SI-4(6): Restrict Non-privileged Users

SI-4(6): Restrict Non-privileged Users requires you to configure monitoring and security tooling so standard users cannot disable, bypass, or tamper with system monitoring functions and data. To operationalize it quickly, define “monitoring components,” block non-privileged access by default, enforce privileged workflows for exceptions, and retain evidence that those restrictions work in production. ¹

Key takeaways:

• Restrict access to monitoring features, configurations, agents, logs, and alerting so only authorized privileged roles can change them. ¹
• Treat “non-privileged” as the default: deny-by-default on monitoring admin actions, with tightly controlled break-glass. ²
• Evidence must show both design and operation: configs, RBAC mappings, and test results demonstrating tamper resistance. ²

SI-4 is the NIST 800-53 family control for system monitoring. Enhancement SI-4(6) focuses on a failure mode auditors see repeatedly: monitoring exists, but ordinary users can interfere with it. That interference can be direct (disabling an agent, stopping a service, clearing logs) or indirect (editing alert rules, changing forwarding destinations, weakening retention, or removing integrations). SI-4(6) pushes you to treat monitoring as security infrastructure that needs its own access control boundaries.

For a Compliance Officer, CCO, or GRC lead, the operational question is straightforward: what counts as “monitoring,” who is “non-privileged,” and what technical guardrails prove non-privileged users cannot tamper with monitoring in production? This page turns that into an implementation checklist you can hand to Security Operations, IT, and platform teams, plus an evidence list you can use to pass a NIST-based assessment.

You do not need perfect tooling to meet SI-4(6). You do need clear scoping, role design, enforcement points (RBAC, OS hardening, immutability where possible), and repeatable proof. ²

Regulatory text

Excerpt: “NIST SP 800-53 control SI-4.6.” ¹

What the operator must do: Implement access restrictions so non-privileged users cannot disable, modify, evade, or delete system monitoring capabilities or monitoring data. This is an enhancement to SI-4 (System Monitoring), so scope it to the people and systems that interact with monitoring controls: endpoints, servers, network devices, cloud control planes, log pipelines, SIEM, EDR, NDR, vulnerability scanning telemetry, and alerting/on-call integrations. ²

Plain-English interpretation (what SI-4(6) is really asking)

Your organization must prevent a standard user from:

• Turning off monitoring (stopping agents/services, uninstalling EDR, disabling auditd, killing collectors).
• Weakening monitoring (editing policies to reduce coverage, turning off high-value detections, changing sampling).
• Redirecting or suppressing monitoring (changing log forwarding destinations, altering pipelines, muting alerts broadly).
• Destroying monitoring evidence (clearing local logs, deleting cloud logs, changing retention to near-zero).

SI-4(6) is not “have monitoring.” It is “protect monitoring from the people you monitor.” If an attacker gets a normal user session, SI-4(6) aims to keep monitoring intact long enough for detection and response to work. ²

Who it applies to (entity + operational context)

Applies to:

• Federal information systems and the organizations operating them. ¹
• Contractor systems handling federal data, including cloud and SaaS environments in scope for federal requirements or contractual flow-downs. ¹

Operationally, it applies wherever:

• End users have local workstation access.
• Engineers have shell/console access to servers.
• Developers can change logging/monitoring configurations through CI/CD.
• Admin consoles exist for SIEM/EDR/log management tools.
• Third parties have any access that could affect monitoring (managed service providers, incident response retainers, outsourced IT). Use the same “non-privileged by default” principle for third-party accounts. ²

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

Step 1: Define “monitoring components” and draw the boundary

Create a short inventory list that you can defend in an audit:

• Endpoint agents (EDR, log shippers)
• Server agents and collectors
• Network sensors / firewall logging
• Cloud audit logs (control plane logs)
• Central log storage and SIEM
• Alerting rules and integrations (paging, ticketing)

Deliverable: a one-page “Monitoring System Boundary” record owned by Security Operations or IT Security. ²

Step 2: Define privileged vs. non-privileged roles for monitoring

Minimum roles most orgs need:

• Monitoring Admin (Privileged): can change policies, collectors, retention, routing, detections.
• Monitoring Operator (Restricted Privileged): can acknowledge alerts, investigate, run searches; cannot change global configs.
• Read-only Auditor: can read logs/dashboards; cannot export sensitive datasets unless separately approved.
• Standard User (Non-privileged): no access to monitoring admin functions; no ability to stop agents or clear logs.

