SI-5: Security Alerts, Advisories, and Directives

SI-5 is a deceptively simple control with a common failure mode: teams “monitor security news,” but cannot prove consistent intake, cannot show which sources are authoritative for their environment, and cannot demonstrate that directives reached the people who must act. The requirement is about reception, but mature programs connect reception to triage and remediation so alerts do not die in an inbox.

For a Compliance Officer, CCO, or GRC lead, the fastest path is to treat SI-5 as an operational pipeline: define your sources (government, ISAC/ISAO, cloud/SaaS providers, key OEMs, internal SOC), define who owns intake, and define what “received” means in evidence terms (subscription + distribution + logs/tickets). Your objective is assessment-ready traceability: “We receive alerts continuously, we can show when we received them, and we can show what we did with the ones that mattered.”

This page provides requirement-level guidance you can implement quickly: scope, roles, a step-by-step build, artifacts to retain, common audit questions, and a practical execution plan. Control text and expectations are drawn from NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 ¹.

Regulatory text

Requirement (SI-5): “Receive system security alerts, advisories, and directives from [organization-defined sources] on an ongoing basis;” ²

What the operator must do:

1. Name the sources you trust and rely on for your systems (the “[organization-defined sources]” parameter).
2. Implement a mechanism to receive those alerts/advisories/directives continuously (not ad hoc).
3. Prove it with repeatable evidence that intake is active and monitored over time ¹.

Plain-English interpretation

SI-5 requires a living “inbox” for security-relevant notifications that matter to your environment. That inbox can be email distribution lists, a ticketing intake queue, a SIEM/SOAR feed, an RSS-to-case workflow, or a SOC runbook. The key is that you can demonstrate:

• Coverage: your sources match your tech stack and threat exposure.
• Continuity: intake happens as a normal business process.
• Control: someone is accountable for checking and routing items.
• Traceability: you can show receipt records and follow-up actions where applicable.

Auditors often treat SI-5 as a governance test: can you show you are plugged into authoritative guidance and that you do not miss directives that require action ³.

Who it applies to (entity and operational context)

Primary applicability:

• Federal information systems and programs aligned to NIST SP 800-53 ³
• Contractor systems handling federal data where NIST 800-53 controls are required by contract, ATO package, or agency overlay expectations ³

Operational contexts where SI-5 becomes high-friction:

• Multi-cloud + SaaS estates where advisories are scattered across vendor portals
• Organizations with a SOC where alerts exist, but advisories/directives are handled informally by engineering
• M&A environments where inherited systems have no mapped alert sources
• Third-party-heavy stacks where supply chain advisories must be routed across owners

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

Step 1: Define “sources” in a way an assessor can test

Create an SI-5 “Approved Sources Register” with categories aligned to your environment. Examples of source categories (you define the actual list):

• Government/sector sources relevant to your mission
• Critical technology providers (cloud, endpoint, identity, email, firewall, EDR, core SaaS)
• Hardware/firmware OEMs if you operate them
• Internal sources (SOC detections, vulnerability management advisories, change management risk notices)

Acceptance criteria: each major platform in your inventory has at least one mapped advisory source, and each source has an owner who can prove subscription/access.

Step 2: Assign ownership and RACI that matches how work gets done

Minimum roles:

• Control owner (GRC): maintains sources register, checks evidence cadence, handles audit requests
• Operational owner (SOC or SecOps): monitors intake channels daily and routes items
• System owners (IT/Engineering/Product): assess applicability and implement fixes or compensating controls

A simple RACI prevents “everyone thought someone else was watching the inbox.”

Step 3: Stand up an intake mechanism (make “receipt” provable)

Pick one primary intake path and one backup:

• Primary: security-alerts distribution list + ticket automation that converts incoming advisories into tracked items
• Backup: vendor portal subscriptions that send to a monitored mailbox, with periodic verification that accounts are active

What auditors want to see is not the tool brand. They want to see the mechanism exists and is used continuously ².

Step 4: Create triage rules that separate “FYI” from “act now”

Define a lightweight triage rubric and document it in an SI-5 procedure:

• Directive: requires action by a due date or mandates configuration/patching
• Advisory: indicates a vulnerability or exposure; action depends on applicability
• Alert: immediate threat activity or exploitation signal; triggers incident/vuln workflows

Route to:

• Vulnerability management when patching/config changes are needed
• Incident response when active exploitation is suspected
• Third-party management when the advisory affects a critical third party and you need attestations, SLAs, or compensating controls

Step 5: Track to closure when action is required

SI-5 is “receive,” but your program fails if you cannot show what happened next for high-impact items. Implement ticket fields that allow:

• Source (from approved register)
• Date/time received
• Systems potentially affected
• Decision (not applicable / monitor / remediate)
• Actions taken and links to patch/change records
• Closure approver (system owner or security)

Step 6: Add a control-health check so “ongoing basis” is real

Implement a recurring check performed by the control owner:

• Validate subscriptions are active
• Confirm distribution lists still route to monitored teams
• Sample recent advisories and confirm triage occurred
• Record findings and corrective actions

Daydream (as a GRC workflow layer) is a practical fit here because it can map SI-5 to an owner, a documented procedure, and a recurring evidence request schedule so you are not rebuilding proof during every assessment ².

Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Retain artifacts that prove sources, receipt, and operational continuity:

Governance artifacts

• SI-5 control narrative (how you meet “receive … on an ongoing basis”) ³
• Approved Sources Register with owners and scope mapping
• SI-5 SOP/runbook for intake and triage

Operational artifacts

• Screenshots or exports showing subscriptions to sources (email subscriptions, portal notification settings)
• Distribution list membership and mailbox monitoring assignment
• Ticket samples showing advisories received, triaged, and closed
• Evidence of routing automation (mail rules, SOAR playbooks, integrations)

Assurance artifacts

• Control-health check logs (subscription verification, sampling results)
• Exceptions register (sources temporarily unavailable, compensating monitoring)

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

Assessors commonly ask:

• “What are your organization-defined sources for SI-5, and why are they appropriate?” ²
• “Show evidence you received advisories continuously, not only during incidents.”
• “Who reviews the inbox, and what happens when they are out?”
• “Show an example where an advisory led to a patch or configuration change.”
• “How do you ensure coverage for cloud services and key third parties?”

Hangups:

• Undefined sources: you cannot answer what you receive from, so you cannot prove compliance.
• No continuity evidence: subscriptions exist, but no logs/tickets prove monitoring.
• No ownership: mailbox exists, nobody is accountable.

Frequent implementation mistakes and how to avoid them

1. Mistake: treating SI-5 as “SOC gets alerts.”
   Fix: include advisories/directives from external sources and map them to systems and owners ².

2. Mistake: subscribing to too many feeds and drowning.
   Fix: start with sources tied to your critical platforms and add feeds only when you can triage them.

3. Mistake: evidence is scattered across inboxes and portals.
   Fix: centralize intake into a mailbox and/or ticket queue so you can export proof quickly.

4. Mistake: no linkage to change/vulnerability workflows.
   Fix: require tickets to reference the patch/change record when action is taken.

5. Mistake: third-party exposure is ignored.
   Fix: route relevant advisories to third-party risk management when a critical third party’s service is implicated (outage risk, breach risk, urgent mitigations).

Enforcement context and risk implications

No public enforcement cases were provided in the source catalog for this requirement. Practically, SI-5 gaps show up as “failure to maintain security situational awareness” during audits, and as preventable exposure during exploited-vulnerability events. The business risk is straightforward: if you do not reliably receive directives and advisories, you will miss time-sensitive mitigations and have weak defensibility in assessments tied to NIST SP 800-53 ³.

Practical execution plan (30/60/90-day)

You asked for speed, so this plan focuses on artifacts and repeatability. Treat the day markers as phases you can compress or extend based on staffing.

First 30 days (Immediate: get to “receiving” with proof)

• Appoint SI-5 control owner and operational owner.
• Draft Approved Sources Register for top systems and critical third parties.
• Create monitored intake channel (mailbox/list) and basic ticket intake path.
• Publish a one-page SI-5 SOP: intake, triage categories, routing targets.
• Start retaining evidence: subscription screenshots and first ticket samples.

By 60 days (Near-term: make it auditable)

• Expand sources register to cover remaining major systems.
• Add triage rubric fields to tickets and require system-owner disposition.
• Implement backup coverage (secondary mailbox owner, on-call rotation, or SOC queue).
• Run first control-health check and log results with corrective actions.

By 90 days (Ongoing operations: reduce missed directives)

• Add automation for known sources (mail rules to tickets, tagging by product).
• Integrate with vulnerability management and change management references.
• Establish a periodic evidence cadence in Daydream (owner attestations + sample set collection) so SI-5 evidence is produced continuously, not assembled during audit.

Frequently Asked Questions

What counts as an “alert, advisory, or directive” for SI-5?

Use your procedure to define each term in operational language: alerts signal active threats, advisories describe exposures or vulnerabilities, and directives require action by policy or authority. The key is consistent handling and evidence of receipt ².

Do we have to prove we acted on every advisory to satisfy SI-5?

SI-5 is a “receive” requirement, but auditors often expect to see triage decisions and escalation for items that apply to your environment. Track disposition and link to remediation records when action is required.

Can our SIEM/SOAR satisfy SI-5 by itself?

Sometimes, if it ingests external advisories/directives and you can show ongoing receipt. Many SIEMs cover internal alerts well but do not replace provider advisory subscriptions without explicit feeds and evidence.

How do we scope SI-5 across SaaS and third parties?

Map each critical SaaS and third party to an advisory source and a routing owner. If a provider publishes advisories only in a portal, treat portal access and notification settings as required evidence.

What evidence is fastest to produce during an audit?

A sources register, subscription proof, a monitored mailbox configuration, and a small set of recent tickets showing receipt and triage. These artifacts directly support “receive … on an ongoing basis” ².

How should a GRC team operationalize SI-5 without building a new tool?

Start with a controlled mailbox, ticketing workflow, and a documented sources list. If evidence collection becomes manual, use Daydream to assign ownership and automate recurring evidence prompts tied to SI-5 ².

Footnotes

1. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON

2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON

3. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5