SI-6(1): Notification of Failed Security Tests

SI-6(1): Notification of Failed Security Tests requires you to detect when a security test fails (for example, an integrity check, vulnerability scan step, or control validation) and promptly notify the right people or systems so the failure is triaged, investigated, and corrected. Operationalize it by defining “failed test” conditions, routing rules, and evidence that notifications were sent and acted on. ¹

Key takeaways:

• Define what counts as a “failed security test” in your environment and tie each failure type to a notification path.
• Make notifications actionable: severity, affected asset, test output, owner, and required response workflow.
• Retain evidence of detection, notification delivery, triage, and closure to satisfy assessors. ¹

For a Compliance Officer, CCO, or GRC lead, SI-6(1) is a build-and-prove requirement: you need a repeatable way to show that when security tests fail, the organization is informed quickly enough to respond, and that the response is tracked to closure. The “security tests” in scope are broader than classic penetration tests. In practice, this includes automated security control tests (CI/CD checks, configuration compliance checks), continuous monitoring tests (endpoint health checks), and scheduled assessments (vulnerability scans, integrity validation, baseline drift checks).

The operational risk is straightforward: if failed security tests don’t trigger notifications, failures become silent. Silent failures become unpatched vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, or compromised integrity that persist until an incident forces discovery. Your job is to prevent that failure mode with clear definitions, routing, and evidence.

This page focuses on rapid operationalization: scoping, workflow design, notification engineering, and audit-ready artifacts aligned to the si-6(1): notification of failed security tests requirement. ¹

Regulatory text

Excerpt: “NIST SP 800-53 control SI-6.1.” ²

Operator interpretation of what you must do: Implement a mechanism that notifies designated personnel or systems when security tests fail, and run it in production as part of your security monitoring and testing program. “Designated” means you must explicitly name who gets notified (roles, on-call rotations, queues) and for which systems and failure types. ¹

Plain-English interpretation

• A “security test” is any defined check meant to validate that a security control is present, working, or within acceptable parameters.
• A “failed security test” is a check that returns an error, a “non-compliant” result, or a result outside the acceptance criteria you defined.
• “Notification” means the failure produces a message in a channel people actually monitor (ticket, pager, security queue, email distribution list) and the organization can prove it happened. ¹

Who it applies to

Entity scope

• Federal information systems and organizations implementing NIST SP 800-53 controls.
• Contractors and other third parties handling federal data or operating systems on behalf of federal agencies where 800-53 controls are flowed down contractually. ¹

Operational scope (where SI-6(1) shows up in real life)

• SOC / security operations: alerts and case management for monitoring and detection failures.
• Vulnerability management: scanning jobs, agent health, scan coverage checks, and scan results that exceed thresholds.
• DevSecOps / CI/CD: SAST/DAST failures, IaC policy failures, container image scan failures, signing and provenance checks.
• IT operations: configuration compliance tools, patch compliance tests, endpoint posture checks.
• Third party operations: security tests performed by managed service providers or external scanning services where you still need the notification trail and response workflow. ¹

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

1) Define “security tests” and “failure” criteria (write it down)

Create a short, enforceable standard that answers:

• Test types in scope: vulnerability scan job completion, vulnerability findings thresholds, configuration drift checks, integrity checks, EDR sensor health checks, backup restore tests, certificate expiration tests, CI policy gates, and other control validations you run.
• Failure conditions: job failed, agent offline, scan coverage below target, critical control check failed, signature verification failed, baseline deviation above tolerance.
• Severity mapping: which failures page on-call vs create tickets vs weekly summaries.
• Time expectation: define what “promptly” means internally as an operational target (avoid external claims; set your own measurable objective). ¹

Deliverable: “Failed Security Test Notification Standard” (1–3 pages) owned by Security/GRC, approved by the CISO or delegated authority.

2) Assign notification ownership and routing (RACI that matches reality)

Build a routing map per failure category:

• Detection owner: team/tool that runs the test (SecOps, Vuln Mgmt, DevSecOps, IT Ops, third party).
• Notification recipient: role-based queue (SOC queue), on-call rotation, system owner distribution, or ticketing group.
• Responder: system owner and engineering team responsible for remediation.
• Accountable approver: person who can accept risk if the failure cannot be fixed quickly (often the system owner with GRC oversight).

Keep routing role-based, not person-based. If it’s person-based, it will break during turnover.

3) Implement automated notification paths (don’t rely on humans forwarding emails)

Your goal is consistent delivery plus an audit trail. Common patterns:

• Tool → Ticketing: scanner/CI tool creates a ticket with structured fields (asset, control, test, output, severity).
• Tool → SIEM/SOAR → Case: event becomes an alert, then a case with enrichment.
• Tool → Pager / ChatOps: only for high-severity or broad-coverage failures, and only when the receiving team is actually staffed to respond.

Minimum content for a notification to be “actionable”:

• System/asset identifier and owner
• Test name and tool
• Failure output or link to raw output
• Severity and reason for severity
• Required next step (triage, rerun test, open incident, patch, exception process) ¹

4) Tie notification to a required workflow (triage → fix → retest → close)

Notifications without follow-through are a common audit finding. Define:

• Triage rules: who validates whether it’s a true failure vs tool error.
• Response playbooks: what “good” looks like per failure type.
• Retest requirement: how you confirm the control is back in compliance.
• Closure criteria: ticket cannot close until evidence of retest exists, or a formally approved exception exists.

Practical control: require a “retest evidence” attachment or link in the ticket before closure for certain categories (for example, integrity check failures or CI policy gate failures).

5) Build coverage checks so you can prove you would know if tests stopped running

SI-6(1) is easy to “pass on paper” while failing in practice if scan jobs stop running or agents fall off. Add meta-tests:

• “No scan results received in X time window” alert
• “Endpoint agent offline” alert
• “CI security gate skipped/disabled” alert (guardrail against bypass)
• “Integrity monitoring disabled” alert

These meta-failures should notify the same way as a failed test because they create the same risk: blind spots.

6) Operationalize exceptions (because some failures are accepted temporarily)

Create an exception path with:

• Documented business justification
• Compensating controls (if any)
• Expiration date and renewal process
• Approval by risk owner
• Link back to the failed test notification/ticket so the audit trail stays intact

7) Prove it continuously (sampling beats storytelling)

For audit readiness, plan to produce a sample set on demand:

• A failure event
• The notification artifact (ticket/alert/email)
• Evidence of triage
• Evidence of remediation
• Evidence of retest and closure

Daydream tip (where it fits naturally): teams often store evidence in too many places (SIEM, Jira/ServiceNow, email, scanner consoles). Daydream can act as the control record that maps SI-6(1) to an owner, procedure, and the recurring evidence you collect each cycle, so audits become a retrieval exercise instead of a scavenger hunt. ¹

Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Keep evidence that proves both design (the process exists) and operation (it runs).

Design evidence (static or slow-changing)

• Failed Security Test Notification Standard (definitions, severity, routing)
• RACI / ownership matrix for test categories and systems
• Tool configuration screenshots or exported settings showing notification integrations
• Runbooks/playbooks for top failure types (vuln scan failure, integrity check failure, CI gate failure) ¹

Operating evidence (recurring)

• Ticket/incident records showing creation from test failure and timestamps
• Alert logs or SIEM events showing the failed test event
• Email or messaging logs if those channels are used (prefer systems with retention and search)
• Triage notes and remediation actions
• Retest results demonstrating the test passes after remediation
• Exception approvals tied to specific failure events ¹

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

Assessors tend to probe the same weak points:

1. “What is a security test here?”
   Be ready with a scoped list and examples, not an abstract definition.

2. “Show me the last few failed tests and what happened.”
   Have a curated sample set across different toolchains (CI, vuln mgmt, endpoint).

3. “How do you know notifications reach the right people?”
   Demonstrate routing rules (group queues, on-call schedules) and show acknowledgements or ticket assignments.

4. “What happens if the testing tool itself fails?”
   Show coverage/meta-alerting and how you detect gaps in scan execution or agent health.

