SI-7(3): Centrally Managed Integrity Tools

SI-7(3) requires you to run integrity verification tools from a central management plane so configuration, policy, alerting, and reporting are consistent across systems. To operationalize it, standardize approved integrity tools, manage them centrally (not per-host “snowflakes”), and retain evidence that coverage, configuration, and alert handling are continuously enforced across your environment. ¹

Key takeaways:

• Central management means one authoritative place to configure, deploy, monitor, and report integrity verification.
• Auditors look for fleet-wide coverage, standardized baselines, and provable alert handling, not just tool installation.
• Your evidence should connect policy → deployment → results → remediation, with clear ownership and cadence.

The si-7(3): centrally managed integrity tools requirement is easy to misunderstand because many teams already run integrity checks in pockets: EDR on endpoints, file integrity monitoring (FIM) on a few servers, container image signing in one platform team, and “golden image” validation in CI/CD. SI-7(3) tightens the expectation: integrity verification can’t be a set of disconnected, locally managed tools that drift over time. You need centralized administration so you can prove standard configuration, consistent enforcement, and complete reporting.

For a CCO, Compliance Officer, or GRC lead, the operational goal is straightforward: you must be able to answer, quickly and defensibly, “Which integrity tool(s) do we use, who controls them centrally, where do policies live, what systems are covered, what happens when integrity failures occur, and where is the evidence?” The requirement text is short, so your job is to turn it into a runbook, an evidence bundle, and an operating cadence that survives audits and customer diligence. ¹

Regulatory text

Requirement (verbatim): “Employ centrally managed integrity verification tools.” ¹

Operator interpretation: You must (1) use integrity verification tooling (for example, FIM, cryptographic integrity checks, signed artifacts, or integrity attestations) and (2) manage that tooling centrally so configuration, deployment, monitoring, and reporting are controlled and consistent. Central management is the control point that prevents per-system drift and makes integrity results auditable across the fleet. ¹

Plain-English interpretation (what this means in practice)

Integrity verification answers: “Is this system/software/data in the expected state, and can we detect unauthorized change?” SI-7(3) adds: “Can you enforce and prove that integrity verification is managed consistently from the center?”

In practice, “centrally managed” usually means you have:

• A standard set of approved integrity tools (not one-off installs).
• Central policy/config management (one console, one set of baselines, one change control path).
• Central telemetry and alerting (results roll up to a defined monitoring workflow).
• Central reporting (coverage and exceptions are visible without asking each system owner). ¹

This is requirement-level; it doesn’t mandate a specific product. It does require you to remove local autonomy that causes blind spots (for example, a server where someone disabled FIM “temporarily” and nobody can detect it centrally).

Who it applies to (entity and operational context)

SI-7(3) is most relevant where you operate or inherit NIST SP 800-53 controls, including:

• Federal information systems and supporting environments. ¹
• Contractor systems handling federal data, including many regulated or contractual environments where NIST SP 800-53 is flowed down. ¹

Operationally, it applies anywhere integrity matters and change is frequent:

• Server fleets (Windows/Linux), including cloud VMs.
• Endpoints (corporate and privileged workstations).
• Containers and Kubernetes nodes.
• CI/CD and artifact repositories (build outputs, packages).
• Critical configuration stores (infrastructure-as-code repos, secrets managers).
• High-impact applications where unauthorized code/config changes are material.

If you’re scoping, start with: production systems, identity/security tooling, and any environment that processes or stores federal data. Then expand.

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

1) Name the control owner and define “integrity tool” for your environment

Assign a single accountable owner (often Security Engineering, SecOps, or Platform Security) with GRC oversight. Define what counts as integrity verification tooling in your stack, such as:

• Host-based FIM for critical directories.
• OS/package integrity verification (signed packages, validation checks).
• Container image signing/verification and admission controls.
• Integrity attestations for builds (provenance) where applicable.

Deliverable: a one-page control card (objective, scope, owner, triggers, and exception rules). This maps directly to what auditors ask first: “Who runs it and how do you know it’s working?”

2) Standardize approved tools and create a central management plane

Pick the centrally managed control point(s). Central management must cover:

• Policy/baseline configuration
• Deployment/enablement status
• Alert routing and retention
• Reporting on coverage and exceptions

Common patterns:

• EDR platform with integrity modules plus a central console.
• Dedicated FIM platform managed by SecOps.
• Cloud-native integrity controls managed through centralized cloud security posture tooling plus log aggregation.

The key is not the brand; it’s the ability to show a single authoritative configuration and fleet-wide visibility. ¹

3) Define integrity baselines and “what good looks like”

Write down:

• What objects are monitored (directories, binaries, configs, registry keys, container images, etc.).
• What change types are allowed (patching windows, approved deployment pipelines).
• What constitutes an integrity failure (unexpected hash change, unsigned binary, modified config outside pipeline).
• Severity and response expectations (ticket, incident workflow, escalation).

Keep this as a standard with a controlled change process. Auditors will test whether settings are consistent across systems and whether exceptions are formally approved.

4) Roll out coverage and handle exceptions intentionally

Build an inventory-driven rollout approach:

• Map in-scope assets (from CMDB/cloud inventory/endpoint management).
• Deploy the centrally managed agent/control to each in-scope asset class.
• Track coverage gaps and exceptions (legacy systems, restricted networks, specialized appliances).

Exception handling must be explicit:

• Document why the exception exists.
• Document compensating controls (for example, immutable infrastructure, read-only root filesystem, restricted admin access).
• Set an expiry or review trigger (for example, re-evaluate at major upgrade or architecture change).

