AC-17(6): Protection of Mechanism Information

Remote access is a force multiplier for IT operations, but it also creates a “map to the castle” problem. The same artifacts that help administrators support a VPN, bastion host, VDI, remote management port, or privileged access workflow can also help an attacker. AC-17(6) focuses on that risk: information about remote access mechanisms must be protected from unauthorized use and disclosure. ¹

For a CCO or GRC lead, the fastest path to operationalizing this requirement is to translate “mechanism information” into an inventory of sensitive assets (documentation, diagrams, configs, scripts, runbooks, firewall rules, IdP app settings, PAM policies, break-glass procedures), assign a control owner, and implement tight access controls plus monitoring. The practical goal is simple: only the people who need remote-access mechanism information to do their job can access it, and you can prove that control operates consistently.

This page gives requirement-level implementation guidance you can execute quickly, with an emphasis on what auditors ask for and what evidence you need to retain.

Regulatory text

Requirement: “Protect information about remote access mechanisms from unauthorized use and disclosure.” ¹

Operator interpretation (what you must do):

1. Identify what counts as “information about remote access mechanisms” in your environment (not just the tools, but the configuration and administration details).
2. Classify that information as sensitive and define who is authorized to access it.
3. Implement technical and procedural controls to prevent unauthorized viewing, copying, or modification.
4. Detect and respond to inappropriate access or sharing of that information.
   All of the above supports the control intent: reducing the likelihood that remote access becomes easier to abuse because mechanism details were exposed. ²

Plain-English interpretation (what counts as “mechanism information”)

“Remote access mechanisms” are the methods and systems that enable access to your network, systems, or applications from outside managed boundaries. “Mechanism information” is the set of details that explain, enable, or administer that access.

Common examples (treat as sensitive unless you have a reason not to):

• Architecture and diagrams: network paths, VPN topology, bastion design, VDI segmentation, management-plane diagrams.
• Configuration artifacts: VPN profiles, MFA enforcement policies, IdP application settings, conditional access rules, device posture rules, firewall objects tied to remote admin.
• Operational runbooks: step-by-step instructions to grant access, troubleshoot connectivity, bypass steps during outages, break-glass procedures.
• Code and scripts: infrastructure-as-code for remote access gateways, configuration scripts, automation for account provisioning into remote-access groups.
• Access-control metadata: group names, role mappings, “who can do what” matrices for remote access platforms.
• Secrets-adjacent data: anything that makes credential guessing, social engineering, or targeted privilege escalation easier (even if it is not a password).

Your implementation should assume that unauthorized disclosure increases attack probability and blast radius, even if the disclosed information is “just documentation.”

Who it applies to

AC-17(6) is most relevant in these contexts:

• Federal information systems and programs assessing against NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 controls. ²
• Contractor systems handling federal data where NIST SP 800-53 controls (or derived requirements) are in scope, including environments supporting federal missions or contracts. ¹

Operationally, it applies wherever you have remote access, including:

• Corporate IT remote workforce access
• Third-party support access (MSPs, software publishers, hardware maintenance)
• Cloud admin access paths (cloud consoles, CI/CD runners with admin rights)
• OT/ICS remote maintenance (if applicable)

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

Use this sequence to get to “audit-ready” without boiling the ocean.

Step 1: Name a control owner and define the boundary

• Assign a single accountable owner (usually Security Engineering, IAM, or Network Security).
• Define what “remote access” covers in your environment (VPN, ZTNA, VDI, RDP via bastion, SSH jump hosts, remote management tools, PAM remote sessions).
• Define where mechanism information lives today (wikis, tickets, Git repos, shared drives, vendor portals).

Output: a short AC-17(6) control implementation statement with owner, scope, and repositories.

Step 2: Inventory and label mechanism information

Create an inventory of mechanism information sources. Keep it practical:

• Repositories (SharePoint/Confluence, GitHub/GitLab, Google Drive)
• Admin consoles (IdP, VPN/ZTNA admin, PAM admin)
• Ticketing systems (where approvals and runbooks are stored)
• Diagramming tools

Then apply a handling rule: “Remote access mechanism information is sensitive; restrict to authorized personnel.” This can be implemented through your existing information classification standard, even if you don’t create a new classification tier.

Output: inventory list + classification/handling rule.

Step 3: Restrict access (least privilege plus strong admin controls)

Implement controls that materially reduce disclosure and misuse:

• Role-based access: only remote access administrators and designated responders can access detailed configs and runbooks.
• Separate read vs. admin permissions: most engineers who need awareness do not need edit rights.
• Privileged access management: route admin actions through PAM where available; minimize standing privileges.
• Repository protections: private repos, branch protections, mandatory review for changes to remote access configs/runbooks.
• Data loss controls (where feasible): prevent public sharing links and external sharing for sensitive repositories.

Decision point: if you must share mechanism information with a third party (support vendor), use a controlled method (named accounts, least privilege, time-bound access, and contractual confidentiality), and document the rationale.

Output: access control lists, role definitions, and repository permission screenshots/exports.

Step 4: Protect in transit and at rest (practical minimums)

AC-17(6) does not prescribe specific cryptography settings in the excerpt provided, but you still need credible protection measures aligned to your enterprise standards:

• Store mechanism information in approved systems with access control and audit logs.
• Avoid emailing configs/runbooks or pasting them into chat channels without access controls.
• If you must transmit, use authenticated, access-controlled channels and avoid anonymous links.

Output: approved storage locations and a “do not share via unmanaged channels” procedure.

Step 5: Monitor and alert on access and change

Auditors and incident responders will ask how you detect misuse.

• Enable audit logs for repositories and admin consoles that store mechanism information.
• Alert on risky events: mass downloads, external shares created, permission changes, unusual access, changes to remote access policies outside change windows.
• Tie alerts to your incident management process.