Deliverable: role definitions + RBAC mapping by tool (SIEM, EDR console, log platform, cloud logging). ¹

Step 3: Enforce restrictions at the endpoints and servers

Control objectives:

• Standard users cannot stop or uninstall monitoring agents.
• Local log deletion is restricted (where feasible) or centrally mitigated (forwarding + immutable storage).
• Service management permissions are limited.

Implementation patterns:

• Managed endpoints: enforce agent tamper protection and restrict uninstall tokens to privileged support.
• Servers: restrict service control to admins; ensure logging agents run under service accounts with least privilege; forward logs off-host quickly.

Deliverable: configuration screenshots/exports showing tamper protection and uninstall controls, plus OS policy settings where applicable. ²

Step 4: Enforce restrictions in the monitoring back-end (SIEM/log platform)

Control objectives:

• Only privileged roles can change ingestion, parsing, routing, retention, alert logic, and user permissions.
• Changes to detections and routing are tracked, approved, and attributable.

Implementation patterns:

• RBAC: deny-by-default for configuration areas.
• Separate admin accounts: no day-to-day browsing from admin identities.
• Change control: ticket required for alert rule edits and retention changes; peer review for detection-as-code repositories.

Deliverable: RBAC matrix by platform + a sample of approved change tickets tied to production changes. ²

Step 5: Control cloud logging and control-plane audit configurations

Common gap: engineers with broad cloud permissions can disable audit trails or lower retention.

Implementation patterns:

• Restrict permissions for logging services (write/delete/configure) to a small privileged group.
• Use separate accounts/projects/subscriptions for centralized logging.
• Apply policy-as-code guardrails that block disabling audit logs or changing retention below your standard.

Deliverable: cloud IAM policy excerpts and organization policy controls that prevent disabling audit logging by non-privileged identities. ²

Step 6: Prove it works with negative testing

Run a simple, repeatable test:

• Use a standard user test account.
• Attempt to stop agent, uninstall agent, edit logging config, delete logs, mute alerts, change retention.
• Record expected denials and actual results.

Deliverable: “SI-4(6) Restriction Test” record with date, tester, system, steps, and outcomes. ¹

Step 7: Operationalize exceptions (break-glass) without breaking the control

You will need urgent changes during incidents and outages. Handle it with:

• Time-bound privileged access (approved, logged, automatically revoked)
• Break-glass accounts stored in a controlled vault
• Post-action review that confirms monitoring was restored and no coverage was reduced

Deliverable: break-glass procedure + logs showing at least one exercised workflow (real or tabletop) with approvals and revocation. ²

Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Keep evidence that demonstrates both design and operating effectiveness:

Evidence	What it proves	Owner
Monitoring boundary / component inventory	Scope is defined and stable	SecOps / GRC
RBAC matrix per monitoring tool	Non-privileged users lack admin rights	SecOps / Tool owner
IAM policies / group membership exports	Access assignments match the matrix	IAM / SecOps
Endpoint/server tamper protection configs	Users cannot disable agents	IT / Endpoint team
Change tickets for detection/retention/routing	Admin changes are controlled and attributable	SecOps
Negative test results (standard user attempts)	Restrictions work in practice	SecOps / GRC
Break-glass procedure + access logs	Exceptions are controlled and reversible	IAM / SecOps

Tip: Store artifacts in an assessment-ready folder structure keyed by control (SI-4(6)) and system boundary. Daydream can help you map SI-4(6) to a control owner, an implementation procedure, and recurring evidence artifacts so collection is routine instead of a scramble. ¹

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

• “Show me that a normal user cannot disable monitoring on a representative endpoint/server.” Expect requests for a live demo or a test record.
• “Who can change SIEM retention and alert rules?” Auditors want named roles, not “the security team.”
• “How do you detect unauthorized changes to monitoring?” Have alerting on config changes, plus change logs.
• “Do third-party accounts have access to monitoring admin?” Be ready with scoped roles and expiration controls for third-party access. ²

Frequent implementation mistakes (and how to avoid them)

1. RBAC exists, but admin rights are shared broadly. Fix: split “operator” from “admin,” and remove standing admin from daily-use accounts.
2. Endpoint agents can be removed by local admins everywhere. Fix: require centrally managed uninstall tokens and restrict who can obtain them.
3. Monitoring changes happen through CI/CD with weak review. Fix: require code owners and approvals for detection and logging pipeline changes.
4. Cloud logging can be disabled by platform engineers. Fix: add guardrails (org policies) and segregate logging administration from app administration.
5. No proof. Fix: schedule recurring negative tests and export RBAC assignments on a regular cadence. ²

Enforcement context and risk implications

No public enforcement cases were provided in the source catalog for this requirement, so treat this as an assessment and contractual compliance expectation rather than a citation-backed enforcement trend. ¹

Risk-wise, SI-4(6) maps to a familiar incident pattern: an intruder gains a low-privilege foothold, then tries to blind monitoring before escalating. If non-privileged users can tamper with monitoring, you will see delayed detection, weaker forensic timelines, and higher likelihood of unresolved scope questions during incident response. ²

Practical execution plan (30/60/90-day)

Numeric day counts are a planning convention here, not a time claim.

First 30 days: Establish scope, ownership, and quick wins

• Assign a single control owner (usually SecOps) and a backup.
• Publish the monitoring boundary and component list.
• Export current RBAC/IAM for SIEM, EDR, and cloud logging.
• Remove obvious excess: disable shared admin accounts; enforce MFA on monitoring admin consoles.
• Enable tamper protection where your endpoint tool supports it and document the setting. ²

By 60 days: Enforce deny-by-default and add change control

• Implement the target role model (Admin vs Operator vs Read-only).
• Lock down uninstall/stop permissions for agents across representative endpoint and server populations.
• Put change control around: retention, routing, detection logic, collector configuration.
• Stand up break-glass with time-bound approvals and logging. ¹

By 90 days: Prove operating effectiveness and make it repeatable

• Run negative tests with standard user accounts across each environment type (endpoint, server, cloud logging, SIEM).
• Add alerts for monitoring configuration changes and permission grants.
• Build a recurring evidence packet: RBAC exports, test results, sample change tickets.
• In Daydream, map SI-4(6) to the control owner, the step-by-step procedure, and the recurring evidence artifacts so audits become a retrieval exercise. ¹

Frequently Asked Questions

Does SI-4(6) mean only sysadmins can view logs?

No. Many teams allow broad read-only access for troubleshooting. SI-4(6) is about restricting the ability to disable, alter, or delete monitoring and monitoring data. ²

Are developers “non-privileged users” if they have cloud access?

Treat “non-privileged” as “not explicitly authorized to administer monitoring.” A developer can be privileged for application deployment while still non-privileged for logging retention, routing, and detection changes. ²

What’s the fastest audit-ready evidence if engineering says this is already locked down?

Export RBAC/group membership from the monitoring tools and run a negative test with a standard user account that attempts the key tampering actions. Pair that with screenshots/config exports showing tamper protection settings. ¹

How do we handle emergencies where someone must change monitoring fast?

Use a break-glass path with explicit approval, time-bound privileged access, and a post-action review to confirm monitoring coverage returned to baseline. Document the workflow and keep access logs. ²

Does SI-4(6) apply to third parties like MSPs?

Yes in practice, because third-party accounts can be non-privileged or privileged depending on what you grant them. Restrict third-party access to the minimum monitoring roles needed and require expiration and logging for privileged actions. ²

What if our endpoint tool can’t prevent local admins from uninstalling the agent?

Compensate by limiting who gets local admin, centralizing logs quickly, alerting on agent removal, and using change control around any removal activity. Document the limitation and the compensating controls as part of your SI-4(6) narrative. ²

Footnotes

1. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON

2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5