5) Centralize alerting, triage, and closure

Integrity alerts without operational handling become audit findings. Define:

• Alert routing (SIEM/SOAR/ticketing).
• Triage owner (SecOps) and escalation paths (system owner, incident response).
• Closure criteria (validated authorized change, rollback, reimage, investigation complete).
• Metrics you can defend qualitatively: open high-severity integrity alerts, aging, and repeat offenders.

6) Prove it continuously (control health checks)

Run recurring checks that answer:

• Are all in-scope assets enrolled and reporting?
• Are baselines unchanged except through approved change?
• Are alert rules enabled and routed correctly?
• Are exceptions current and approved?

Daydream (as a GRC system) fits naturally here by turning SI-7(3) into an operator-owned control card, attaching the minimum evidence bundle each cycle, and tracking remediation items to closure with due dates.

Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Retain evidence that shows central management, coverage, and operation. A practical “minimum evidence bundle” for SI-7(3):

Governance and design

• Control card: objective, scope, owner, cadence, exception rules.
• Tool standard: approved integrity tools and where they are required.
• Baseline/config standard and change control references.

Technical configuration

• Screenshots/exports showing centralized policy settings (baseline rules, monitored paths, signature enforcement, alert rules).
• Agent deployment policies (endpoint management, config management, Kubernetes admission policies).
• Integration proof: tool → SIEM/ticketing routing rules.

Operational proof

• Coverage report(s): in-scope asset count vs reporting assets; exception list.
• Sample alerts and triage records: ticket/incident with investigation notes and closure.
• Health check results and remediation tracking (open items and validated closure).

Retention location

• A named system of record (GRC repository) with access control and version history.

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

Expect these questions, and prepare crisp answers:

1. “Show us central management.”
   They will ask for the central console, the policy objects, and proof that endpoint settings are inherited rather than locally edited.

2. “What is your in-scope population?”
   If your inventory is weak, SI-7(3) becomes untestable. Tie scope to your asset inventory and your federal-data boundary. ¹

3. “How do you know it’s operating?”
   Provide recent health check output, coverage reports, and alert/ticket samples.

4. “How do you control exceptions?”
   If you can’t show approvals, compensating controls, and review triggers, the auditor will treat gaps as control failures.

5. “What happens on detection?”
   They will look for an operational loop: detect → triage → remediate → verify.

Frequent implementation mistakes (and how to avoid them)

Mistake	Why it fails SI-7(3)	Fix
Installing integrity tools but letting each team manage settings	Local drift breaks “centrally managed”	Enforce policy from a central console; restrict local overrides
No coverage accounting	You can’t prove the control applies to all in-scope systems	Inventory-based coverage reporting; reconcile monthly
Alerts routed but never worked	Auditors test closure evidence, not routing diagrams	Keep sample cases and closure notes; define closure criteria
Exceptions in email/Slack	Exceptions become invisible and permanent	Track exceptions in GRC with approvals and review triggers
“Set and forget” rollout	Agents fall off, policies change, telemetry breaks	Control health checks and remediation tracking

Enforcement context and risk implications

No public enforcement cases were provided in the source material for this requirement, so you should treat SI-7(3) primarily as an auditability and security-resilience control anchored in NIST SP 800-53. ²

Risk-wise, weak central management shows up the same way in most assessments:

• You can’t detect unauthorized changes reliably across the fleet.
• You can’t prove coverage to customers or auditors.
• You accumulate “unknown unknowns” because teams disable controls locally.

Practical 30/60/90-day execution plan

First 30 days (stabilize and define)

• Assign owner and publish the SI-7(3) control card (scope, cadence, exceptions).
• Decide which integrity tools are “approved” for each asset class.
• Stand up or confirm the central management plane (console access, RBAC, logging).
• Draft baseline standards and exception workflow in your GRC system (Daydream fits well as the system of record).

Days 31–60 (deploy and prove coverage)

• Build in-scope asset list from your inventory sources; reconcile disagreements.
• Roll out centrally managed policies to priority systems (production, identity/security tooling, federal-data boundary).
• Turn on alert routing to SIEM/ticketing and run a tabletop on an integrity alert.
• Start an exceptions register with approvals and compensating controls.

Days 61–90 (operate, test, and harden)

• Run a control health check cycle and document results in the evidence bundle.
• Sample test: pick systems at random and prove they inherit central policy and report integrity telemetry.
• Close or formally accept coverage gaps with time-bound plans.
• Prepare an “auditor packet”: control card, baseline, coverage report, sample alerts/tickets, exception log, and health check output.

Frequently Asked Questions

Does SI-7(3) require file integrity monitoring (FIM) specifically?

The text requires “centrally managed integrity verification tools,” not a specific technology. You can meet intent with different integrity mechanisms, but you must show integrity verification is centrally managed and consistently enforced. ¹

What counts as “centrally managed” in an audit?

Auditors expect a single authoritative place where policies are defined, deployed, and reported. If local admins can disable or materially alter integrity settings without central visibility and control, expect pushback.

We have separate tools for endpoints, servers, and containers. Is that allowed?

Yes, if each tool is centrally managed for its domain and you can produce unified reporting for in-scope coverage and exceptions. The audit failure pattern is fragmented ownership with no consolidated evidence trail.

How should we handle legacy systems that can’t run an agent?

Put them in a formal exception register with compensating controls and an owner. Common compensating controls include tighter admin restrictions and immutable deployment patterns, but document what you actually do and how you review it.

What evidence is most persuasive for SI-7(3)?

A current coverage report tied to your asset inventory, exports/screens showing centralized policy settings, and a small set of alert-to-closure records. Add a recurring health check record to prove sustained operation.

Where does Daydream fit for this control?

Daydream works well as the system of record for the SI-7(3) control card, the minimum evidence bundle per operating cycle, and remediation tracking to validated closure with due dates.

Footnotes

1. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON

2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON