CP-10(4): Restore Within Time Period

The cp-10(4): restore within time period requirement is a contingency planning enhancement in NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 that gets assessed as an operational capability, not a policy statement. Assessors will look for two things: (1) a defined time period for restoration, and (2) repeatable proof that you can meet it using trusted restore sources. “Trusted” here has specific meaning: the information you restore from must be configuration-controlled (tracked, approved, versioned) and integrity-protected (tamper-evident, validated) and must represent a known operational state of the component.

This requirement is frequently misunderstood as “we have backups.” Backups are necessary, but CP-10(4) is about restore performance against an objective and the trustworthiness of the restore inputs (gold images, infrastructure-as-code baselines, configuration snapshots, backup sets, and related metadata). If you cannot show that the restore source is known-good, and you cannot show measured restoration within the stated period, you will struggle in audits even if your engineering team is confident they can rebuild quickly.

Regulatory text

Requirement (verbatim): “Provide the capability to restore system components within {{ insert: param, cp-10.04_odp }} from configuration-controlled and integrity-protected information representing a known, operational state for the components.” ¹

Operator interpretation: You must (a) set the restore time period (the organization-defined parameter), (b) identify which “system components” are in scope, (c) maintain approved and tamper-evident restore sources for those components, and (d) demonstrate, through tests or real incidents, that restoration completes within the time period. ²

Practical reading: CP-10(4) is “restore to known-good within X,” where “X” must be declared and proven.

Plain-English interpretation

CP-10(4) expects a disciplined restore capability:

• Restore within a time period: you commit to a restore window for each component or component class (for example, “directory services,” “core application servers,” “CI/CD runners,” “database cluster nodes”). That window becomes the yardstick.
• From configuration-controlled information: the restore input is under change control with traceability (who changed it, when, why, approvals, version history).
• With integrity protection: you can detect tampering and verify what you restored is exactly what you intended (checksums, signatures, immutable storage controls, access controls, and verification steps).
• Known operational state: you restore to a baseline that is known to boot, join the domain/cluster, pass health checks, and run the needed services.

Who it applies to (entity and operational context)

This applies to:

• Federal information systems that implement NIST SP 800-53 controls. ²
• Contractor systems handling federal data where NIST SP 800-53 is a contractual or program requirement. ²

Operationally, CP-10(4) shows up in:

• Security authorization / ATO packages and continuous monitoring for federal environments.
• Incident response and ransomware recovery expectations, where restoration speed and restore integrity are both scrutinized.
• High-availability and DR programs, especially in hybrid environments where “restore” may mean redeploying from images and IaC rather than traditional bare-metal recovery.

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

Step 1: Set the “restore within” time period (the ODP)

1. Choose a measurable restore objective for each component class. Avoid a single global number unless every component truly has the same business need.
2. Document the rationale (mission/business impact, dependencies, and recovery sequence).
3. Align with contingency planning artifacts (your Contingency Plan, Disaster Recovery plan, and system architecture diagrams) so the objective is testable and not aspirational.

Output: a restore time objective register that names components, dependencies, restore method, and measured target time.

Step 2: Define “system components” in scope

1. Inventory restore-relevant components, not just applications: identity, DNS, PKI, hypervisor/cluster control plane, container orchestration control plane, secrets management, logging pipeline, and key third-party dependencies that gate recovery.
2. Group components into tiers based on recovery priority and dependency order.
3. Define what “restored” means per component (example: “service passes health checks, joins cluster, and can serve traffic behind the load balancer”).

Output: scoped component list with restoration success criteria.

Step 3: Build “known operational state” restore sources

1. Standardize golden sources: immutable images, approved configuration baselines, infrastructure-as-code templates, and/or backup sets.
2. Prove configuration control: change tickets, approvals, version tags, and release notes for images/config baselines.
3. Prove integrity protection: implement cryptographic hashes/signing where feasible, restrict write access, and perform validation during restore (for example, verify image signature or checksum before deployment).
4. Keep restore sources current: patch cadence and baseline updates must not outpace your restore library.

Output: a controlled baseline library (images/configs/backups) with traceability and integrity checks.

Step 4: Engineer restoration runbooks that hit the time objective

1. Write runbooks per tier/component with prerequisites and command-level steps.
2. Automate what is repeatable (deployment pipelines for rebuild, scripted DB restore, infrastructure provisioning, configuration application).
3. Embed verification: health checks, service validation, and security validation (critical configs present, secrets rotated as required, monitoring connected).
4. Define stop conditions and escalation paths when the time objective will be missed.

Output: tested, operator-ready runbooks with success criteria and rollback/escalation.

Step 5: Test restores and measure actual time-to-restore

1. Run restore tests that simulate realistic constraints: limited staff availability, partial outages, and dependency failures.
2. Measure elapsed time from declared start point to “restored” success criteria.
3. Record variance and open corrective actions when targets are missed.
4. Retest after material changes (major upgrades, new platforms, backup tooling changes).

Output: restore test reports with timestamps, logs, and corrective action tracking.

Step 6: Tie results to governance and evidence

1. Assign a control owner (usually BC/DR owner or platform reliability leader) and identify engineering owners for each tier.
2. Track recurring evidence on a predictable cadence aligned to audits.
3. Keep exceptions explicit: if a component cannot meet the time period, document compensating controls and an approved remediation plan.

Output: control mapping, ownership, and an evidence calendar (Daydream can help standardize this mapping and recurring evidence collection across systems).

Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Auditors typically want to see a chain from objective → trusted restore source → test proof. Retain:

• Restore time objective register (component, objective, definition of “restored,” dependencies).
• Configuration-controlled baseline evidence: change records, approvals, version history for images, IaC repos, configuration baselines.
• Integrity protection evidence: checksum/signature verification procedure, access controls to baseline storage, immutability settings, logging.
• Runbooks with version control and last-reviewed dates.
• Restore test packages: test plan, execution logs, timestamps, screenshots or console output, incident tickets if tests were conducted during real events, and after-action reports.
• Corrective actions: tracking tickets, root cause analysis, and closure evidence.
• Training/role readiness evidence: on-call rotations, tabletop participation, and runbook training records.

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

Expect these lines of questioning:

• “What is your restore time period for this system/component?” If you cannot answer with a documented value, the control is not operationalized.
• “Show me the restore source and prove it’s known-good.” Teams often show a backup but cannot show config control around the backup selection, baseline, or gold image approval.
• “How do you verify integrity before restoring?” “Access is restricted” may not satisfy integrity-protected expectations without verifiable controls and logs.
• “Demonstrate you met the time objective.” Verbal assurance fails here. You need test timestamps and success criteria.

Frequent implementation mistakes and how to avoid them

Mistake	Why it fails CP-10(4)	Fix
Single blanket restore time for everything	Not testable or realistic across component types	Set objectives by tier/component class and define “restored” per component
“Backups exist” equals compliance	CP-10(4) requires measured restore capability and trusted restore inputs	Run restores, record time, and show controlled, integrity-protected sources
Restore sources aren’t under change control	You can’t prove “known operational state”	Version and approve images/config baselines; link to change tickets
Integrity is assumed, not validated	Tampering risk remains during incidents	Add checksum/signature verification steps and immutable storage controls
Runbooks are tribal knowledge	Time objectives are missed under stress	Publish runbooks, train operators, and rehearse restores

Enforcement context and risk implications

No public enforcement cases were provided for this specific requirement in the supplied sources. Practically, CP-10(4) failures increase the likelihood that outages become extended outages, and that recovery actions reintroduce compromised or misconfigured components because the restore input is not verifiably known-good. That becomes a mission risk and a security risk, especially during ransomware recovery where restoring from an untrusted baseline can re-seed persistence.

Practical 30/60/90-day execution plan

First 30 days (establish the target and scope)

• Assign control ownership and engineering points of contact per component tier.
• Define in-scope “system components” and dependencies for restoration order.
• Set the organization-defined restore time period(s) and document “restored” success criteria.
• Inventory restore sources (backups, images, IaC, config snapshots) and identify gaps in configuration control and integrity protections.

Days 31–60 (make restores repeatable)

• Standardize baseline creation and approval workflow (image pipeline, IaC promotion, config baseline governance).
• Implement integrity verification steps for restore sources and document them in runbooks.
• Draft or update runbooks per tier, including verification and escalation steps.
• Set up evidence capture patterns (log retention, test report templates, ticket tags).

Days 61–90 (prove performance and close gaps)

• Execute restore tests for each tier and measure time against objectives.
• Document results, open corrective actions, and schedule retests for failed objectives.
• Operationalize recurring evidence collection and map artifacts to audit requests.
• If you use Daydream, configure CP-10(4) evidence checklists and reminders so restore test outputs, approvals, and runbook versions are consistently captured.

Frequently Asked Questions

What counts as “system components” for CP-10(4)?

Treat any component required to bring the system back to an operational state as in scope, including identity, network services, control planes, and key data services. Document the list and the dependency order so the restore objective is testable.

Can infrastructure-as-code and golden images satisfy “configuration-controlled” restore information?

Yes, if you can show version control, approvals, and traceability for promoted baselines, plus you restore from those approved versions. Pair it with runbooks and restore tests that prove timing.

What does “integrity-protected” mean in a restore context?

You need controls that prevent or detect tampering with restore sources, plus a verification step during restoration. Examples include restricted write access, immutability controls, and checksum/signature verification recorded in logs.

Do we need to meet the restore time period during a real incident, or are tests enough?

Tests are usually the cleanest evidence because they are controlled and repeatable. If you have incident records that include timestamps and success criteria, keep them as supporting evidence.

How granular should the restore time period be?

Set it at the level you can actually measure and test: component tier or component class is common. If auditors ask for a single value, provide the tiered table and explain the dependency-driven rationale.

What evidence is most likely to be missing in an audit?

Teams often miss traceability from restore sources to change control approvals, and they miss measured restore time logs tied to a defined “start” and “restored” endpoint. Build templates that force those fields into every test report.

Footnotes

1. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON

2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5