SI-7(4): Tamper-evident Packaging

The si-7(4): tamper-evident packaging requirement is easy to misunderstand because it sits in the System and Information Integrity family, yet it often gets implemented by procurement, receiving, and IT asset management. For a CCO or GRC lead, the fastest path is to translate the control into a repeatable supply chain handling procedure: require tamper-evident measures for defined classes of components, check them at receipt, and document what you checked.

This control is most relevant where you accept hardware, removable media, security appliances, or other sensitive components that could be modified before installation. It also matters when third parties ship preconfigured devices, when equipment is staged at a logistics provider, or when assets pass through multiple hands between manufacturer and your data center.

Operationalizing SI-7(4) means you must (1) set clear packaging/chain-of-custody expectations for suppliers and internal teams, (2) inspect and record results consistently, and (3) handle failures with quarantine and escalation. The goal is to reduce the chance that compromised components enter your environment without detection, and to prove you had controls in place when an assessor asks.

Regulatory text

Source excerpt: “NIST SP 800-53 control SI-7.4.” (NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON)

Operator interpretation of what you must do: Implement and enforce tamper-evident packaging for system components (as defined in your environment), then verify that packaging is intact when items are received and before items are introduced into production. Document the standard, the checks, and the outcomes so an assessor can trace a specific received item to an inspection and any exception handling. This requirement is part of NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5).

Plain-English interpretation (what SI-7(4) is really asking)

SI-7(4) expects you to prevent “silent” tampering in the supply chain by making tampering visible. “Tamper-evident” does not mean tamper-proof; it means the packaging shows clear signs if someone opened it, resealed it, or swapped contents.

Practically, this is a control over:

• How components are packaged for shipment (your standards and supplier requirements).
• How you receive and stage components (your inspection and quarantine procedures).
• How you prove it happened (your evidence and traceability).

If you cannot prove inspection happened, many assessors will treat the control as not implemented, even if you believe your suppliers ship securely.

Who it applies to (entities and operational context)

Primary applicability

• Federal information systems and contractor systems handling federal data implementing NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 control baselines (NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5).

Operational contexts where SI-7(4) is commonly in scope

• Receiving servers, network devices, firewalls, HSMs, or specialized appliances shipped to data centers or offices.
• Receiving end-user devices (laptops, phones) that arrive pre-imaged from a reseller or staging provider.
• Receiving removable media or spare parts that could be substituted.
• Any environment with drop-shipping, cross-docking, or third-party warehousing.

Typical owners

• Control owner often sits in Security / GRC.
• Day-to-day operators are usually IT Asset Management, Data Center Ops, Receiving/Facilities, and Procurement/Vendor Management for supplier terms.

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

Use the steps below as a “minimum viable” SI-7(4) implementation you can deploy, then mature.

1) Define scope: components and shipments that require tamper-evident packaging

Create a short scoping statement that answers:

• Which component categories require tamper-evident packaging (example: production infrastructure, security-sensitive components, items shipped with credentials, devices shipped preconfigured).
• Which delivery paths are covered (to HQ, to data centers, to remote employees, to a third-party colocation provider).
• Which third parties ship covered items (manufacturers, resellers, integrators, staging providers, logistics providers).

Deliverable: “Tamper-evident packaging standard” section in your receiving SOP.

2) Set acceptance criteria: what “tamper-evident” means for your program

Define acceptable methods you will accept. Keep it operational and inspectable:

• Sealed boxes with tamper-evident tape that shows “VOID” or equivalent when lifted.
• Serialized seals (numbers recorded on packing slips or in receiving logs).
• Sealed anti-static bags with intact seals for internal components.
• Evidence of repacking or double boxing rules for certain items (only if your team can verify consistently).

Define “fail” conditions clearly:

• Broken or replaced seal, mismatched serial number, cut tape, torn packaging, signs of re-taping, box damage inconsistent with normal transit, or missing manufacturer seals.

Deliverable: A one-page inspection checklist with pass/fail criteria and photos/examples your staff can follow.

3) Put requirements into third-party terms and internal purchase workflows

For in-scope purchases, ensure procurement triggers the requirement:

• Add SI-7(4) packaging requirements to purchase order terms or supplier security addendum for relevant suppliers.
• Require upstream parties (resellers/integrators) to flow requirements down to their shippers where applicable.
• For drop-ship to employees, require the shipper to use tamper-evident methods and provide tracking plus seal identifiers when you use serialized seals.

Deliverable: Contract clause or PO boilerplate and a procurement intake question (“Is this shipment in SI-7(4) scope?”).

4) Implement a receiving inspection workflow (the control that assessors will test)

Establish a standard flow for every in-scope delivery:

1. Receive package in a controlled area (even a locked cage or supervised desk).
2. Inspect packaging against checklist before opening.
3. Record results (pass/fail, date/time, receiver, tracking number, seal numbers if present, photos if feasible).
4. If pass, open and continue to asset tagging/imaging per your normal process.
5. If fail, do not install. Move to quarantine and start the exception workflow.

Deliverable: Receiving log template and a short SOP that a non-security staff member can execute.

5) Quarantine and escalation for suspected tampering

Define a simple decision tree:

• Minor transit damage with intact tamper evidence: document, accept, proceed.
• Tamper evidence compromised or contents mismatch: quarantine item, notify security, open an incident or problem ticket, contact shipper/supplier, preserve packaging for investigation.

Make “quarantine” real:

• Dedicated shelf/cage, restricted access, and a rule that quarantined items do not enter inventory for deployment.

Deliverable: Quarantine SOP + ticket category (security incident or supply chain exception) and responsible escalation contacts.

6) Train the people who physically touch boxes

Training can be brief but must be specific:

• What to check.
• What to photograph.
• When to stop and escalate.
• How to record evidence in the system of record.

Deliverable: Training slide + attendance record (or LMS completion) for receiving/data center staff.

7) Build audit-ready traceability (what makes SI-7(4) “real” to an assessor)

Ensure you can trace:

• Purchase or shipment → receiving event → inspection record → asset record → exception ticket (if any).

If you use Daydream or a GRC platform, map SI-7(4) to:

• A named control owner.
• A written procedure.
• A recurring evidence set (receiving logs + exceptions). This aligns with the practical control guidance to “map SI-7(4) to control owner, implementation procedure, and recurring evidence artifacts.” (NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON)

Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Keep evidence that shows both design (your rules) and operating effectiveness (proof you followed them):

Design artifacts

• Tamper-evident packaging standard (what is required; what is acceptable).
• Receiving and inspection SOP (including quarantine/escalation).
• Supplier/third-party contract language or PO terms for in-scope suppliers.
• Training materials.

Operating artifacts

• Receiving inspection logs (shipment identifier, inspector, result).
• Photos for failed inspections (and optionally for passes on high-risk items).
• Exception tickets/incident records for suspected tampering, including disposition.
• Asset inventory record showing item lifecycle (received → accepted/quarantined → deployed/returned).

Retention tip (operational): store evidence in the same system you use for asset intake or ticketing, then link it in your GRC control record so audits do not turn into inbox archaeology.

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

Assessors and auditors tend to probe the same weak points:

• “Show me the last few in-scope shipments and the inspection evidence.” If you cannot produce shipment-level records, the control will likely be marked weak.
• “What is your definition of tamper-evident packaging?” Vague answers (“sealed box”) invite findings.
• “What happens if the seal is broken?” “We notify someone” is not a workflow. They want quarantine, escalation, and disposition.
• “How do you handle drop-shipped laptops to remote staff?” If the user receives it, you still need an inspection and reporting path.
• “How do you ensure third parties comply?” Expect questions about PO terms, supplier instructions, and any verification on receipt.

Frequent implementation mistakes (and how to avoid them)

1. Mistake: Treating tamper-evident packaging as a supplier promise only.
   Fix: Make inspection at receipt mandatory and logged. Supplier controls do not replace your receiving control.

2. Mistake: No scope definition, so everyone assumes it applies to everything or nothing.
   Fix: Publish a short scoping matrix (component type × delivery path × environment).

3. Mistake: “Inspection” is verbal and undocumented.
   Fix: Use a simple log with required fields and make it part of the intake checklist before asset tagging.

4. Mistake: Exceptions are handled ad hoc and the box gets opened anyway.
   Fix: Create an explicit “stop rule” and quarantine location. Give receiving staff authority to pause deployments.

5. Mistake: Remote delivery is ignored.
   Fix: Require end users to photograph seals upon receipt and report issues through a standard ticket type.

Enforcement context and risk implications

No public enforcement cases were provided in the source catalog for SI-7(4). Treat this as an assessment-driven requirement: failure usually surfaces during federal ATO activities, independent assessments, or customer audits aligned to NIST SP 800-53 (NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5).

Risk-wise, poor SI-7(4) execution increases the chance of introducing compromised hardware, swapped components, or pre-positioned malware via the supply chain. The control’s operational value is strongest for high-impact systems, sensitive environments, and any workflow that accepts preconfigured devices from a third party.

Practical execution plan (30/60/90-day)

Use a phased rollout that prioritizes highest-risk intake points first.

First 30 days (Immediate)

• Assign a control owner and backup; name the receiving operators by site.
• Define scope categories and in-scope shipment triggers in procurement intake.
• Publish the inspection checklist and pass/fail criteria.
• Stand up a quarantine process and ticket category for suspected tampering.
• Start logging inspections for the highest-risk components (security appliances, production infrastructure).

By 60 days (Near-term)

• Add contract/PO language for in-scope suppliers and staging providers.
• Train receiving and data center staff; add quick-reference photos of acceptable seals vs failures.
• Make inspection logs traceable to asset inventory records and shipment tracking numbers.
• Run a tabletop exercise: “broken seal on firewall shipment” and validate quarantine/escalation works.

By 90 days (Operationalized)

• Expand scope to additional component classes and remote delivery scenarios.
• Add periodic QA: sample inspection records, confirm evidence completeness, confirm exceptions were dispositioned.
• Map SI-7(4) in your GRC system to procedure and recurring evidence artifacts so audits are pull-not-push. This matches the recommended control mapping approach (NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON).

Frequently Asked Questions

Does SI-7(4) apply to software downloads or only physical shipments?

SI-7(4) is framed around tamper-evident packaging, so it is primarily a physical supply chain control. For software integrity, you typically address tampering through other integrity controls and verification methods, but keep SI-7(4) focused on physical components per your scope.

What counts as “tamper-evident” in practice?

Something a receiver can inspect that clearly shows if the package was opened or resealed, such as tamper-evident tape or serialized seals. Define your acceptable methods in writing and train staff to check for common failure indicators.

Do we need to inspect every single box?

Inspect every in-scope shipment as defined by your scope statement. If you want sampling, document a risk-based rationale and apply it consistently, but be prepared for assessors to request shipment-level evidence for high-risk items.

How do we handle drop-shipped equipment to remote employees?

Give the employee a simple receipt checklist and require photos of seals/packaging before opening for in-scope devices. Route failures into the same quarantine/exception workflow, which may mean “do not power on, contact IT, return under controlled process.”

What evidence is the fastest win for audit readiness?

A receiving inspection log tied to tracking numbers and asset IDs, plus a written SOP and a clear exception ticket trail for any failures. That combination proves both the process and that it runs.

Where should this live in our program: security, procurement, or facilities?

Security/GRC should own the control definition and assurance, but receiving/data center ops usually run the day-to-day checks. Procurement supports by putting packaging requirements into third-party terms for in-scope purchases.