SI-7: Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity

To meet the si-7: software, firmware, and information integrity requirement, you must deploy integrity verification tools that detect unauthorized changes to specified software, firmware, and information, then operationalize alerting, investigation, and evidence retention. Treat SI-7 as an always-on detection control tied to change management, secure configuration, and incident response. ¹

Key takeaways:

• SI-7 is a tooling-plus-process requirement: detect unauthorized changes and act on them with defined workflows. ¹
• Scope is the hard part: you must explicitly define which software, firmware, and information are covered and show evidence that integrity checks run. ¹
• Audit readiness depends on repeatable artifacts: baselines, alerts, tickets, investigation notes, and exceptions tied to approvals.

SI-7 is one of those controls that looks simple in the catalog and gets messy in real environments. The requirement asks you to employ integrity verification tools to detect unauthorized changes to software, firmware, and information you designate. That means you need (1) a clear scope statement, (2) a technical method to verify integrity, and (3) an operational loop that turns detections into triage, containment, and learning.

For a CCO, compliance officer, or GRC lead, the fastest path is to treat SI-7 as a “detect and respond” control that sits across IT operations, security engineering, and system ownership. Your job is to make it assessable: documented scope, named control owner, repeatable procedures, and durable evidence. If you cannot show what is monitored, how integrity is checked, and how alerts are handled, you will struggle to demonstrate implementation even if engineers “do something like this already.”

This page gives requirement-level steps you can hand to operators and then collect the evidence you’ll need for assessments against NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5. ²

Regulatory text

Excerpt (SI-7): “Employ integrity verification tools to detect unauthorized changes to the following software, firmware, and information: {{ insert: param, si-7_prm_1 }} ; and” ¹

What an operator must do with this text

1. Choose the in-scope targets represented by the parameter placeholder (the “following software, firmware, and information”). In practice, you must explicitly list categories and/or systems (for example: “server OS binaries,” “container images,” “network device firmware,” “production configuration repositories,” “audit logs”). Your list becomes the control scope statement. ¹
2. Implement integrity verification tooling for those targets. Tooling can vary by asset type, but it must be capable of detecting unauthorized changes. ¹
3. Operationalize detection: alerts must route to a monitored queue, trigger investigation, and result in a disposition (benign authorized change, misconfiguration, compromise, or false positive with documented tuning).

Plain-English interpretation

SI-7 requires you to continuously (or at defined intervals) check that critical code, firmware, and important information have not been altered outside authorized change paths. You are building a control that answers: “If someone tampers with production binaries, golden images, firmware, configurations, or sensitive records, will we know quickly, and can we prove what happened?”

This is integrity, not availability. A system can be up and still be untrustworthy. SI-7 is how you reduce the chance that hidden changes survive long enough to cause harm.

Who it applies to

Entity scope

• Federal information systems and contractor systems handling federal data commonly map to NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 as part of their security control baseline. ²

Operational context

• Environments with production workloads, privileged admin access, CI/CD pipelines, endpoints, network appliances, or managed services where configuration drift and tampering are credible risks.
• Organizations relying on third parties for hosting, managed detection, endpoint management, or firmware-managed devices must include third-party-operated components in scope where you remain responsible for the control outcome.

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

1) Assign ownership and define scope (make it assessable)

• Name a control owner (often Security Engineering, Detection & Response, or Platform Security) and a compliance owner (GRC) responsible for evidence quality.
• Write the SI-7 scope statement: list what “software, firmware, and information” means in your environment. Keep it concrete:
  • Software: OS binaries, installed packages, application artifacts, container images, IaC modules.
  • Firmware: network devices, laptops, servers with BMC/UEFI, security appliances.
  • Information: security logs, critical configuration files, key registries, security policies stored as code.
• Define “unauthorized change” in one paragraph: any modification not tied to an approved change record, not performed by an approved deployment pipeline identity, or not matching a signed artifact/hardened baseline.

Deliverable: SI-7 control narrative + scope register entry that an assessor can read in five minutes.

2) Select integrity verification methods by asset type

Pick mechanisms that create verifiable “known-good” references and detect drift:

Asset type	Integrity method examples	What auditors look for
Servers/endpoints	File integrity monitoring (FIM), system file baseline, EDR integrity events	Proof it runs, alert examples, tuning notes
Containers / CI/CD	Signed images, hash verification in deploy gates, artifact attestations	Evidence of verification in pipeline logs
Network devices	Firmware version validation, config integrity checks, golden config drift	Device inventory mapped to checks
Critical data / logs	Write-once logging, checksum validation, immutability controls	Evidence logs can’t be silently altered

You do not need one tool for everything. You do need end-to-end coverage that matches your defined scope and produces reviewable outputs.

3) Build the detection-to-response workflow

Integrity detection without response becomes shelfware. Define:

• Alert routing: where events land (SIEM queue, ticketing system), severity mapping, and ownership.
• Triage runbook: what the analyst checks first (change ticket correlation, deployment pipeline logs, admin session logs).
• Disposition codes: authorized change, unauthorized but benign (then fix process gap), suspected compromise (trigger incident response).
• Containment hooks: isolate endpoint, block account, roll back artifact, restore golden configuration.
• Post-incident actions: tune rules, tighten change control, update baselines.

Minimum operational expectation: You can show at least one closed-loop example: an alert, investigation, and documented resolution.

4) Integrate SI-7 with change management and configuration management

Most “unauthorized” integrity alerts are actually “authorized changes with bad paperwork.” Reduce noise by integrating:

• Change tickets or deployment approvals as an allow-list input for triage.
• “Break-glass” admin workflows with mandatory ticket references.
• Baseline update procedure: how a legitimate patch becomes the new known-good state.

5) Validate coverage and keep it current

Create a lightweight cadence:

• Reconcile the asset inventory against the SI-7 scope list.
• Confirm integrity agents/checks are installed and reporting.
• Review exceptions (systems that cannot support FIM, third-party appliances) and document compensating controls.

A practical move: track SI-7 coverage as a simple matrix (system → integrity method → reporting location → owner → exception status).

6) Make evidence collection repeatable (Daydream-friendly)

Assessments fail on evidence quality more often than on intent. In Daydream, teams typically map SI-7 to:

• Control owner and operator runbooks
• Evidence artifacts and collection frequency
• System list and tool outputs This makes SI-7 “queryable” during audits instead of a scramble across security tools and ticket queues.

Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Keep artifacts that prove design and operation:

Design evidence

• SI-7 control narrative (scope + definitions + tooling approach) ¹
• System/asset scope list and rationale for inclusions/exclusions
• Tool configuration standards (what paths, registries, configs are monitored; what constitutes a violation)

Operational evidence

• Screenshots/exports showing agents/checks are deployed and healthy
• Sample integrity alerts and the correlated tickets/cases
• Triage runbook and investigation notes (sanitized as needed)
• Baseline change records (when hashes/baselines were updated and why)
• Exceptions register with approvals and compensating controls

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

• “Show me exactly what the {{ si-7_prm_1 }} scope includes in your environment.” ¹
• “What tool verifies integrity for each category (software vs firmware vs information)?”
• “How do you prove changes were unauthorized rather than a missed change ticket?”
• “Show a recent integrity alert and the full handling trail.”
• “How do you prevent an attacker from tampering with the integrity tool or its logs?”

Frequent implementation mistakes (and how to avoid them)

1. Mistake: Scope is vague (“critical systems”).
   Fix: publish a system list and monitored object types. Tie scope to asset inventory.
2. Mistake: Monitoring only OS files, ignoring CI/CD artifacts.
   Fix: add pipeline-stage verification (hash/signature checks) for build outputs and deployables.
3. Mistake: Alerts route nowhere or have no owner.
   Fix: assign queue ownership and on-call coverage; test routing with a controlled change.
4. Mistake: Baselines never update, so everything becomes “unauthorized.”
   Fix: baseline update procedure linked to patching and releases.
5. Mistake: Exceptions live in email.
   Fix: maintain an exceptions register with expiry and compensating controls.

Enforcement context and risk implications

No public enforcement cases were provided in the source catalog for this requirement, so this page does not cite specific actions.

Practically, SI-7 failures show up during incidents and assessments as:

• Inability to prove production artifacts were not tampered with
• Delayed detection of persistence mechanisms (web shells, modified binaries, altered configs)
• Control gaps at third parties (managed hosting, SaaS admin actions, outsourced IT) where you cannot evidence integrity checks or investigative trails

Treat SI-7 as evidence that your environment is “measurably trustworthy,” not just “patched.”

Practical 30/60/90-day execution plan

First 30 days (Immediate stabilization)

• Assign SI-7 control owner and publish the scope statement aligned to your asset inventory. ¹
• Identify existing integrity signals already available (EDR, configuration drift tools, CI/CD logs).
• Draft the triage runbook and define alert routing to a ticketing/case system.
• Stand up an evidence folder structure (or Daydream control workspace) with a list of required artifacts.

Days 31–60 (Operationalize detection and prove it works)

• Implement or tune integrity verification per asset class to cover the defined scope. ¹
• Run a controlled test: make an authorized change and confirm it is classified correctly; simulate an unauthorized change in a non-production environment and confirm alerting and response.
• Start building the “audit packet”: sample alerts, closed tickets, baseline update records, exceptions.

Days 61–90 (Harden and scale)

• Expand coverage to remaining systems and hard-to-monitor areas (firmware, network devices, third-party-managed components).
• Add metrics that matter operationally (alert volume by type, time-to-triage) without turning them into unsupported compliance claims.
• Hold a tabletop exercise for an integrity event and capture the after-action notes as evidence of operational maturity.

Frequently Asked Questions

What counts as “information” under SI-7?

Define it based on what would create security impact if altered, such as security logs, access control configurations, or production configuration files. Document your categories in the SI-7 scope statement. ¹

Can we satisfy SI-7 with EDR alone?

Sometimes for endpoint and server file integrity signals, yes, if EDR provides integrity verification outputs and you can evidence alert handling. You will usually need additional methods for CI/CD artifacts, firmware, and protected logs.

How do we handle third-party hosted systems?

Require the third party to provide evidence of integrity verification (reports, alerts, or attestations) for the in-scope components they operate, or document compensating controls you operate (for example, deploy-time verification and immutable logging).

What evidence is most persuasive to an assessor?

A full trail: defined scope, tool configuration, a real alert, the ticket it created, investigation notes correlating to approved change records, and the final disposition. That bundle proves operation, not just design.

How do we reduce false positives from patching and releases?

Link baselines to approved deployment identities and change records, and define a baseline update procedure that runs as part of patch management. Keep an exceptions register for edge cases.

Where does Daydream fit in SI-7 implementation?

Daydream helps you map SI-7 to a named owner, a documented procedure, and recurring evidence artifacts so you can produce an audit-ready packet without chasing screenshots and tickets across teams.

Footnotes

1. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON

2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5