Output: logging configuration evidence + sample alerts + incident ticket references.

Step 6: Add operational governance (change control + periodic review)

• Require change control for remote access mechanism changes (who approved, what changed, when).
• Review permissions to mechanism information repositories and admin consoles on a defined cadence that matches your access review program.
• Retire old runbooks/diagrams so stale documentation does not create hidden exposure.

Output: access review records, change tickets, and repository lifecycle/retention notes.

Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Build an “AC-17(6) evidence pack” that a control tester can evaluate quickly:

• Control narrative / procedure: how you protect remote access mechanism information, including scope and responsible roles. ¹
• Inventory of mechanism information locations: list of systems/repositories and owners.
• Access controls proof: permission exports, screenshots, group membership lists, PAM policy references.
• Access review evidence: reviewer, date, exceptions, remediation tickets.
• Logging/monitoring proof: enabled audit logs, alert rules, and a sample of log events.
• Change management proof: tickets/approvals for changes to remote access configurations and runbooks.
• Third-party sharing controls (if applicable): contracts/NDAs, time-bound access approvals, and deprovisioning evidence.

Tip: In Daydream, structure this as a single mapped control with a recurring evidence checklist so your team collects the same artifacts each cycle and avoids scrambling before an assessment. ¹

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

Expect these questions from assessors mapping to the ac-17(6): protection of mechanism information requirement:

• “Show me where remote access mechanism documentation is stored and who can access it.”
• “How do you prevent remote access configuration details from being publicly shared?”
• “Who can administer VPN/ZTNA/IdP policies, and how is that access granted and reviewed?”
• “Do you log access to the repositories that contain remote access runbooks/configs?”
• “How do you handle third-party support access to remote access mechanism information?”

Hangups that slow audits:

• Mechanism information spread across wikis, ticket comments, and personal drives.
• “Everyone in IT can see it” access models without justification.
• No repeatable evidence of access reviews.

Frequent implementation mistakes (and how to avoid them)

1. Mistake: treating “mechanism information” as harmless because it’s not a secret.
   Fix: classify it as sensitive operational security information and restrict distribution.

2. Mistake: focusing only on the remote access tool, not the documentation.
   Fix: include diagrams, runbooks, scripts, and tickets in scope.

3. Mistake: granting broad read access for convenience.
   Fix: split audiences. Provide a high-level overview to broader IT staff and keep detailed configuration and admin runbooks restricted.

4. Mistake: no monitoring of repositories and admin consoles.
   Fix: turn on audit logs and define a small set of actionable alerts tied to incident response.

5. Mistake: third-party support accounts with persistent access.
   Fix: require named accounts, time-bound access, and explicit approvals; document offboarding.

Enforcement context and risk implications

No public enforcement cases were provided in the available source catalog for this requirement, so you should treat AC-17(6) as an assessment and authorization expectation rather than a control with a specific enforcement narrative in this dataset. ¹

Risk-wise, mechanism information disclosure commonly shows up as:

• Faster attacker lateral movement after an initial foothold
• More effective social engineering (“I’m calling about the VPN group named X…”)
• Higher probability of privileged access abuse because admin pathways are documented and shared widely

A practical 30/60/90-day execution plan

First 30 days (stabilize and contain)

• Assign owner and scope remote access mechanisms in a single-page control narrative. ²
• Inventory where mechanism information lives; identify obvious public/external shares.
• Lock down the highest-risk repositories (remove public links, restrict external sharing, reduce broad groups).
• Enable audit logging for the primary repositories and remote access admin consoles.

By 60 days (make it repeatable)

• Implement role-based access and separate read/edit permissions for key repositories.
• Establish a standard for storing runbooks/configs (approved locations only).
• Define alerting for risky events (permission changes, external shares, large downloads).
• Add change control requirements for remote access mechanism changes.

By 90 days (prove operation and get audit-ready)

• Run at least one formal access review for mechanism information locations and remote access admin roles.
• Fix exceptions through tracked remediation tickets.
• Assemble the AC-17(6) evidence pack and run an internal “mock audit” walk-through.
• Optional: implement a Daydream control record with recurring evidence tasks so reviews, exports, and screenshots happen on schedule. ¹

Frequently Asked Questions

What exactly is “information about remote access mechanisms” in AC-17(6)?

It includes documentation, configurations, diagrams, scripts, and administrative details that explain or enable remote access. If the information would help someone understand how to access or administer your environment remotely, treat it as in scope. ¹

Does AC-17(6) mean we have to hide all remote access documentation from IT staff?

No. Provide high-level guidance broadly if needed, but restrict detailed configurations, admin runbooks, and sensitive diagrams to authorized roles. The test is whether access is justified and controlled. ²

How do we handle sharing remote access mechanism details with a third party support provider?

Use named accounts, least-privilege permissions, and time-bound approvals. Store shared materials in controlled repositories rather than email, and retain the approval and deprovisioning evidence. ¹

What evidence do auditors usually expect for AC-17(6)?

Auditors typically ask for a control narrative, repository and admin-console access lists, proof of restricted permissions, logging/monitoring evidence, and access review records. Keep sample change tickets for remote access configuration changes. ¹

We already protect VPN credentials. Isn’t that enough?

Credentials are only part of the risk. AC-17(6) also targets the “how it works” information, such as group mappings, conditional access rules, and break-glass steps, because disclosure can materially reduce an attacker’s effort. ²

What’s the fastest way to close gaps without rebuilding remote access?

Centralize mechanism information into a small set of approved repositories, restrict access to defined roles, turn on audit logs, and run a documented access review. That set of actions usually closes the biggest audit findings quickly. ¹

Footnotes

1. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON

2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5