SI-7(14): Binary or Machine Executable Code

The si-7(14): binary or machine executable code requirement is about one thing: preventing unauthorized or tampered executables from running in production endpoints, servers, and workloads. In audits, teams fail this control less because they lack tools and more because they cannot prove consistent enforcement across different compute types (user endpoints, Windows/Linux servers, containers, ephemeral cloud instances, and third-party managed platforms).

For a Compliance Officer, CCO, or GRC lead, the fastest way to operationalize SI-7(14) is to set an enterprise standard for “execution trust,” then map it to enforcement points you already own: endpoint protection/EDR policy, OS-native allowlisting, CI/CD release gates, and privileged access workflows. The control becomes testable when you can answer two questions with artifacts: (1) “What executables are allowed to run here?” and (2) “What happens when something else tries?”

This page gives requirement-level implementation guidance you can hand to Security Engineering and IT Ops, plus the evidence package you need for assessment readiness under NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5. ¹

Regulatory text

Framework requirement: “NIST SP 800-53 control SI-7.14.” This enhancement is labeled SI-7(14): Binary or Machine Executable Code. ²

What the operator must do: Implement controls that ensure the integrity and authorization of binary or machine-executable code before execution. In practice, auditors expect you to prevent execution of unapproved binaries, detect changes to approved binaries, and maintain records that show enforcement and exception handling across in-scope systems. ¹

Plain-English interpretation (what this requirement really means)

Executables are where compromise becomes real. A clean source repository does not protect you if endpoints can run unsigned installers, downloaded tools, renamed malware, or tampered service binaries.

SI-7(14) pushes you toward an “execution control” posture:

• Approved code runs.
• Everything else is blocked or contained, then investigated.
• If you allow an exception, you document who approved it, why, and for how long.

Treat “binary or machine executable code” broadly: OS executables, DLLs/shared libraries, scripts packaged as executables, installers, drivers, container images that contain executables, and managed runtime artifacts that still execute (for example, PowerShell). Your scoping should reflect what your environment can execute, not what your developers think of as “code.”

Who it applies to (entity and operational context)

Entity types:

• Federal information systems
• Contractor systems handling federal data (including regulated service providers supporting federal workloads) ²

Operational context (where this shows up):

• Corporate endpoints (laptops, VDI)
• Windows and Linux servers (on-prem and cloud IaaS)
• Container hosts and container runtimes
• CI/CD runners and build agents
• Third-party managed platforms where you still control runtime policy (or must contractually require it)

If you cannot technically enforce allowlisting on a managed service, your compliance outcome shifts to governance: contract requirements, attestations, compensating controls, and monitoring of what you can observe.

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

Use this as a build sheet for an implementation ticket set.

Step 1: Define “execution trust” standard (policy-level, but actionable)

Document a standard that answers:

• What qualifies as approved executable code (signed by your org, signed by a trusted publisher, hash allowlisted, delivered only through managed software distribution, etc.)
• What is prohibited by default (user-writable paths, temp directories, unsigned binaries in sensitive tiers, ad-hoc admin installs)
• How exceptions work (who can approve, required justification, expiry expectations, and monitoring)

Output: a one-page control standard plus a short exception template.

Step 2: Build an authoritative inventory of execution surfaces

You need an inventory of in-scope systems and runtime types:

• Endpoints by OS family
• Server tiers (prod vs non-prod)
• Container platforms (Kubernetes, ECS, etc.)
• CI/CD and automation hosts

This inventory is what an assessor will sample against. If it’s incomplete, any control testing becomes unpredictable.

Step 3: Choose and implement enforcement points (minimum two layers)

A practical pattern is endpoint/host enforcement + deployment pipeline controls.

Host/endpoint enforcement options (pick what fits your stack):

• OS-native application control / allowlisting (common on Windows; similar patterns exist elsewhere)
• EDR policy controls that restrict unknown executables
• Privileged execution controls: only approved admin tools can run; admin installs require ticket + approval

Pipeline enforcement options:

• Only deploy artifacts from controlled CI/CD
• Require signing of release artifacts, then verify signature at deploy time
• Restrict production systems from pulling executables from the public internet

Your goal is not tool perfection; it is consistent “approved vs not approved” enforcement.

Step 4: Implement code authenticity and integrity checks

Put at least one of these controls in place per execution surface:

• Code signing for internally produced executables; verify signatures before release and/or at runtime
• Cryptographic hash allowlisting for high-risk systems where signing is not feasible
• Trusted repository rules for container images (only run from approved registries; block “latest” tags if you can’t trace provenance)

For third-party software, define acceptance criteria (publisher signing, distribution channel, checksum validation, SBOM availability if required by your program). Keep the criteria consistent and auditable.

Step 5: Centralize logging and create a “blocked execution” response path

Auditors will ask what happens when an unapproved binary attempts to run.

• Capture alerts/events for allowlist blocks, signature failures, and policy bypass attempts
• Triage workflow: classify as false positive, admin need, or suspected malicious activity
• Create an investigation record that links the event to disposition and any exception

Step 6: Run a control effectiveness test and lock your evidence cadence

Before you call it “implemented,” do a short test:

• Attempt to execute a known unapproved binary in a controlled environment
• Confirm the system blocks (or quarantines) and creates a log record
• Confirm the incident/ticketing workflow captures disposition

Then set an evidence cadence that matches how often policy changes: rule updates, exception reviews, sampling checks, and periodic re-validation after major platform changes.

Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Keep artifacts that prove design and operation:

Design evidence

• SI-7(14) control narrative: scope, enforcement points, and ownership
• Execution trust standard (approved code criteria, prohibited paths, exception handling)
• System inventory for in-scope endpoints/servers/workloads
• Configuration baselines for allowlisting / application control policies (exported policy files or screenshots with identifiable system names)

Operating evidence

• Change records for allowlist updates (who approved, what changed, why)
• Exception register (request, risk acceptance, compensating controls, expiry expectation)
• Sample logs showing blocks or signature verification failures and triage outcomes
• Deployment pipeline evidence: signed artifact attestations or release approvals tied to artifacts deployed

Daydream (as a workflow hub) fits best here when you need repeatable evidence collection: map SI-7(14) to a control owner, define the procedure, and schedule recurring evidence pulls so you are not rebuilding proof during an assessment.

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

Expect these lines of questioning:

• “Show me how a system decides whether an executable is allowed to run.”
• “Is this enforced on all endpoints or only a subset? How did you choose scope?”
• “How do you prevent users or admins from bypassing the control?”
• “How do you validate third-party executables before deployment?”
• “Show an example of a blocked execution attempt and what your team did next.”
• “Where is the exception process, and can you show approved exceptions?”

Hangup: teams present a policy document without enforcement telemetry. For SI-7(14), auditors want proof that the environment blocks or detects unapproved execution, not just that “software is approved.”

Frequent implementation mistakes and how to avoid them

Mistake	Why it fails	Fix
Relying only on source control hygiene	Doesn’t stop downloaded or lateral movement tools on endpoints	Add host-level execution controls (allowlisting/EDR restrictions)
Allowlisting exists but no exception register	Assessors see uncontrolled bypass	Create a lightweight exception workflow with approvals and review triggers
Enforcing only on “critical servers” without documented scope	Sampling risk; assessor may pick excluded systems	Write scope rules, tie to system inventory, document compensating controls
Signing exists but nobody verifies signatures	Signing becomes ceremonial	Add verification gates in CI/CD and/or runtime policy checks
Logging exists but not connected to response	Control looks “detect-only” with no governance	Tie blocked events to tickets and retain dispositions

Enforcement context and risk implications

No public enforcement cases were provided in the source catalog for this requirement, so this page does not cite enforcement actions.

Risk-wise, SI-7(14) addresses a common failure mode: attackers executing unauthorized code after phishing, exposed credentials, or supply chain compromise. If your environment allows arbitrary binaries, you inherit high blast radius from any endpoint foothold. Auditors treat this as a practical safeguard that reduces the chance that integrity monitoring becomes “after the fact.”

Practical 30/60/90-day execution plan

Use phases rather than day-count promises. Your actual timeline depends on platform diversity and endpoint management maturity.

First 30 days (Immediate)

• Assign an accountable owner (Security Engineering or Endpoint/Platform Security) and a governance owner (GRC)
• Publish an “execution trust” standard and exception template
• Define scope using an inventory snapshot: endpoints, server tiers, container workloads, CI/CD runners
• Pick enforcement mechanisms per platform (even if initial enforcement is “audit mode” where supported)

Days 31–60 (Near-term)

• Turn on enforcement for a pilot population (a representative endpoint group and one server tier)
• Implement artifact signing and verification gates for one key application pipeline
• Centralize blocked execution logs and create a triage runbook with ticketing integration
• Start the exception register and require approval for any allowlist additions

Days 61–90 (Operationalize)

• Expand enforcement coverage by platform, with a clear scope statement for any exclusions
• Run a control effectiveness test and store results as evidence
• Establish recurring evidence collection: policy exports, allowlist changes, exception review, and sample event reviews
• Prepare an assessor-ready packet in Daydream: control narrative, scope, procedures, and rotating operating evidence

Frequently Asked Questions

Does SI-7(14) require application allowlisting everywhere?

The control expects you to control and verify executable code before it runs. Allowlisting is a common way to meet that expectation, but you can also use signing verification and controlled deployment paths if they are enforced and evidenced. ¹

Are scripts in scope, or only compiled binaries?

Treat anything that executes machine instructions or triggers execution in your environment as in scope. If your environment executes scripts via interpreters (PowerShell, Python, Bash), include those execution paths in your “approved execution” standard.

How do we handle third-party software that isn’t signed?

Define acceptance criteria and an exception path. Common approaches include validating checksums from the publisher, distributing only through managed software deployment, and hash allowlisting with tighter monitoring plus a documented expiration trigger.

What evidence is most persuasive to auditors?

Policy alone rarely passes. Provide configuration exports showing enforcement, logs showing blocked/flagged execution attempts, and ticket records showing triage and approvals for allowlist changes and exceptions.

We run containers. Does this apply to images?

Yes, because containers still execute code. Control what images can run (approved registries, pinned digests) and keep build-to-deploy evidence that images were produced through controlled pipelines.

How do we operationalize this across multiple teams without chaos?

Centralize the standard and exception workflow, then let platform owners implement enforcement in their tooling. Daydream helps by mapping SI-7(14) to owners, procedures, and recurring evidence so teams stop reinventing audit packages.

Footnotes

1. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5

2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON