AU-6(8): Full Text Analysis of Privileged Commands

AU-6(8) requires you to run full-text analysis on logs of privileged commands, and to do that analysis on a physically distinct component or a dedicated analysis system, not on the same system being administered. Operationalize it by centralizing privileged command logs, forwarding them to a separate analysis tier (SIEM/analytics), and running repeatable detections and reviews with retained evidence. ¹

Key takeaways:

• You must analyze the full command text of privileged activity, not just summaries or metadata. ¹
• Analysis must occur on a physically distinct subsystem or other dedicated system, which drives architecture and logging pipeline decisions. ¹
• Auditors will look for proof of end-to-end collection, separation, detections, triage, and retained review evidence tied to privileged roles and systems.

The au-6(8): full text analysis of privileged commands requirement is a practical control with a straightforward intent: if an administrator (or any privileged automation) runs powerful commands, you need to be able to see exactly what was executed and analyze it somewhere the admin cannot quietly tamper with. The “full text” part matters because short summaries, exit codes, or “command ran” events rarely show what changed. The “physically distinct” or “dedicated analysis system” part matters because it reduces the risk that the same system being administered can erase or manipulate the evidence.

For a Compliance Officer, CCO, or GRC lead, the fastest path is to treat AU-6(8) as an architecture-and-operations requirement: (1) define what counts as a privileged command in your environment, (2) ensure those commands are logged with full content, (3) forward logs to an independent analysis tier, and (4) run documented analytic checks with repeatable evidence capture. The goal is not more logs; it’s defensible detection and review of administrator actions with segregation that stands up in an assessment. ¹

Regulatory text

Requirement (verbatim): “Perform a full text analysis of logged privileged commands in a physically distinct component or subsystem of the system, or other system that is dedicated to that analysis.” ¹

What the operator must do:

• Capture privileged command logs with full command content (for example, the actual shell command or admin action string, not only a “success” event).
• Move those logs to a separate place for analysis that is physically distinct from the system producing the commands, or a dedicated analysis system.
• Perform analysis on that separate system using documented methods (detections, queries, correlation rules, or other analytic procedures) and keep evidence that it occurs. ¹

Plain-English interpretation

AU-6(8) expects you to answer two audit questions with confidence:

1. “Can you show exactly what privileged users executed?” That means full command text (and enough context to interpret it).
2. “Can you prove the analysis happens somewhere administrators can’t easily manipulate?” That means analysis is done on an independent/dedicated subsystem, not locally on the host where the privileged commands ran. ¹

In practice, teams meet this by forwarding privileged command logs into a SIEM or log analytics platform that is operationally and access-controlled separately from the administered systems, then running alerting and periodic review queries on the centralized platform.

Who it applies to (entity and operational context)

Entity types most commonly mapped to AU-6(8):

• Federal information systems
• Contractor systems handling federal data (for example, where NIST SP 800-53 controls are contractual or inherited through an authorization boundary) ¹

Operational contexts where AU-6(8) shows up in real life:

• System administrators with OS-level privileges (Windows admin, Linux root, network device enable/admin modes)
• Privileged access management (PAM) sessions (human admins and break-glass)
• SRE/DevOps automation with elevated permissions (CI/CD runners, configuration management, orchestration)
• Managed service providers or other third parties with privileged remote access

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

Step 1: Define “privileged commands” in your environment

Write a short, explicit definition that engineers and auditors can use. Include:

• Which identities are privileged (root, local admin, domain admin, sudoers, privileged cloud roles)
• Which systems are in scope (servers, endpoints, network gear, cloud control planes, databases)
• What command sources count (interactive shells, remote management tools, automation pipelines)

Artifact to produce: AU-6(8) scope statement (1–2 pages) owned by Security/IT with GRC review.

Step 2: Ensure full-text command logging is technically feasible

You need logging sources that produce command content, not only session start/stop. Examples by domain (choose what fits your stack):

• PAM session recording / command logging (preferred where PAM is in place)
• OS audit frameworks that can record executed commands (varies by platform)
• Administrative tool logs (for example, remote execution tooling that logs the exact commands it runs)
• Network/device admin command logs where the platform supports command accounting

Key design check: validate that logs include the command string (or equivalent) and enough fields to attribute action (who, when, where, target). AU-6(8) is about full text analysis of logged privileged commands, so if your current telemetry only logs “admin used sudo,” you are not there yet. ¹

Artifact to produce: Log source inventory for privileged commands with fields captured per source.

Step 3: Route privileged command logs to a physically distinct or dedicated analysis system

This is the separation requirement. Your design should show:

• A log pipeline that forwards privileged command events off-host
• An analysis tier (SIEM/log analytics) that is access-controlled separately from admin access to production systems
• Tamper-resistance controls (write-once storage options, restricted delete permissions, immutable retention where supported)

You do not need exotic tooling, but you do need a defensible story that analysis happens “in a physically distinct component or subsystem… or other system dedicated to that analysis.” ¹

Artifact to produce: Logging architecture diagram showing separation and access boundaries.

Step 4: Implement full-text analysis content (detections and reviews)

“Full text analysis” means you should inspect the command content for risk patterns. Build a baseline library:

• High-risk command patterns (account creation, privilege escalation, disabling logging, firewall rule changes, credential dumping tools, mass deletion)
• Contextual correlation (privileged command executed outside change window; unusual host; unusual user; first-time command pattern)
• Allowlist/denylist logic (approved admin scripts vs ad hoc commands)

Operationalize two motions:

1. Alerting for high-risk patterns (near-real-time, triaged by SecOps)
2. Periodic review of privileged command activity (sampled or targeted, documented outcomes)

Artifact to produce: Detection catalog (rule name, purpose, query logic, severity, owner, tuning notes).

Step 5: Define investigation and escalation procedures tied to the findings

Your runbook should answer:

• What constitutes suspicious privileged command activity?
• Who triages, and what evidence they collect?
• When do you open an incident vs a ticket vs a change remediation?
• How do you document false positives and tuning decisions?

Artifact to produce: AU-6(8) privileged command triage runbook linked to your incident response process.

Step 6: Prove it runs and retain evidence

Auditors commonly accept a combination of:

• Screenshots or exports of alert rules and queries
• Samples of analyzed command logs
• Ticket/incident records showing triage and closure
• Access control evidence showing the analysis system is separate from production admin access

Daydream (as a GRC system of record) fits naturally here: you map AU-6(8) to a control owner, attach the procedure, schedule recurring evidence requests, and keep a clean audit trail of reviews and outcomes without scattering artifacts across chat and shared drives.

Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Maintain an “AU-6(8) evidence binder” with:

• Control narrative: what you do and where it’s documented
• Scope statement: privileged identities, systems, and log sources
• Architecture diagram: log forwarding and dedicated analysis component/subsystem
• Configuration evidence:
  • log source settings showing command content captured (redact secrets)
  • forwarding configuration to the analysis system
• Detection/review evidence:
  • list of rules/queries that parse command text
  • samples of alert outputs or scheduled reports
  • tickets/incidents showing triage and resolution notes
• Access control evidence:
  • role-based access to the analysis system
  • separation between system administrators and log administrators (where applicable)

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

Expect questions like:

• “Show me an example of a privileged command log entry with the full command text.”
• “Where does analysis occur, and how is that system physically distinct or dedicated?”
• “Who can delete or modify logs in the analysis system?”
• “How do you detect high-risk privileged commands, and how do you tune false positives?”
• “How do you cover privileged automation and third-party admin access?”

Common hangup: teams have lots of logs, but none that reliably include the command string. Another hangup: analysis occurs on the same host (local grep), which fails the separation intent.

Frequent implementation mistakes and how to avoid them

1. Collecting only session metadata (login/logout)
   Fix: ensure your telemetry includes executed command content or an equivalent action string.

2. Storing logs centrally but analyzing ad hoc
   Fix: define a minimum set of queries/detections and a review cadence with retained outputs.

3. No credible separation between production admin and log analysis
   Fix: restrict SIEM admin rights, separate duties, and document access boundaries and audit logs for the analysis platform.

4. Logging secrets in command text (API keys pasted into CLI)
   Fix: implement redaction where feasible; train admins; prefer secure parameter stores; treat command logs as sensitive.

5. Ignoring third-party privileged access paths
   Fix: route third-party admin sessions through PAM or controlled tooling that produces command logs, then include them in analysis scope.

Enforcement context and risk implications

No public enforcement cases were provided in the source catalog for AU-6(8). Treat it as an assessment-readiness control: failures typically show up as audit findings framed as inadequate audit logging, inadequate monitoring of privileged activity, or inability to reconstruct admin actions after an incident. ¹

A practical 30/60/90-day execution plan

First 30 days (Immediate)

• Assign a control owner and write the AU-6(8) scope statement.
• Inventory privileged access paths (human, automation, third party) and identify which ones produce full command text today.
• Stand up or confirm a dedicated analysis tier (SIEM/log platform) and document who has admin rights to it.
• Draft the evidence binder structure in Daydream so collection is repeatable.

By 60 days (Near-term)

• Implement/expand command-text logging for highest-risk admin paths (PAM sessions, domain admin actions, production server sudo/root activity where feasible).
• Configure forwarding to the analysis platform and validate end-to-end ingestion.
• Publish an initial detection catalog focused on a small set of high-risk command patterns and required triage steps.
• Run the first documented review cycle and store outcomes.

By 90 days (Operationalize)

• Expand coverage to remaining in-scope platforms and privileged automation.
• Tune detections based on triage results; document tuning decisions.
• Formalize recurring review operations (ownership, handoffs, escalation).
• Package assessment-ready evidence: sample logs, rules, tickets, access controls, and architecture diagrams.

Frequently Asked Questions

Does AU-6(8) require session recording, or is command logging enough?

The text requires “full text analysis of logged privileged commands,” so you need command content in logs and analysis of that content. Session recording can help, but the requirement is satisfied by reliable command-text logging plus analysis on a distinct/dedicated system. ¹

What does “physically distinct component or subsystem” mean in practice?

It means analysis should not happen on the same system where the privileged commands are executed. Most teams meet this by forwarding logs to a centralized SIEM/log analytics platform that is separately administered and access-controlled. ¹

Are cloud control plane actions considered “privileged commands”?

If a cloud role can administer resources, change security settings, or alter logging, treat those actions as privileged within your AU-6(8) scope. Your goal is full-text or equivalent high-fidelity activity records and analysis on a dedicated analysis system. ¹

How do we handle privileged automation (CI/CD, config management) without drowning in alerts?

Start by tagging automation identities and allowlisting approved scripts while alerting on deviations, first-time patterns, or execution outside expected contexts. Keep the allowlist controlled and reviewed so it does not become a blanket exemption.

What evidence do auditors ask for most often?

They typically want a sample privileged command log entry showing full command content, proof logs are analyzed in a separate/dedicated system, and proof that alerts/reviews produce tickets or documented outcomes. Keep diagrams, rule exports, and a short runbook ready.

Where does Daydream fit for AU-6(8)?

Daydream helps you assign ownership, document the procedure, request and retain recurring evidence (rules, samples, reviews), and present a clean audit trail that connects command-log analysis operations back to AU-6(8).

Footnotes

1. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON