SR-7: Supply Chain Operations Security

SR-7: Supply Chain Operations Security requirement means you must apply Operations Security (OPSEC) controls to protect supply chain-related information across the full lifecycle of your system, components, and services. To operationalize it fast, define what “supply chain-related information” includes for your environment, pick OPSEC controls that reduce exposure, assign owners, and retain repeatable evidence that the controls run.

Key takeaways:

• SR-7 is about preventing disclosure and adversary inference from supply chain signals (not just “vendor security reviews”).
• Scope first: define which supply chain details are sensitive, where they live, and who can see them.
• Audits focus on proof: mapped control ownership, procedures, and recurring artifacts tied to systems and third parties.

The sr-7: supply chain operations security requirement often gets mis-scoped as a procurement or third-party risk questionnaire exercise. That misses the point. SR-7 is about OPSEC: reducing the chance that internal or external parties can observe, correlate, or extract supply chain-related information that enables targeting, counterfeiting, compromise, or disruption. Think: architecture diagrams showing component provenance, deployment schedules, build pipeline details, supplier names and roles, shipping/receiving patterns, maintenance windows, and exception workflows that reveal where controls are weakest.

Operationally, SR-7 forces a practical question: “If an attacker, competitor, or disgruntled insider learned our supply chain specifics, what could they do with it?” Your job as a CCO/GRC lead is to translate that into clear classifications, access controls, communications rules, monitoring, and training that apply to employees and third parties. Then you need assessment-ready evidence that the OPSEC controls are defined, used, and reviewed.

This page gives requirement-level implementation guidance you can implement quickly: scope, control selection, procedures, evidence, audit questions, and an execution plan that fits real delivery teams.

SR-7: Supply Chain Operations Security (requirement-level guidance)

Requirement statement (operator view): Apply OPSEC controls to protect information about your supply chain for systems, components, and services, and be able to show how those controls work in practice. ¹

Plain-English interpretation

SR-7 requires you to identify supply chain-related information that would increase risk if exposed and then reduce its exposure through OPSEC controls. OPSEC here is not a single tool. It is a set of practical safeguards that prevent:

• accidental disclosure (oversharing in tickets, docs, emails, RFP responses, public repos),
• intentional disclosure (insider threat, third-party misuse),
• inference (an observer can deduce sensitive supply chain realities from patterns like maintenance windows, package names, build logs, shipping notifications).

Your “done” state is not “we have a policy.” Your “done” state is:

1. a defined scope of sensitive supply chain information,
2. implemented OPSEC controls mapped to that scope,
3. assigned ownership and repeatable operating procedures,
4. evidence that the controls run across the system lifecycle.

Who it applies to (entity + operational context)

SR-7 applies in environments using NIST SP 800-53 where you operate:

• Federal information systems, and
• contractor systems handling federal data (including systems/services/components delivered through third parties). ¹

Operationally, it applies wherever supply chain information is created, stored, processed, or shared, including:

• procurement and sourcing,
• engineering (architecture, build, CI/CD, SBOMs, dependency management),
• IT operations (patch windows, change calendars, runbooks),
• security (IR playbooks, detections that name suppliers/tools),
• legal/compliance (contract exhibits, audit responses),
• third-party collaboration spaces (shared ticketing, shared drives, Slack/Teams channels).

## Regulatory text

“Employ the following Operations Security (OPSEC) controls to protect supply chain-related information for the system, system component, or system service: {{ insert: param, sr-07_odp }}.” ²

What the operator must do with that text:

• The control expects you to select and implement OPSEC controls appropriate to your system and supply chain risk.
• The “{{ insert: param, sr-07_odp }}” indicates the catalog supports organization-defined parameters; you must define what OPSEC measures you will apply, then implement them consistently. ²

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

Step 1: Define “supply chain-related information” for your environment

Create a short, specific definition that engineers and procurement can apply without debate. Include examples. Common categories:

• supplier identities and roles (who provides what, criticality),
• component provenance and bill-of-materials details,
• build and release process details (branching, signing, artifact repos),
• deployment topology and dependencies (what runs where, who administers),
• operational schedules (patch cadence, maintenance windows),
• exception processes (emergency access, break-glass supplier support),
• logistics and physical receipt details for hardware components.

Deliverable: “Supply Chain Information Handling Standard” (one to two pages) aligned to your data classification scheme.

Step 2: Identify where that information lives and how it flows

Run a lightweight mapping exercise:

• Systems: CMDB, asset inventory, SDLC tools, CI logs, artifact registries.
• Data stores: SharePoint/Drive, Confluence/Wikis, Git repos, ticketing systems.
• Communications: email, chat, incident channels, vendor portals.
• External sharing: customer audit responses, RFPs, public docs, support forums.

Deliverable: data flow map or inventory table of “locations + owners + access model.”

Step 3: Choose OPSEC controls that reduce exposure (minimum viable set)

Pick controls that match your reality and can be evidenced. Typical OPSEC controls for SR-7 include:

• Access controls: role-based access to supply chain docs, least privilege for supplier lists, restricted project spaces for sensitive integrations.
• Labeling and handling rules: tags like “Supply Chain Sensitive,” required headers/footers, rules for external sharing.
• Secure collaboration patterns: approved channels for third-party communication, prohibition on pasting build logs into tickets shared externally.
• Publication review: security/compliance review for public documentation and open-source repos that mention internal tooling or suppliers.
• Monitoring and alerting: DLP rules or keyword-based detection for supplier names, signing keys, SBOM artifacts, shipping references.
• Training: targeted guidance for procurement, engineering, and incident responders on what not to disclose.

Decision checkpoint: If you cannot produce evidence that a control runs, it will fail in assessment. Prefer controls that generate artifacts automatically (access reviews, tickets, logs).

Step 4: Assign owners and embed SR-7 into operating procedures

Auditors look for accountable ownership. Assign:

• a control owner (GRC or Security),
• operating owners (Procurement, Engineering, IT Ops),
• a review cadence (driven by your risk program and change frequency).

Convert the controls into procedures people follow:

• “How to onboard a third party without disclosing restricted supply chain details.”
• “How to respond to a customer security questionnaire without naming sensitive sub-suppliers.”
• “How to create incident tickets with redacted supplier details in shared queues.”

Practical tip: Put SR-7 checks into existing gates (change management, SDLC approvals, procurement intake). Avoid building a standalone SR-7 workflow nobody uses.

Step 5: Validate with a tabletop and one real transaction

Do one controlled test:

• simulate a customer requesting sub-supplier detail,
• simulate an engineer opening a ticket with a third party that includes logs,
• verify the handling rules, approvals, and redaction steps work.

Capture the outputs as evidence.

Step 6: Retain recurring evidence (make it repeatable)

SR-7 commonly fails due to “missing implementation evidence.” ²

Build an evidence plan where each control produces a recurring artifact (access review export, ticket samples, approval records, training completion record, monitoring rule configuration screenshot/export).

Where Daydream fits naturally: teams often struggle to keep SR-7 evidence organized across procurement, engineering, and security. Daydream helps by mapping SR-7 to a control owner, implementation procedure, and recurring evidence artifacts so assessments stop depending on tribal knowledge. ²

Required evidence and artifacts to retain (audit-ready list)

Maintain a binder (GRC tool or structured repository) with:

• SR-7 control narrative: scope, OPSEC control set selected, and rationale. ³
• Supply chain info classification/handling standard with examples.
• Inventory/data flow artifacts showing where supply chain-sensitive info lives.
• Access control evidence: screenshots/exports of restricted groups, access review records, and join/leave logs where available.
• External sharing procedure: approval workflow for customer disclosures and third-party collaboration.
• Redaction guidance: examples of “before/after” for logs, architecture diagrams, tickets.
• Monitoring/DLP configuration evidence: rule definitions and sample alerts (sanitized).
• Training materials and completion records for relevant roles.
• Exception register: documented exceptions with approvals and expiry.

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

Expect assessors to ask:

• “Define supply chain-related information for this system. Show examples.”
• “Where is it stored, and how do you restrict access?”
• “How do you prevent accidental disclosure to third parties during support tickets?”
• “Show evidence the controls operate: approvals, access reviews, monitoring, training.”
• “How do you handle urgent incidents where a supplier needs data fast?”

Common hangups:

• Overbroad scope (“everything about vendors is sensitive”) that makes compliance impossible.
• Underscoped scope (only contracts) that ignores engineering and operations realities.
• No operational evidence beyond a policy.

Frequent implementation mistakes and how to avoid them

1. Mistake: Treating SR-7 as procurement-only.
   Fix: include SDLC, IT ops, incident response, and customer trust functions in scope workshops.

2. Mistake: No shared definition of supply chain-sensitive info.
   Fix: publish a short definition with concrete examples and “allowed vs restricted” disclosures.

3. Mistake: Sharing supplier names and tooling in customer responses by default.
   Fix: create an approved disclosure matrix and a security/legal review path for exceptions.

4. Mistake: Collaboration sprawl with third parties.
   Fix: restrict third-party communication to approved channels, and configure shared ticket queues with redaction rules.

5. Mistake: Evidence collected only at audit time.
   Fix: predefine recurring artifacts. Automate collection where possible, then store centrally.

Enforcement context and risk implications

No public enforcement cases were provided in the source catalog for SR-7. Your risk is still concrete: disclosure of supply chain details can enable targeted compromise (choosing the right supplier, dependency, or maintenance window) and can create downstream contractual and incident reporting exposure. Treat SR-7 as a preventative control that reduces blast radius before an incident happens. ³

Practical execution plan (30/60/90-day)

Use phases rather than fixed durations if your environment moves slower or faster.

First 30 days (Immediate)

• Appoint SR-7 control owner and operating owners.
• Draft supply chain-sensitive definition + handling rules.
• Identify top systems and third parties in scope for a pilot.
• Create evidence register: what you will collect, who produces it, where it’s stored.

By 60 days (Near-term)

• Implement access restrictions for the pilot repositories/spaces.
• Roll out external sharing procedure for customer and third-party communications.
• Configure monitoring/DLP for the pilot channels where feasible.
• Run one tabletop and fix the gaps found.

By 90 days (Operationalize)

• Expand scope beyond pilot to additional systems/components/services.
• Establish recurring reviews: access reviews, exception review, and procedure refresh.
• Standardize templates: redacted ticket template, approved disclosure language, supplier engagement checklist.
• Centralize ongoing evidence collection; Daydream can keep SR-7 mapped to owners, procedures, and recurring artifacts so you do not rebuild the binder each audit. ²

Frequently Asked Questions

What counts as “supply chain-related information” under SR-7?

Treat it as any information that reveals who supplies your system/components/services and how you build, deliver, support, or update them. Write a definition with examples your teams actually handle, then apply OPSEC controls to that scope. ²

Do we need a separate SR-7 policy?

You need documented handling rules and procedures, but they can live inside existing policies (data classification, secure SDLC, change management) if they clearly cover supply chain-sensitive information and produce evidence. Assessors will look for clarity and operational proof, not a specific document title. ³

How do we handle customer requests for sub-suppliers or component details?

Create a disclosure decision path: what you can share by default, what needs review, and what you refuse or provide under NDA with redaction. Keep approval records as evidence of controlled disclosure.

Does SR-7 apply to SaaS providers we rely on, or only to hardware suppliers?

It applies to systems, components, and services, so SaaS, cloud, MSPs, and software dependencies all fall in scope where their details become supply chain-sensitive information in your environment. ²

What evidence usually satisfies auditors for SR-7?

Auditors typically expect a mapped control narrative, documented procedures, and recurring artifacts such as access reviews, approval workflows for external sharing, monitoring configurations, and training completion records. The common failure mode is missing evidence that the process runs. ²

We already have third-party risk management. Isn’t that enough?

Third-party due diligence helps, but SR-7 focuses on OPSEC controls that prevent supply chain-related information exposure during operations. You still need handling rules, access restrictions, and controlled communications tied to your systems and workflows. ³

Footnotes

1. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON

2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON

3. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5