AU-6(5): Integrated Analysis of Audit Records

To meet the au-6(5): integrated analysis of audit records requirement, you must correlate audit log analysis with at least one additional, relevant data source (for example, vulnerability results, threat intel, configuration drift, or identity context) so detections reflect real risk and surface unusual activity faster ¹. Operationally, this means building a repeatable correlation workflow, assigning ownership, and retaining evidence that integrated reviews occur and produce actionable outcomes.

Key takeaways:

• You need correlation, not separate reviews: audit logs plus another analysis stream in a single investigative view ¹.
• “Done” requires procedures and evidence: documented logic, recurring reviews, and tickets/outcomes tied to correlated findings.
• The fastest path is a use-case-driven SIEM/SOAR workflow with defined inputs, thresholds, and escalation paths.

AU-6(5) is an audit analysis maturity requirement: it expects your team to move beyond looking at logs in isolation and instead combine audit record review with other security-relevant analysis to improve detection of inappropriate or unusual activity ¹. For a Compliance Officer, CCO, or GRC lead, the practical challenge is scoping “integrated analysis” tightly enough that it is testable, repeatable, and evidence-backed.

In practice, auditors look for two things. First, a defensible design: which data sources are integrated with audit records, why they were selected, and which use cases they support. Second, operational proof: that integrated analysis runs on a defined cadence (or continuously), produces findings, and drives response actions. If your SOC says “the SIEM correlates things,” but you cannot show the correlation rules, review workflow, and resulting investigations, you will struggle in an assessment.

This page translates AU-6(5) into an implementable requirement: clear applicability, step-by-step execution, the artifacts to retain, and the most common exam hangups. It’s written so you can assign owners today and stand up evidence you can defend tomorrow.

Requirement: AU-6(5) Integrated Analysis of Audit Records

Control intent: Improve detection fidelity by correlating audit records with additional analytical inputs that provide context, risk, or confirmation signals ¹.

Why assessors care (operator view)

Audit logs alone are noisy. Integrated analysis reduces false positives and highlights what matters: suspicious actions on high-value assets, privileged identities behaving oddly, or activity that aligns with known exploitable conditions. AU-6(5) is where “we collect logs” must turn into “we detect and investigate risk.”

Regulatory text

“Integrate analysis of audit records with analysis of {{ insert: param, au-06.05_odp.01 }} to further enhance the ability to identify inappropriate or unusual activity.” ¹

What you must do (operator translation):

• Perform audit log analysis in a way that combines it with at least one other category of analysis relevant to your environment (the “other data” is defined by your organization’s selected parameter in implementation).
• Demonstrate that this integration enhances detection of inappropriate or unusual activity, not just that multiple tools exist.

Practical scoping note: NIST uses a parameter placeholder for the “other analysis.” Your job is to define the specific source(s) and show they are actually integrated into a single analytical workflow ¹.

Plain-English interpretation

You comply with AU-6(5) when your team can show, with evidence, that:

1. audit records flow into an analysis platform or workflow, and
2. that workflow correlates those records with another analysis stream (risk, threat, posture, or identity context), and
3. analysts review outcomes and take action when correlation indicates unusual or inappropriate activity ¹.

Who it applies to

Entity types

• Federal information systems
• Contractor systems handling federal data ¹

Operational context

• Environments where you maintain centralized logging (SIEM or log platform), or where audit records can be aggregated from endpoints, identity systems, network/security tooling, and cloud control planes.
• Any program claiming alignment to NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 control baselines ².

Typical internal owners

• Primary: SOC manager / Detection engineering lead
• Supporting: IAM lead, Vulnerability management lead, Cloud security lead, GRC/control owner

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

Step 1: Define the “integrated analysis” sources (tight scope)

Create a short list of approved correlation inputs paired to audit records. Pick sources you can operationalize and evidence. Common options:

• Vulnerability and exposure findings (to prioritize events on exploitable assets)
• Threat intelligence indicators (to flag known bad infrastructure)
• Configuration/compliance drift (to detect behavior on misconfigured assets)
• Identity and access context (privileged status, MFA state, role changes)
• Asset criticality / data classification tags

Document your selections as the AU-6(5) parameter definition and obtain sign-off from the control owner.

Step 2: Establish the integration mechanism (how correlation happens)

You need an implemented method, not an aspiration. Acceptable patterns:

• SIEM correlation rules that join log events with enrichment tables/feeds
• SOAR playbooks that enrich events during triage with external analysis results
• Data lake + detection pipeline where queries combine log events with other datasets

Record the architecture at a level an assessor can follow: data sources, transport, storage, enrichment points, and where analysts see the combined view.

Step 3: Build use cases that prove “enhanced ability”

Define a small set of integrated detection use cases that clearly benefit from correlation. For each use case, specify:

• Triggering audit events (what log evidence starts the chain)
• The integrated data used (what gets joined/enriched)
• The decision logic (what makes it unusual/inappropriate)
• The expected analyst action (triage steps and escalation)

Example use cases (write these in your procedure):

• Privileged role assignment + authentication anomalies + admin API calls in cloud logs
• Endpoint malware alert + new persistence-related process events + suspicious outbound connections
• High-risk vulnerability present on a server + repeated failed logins + successful login from new geo

You do not need dozens. You need a defensible set that covers your highest-risk pathways.

Step 4: Operationalize review and response

Integrated analysis must be used. Define:

• Monitoring model: continuous alerting, scheduled hunts, or both
• Triage workflow: who reviews, what tools, what steps, and what SLAs your program adopts internally (these can be policy-defined)
• Escalation: incident response criteria, containment actions, and evidence capture

Make sure the workflow produces an auditable trail (tickets, case notes, chatops transcripts, incident records).

Step 5: Validate with test data and tune

Before you claim “operating effectively,” run table-top or test events:

• Generate known events (benign and suspicious)
• Confirm logs ingest correctly
• Confirm enrichment joins correctly
• Confirm alerts/cases are created and routed
• Confirm analysts can reproduce the decision path

Keep the test record as part of implementation evidence.

Step 6: Assign ownership and recurring evidence

Map AU-6(5) to:

• Control owner
• Detection engineering owner
• Evidence owner (often GRC or SOC operations)
• Review cadence for evidence collection

Daydream (as a practical operational layer) typically fits here: teams use it to map AU-6(5) to an owner, a written procedure, and a recurring evidence set that is consistent across systems and assessment cycles ¹.

Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Keep evidence that proves both design and operation:

Design evidence (what you built)

• AU-6(5) control narrative describing integrated analysis sources and rationale ¹
• Data flow/architecture diagram showing audit record ingestion and enrichment points
• Documented detection use cases and correlation logic (rule descriptions, query logic, or playbook steps)
• Source inventory: list of audit log sources and the integrated “other analysis” sources

Operational evidence (that it runs and produces outcomes)

• SIEM/SOAR change records for correlation rules (creation, modification, approvals)
• Alert/case samples showing enrichment fields and correlated context
• Investigation tickets with analyst notes referencing both audit logs and the integrated source
• Review meeting notes or metrics summaries (qualitative is fine if you cannot support numbers)
• Tuning records: false positive dispositions, rule adjustments, and lessons learned

Retention and integrity pointers

Align retention and integrity controls to your broader AU family decisions; AU-6(5) assessors mainly test that evidence exists and that integrated analysis is repeatable ².

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

Assessors often ask:

• “Show me an example where an alert is based on audit logs plus another analysis source.” Be ready with a case packet.
• “Where is the correlation logic documented?” Point to rule repositories, runbooks, and change tickets.
• “How do you know the integrated sources are current and trustworthy?” Show feed/update mechanisms and ownership.
• “Who reviews integrated outputs, and how do you ensure follow-up?” Show queues, on-call rotations, and ticket workflows.
• “What is the defined ‘other analysis’ for AU-6(5) in your system?” Provide the scoped parameter definition ¹.

Frequent implementation mistakes (and how to avoid them)

1. Mistake: ‘We have a SIEM’ as the control story.
   Fix: Document specific correlation use cases and show evidence of alerts/cases with enrichment.

2. Mistake: Enrichment exists, but analysts don’t use it.
   Fix: Update triage runbooks so enrichment fields drive decisions (priority, routing, escalation). Train to the runbook and keep training records.

3. Mistake: Correlation logic is tribal knowledge.
   Fix: Store rules/playbooks in a version-controlled repository or governed change process. Retain approval history.

4. Mistake: Integrating low-value sources that don’t change outcomes.
   Fix: Choose integrated sources tied to risk decisions: exposure, privilege, criticality, threat intel. Tie each to at least one detection use case.

5. Mistake: No proof of “enhanced ability.”
   Fix: Maintain a short “case library” with examples where correlation improved triage (faster confirmation, better prioritization, fewer escalations). Keep it qualitative if needed.

Enforcement context and risk implications

No public enforcement cases were provided in the source material for AU-6(5). Your risk is assessment-based: failure typically shows up as a control design gap (“integration not defined”) or operating gap (“no evidence of correlated review”) during audits against NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 ².

Practical 30/60/90-day execution plan

First 30 days (Immediate)

• Assign AU-6(5) control owner and technical owner; document RACI.
• Define the “other analysis” sources you will integrate with audit records; get sign-off ¹.
• Inventory audit log sources and confirm ingest health for the highest-risk systems.
• Select a small set of integrated detection use cases and write a one-page runbook per use case.

By 60 days (Near-term)

• Implement correlation/enrichment for the selected use cases in your SIEM/SOAR or detection pipeline.
• Stand up case management workflow: routing, triage steps, escalation triggers.
• Run controlled tests and document results (screenshots, exported cases, tickets).

By 90 days (Operationalize and evidence)

• Tune rules based on analyst feedback and false positive reviews.
• Build an evidence package template: rule list, sample correlated cases, review notes, and change history.
• Put evidence collection on a recurring schedule owned by GRC (Daydream can help standardize the mapping of AU-6(5) to owners, procedures, and recurring artifacts so you are not rebuilding evidence each audit cycle) ¹.

Frequently Asked Questions

What counts as “integrated analysis” for AU-6(5)?

Integration means your audit record analysis is correlated with another analysis source in a single workflow that affects detection or triage outcomes ¹. Separate dashboards reviewed independently usually fail the “integrated” expectation.

Do we need a SIEM to satisfy AU-6(5)?

No specific tool is mandated ². You do need a reliable way to correlate audit records with another analysis source and produce evidence that analysts review and act on the combined output.

Can vulnerability scanning be the “other analysis” source?

Yes, if you can show the vulnerability context is actually joined to audit events and changes prioritization or escalation ¹. Keep a sample case where an event was treated as higher risk because the asset was exposed.

How do we prove the integration “enhances” detection without metrics?

Maintain a case library with before/after narratives: what the audit log showed, what the integrated source added, and what action it drove ¹. Ticket notes and alert enrichment fields are usually enough for assessors.

What evidence is most persuasive in an audit?

A correlated alert or investigation ticket that clearly shows audit events plus enrichment/context from the integrated source, along with the documented rule/playbook that produced it ¹. Add change history to show governance.

How does this relate to third-party systems handling federal data?

If a third party operates systems handling federal data, they may need to meet NIST SP 800-53 control expectations contractually, including AU-6(5) ². Ensure your logging and correlation scope includes outsourced components (for example, managed cloud, MSSP monitoring, or SaaS audit logs) where you have responsibility.

Footnotes

1. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON

2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5