IA-13(3): Token Management

To meet the ia-13(3): token management requirement, you must define and enforce how your systems issue, protect, validate, rotate, revoke, and expire authentication assertions and access tokens, then retain evidence that the rules are consistently applied. Operationalize it by standardizing token settings, centralizing governance, and proving runtime enforcement through logs and configuration baselines. ¹

Key takeaways:

• Treat “assertions and access tokens” as controlled security objects with documented lifecycle rules and technical enforcement. ¹
• Standardize token TTL, audience/scope, signing/encryption, storage, and revocation patterns across apps and third parties. ¹
• Evidence wins audits: configuration snapshots, IdP settings exports, key-rotation records, and token validation/revocation logs. ¹

IA-13(3) is a requirement-level control enhancement under NIST SP 800-53 that forces you to get specific about token handling, not “authentication in general.” If your environment uses SAML assertions, OIDC ID tokens, OAuth2 access tokens, API tokens, session tokens, or brokered tokens from an identity provider (IdP), then token management is already a production dependency. The compliance risk is rarely that teams have no tokens; it’s that each application team made different token choices, no one can explain them, and there is no evidence they are enforced consistently.

For a Compliance Officer, CCO, or GRC lead, the fastest path is to convert IA-13(3) into a short token standard plus a measurable operating procedure: who approves token configurations, which defaults are mandatory, how exceptions work, and what proof you retain every cycle. You are aiming for two outcomes: (1) tokens are constrained and protected so they can’t be replayed or misused easily; (2) you can show an assessor exactly where token rules live and how you know they are working. ²

Regulatory text

NIST excerpt: “In accordance with {{ insert: param, ia-13_odp.01 }}, assertions and access tokens are:” ¹

What this means for an operator: the control points to an organization-defined policy (“ODP”) that you must fill in. Your job is to define the required properties and handling rules for assertions and access tokens, then enforce them technically across systems that issue, accept, store, or forward tokens. Expect auditors to ask, “What are your defined requirements for tokens, where are they configured, and what evidence proves they are followed?” ¹

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Plain-English interpretation (what IA-13(3) is really asking)

IA-13(3) requires that your organization manage tokens and assertions as security-sensitive objects with a governed lifecycle:

• Issuance: Who can mint tokens, under what conditions, and with what claims (audience, subject, scopes).
• Protection: How tokens are signed/encrypted, stored, and transported.
• Validation: How relying services verify signature, issuer, audience, expiry, and scopes.
• Expiration/renewal: How long tokens live and how they are refreshed.
• Revocation: How you invalidate tokens (and associated sessions) after compromise, user termination, key rotation, or policy changes.
• Monitoring: How you detect anomalous token use and validate enforcement. ¹

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Who it applies to (entity and operational context)

Entities: Federal information systems and contractor systems handling federal data. ¹

Operational context where it matters most:

• Centralized identity and SSO (SAML/OIDC) across workforce and privileged users
• API ecosystems (internal microservices, external APIs, and partner integrations)
• SaaS and cloud control planes that rely on OAuth/OIDC tokens
• Third-party integrations where your system consumes tokens issued by an external IdP, or your IdP issues tokens to third parties
• Mobile apps and SPAs where token storage and refresh patterns are common failure points ¹

Systems in scope (practical):

• Identity provider(s), authorization servers, token brokers
• Applications that issue or validate tokens
• API gateways/service meshes that validate JWTs
• Secrets managers, config management, and logging/SIEM systems that provide proof ¹

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What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

1) Name a control owner and define your token standard

Deliverable: a one-page Token Management Standard mapped to IA-13(3), with an assigned owner (typically IAM lead, Security Engineering, or Platform Security) and a compliance approver (GRC). This is the “ODP” content you will be assessed against. ¹

Minimum topics to define in the standard:

• Token types in use (SAML assertions, JWT access tokens, refresh tokens, API keys if treated as tokens)
• Required claims/fields (issuer, audience, subject, scopes/roles, expiry)
• Signing and key management expectations (approved algorithms, key rotation requirement, JWKS endpoint governance)
• Encryption requirements (when tokens must be encrypted vs signed only)
• TTL and refresh rules (different TTLs for interactive vs machine-to-machine)
• Revocation and session termination expectations
• Storage rules (no tokens in logs; secure storage on clients; server-side session binding where applicable)
• Third-party token acceptance rules (trusted issuers, required audience, contract/security addendum requirements) ¹

2) Build and maintain a token inventory (issuer + consumers)

Create a living register that ties:

• Token issuer (IdP/auth server)
• Relying party/resource server (API/app)
• Token type (SAML/OIDC/OAuth)
• Validation method (library, gateway policy, custom code)
• Key source (JWKS URL, certificate store)
• Revocation approach (introspection endpoint, denylist, session store)
• Logging locations for evidence (SIEM index, app logs) ¹

This inventory is what prevents “unknown token validators” from breaking your standard.

3) Standardize issuance configurations in the IdP / auth server

In your IdP configuration, enforce:

• Approved signing keys and rotation workflow
• Audience restrictions per app/API
• Scope/role issuance mapped to entitlements
• Refresh token issuance limits aligned to your standard
• “Proof” exports: configuration snapshots, policy objects, app integration settings ¹

If different business units run different tenants, you need a governance layer that forces the same baseline.

4) Enforce validation at every token consumer

Require token consumers to validate at least:

• Signature and algorithm
• Issuer allowlist
• Audience match
• Expiration/nbf
• Scope/role authorization checks (not just authentication)
• Token binding to client/app context where supported ¹

Implementation shortcut that auditors accept: put JWT validation policies in an API gateway or service mesh so validation is consistent and centrally reviewable, then prove apps cannot bypass it.

5) Implement revocation and termination pathways

Define and test operational triggers:

• User termination (HR feed) or privileged access removal
• Credential compromise or suspicious activity
• Key rotation events
• Third-party offboarding (integration disabled) ¹

Evidence is usually missing here. Build runbooks and show execution records from real events or test exercises.

6) Logging, monitoring, and “no token leakage” controls

Token management audits often turn into “show me your logs”:

• Log token validation outcomes without printing token bodies
• Detect invalid issuer/audience errors and investigate patterns
• Ensure application tracing does not capture Authorization headers
• Validate that support tooling, APM, and WAF rules redact tokens ¹

7) Put it on a recurring compliance cadence (and make it assessable)

Do not treat IA-13(3) as a one-time policy write-up. Create a repeatable procedure:

• Periodic review of IdP app integrations against baseline
• Periodic sampling of token consumers for validation controls
• Review of key rotation events and exception tickets
• Confirmation that third-party integrations still meet issuer/audience requirements ¹

Daydream fits naturally here as the system of record that ties the owner, procedure, and recurring evidence artifacts to the IA-13(3) requirement so your team can answer assessor questions without a scramble. ¹

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Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Keep evidence in an auditor-ready folder structure mapped to IA-13(3). Suggested artifacts:

Governance

• Token Management Standard (approved, versioned)
• RACI/control owner assignment
• Exception register with approvals and compensating controls ¹

Technical configuration

• IdP/auth server exports: app integration configs, token policies, signing key settings
• API gateway/service mesh policies enforcing validation
• Code or IaC snippets showing standardized validation libraries/config ¹

Key management

• Key rotation/change records (ticket, change approval, execution evidence)
• JWKS publication process and access controls ¹

Operational

• Revocation/termination runbooks
• Incident or test records showing token revocation execution
• Sample logs showing validation failures and investigation workflow (with token redaction) ¹

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Common exam/audit questions and hangups

Assessors usually focus on these friction points:

1. “Where is your organization-defined parameter?”
   They want the explicit token rules you adopted (TTL, claims, rotation, revocation). ¹

2. “How do you know every API validates issuer/audience?”
   They will sample. If validation is inconsistent across teams, expect findings. ¹

3. “What happens on termination or compromise?”
   If you can’t revoke tokens or terminate sessions predictably, the control will look immature. ¹

4. “Prove tokens are not exposed in logs.”
   Redaction controls and examples of sanitized logs matter. ¹

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Frequent implementation mistakes (and how to avoid them)

Mistake	Why it fails	Fix that works
Treating IA-13(3) as “IdP is configured, done.”	Token consumers can still accept weak tokens or skip checks.	Enforce validation at gateways/meshes and sample app configs. 1
No written ODP token standard	The requirement explicitly depends on defined org parameters.	Publish a short standard with defaults and exceptions. 1
Revocation is “best effort”	Auditors ask for deterministic termination paths.	Runbooks + test evidence + clear triggers. 1
Tokens show up in logs/APM	Creates replay and data exposure risk.	Redaction rules, logging guidance, and verification samples. 1
Third-party integrations accept any issuer	Opens impersonation and trust boundary issues.	Allowlist issuers, pin audiences, document contracts and configuration. 1

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Enforcement context and risk implications

No public enforcement cases were provided for this requirement in the supplied source catalog. ¹

Operationally, weak token management usually shows up as account takeover paths, lateral movement through overly broad scopes, and long-lived sessions that persist after termination. In federal contracting or federal systems contexts, the practical risk is assessment findings, delayed authorizations, and loss of trust in your identity boundary. ¹

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Practical 30/60/90-day execution plan

First 30 days (stabilize and define)

• Assign IA-13(3) control owner and approver; document RACI. ¹
• Publish Token Management Standard (ODP content): token types, mandatory validations, key rotation and revocation expectations. ¹
• Build token inventory for highest-risk systems: IdP, API gateway, top external-facing APIs, critical workforce apps. ¹
• Identify evidence sources and set up an audit folder structure mapped to IA-13(3). ¹

Days 31–60 (enforce and instrument)

• Standardize IdP token issuance policies and export configs as baseline evidence. ¹
• Implement centralized token validation policies where possible (gateway/mesh). ¹
• Add logging redaction controls and verify Authorization headers and token bodies are not captured. ¹
• Write revocation/termination runbooks and perform a tabletop test; retain records. ¹

Days 61–90 (prove operation and close gaps)

• Sample token consumers against the standard; open and track remediation items. ¹
• Implement an exception workflow with compensating controls and expiry dates. ¹
• Run a key rotation exercise (planned change) and retain the end-to-end evidence package. ¹
• Put recurring evidence collection on a calendar and manage it in Daydream so audits pull from a single system of record. ¹

Frequently Asked Questions

Does IA-13(3) apply if we only use SSO and no “API tokens”?

Yes. The text explicitly covers “assertions and access tokens,” and SSO commonly relies on SAML assertions or OIDC tokens. Treat them as governed objects with defined issuance, validation, and expiration rules. ¹

What’s the fastest way to show token validation is consistent across microservices?

Enforce validation at an API gateway or service mesh policy layer, then keep the policy configuration and change history as evidence. Supplement with a small sample of service configs proving they cannot bypass the enforcement point. ¹

How do we handle third-party integrations that bring their own IdP or token issuer?

Require an allowlisted issuer, strict audience checks, and documented onboarding/offboarding steps for the integration. Keep the integration’s token configuration and security requirements in your third-party records and your token inventory. ¹

Are API keys covered by IA-13(3)?

If your organization treats API keys as access tokens in practice, manage them under the same lifecycle expectations: issuance controls, storage protections, rotation, revocation, and monitoring. Document this decision in your token standard so assessors see a clear scope call. ¹

What evidence is most commonly missing during assessments?

Revocation proof and “no token leakage” proof. Teams often have a policy but cannot show runbooks executed or redaction verified in real log samples. ¹

What should we put in Daydream for IA-13(3) so it’s audit-ready?

Store the control owner, the Token Management Standard, the token inventory, and a recurring evidence checklist (IdP config exports, gateway policies, key rotation records, revocation test records). That turns IA-13(3) from a narrative into a repeatable evidence stream. ¹

Footnotes

1. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON

2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON