IA-5(13): Expiration of Cached Authenticators

IA-5(13) requires you to block cached authenticators from being used after a defined expiration period (your organization-set value). Operationalize it by identifying where credentials are cached (endpoints, apps, PAM, offline modes), setting a maximum cache lifetime, enforcing it via configuration, and retaining evidence that expired cached authenticators cannot authenticate. ¹

Key takeaways:

• You must define the expiration threshold and apply it consistently across systems that cache authentication material. ¹
• The control is about enforcement: expired cached authenticators must fail authentication, not merely be “rotated” in policy. ¹
• Auditors will expect configuration evidence and test results, not just written standards. ²

The ia-5(13): expiration of cached authenticators requirement is easy to misunderstand because “cached authenticators” show up in places teams do not label as “credential storage.” Endpoint OS credential caches, offline-capable apps, VDI profiles, password managers used for service accounts, local browser credential stores, and some PAM agent workflows can all create cached authentication artifacts that outlive your intended password or token validity.

NIST’s intent is straightforward: if your environment caches authenticators for usability or resiliency, you must put a hard stop on their use after a defined time threshold. That threshold is an organization-defined parameter, so the compliance work is as much governance (defining it) as engineering (making the environment obey it). ¹

This page tells a CCO, Compliance Officer, or GRC lead exactly what to decide, who must implement it, what evidence to collect, and how to walk into an assessment with a clean story: “Here is where caching occurs, here is the expiration requirement, here is the configuration enforcing it, and here are our tests showing expired cached authenticators cannot authenticate.”

Regulatory text

Requirement (verbatim): “Prohibit the use of cached authenticators after {{ insert: param, ia-05.13_odp }}.” ¹

What this means operationally:

• You must set a specific expiration value (the organization-defined parameter) that describes how long cached authenticators may be used.
• You must prevent authentication if the authenticator being presented is a cached version that is older than the defined expiration.
• You must be able to demonstrate the enforcement through configuration and testing, not only through written policy. ¹

Plain-English interpretation

If a device or application stores authentication material locally so a user or process can sign in without reaching the primary identity system, that “cached” authenticator becomes a security risk over time. IA-5(13) says: after your defined time limit, the cached credential must stop working. ¹

Think of it as a forced “revalidation” boundary. After the boundary, the system must require fresh authentication (for example, reaching the IdP, domain controller, or auth service) rather than relying on old cached material.

Who it applies to

Entity scope

• Federal information systems and contractor systems handling federal data implementing NIST SP 800-53 controls (for example, as part of a system security plan and assessment boundary). ²

Operational scope (where cached authenticators commonly exist)

You should assume IA-5(13) touches multiple teams and platforms:

• Endpoints and OS login: workstations, laptops, mobile devices, VDI images.
• Remote access and offline scenarios: traveling users, intermittent network connectivity, disaster recovery modes.
• Applications with offline tokens: thick clients, field service apps, some secure mobile app containers.
• Privileged access: PAM tools that cache credentials or store check-out tokens locally.
• Service accounts and automation: schedulers, agents, batch processes that store credentials locally for restart resilience.

Your assessment boundary matters. Map caching locations to the systems in scope for your authorization package or control baseline.

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

Treat IA-5(13) as a mini-program with clear decision points and measurable enforcement.

Step 1 — Name a control owner and approvers

Assign one accountable owner (often IAM engineering, endpoint engineering, or security architecture) and identify required approvers (system owner, ISSO, GRC). This reduces the “every team thought someone else handled it” failure mode.

Daydream note: In Daydream, record IA-5(13) with a single owner, an implementation procedure, and recurring evidence tasks so the control does not drift between audits. ²

Step 2 — Define the organization-set expiration parameter

IA-5(13) requires you to fill in the variable: how long is a cached authenticator valid. Document:

• The expiration value
• Any tiering by system sensitivity (if you do this, explain the rationale and ensure it is consistent)
• Exceptions and compensating controls (if any), with explicit approval

Avoid “TBD” or “per system owner” language. Auditors read that as non-enforcement.

Step 3 — Inventory where authenticators are cached (in-scope systems)

Create a simple register with:

• System/component (endpoint OS, app name, PAM agent, etc.)
• Type of authenticator cached (password hash, refresh token, Kerberos tickets, local secure enclave token, etc.)
• Where stored (local disk, encrypted store, memory, secure element)
• How the system decides whether to accept the cached authenticator
• Current expiration behavior
• Target expiration behavior aligned to IA-5(13)

This inventory becomes the backbone of your evidence set because it shows you understood “cached” in your environment.

Step 4 — Implement technical enforcement per caching location

Your goal is consistent: after expiration, cached auth fails. Common technical patterns include:

• Endpoint/domain caching controls: limit cached logons, shorten cache validity, or require online authentication after threshold.
• Application token lifetime controls: set refresh token max age, rotate signing keys as appropriate, and enforce “max session age” on the authorization server.
• PAM/workload secrets controls: configure check-out tokens/credentials with strict TTLs and force re-checkout after TTL.
• Offline mode controls: enforce “offline grace period” and hard-fail after the period, requiring connectivity to re-authenticate.

The exact mechanism varies by platform. The compliance requirement is the same: prohibit use after the defined time limit. ¹

Step 5 — Build a test procedure and run it on a schedule

Write a test you can repeat:

• Select representative systems from the cache inventory.
• Authenticate successfully while within the cache lifetime.
• Simulate exceeding the expiration threshold (time advance in a test environment, token aging, offline period exceedance).
• Attempt authentication again using the cached authenticator.
• Expected result: authentication is denied, or the system forces a fresh online authentication path.

Capture results (screenshots, logs, test cases, and outcomes). Retest after significant changes: IdP settings, endpoint policy changes, PAM upgrades, app releases.

Step 6 — Operationalize monitoring and exception handling

Define:

• Who reviews drift (for example, endpoint policy baselines, IdP token lifetime settings)
• How exceptions are approved (system owner + security sign-off)
• How exceptions are time-bounded and revalidated

Auditors often accept narrowly-scoped exceptions with clear compensating controls, but they expect the exception process to be real and evidenced.

Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Keep evidence that ties policy to enforcement and enforcement to results:

1. Documented parameter: your chosen expiration threshold and scope statement (which systems/users it applies to).
2. Cache inventory/register: the list of caching locations and how each is controlled.
3. Configuration evidence ¹:
   • IdP/auth server token lifetime screenshots or exported configuration
   • Endpoint management policy settings exports
   • PAM policy settings showing TTL/expiration for cached secrets
4. Test evidence:
   • Written test procedure
   • Logs/screenshots showing authentication denial after expiration
   • Dated test execution record and reviewer sign-off
5. Change control linkage:
   • Tickets/PRs showing settings were implemented and reviewed
6. Exceptions register (if needed):
   • Business justification, compensating controls, approval, and expiry date

If you use Daydream to manage control operations, store these as recurring evidence tasks mapped to IA-5(13) so collection is continuous rather than audit-driven. ¹

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

Assessors tend to probe in predictable ways:

• “What is your ia-05.13 organization-defined parameter?” If you cannot state it clearly, you will struggle to show compliance. ¹
• “Where do you cache authenticators in this environment?” They want breadth: endpoints, apps, remote access, privileged workflows.
• “Show me it fails after expiration.” Policy alone rarely passes. They want a demo, logs, or test results.
• “How do you prevent drift?” Token lifetime changes and endpoint policy exceptions are common drift sources.
• “Are there offline scenarios?” Offline authentication is where cached authenticators create the longest-lived risk.

Frequent implementation mistakes and how to avoid them

Mistake	Why it fails	Fix
Writing a policy that says “cached authenticators expire” without a hard parameter	No measurable requirement; nothing to test	Define the expiration value and scope explicitly. 1
Only addressing one platform (for example, IdP tokens)	Cached authenticators exist elsewhere	Maintain a cache inventory and cover each item with a control mechanism.
Confusing password expiration with cache expiration	Password rotation does not guarantee cached material is invalidated	Test that cached login/token fails after the parameter window.
Allowing permanent offline mode	Cached authenticators remain valid indefinitely	Enforce an offline grace period that ends with forced online re-authentication.
No repeatable evidence	One-time screenshots get stale	Add scheduled tests and evidence collection tied to change management.

Enforcement context and risk implications

No public enforcement cases were provided in the source catalog for this control, so you should treat IA-5(13) primarily as an assessment and authorization risk: failure typically shows up as control deficiency, POA&M items, or authorization conditions rather than a named enforcement action in the provided materials. ²

Risk-wise, long-lived cached authenticators widen the blast radius of:

• Lost/stolen endpoints
• Compromised local profiles
• Malware that extracts tokens/credential material
• Prolonged offline access after termination or role change

A practical 30/60/90-day execution plan

You asked for speed. Here is a plan that aligns governance, engineering, and evidence without pretending every environment is identical.

First 30 days (Immediate)

• Assign IA-5(13) owner and backups.
• Define the organization-set expiration parameter and get approvals.
• Build the cache inventory for in-scope systems.
• Identify the top enforcement points (IdP token settings, endpoint cache policies, PAM TTL policies).
• Draft the test procedure and run a pilot test on a small representative set. ¹

By 60 days (Near-term)

• Implement enforcement changes across primary platforms (endpoint baseline, IdP config, PAM policies).
• Close gaps found in the inventory (systems with “unknown” caching behavior).
• Establish exception workflow and register.
• Capture configuration exports and first full set of test results as your baseline evidence package.

By 90 days (Stabilize and operationalize)

• Expand testing to cover edge cases: offline mode, DR procedures, privileged break-glass workflows.
• Add monitoring for drift (config baseline checks; periodic review tied to change control).
• Package the control narrative for auditors: parameter, inventory, configuration, test results, exceptions.
• In Daydream, schedule recurring evidence collection and set reminders aligned to changes in IAM/endpoint/PAM configurations. ²

Frequently Asked Questions

What counts as a “cached authenticator” for IA-5(13)?

Any authentication material stored to allow future authentication without re-entering credentials or re-contacting the authoritative authentication service can qualify. Treat endpoint cached logons, offline tokens, and locally stored app tokens as in scope until you can prove otherwise. ¹

Do I need one expiration value for every system?

The control requires an organization-defined expiration parameter, and you can define it with tiers if your governance supports it. If you tier, document the rationale and make sure each tier is enforced and testable. ¹

Is “password expiration” enough to satisfy IA-5(13)?

Usually no. Password rotation does not prove cached credentials or tokens are rejected after the cache expiration window; you must show the system blocks use of the cached authenticator after the defined time. ¹

How do we handle laptops used in the field with limited connectivity?

Define an offline allowance that fits the mission, then enforce a hard cutoff that forces re-authentication through the primary identity path. Document exceptions explicitly if certain roles must exceed the standard window. ¹

What evidence do auditors actually accept for this control?

Auditors typically accept a clearly defined parameter, configuration exports showing enforcement, and repeatable test results demonstrating expired cached authenticators fail. Keep an inventory tying each caching location to its enforcement mechanism. ²

How should we track this in a GRC workflow so it doesn’t regress?

Track IA-5(13) with a named owner, a configuration baseline, and recurring evidence tasks tied to IAM/endpoint/PAM change events. Daydream can hold the procedure, evidence checklist, and review cadence so the control stays audit-ready. ²

Footnotes

1. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON

2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5