry requirements: alert appears in SIEM/EDR console, ticket created, log retained.
• Safety constraints: no live malware; only approved benign artifacts; approved test window; rollback steps.

Keep these in a standard operating procedure (SOP) so the test is repeatable.

Step 3: Choose benign test artifacts and get approvals

Use artifacts that are clearly benign but commonly recognized by security tools or your detection rules. Maintain:

• Artifact source and hash (or a stable identifier).
• Storage location and access control.
• Approval record (SecOps + Change Management, if required).

Avoid “mystery files” downloaded from the internet without provenance. Your assessor will ask what you introduced and why it was safe.

Step 4: Execute tests in a controlled manner

Run the test following the SOP:

• Record date/time, tester, system name, agent version/signature version, policy version.
• Introduce the benign artifact via the defined path.
• Capture what happened on the endpoint/gateway and in the management consoles.

Practical operator checks:

• Did the endpoint agent see the file?
• Did policy apply to that device group?
• Did the control take the configured action?
• Did the alert flow to monitoring and create an operational signal?

Step 5: Verify end-to-end handling (not just detection)

Assessors often reject “screenshot of an EDR alert” if you cannot show end-to-end response. Validate:

• Alerting: appears in the console and/or SIEM.
• Blocking/quarantine: artifact cannot execute or is isolated.
• Logging: logs contain required fields (host, user, action, timestamp).
• Workflow: ticketing/triage step exists (even if you close it as test).

Step 6: Record results and track exceptions to closure

If any test fails, open a remediation ticket with:

• Root cause (policy gap, agent not installed, signature outdated, logging broken).
• Compensating controls (if needed).
• Fix and retest evidence.

Step 7: Establish cadence and triggers

SI-3(6) expects more than a one-time test. Set routine execution tied to operational reality:

• Run on a recurring schedule.
• Run after material changes (new EDR platform, policy changes, new SIEM pipeline, major OS upgrades).
• Run when onboarding new environments (new cloud account, new VDI pool).

You do not need to invent an aggressive cadence; you need a defensible one you actually meet, then evidence it.

Required evidence and artifacts to retain (assessment-ready packet)

Store evidence in a system your auditors can access (GRC tool, ticketing system, evidence repository). Minimum set:

• SI-3(6) SOP/test procedure (scope, artifacts, steps, success criteria). ¹
• Approved benign test artifacts list (with provenance/identifier).
• Test execution record for each run (who/what/where/when).
• Screenshots or exports of:
  • EDR/AV detections and actions,
  • email gateway disposition (if tested),
  • web gateway blocks (if tested),
  • SIEM events showing ingestion.
• Change tickets for failed tests and evidence of retest.
• Policy/configuration snapshot (or configuration version reference) showing expected actions at test time.

Daydream tip (practical): If you manage multiple environments, Daydream can store the SI-3(6) procedure, map it to the control owner, and schedule recurring evidence requests so you collect the same artifacts each cycle without rebuilding the packet.

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

Auditors and assessors typically ask:

• “What benign code did you introduce, and how do you know it’s safe?”
• “Show me a recent test for each major protection mechanism in scope.”
• “How do you know the endpoint agent is installed and enforced on all in-scope assets?”
• “Prove the alert made it to your monitoring function, not just the local console.”
• “What happens when the test fails? Show corrective action and retest.”
• “How do you ensure tests reflect real attack paths (email, browser, file shares, CI/CD)?” ¹

Typical hangup: teams test only on one admin laptop, then claim coverage for the enterprise. Close that gap with representative sampling tied to asset groups and control boundaries.

Frequent implementation mistakes (and how to avoid them)

1. Mistake: Treating “tool installed” as “tested.”
   Fix: keep a test run record that proves the configured action occurred.

2. Mistake: Testing detection but ignoring telemetry.
   Fix: require SIEM/monitoring verification in the pass criteria.

3. Mistake: Unsafe testing practices (accidental live malware).
   Fix: restrict to approved benign artifacts; document provenance; use a controlled change window.

4. Mistake: No linkage to remediation.
   Fix: every failed test produces a ticket, owner, fix, and retest evidence.

5. Mistake: Scope mismatch.
   Fix: align tests to your system boundary and the mechanisms you claim in your SSP/control narrative.

Enforcement context and risk implications

No public enforcement cases were provided in the source catalog for this requirement, so you should treat SI-3(6) primarily as an assessment-readiness and operational resilience control rather than a “headline enforcement” item. The practical risk is straightforward: if protections are misconfigured, partially deployed, or not logging, malware events can go undetected or untriaged, and you will have weak evidence during incident response and external assessments. ¹

Practical 30/60/90-day execution plan (operator-focused)

First 30 days (stand up the control)

• Assign control owner and approver; document scope (systems + mechanisms).
• Draft SI-3(6) SOP with parameters: test paths, pass/fail, evidence list.
• Select benign test artifacts; document provenance and storage.
• Run an initial test in a non-production or low-risk segment to validate the procedure.
• Create an evidence repository structure (folders or GRC evidence objects) and naming convention.

Next 60 days (prove coverage and fix gaps)

• Expand testing to representative asset groups (server, workstation, VDI, cloud workloads).
• Add at least one non-endpoint path (email or web) if in scope for your environment.
• Validate alert routing to SIEM and ticketing.
• Resolve failures with tracked tickets and retest.
• Update SSP/control narrative (or equivalent) to match real behavior and evidence.

Next 90 days (operationalize and make it repeatable)

• Formalize recurring test scheduling and post-change triggers.
• Automate evidence capture where possible (console exports, SIEM saved searches).
• Add QA checks: agent coverage reports, policy assignment checks, log pipeline health checks.
• Run a tabletop-style review with GRC + SecOps: can you answer the top audit questions in one sitting using your evidence packet?

Frequently Asked Questions

Do we have to introduce real malware to meet si-3(6): testing and verification requirement?

No. The requirement text specifies introducing known benign code and testing the protection mechanism response. Use approved benign artifacts and document their provenance. ¹

What systems should we test if we have multiple environments (on-prem and cloud)?

Test representative systems for each distinct control boundary and each distinct protection mechanism configuration. If policy or telemetry differs by environment, treat it as separate coverage and collect evidence for each.

Is a screenshot of an EDR detection enough evidence?

Usually not by itself. Pair it with proof of the configured action (quarantine/block) and proof the event entered your monitoring workflow (SIEM record or ticket). ¹

How do we handle production testing safely?

Use benign artifacts, limit to a controlled set of test endpoints or mailboxes, and coordinate with SecOps monitoring so alerts are tagged as tests. Document the safety constraints in the SOP.

What if a test fails because an endpoint didn’t have the agent installed?

Record it as a control failure, open a remediation ticket, install/enforce the agent, and rerun the same test on the corrected endpoint. Keep both the failure and retest evidence for audit defensibility.

How should we manage evidence collection without creating manual busywork every cycle?

Standardize the evidence checklist and store it with the SOP, then use a recurring workflow in your GRC system to request the same artifacts each run. Daydream can help map SI-3(6) to the owner and recurring evidence so the packet stays current.

Footnotes

1. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON