SI-4(14): Wireless Intrusion Detection

The si-4(14): wireless intrusion detection requirement is narrow in text but broad in operational impact: you need a working capability that continuously identifies unauthorized (“rogue”) wireless devices and detects wireless attack attempts that could lead to compromise or breach. ¹

Most control failures here are not about buying the wrong technology. They come from gaps in scope (unknown wireless assets, unmanaged sites, lab networks), gaps in operations (alerts not routed, no triage standards, no follow-up), or gaps in evidence (nothing that proves detection is running, tuned, and reviewed). A WIDS/WIPS program that is technically sound but poorly governed often fails assessments because you cannot show consistent, repeatable operation.

This page gives requirement-level implementation guidance for a Compliance Officer, CCO, or GRC lead: who owns what, what you need to build, what artifacts to keep, and what exam questions to pre-answer. Where it makes sense, it also shows how to turn SI-4(14) into an assessable control narrative with owners and recurring evidence so you can stay audit-ready.

Regulatory text

Requirement (verbatim): “Employ a wireless intrusion detection system to identify rogue wireless devices and to detect attack attempts and potential compromises or breaches to the system.” ¹

Operator interpretation: what you must do

• Employ means you must run a wireless intrusion detection capability in production, not just write a policy. ¹
• Your WIDS must support two outcomes:
  1. Identify rogue wireless devices (unauthorized APs, hotspots, ad-hoc networks, unauthorized radios) within your monitored environment. ¹
  2. Detect attack attempts and potential compromises/breaches over wireless (e.g., suspicious associations, evil twin behavior, deauth floods, unusual wireless traffic patterns), then drive response. ¹

Plain-English interpretation (what “good” looks like)

You have a defined wireless security boundary, sensors or equivalent telemetry that can observe the wireless spectrum where your systems operate, and an operational process that turns detections into tickets, investigations, containment, and documentation. If your organization allows no Wi‑Fi, you still need a way to detect and respond to rogue wireless activity in facilities where systems could be exposed.

Who it applies to

Entity types

• Federal information systems and programs implementing NIST SP 800-53 controls. ²
• Contractors and service providers handling federal data where 800-53 is contractually required (common in regulated or federal-adjacent environments). ²

Operational contexts where SI-4(14) is usually assessed

• Corporate offices, data centers, and labs with Wi‑Fi.
• Warehouses and manufacturing where wireless scanners/IoT operate.
• Clinics/field sites with guest networks and shared airspace.
• Third-party managed locations where your systems are present (colos, managed offices), if your boundary definition includes those locations.

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

1) Set scope: define “where wireless intrusion detection must work”

Deliverable: Wireless monitoring scope statement (sites, floors, SSIDs, VLANs, and wireless technologies in-scope).

Minimum decisions to record:

• Do you run corporate Wi‑Fi? Guest Wi‑Fi? IoT Wi‑Fi?
• Which locations are in-scope for monitoring (HQ only vs all offices vs “any facility with federal system components”)?
• Which wireless technologies matter (Wi‑Fi is typical; include others if your environment relies on them).

Practical tip: auditors will accept a scoped program if it is justified and consistent with your system boundary and architecture narrative.

2) Assign ownership and RACI (make it assessable)

Deliverable: Control owner and operators with escalation path.

A workable split:

• Control owner (GRC/InfoSec): defines requirements, ensures evidence, manages exceptions.
• Network/Wireless team: deploys sensors/AP telemetry, maintains baselines of authorized devices.
• SOC/IR team: triages alerts, investigates, initiates containment and incident workflow.
• Facilities/Physical security (optional): assists with locating rogue APs or unauthorized equipment.

If you use Daydream for control operations, this is where it fits naturally: map SI-4(14) to an owner, an implementation procedure, and recurring evidence tasks so the control stays “alive” between audits. ¹

3) Choose the detection approach and document the design

Deliverable: Wireless intrusion detection design aligned to your network architecture.

Common acceptable patterns:

• Dedicated WIDS/WIPS sensors placed to cover defined areas.
• Controller-based WIDS/WIPS using enterprise APs as sensors.
• Managed service where a third party monitors wireless events and provides incident handoff.

Your documentation should answer:

• What telemetry is collected (rogue AP detection, client associations, threat signatures/heuristics)?
• How detections become actionable events (SIEM ingestion, alert routing, ticket creation)?
• What “rogue” means in your environment (unauthorized SSID, unauthorized BSSID/MAC, AP plugged into corporate switch, employee hotspot near secure area).

4) Build the authorized wireless baseline (so “rogue” is measurable)

Deliverables:

• Inventory of authorized APs/controllers (and their identifiers).
• Approved SSID list and security settings baseline (encryption/auth expectations).
• Exception register for temporary APs, labs, or approved test gear.

Operational requirement: keep the baseline current. A stale baseline creates constant false positives or, worse, missed rogue devices that look “normal.”

5) Configure detections and alert thresholds tied to response actions

Deliverables:

• Detection use cases mapped to response playbooks.
• Alert severity rubric (what pages the SOC vs what creates a low-priority ticket).

At minimum, ensure you have detections for:

• Rogue access points or ad-hoc networks in monitored areas. ¹
• Indicators of wireless attack attempts and likely compromise conditions. ¹

6) Integrate with incident handling and track remediation

Deliverables:

• Runbook/playbook for “Rogue AP detected” and “Wireless attack attempt detected.”
• Ticketing workflow with required fields (location, evidence, disposition, containment steps).
• Post-incident notes that show closure and lessons learned when relevant.

A simple, audit-friendly workflow:

1. Alert triggers ticket.
2. Triage validates: false positive vs true rogue/attack.
3. Containment: disable switchport, block MAC, remove device, adjust RF controls as appropriate.
4. Root cause: why it existed (policy gap, physical access issue, shadow IT).
5. Closure: evidence attached, baseline updated, exception logged if approved.

7) Operate and prove it: reviews, tuning, and coverage checks

Deliverables:

• Recurring review record (alerts reviewed, outcomes, tuning changes).
• Coverage validation (sensor health, AP telemetry status, “no data” alerts).
• Periodic test (controlled rogue AP test or tabletop plus technical verification) to confirm detection-to-ticket works.

Assessors want to see that the system detects and that humans act on detections. ¹

Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Use an evidence folder structure that supports “design + operate + improve”:

Design & scope

• Wireless monitoring scope statement (sites/areas/SSIDs in-scope)
• Wireless architecture diagram showing WIDS/WIPS sensors/APs and log flow
• Tool configuration summary (screenshots or exported config where feasible)

Authorization baseline

• Authorized AP list (export from controller/MDM/NAC)
• Approved SSID/security baseline
• Exceptions register for approved deviations

Operational records

• Alert samples showing rogue device detection and wireless attack detection. ¹
• Tickets/IR cases with timestamps, investigation notes, and remediation actions
• Sensor health/coverage monitoring logs (“heartbeat,” missing telemetry alerts)
• Review meeting notes or weekly/monthly review attestations
• Tuning/change records (what was changed and why)

Ownership

• RACI or control ownership record
• Procedure/runbook for triage and remediation

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

Expect these questions:

1. “Show me how you identify rogue wireless devices.”
   Bring: authorized baseline + a recent alert/ticket + disposition.

2. “How do you detect wireless attack attempts?”
   Bring: detection rule list/use cases + sample events + SOC workflow mapping. ¹

3. “What is your wireless monitoring coverage?”
   Bring: scope statement + sensor/AP placement + health monitoring proof.

4. “Who reviews alerts and how often?”
   Bring: SOC procedures + evidence of review and follow-up actions.

5. “What about sites managed by third parties?”
   Bring: boundary decision, contract/SOW language if applicable, and compensating controls if you cannot deploy sensors.

Frequent implementation mistakes (and how to avoid them)

• Mistake: Policy-only compliance. You have a wireless policy but no deployed detection.
  Fix: show working telemetry, alerts, and tickets. “Employ” requires operation. ¹

• Mistake: No authoritative baseline. Everything looks rogue, or true rogues blend in.
  Fix: maintain approved AP/SSID lists and update them with change management.

• Mistake: Blind spots. WIDS covers HQ but not labs, warehouses, or satellite sites that still host in-scope systems.
  Fix: explicitly scope exclusions and document compensating monitoring or access restrictions.

• Mistake: Alerts don’t reach responders. Events exist in a console nobody watches.
  Fix: integrate with SIEM/ticketing and assign on-call responsibility.

• Mistake: No closure evidence. You can show detections but not remediation.
  Fix: require ticket closure notes and link to change records or physical removal confirmation.

Enforcement context and risk implications

No public enforcement cases were provided in the source catalog for SI-4(14), so you should anchor your “why” to operational risk: rogue APs and wireless attack paths create an alternate entry into environments that may bypass wired NAC controls, segmentation assumptions, or endpoint protections. The assessment risk is also straightforward: teams often cannot prove operation, so the control fails on evidence even if the technology exists.

Practical 30/60/90-day execution plan

First 30 days (stand up control ownership and scope)

• Name the SI-4(14) control owner and operator teams; publish RACI.
• Define wireless scope and boundary decisions; document exclusions and rationale.
• Inventory authorized wireless infrastructure and approved SSIDs.
• Decide tooling pattern (dedicated sensors, controller-based WIDS/WIPS, or managed service) and document the design.

By 60 days (deploy, integrate, and start producing evidence)

• Deploy WIDS/WIPS telemetry across in-scope areas; confirm sensors are healthy.
• Integrate alerts into SIEM/ticketing; define severity and routing.
• Write and approve runbooks for “rogue AP” and “wireless attack attempt.”
• Run a controlled detection test and capture evidence (alert → ticket → response steps). ¹

By 90 days (stabilize operations and make it audit-ready)

• Establish recurring review cadence for alerts, false positives, and tuning.
• Formalize baseline maintenance with change management triggers (new APs, SSID changes, site openings).
• Build an audit packet: scope, design, baseline, sample alerts, sample tickets, review logs.
• In Daydream, map SI-4(14) to an owner, a written procedure, and recurring evidence tasks so evidence collection is routine, not a scramble. ¹

Frequently Asked Questions

Does SI-4(14) require WIPS (prevention), or is WIDS (detection) enough?

The text requires you to “employ a wireless intrusion detection system,” so detection is the explicit requirement. If your environment needs prevention features, document them as part of your design, but ensure detection-to-response works end to end. ¹

We prohibit Wi‑Fi. Do we still need to implement SI-4(14)?

If wireless is prohibited, you still need a way to identify rogue wireless devices and detect wireless attack attempts that could affect your systems in your facilities. Scope the control to the areas where wireless exposure is realistic and document how you detect and respond. ¹

Can our enterprise access points act as the wireless intrusion detection system?

Often yes, if your AP/controller stack provides WIDS telemetry that identifies rogues and detects attack attempts, and you operationalize alert triage and remediation. Your evidence must show the capability is enabled, monitored, and acted on. ¹

What evidence is the fastest to produce for an auditor?

Provide a recent rogue-device alert, the linked ticket with investigation notes, and proof of remediation (switchport disabled, device removed, exception logged). Pair that with your authorized AP/SSID baseline and a coverage/health report.

How do we handle third-party managed offices or co-locations?

Decide whether those sites are in your control boundary. If in-scope, require monitoring capabilities contractually or deploy your own sensors; if out-of-scope, document the boundary and any compensating controls that reduce wireless exposure.

What’s the minimum recurring operation we need to show?

Show that alerts are reviewed, investigated, and closed with documented outcomes, plus periodic tuning and coverage checks. The goal is repeatable operation evidence, not a one-time screenshot. ¹

Footnotes

1. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON

2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5