SR-4: Provenance

To meet the sr-4: provenance requirement, you must document, monitor, and maintain valid provenance for the systems, components, and data you define in scope, so you can prove where they came from, how they changed, and who handled them across their lifecycle ¹. Operationalize SR-4 by setting scope, assigning owners, implementing traceability controls, and retaining repeatable evidence.

Key takeaways:

• SR-4 requires lifecycle traceability for in-scope systems, components, and associated data, not a one-time inventory ¹.
• “Valid provenance” means you can substantiate origin and change history with authoritative records and integrity protections.
• Your fastest path is a scoped provenance register, tied to procurement, CI/CD, asset management, and logging, with recurring evidence capture.

SR-4 (Provenance) sits in the Supply Chain Risk Management control family in NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5. The practical goal is simple: if an assessor asks, “Where did this component/data come from, what has happened to it, and how do you know?”, you can answer with records that are consistent, tamper-resistant, and tied to real operating processes. The control language is broad by design because “provenance” can mean different things depending on what you run: cloud services, endpoints, containers, model artifacts, third-party libraries, or sensitive datasets.

For a CCO, GRC lead, or compliance officer, the operational challenge is rarely the concept. It’s implementation: defining scope, connecting the right internal systems (procurement, CMDB, source control, build pipelines, data platforms), and setting an evidence trail that continues to exist after people and platforms change. SR-4 also forces clarity on third parties. If you cannot trace supplier origin or custody for a critical component or dataset, you carry avoidable security and audit risk.

This page turns SR-4 into a requirement you can assign, test, and evidence with minimal ambiguity, using NIST’s control text as the anchor ².

Regulatory text

Control requirement (SR-4): “Document, monitor, and maintain valid provenance of the following systems, system components, and associated data: {{ insert: param, sr-04_odp }}.” ¹

What the operator must do from this text

1. Decide and document scope for “systems, system components, and associated data” (the organization-defined parameter). The control is incomplete until you define what assets and data types are in scope.
2. Document provenance for those in-scope items (origin, custody/handling, and change history).
3. Monitor provenance as a living control (detect untracked changes, unknown sources, or broken chain-of-custody).
4. Maintain valid provenance over time (records stay accurate, attributable, and protected from tampering).

Plain-English interpretation (what “valid provenance” means in practice)

For SR-4, “valid provenance” means you can demonstrate, with authoritative records, at least these facts for each in-scope item:

• Origin: Where it came from (supplier/third party, repository, manufacturer, internal team), plus identifying details (version, hash, serial, artifact ID).
• Lineage and change history: What changed, when, by whom/what process, and what approvals existed (tickets, pull requests, change records).
• Custody/handling: Where it has been stored, processed, moved, or deployed, including which third parties or internal services touched it.
• Integrity of the record: Evidence is protected so it can’t be quietly altered after the fact (access controls, immutable logs, signed artifacts where feasible).

If you can’t show those elements reliably, auditors will treat provenance as “not implemented” even if you have partial inventories.

Who it applies to (entity and operational context)

SR-4 is relevant anywhere you align to NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5, including:

• Federal information systems and programs assessed against NIST SP 800-53 controls ³.
• Contractors handling federal data where NIST SP 800-53 control alignment is contractually required or used as an assessment baseline ³.

Operationally, SR-4 usually lands across:

• IT asset management / CMDB (systems and hardware components).
• Engineering and DevSecOps (source code, dependencies, container images, build artifacts).
• Data governance / security (datasets, pipelines, training data, exports).
• Procurement and third-party risk management (supplier origin, SBOMs, support chain, hosting providers).
• Security operations (monitoring for unauthorized changes and unknown artifacts).

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

Step 1: Define SR-4 scope (the ODP) so it’s testable

Create an SR-4 scoping statement that names what you will track provenance for. Use risk-based criteria your assessor will accept. Common scoping patterns:

• All production systems and their deployed components
• All components that process regulated/sensitive data
• All externally sourced code/packages and container images
• All “golden” datasets and any downstream extracts

Deliverable: a one-page “SR-4 Provenance Scope” entry in your control narrative, plus a list of in-scope asset/data categories.

Step 2: Assign single-threaded ownership and RACI

SR-4 fails most often because no one owns the end-to-end lineage across IT, engineering, and data. Assign:

• Control owner (accountable): typically Security/GRC or Supply Chain Security.
• System owners (responsible): IT/Engineering/Data platform owners for in-scope areas.
• Evidence owner: the person who can produce artifacts on demand (often GRC).

This mapping is explicitly aligned with recommended practice to map SR-4 to owner, procedure, and recurring evidence artifacts ¹.

Step 3: Build a provenance register (your minimum viable backbone)

Create a register (spreadsheet, GRC system, or Daydream control record) with one row per in-scope item type or critical asset, containing:

• Unique identifier (asset ID, repo ID, dataset ID, image name)
• Source/origin (third party/internal; repo/manufacturer)
• Integrity identifiers (hashes, signatures, serials as applicable)
• Storage/location (systems of record)
• Change control hook (ticketing system, PR workflow, MDM, CI/CD)
• Monitoring hook (alerts for drift/unknown artifacts)
• Evidence pointers (where logs/reports live)

This register becomes your audit “table of contents.”

Step 4: Implement provenance capture in the systems that already exist

You don’t need a new tool first. You need tight linkage:

For software components

• Require source repositories and dependency manifests to be recorded.
• Capture build provenance: build job ID, commit SHA, build logs, artifact hash.
• Record approvals (PR reviews, change tickets) for production releases.

For infrastructure and endpoints

• Record procurement source and receiving records for hardware.
• Track configuration baselines and drift via configuration management.
• Maintain MDM/EDR inventory tied to asset IDs.

For data

• Define authoritative sources for “golden datasets.”
• Capture lineage through pipelines: job runs, transformations, access paths.
• Maintain export logs and approvals for sensitive dataset extracts.

Step 5: Add monitoring that detects broken provenance

SR-4 includes “monitor,” so implement checks that surface exceptions:

• New production artifacts without a recorded build job or repository
• Unknown dependencies introduced outside approved channels
• Data extracts occurring outside approved workflows
• Asset drift that bypasses change control

Make exceptions actionable: route to a ticket queue with an owner and SLA defined by policy (your SLA can be qualitative if you don’t want to hardcode time).

Step 6: Lock down the evidence so it remains “valid”

“Maintain” implies durability and integrity:

• Limit write access to provenance records.
• Retain immutable logs where feasible (append-only storage, WORM settings, or equivalent).
• Ensure evidence survives personnel turnover (shared ownership, runbooks, and centralized storage).

Step 7: Test SR-4 with an assessor-style walkthrough

Pick a sample of in-scope items and run this script:

1. Identify the asset/data item from the register.
2. Show origin evidence (supplier record, repo, artifact source).
3. Show last change evidence (ticket/PR/build log).
4. Show monitoring evidence (alerting, drift report, exception ticket).
5. Show retention and access controls for the evidence set.

If any link fails, update the register and procedure until the chain is unbroken.

Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Use this as an evidence checklist. Keep it simple and repeatable.

Evidence artifact	What it proves for SR-4	Typical system of record
SR-4 control narrative + scope statement	Defined ODP scope and approach	GRC repository / Daydream
Provenance register	Traceability index for in-scope items	GRC tool, spreadsheet with change control
Procurement/third-party records	Origin of externally sourced components	Procurement system, contracts repository
Source control + CI/CD build logs	Build and change lineage for software	Git platform, CI tool logs
Artifact integrity info (hash/signature)	Integrity and identity of components	Artifact registry, build outputs
Change tickets / approvals	Authorized changes and accountability	ITSM/ticketing
Data lineage records / pipeline logs	Lineage of datasets and transformations	Data platform logs, catalog
Monitoring reports and exception tickets	Ongoing monitoring and response	SIEM, configuration tools, ITSM

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

Auditors and assessors tend to press on these:

• “What’s in scope for SR-4 and why?” If your scope is vague, the assessment will expand it for you.
• “Show me provenance end-to-end for this one component.” They will pick a real production item.
• “How do you detect components/data with unknown origin?” Inventory without monitoring rarely passes.
• “How do you prevent tampering with provenance records?” Screenshots are weak evidence; logs with access control are stronger.
• “How does this work with third parties?” Expect scrutiny on externally sourced libraries, SaaS, MSPs, and hosted pipelines.

Frequent implementation mistakes (and how to avoid them)

1. Treating provenance as a one-time inventory. Fix: add monitoring and an exception workflow tied to tickets.
2. No defined ODP scope. Fix: write and approve a scoping statement and align it to system criticality and data sensitivity ¹.
3. Evidence scattered across teams with no index. Fix: maintain a provenance register that points to evidence locations.
4. Relying on informal attestations. Fix: use system-generated logs, build records, and change approvals as primary evidence.
5. Ignoring “associated data.” Fix: define which datasets require lineage, especially where regulated data flows through third-party tooling.

Enforcement context and risk implications

No public enforcement cases were provided in the source material for SR-4. Practically, SR-4 gaps show up as:

• Inability to explain origin after a security incident (supply chain compromise, unauthorized dependency).
• Audit findings for weak configuration/change management linkages and incomplete third-party traceability.
• Higher operational risk when teams cannot quickly determine “what changed” and “what is impacted.”

Practical 30/60/90-day execution plan

First 30 days (foundation)

• Publish SR-4 scope (ODP) and get owner sign-off ¹.
• Assign control owner and evidence owner; document RACI.
• Stand up the provenance register with your initial in-scope list.
• Identify systems of record for: procurement, source control, CI/CD, artifact registry, CMDB, data pipelines.

Days 31–60 (operational wiring)

• Map each in-scope category to its provenance capture points (what logs/records prove origin and change).
• Implement or tighten change control hooks where provenance is weak (release approvals, ticket linking, repository policies).
• Define monitoring exceptions (unknown artifact, unapproved data extract, unmanaged asset drift) and route them to tickets.
• Run an internal “sample test” walkthrough and record gaps.

Days 61–90 (evidence-ready and repeatable)

• Convert the walkthrough into a repeatable monthly/quarterly control test with evidence snapshots.
• Harden evidence retention and access control for provenance records.
• Add executive reporting: open exceptions, recurring root causes, and remediation status.
• If you use Daydream, map SR-4 to the control owner, implementation procedure, and recurring evidence artifacts so the control stays assessment-ready without manual chasing ¹.

Frequently Asked Questions

What counts as “provenance” for SR-4 in a DevOps environment?

Provenance means you can trace a deployed artifact back to a specific source repository state and build process, with records of approvals and integrity identifiers ¹. If you can’t show commit/build lineage, you should treat it as broken provenance.

Do I need cryptographic signing for SR-4 to pass an audit?

NIST’s SR-4 text requires “valid provenance,” not a specific mechanism ¹. Signing is a strong way to support validity, but many programs start by proving lineage through controlled logs, approvals, and restricted evidence access.

How do I scope “associated data” without boiling the ocean?

Start with datasets that drive mission outcomes, contain sensitive data, or feed downstream reporting and automated decisions. Document the scoping rule and list the specific datasets in your provenance register so the scope is defensible ¹.

What’s the minimum evidence set an assessor will accept for one sampled item?

Expect to show origin evidence, change/approval evidence, monitoring or drift detection evidence, and proof that the records are maintained and access-controlled. Your provenance register should point to each artifact location so you can produce it quickly.

How does SR-4 relate to third-party risk management?

SR-4 forces you to retain origin and custody records for third-party-supplied components and services that are in scope ¹. If procurement and security records are disconnected, your provenance chain breaks at the exact point assessors care about.

We have a CMDB. Is that enough?

A CMDB helps with inventory, but SR-4 also requires monitoring and maintained validity of provenance across components and data ¹. You typically need links to change tickets, build pipelines, and data lineage logs to complete the trace.

Footnotes

1. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON

2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5; Source: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON

3. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5