5. “Do third parties perform any of these tests?”
   If yes, show how notifications from the third party enter your workflow and how you retain the evidence internally. ¹

Frequent implementation mistakes and how to avoid them

Mistake: Treating “failed tests” as “high vulnerabilities only”

Fix: include operational failures (scan jobs failing, agents offline, integrity monitoring disabled). Silent tool failure is still a security failure.

Mistake: Email-only notifications with no case tracking

Fix: route into a system of record (ticketing or case management) with ownership, SLA targets you define internally, and closure criteria.

Mistake: No definition of failure thresholds

Fix: publish acceptance criteria per test type (what constitutes “fail”), then align alert severities.

Mistake: Manual forwarding and tribal knowledge

Fix: automate routing; use group-based queues; document who owns each category and keep it updated.

Mistake: Evidence lives only in the scanner console

Fix: export or link evidence into tickets and retain it according to your record retention approach so you can produce it during an assessment. ¹

Enforcement context and risk implications

No public enforcement cases were provided in the source material for this specific control enhancement. ¹

Risk is still concrete:

• Missed failed tests often translate into prolonged exposure windows: unpatched vulnerabilities, broken integrity monitoring, or noncompliant configurations that persist.
• In federal or federal-adjacent environments, inability to show notification and response evidence can drive negative assessment results, delayed authorization decisions, or contractual noncompliance findings tied to control operation. ¹

Practical execution plan (30/60/90-day)

Use phased execution with deliverables. Adjust based on system criticality and existing tooling maturity.

First 30 days (establish the control, stop the bleeding)

• Identify top security tests already running (vuln scans, EDR health, CI gates, config compliance).
• Define “failed test” criteria for those tests and publish a one-page standard.
• Implement or confirm automated notification to a system of record (ticket/case) for the highest-risk failure categories.
• Run an internal tabletop: pick one recent failed test and trace whether notification, triage, remediation, and retest are visible end-to-end. ¹

Days 31–60 (expand coverage and make it auditable)

• Add meta-alerting for “tests not running” and “agents offline.”
• Standardize notification payload fields (asset, owner, output link, severity, next step).
• Implement closure criteria requiring retest evidence or a time-bound exception.
• Start a recurring evidence pull: sample failures and attach/export proof into your compliance repository (Daydream can store the mapping and recurring artifacts). ¹

Days 61–90 (harden operations and reduce false noise)

• Tune severity thresholds to reduce alert fatigue while keeping coverage.
• Add third party feed handling where applicable (managed scanners, MSSP findings) into the same workflow and evidence store.
• Add KPIs for internal management reporting (counts and aging are fine; avoid external benchmarking).
• Perform an internal mini-assessment: can you produce a complete evidence package for multiple failure types without system-admin assistance? ¹

Frequently Asked Questions

What counts as a “failed security test” under SI-6(1)?

Any defined security check that returns a noncompliant result or cannot complete successfully can be a failed test. The key is to define the tests and failure conditions in your standard and then show notifications occur when those conditions happen. ¹

Do vulnerability findings count, or only scanner job failures?

Both can count. A scan job failure is a failed test because you lose coverage; a scan result that violates your acceptance criteria can also be treated as a failed test if your program defines it that way and triggers notification. ¹

Is email notification sufficient?

Email can work only if it reliably reaches monitored inboxes and you can prove receipt and follow-up. Most teams make tickets or cases the primary record because it supports assignment, workflow, and evidence retention. ¹

How do we handle failed tests from a third party scanning provider?

Require the third party to send failure notifications into your designated channel (ticket queue, shared mailbox with retention, or SIEM feed) and ensure you retain the records internally. Your evidence should still show triage and closure by your accountable system owners. ¹

What evidence do auditors usually want to see?

They want end-to-end proof: the failed test output, the notification artifact, assignment/triage notes, remediation actions, and retest results or an approved exception. Provide samples across different systems and tools to show the control operates consistently. ¹

How do we reduce noise without failing the control?

Tune thresholds and severities, but keep clear routing for high-impact failures and for “testing stopped working” conditions. Document the tuning rationale in your standard and keep evidence that notifications still fire for meaningful failures. ¹

Footnotes

1. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5

2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON