IR-2(2): Automated Training Environments
IR-2(2) requires you to provide an automated incident response training environment (for example, a cyber range, lab, or sandbox) where your incident responders can practice realistic scenarios without risking production systems or sensitive data. To operationalize it, you need a defined training platform, scenario content, controlled access, and repeatable evidence that training occurred and the environment is maintained. 1
Key takeaways:
- You must stand up (or contract for) a dedicated, automated environment for incident response training, not just slide-based training. 1
- Scope, safety controls, and repeatable evidence matter more to auditors than the specific tooling you pick. 1
- Treat this like an operational capability: defined owner, runbooks, scenarios, access controls, and recurring proof of use. 1
The ir-2(2): automated training environments requirement is about whether your incident response program can practice under realistic conditions. Most teams can show an incident response plan and a table-top exercise. IR-2(2) asks for something more operational: an environment where responders can execute actions (triage, containment, eradication, recovery, communications) using tools and telemetry that resemble your real stack. 1
For a CCO or GRC lead, the fastest path is to translate the requirement into a few non-negotiables: a defined training environment (owned or third-party), documented scenarios aligned to your incident types, safe data handling (no production secrets), controlled access, and a cadence of sessions with retained logs and attendance. Your goal is not to build a perfect cyber range. Your goal is to be able to prove to an assessor that (1) the environment exists, (2) it is fit for incident response practice, and (3) your responders actually use it. 1
This page gives requirement-level implementation guidance you can hand to an IR lead, SOC manager, or security engineering manager and then audit against.
Regulatory text
Requirement (IR-2(2)): “Provide an incident response training environment using {{ insert: param, ir-02.02_odp }}.” 1
Operator interpretation of the text:
- You must provide a training environment for incident response, meaning it can’t be hypothetical or “planned.” It needs to exist and be available to the people who respond to incidents. 1
- The environment should be automated in practice: responders should be able to run scenarios, generate events, and interact with systems/tools in a repeatable way (as opposed to only discussing scenarios in meetings). 1
- The “{{ insert: param, ir-02.02_odp }}” element is an organization-defined parameter in the catalog representation; treat it as “using your defined approach/technology” and document the approach you selected so it is assessable. 1
Plain-English interpretation (what auditors expect)
Auditors typically test IR-2(2) by asking: “Show me the environment where your incident responders practice.” If the answer is a slide deck, a Teams call, or a once-a-year table-top with no technical execution, you will struggle.
A compliant posture usually looks like:
- A lab, sandbox, test tenant, or cyber range that mirrors key elements of your production environment (identity, endpoints, logging, email, cloud control plane, ticketing). It does not need to be complete. It must be purposeful for incident response.
- A way to inject events (malware simulation, phishing simulation, suspicious admin activity, exfil attempt) and observe logs/alerts.
- Clear separation from production and a safe approach to data (synthetic or sanitized).
- Records that the environment was used for training and that you corrected gaps found during training.
Who it applies to
Entities
- Federal information systems and organizations implementing NIST SP 800-53 controls. 2
- Contractors and other third parties operating systems that handle federal data, where NIST SP 800-53 controls are flowed down contractually or mapped for assessment. 2
Operational context
- SOC and IR teams (internal or outsourced) who are expected to execute incident response actions.
- Cloud and infrastructure teams that must supply non-production environments, logging pipelines, and access controls.
- GRC teams that must define control ownership, map evidence, and keep the program assessment-ready.
What you actually need to do (step-by-step)
1) Assign ownership and define “done”
- Name a control owner (often Head of IR, SOC Manager, or Security Operations).
- Name supporting owners: Cloud Platform, IT Ops, IAM, and GRC.
- Write a one-page IR-2(2) implementation procedure with:
- What the training environment is
- Where it lives (network / cloud account / tenant)
- Who can access it
- How scenarios are executed and recorded
- What evidence is retained 1
Practical tip: Put the “definition of done” in the procedure: “Environment exists, access is controlled, scenarios are run, artifacts are retained, gaps feed corrective actions.”
2) Choose an environment model that matches your operating reality
Pick one primary model and document it:
- Dedicated lab: segregated VPC/VNet/subscription with test endpoints and log sources.
- Cyber range / specialized platform: vendor-hosted training range with built-in scenario orchestration.
- Hybrid: your own logging/SIEM plus a vendor range that generates telemetry.
Selection criteria you can defend in an audit:
- Separation from production
- Ability to generate repeatable incidents
- Ability to observe detection + response workflows end-to-end
- Evidence outputs (logs, screenshots, run reports)
3) Build baseline technical controls for safety and repeatability
Minimum controls to implement and document:
- Isolation: separate accounts/projects/subnets; block inbound from the internet unless needed; restrict egress where feasible.
- Identity and access: role-based access for trainees; time-bound access for external facilitators; MFA consistent with your environment.
- Data handling: no production secrets; no customer data; use synthetic datasets; sanitize any configs you copy in.
- Logging: enable the same logging categories you rely on in production so the training is real (auth logs, endpoint telemetry, cloud audit logs).
- Reset mechanism: scripted rebuild, snapshots, or infrastructure-as-code so the environment returns to a known-good state after exercises.
4) Develop scenario content tied to your incident types
Create a scenario pack that reflects your threat model and technology:
- Phishing leading to credential compromise
- Endpoint malware with lateral movement
- Cloud key exposure and suspicious API calls
- Data exfiltration attempt from a sensitive repository
- Ransomware-like disruption (simulated safely)
For each scenario, maintain a short “scenario card”:
- Objective (what skill is trained)
- Preconditions (what must exist in the environment)
- Inject steps (how the event is generated)
- Expected responder actions (triage, contain, eradicate, recover)
- Success criteria (what “good” looks like)
- Evidence outputs to capture
5) Run training events and capture operational evidence
Operationalize with a simple runbook:
- Schedule the session and invite required roles (IR lead, comms, legal liaison if relevant, IT ops).
- Provision or reset the environment.
- Execute scenario injects.
- Require responders to work in normal tools: ticketing, chat bridge, SIEM, EDR console, cloud console.
- Hold a short after-action review and create corrective actions.
6) Close the loop into your incident response program
IR-2(2) becomes real when training drives improvement:
- Track issues found (missing logs, unclear escalation path, broken tooling access).
- Assign remediation owners and due dates.
- Update playbooks and detection content based on lessons learned.
Daydream fit (earned mention): If your biggest failure mode is “we did the work but can’t prove it,” Daydream helps map IR-2(2) to a named owner, a repeatable procedure, and recurring evidence artifacts so audits stop turning into scavenger hunts. 1
Required evidence and artifacts to retain
Keep evidence in an audit-ready folder with consistent naming. Suggested artifacts:
- IR-2(2) control narrative (how your environment meets the requirement). 1
- Architecture diagram of the training environment and isolation boundaries.
- Access control list or role mapping (who can access; approval workflow).
- Scenario cards and inject scripts (or vendor run reports).
- Training records: agenda, attendance, facilitator notes.
- Output evidence: screenshots, SIEM/EDR event exports, ticket IDs created during the exercise.
- After-action report with corrective actions and tracking to closure.
Common exam/audit questions and hangups
Auditors and assessors commonly ask:
- “Show me the environment. Where is it hosted? Who administers it?”
- “How do you prevent production data from entering the environment?”
- “How do you know training is repeatable and not ad hoc?”
- “Show evidence of at least one session and the artifacts it produced.”
- “How do findings from training update your incident response process?” 1
Hangups that derail teams:
- Confusing a table-top exercise with an automated environment.
- No proof the environment is actually available (accounts disabled, expired licenses, no runbook).
- Evidence exists but is scattered across chat, ticketing, and personal folders.
Frequent implementation mistakes (and how to avoid them)
-
Building a lab that is “realistic” but unsafe
Fix: treat it like a semi-hostile environment. Segment, restrict access, and strip production secrets. -
Over-scoping the environment
Fix: mirror only what you need to practice the top incident paths. Start with identity, endpoints, logging, and one business app. -
No reset path
Fix: implement rebuild scripts or snapshots early. Training dies when the environment becomes “broken” and nobody owns restoration. -
Training happens, but no evidence is retained
Fix: predefine an evidence checklist for every session (attendance, tickets, screenshots/log exports, after-action report). -
Third-party hosted range with unclear responsibility
Fix: contractually and operationally define who maintains scenarios, who can access recordings/logs, and how you export evidence for audits.
Enforcement context and risk implications
No public enforcement cases were provided in the source material for this requirement, so treat IR-2(2) primarily as an assessment and operational resilience risk. The practical risk is predictable: teams without a real training environment tend to discover tooling gaps, access issues, and unclear runbooks during live incidents rather than during practice. 1
Practical 30/60/90-day execution plan
Use phases (not date promises) so you can adapt to your engineering capacity.
First 30 days (Immediate)
- Assign owner and backups; publish the IR-2(2) implementation procedure. 1
- Select the environment model (internal lab, vendor range, or hybrid) and document the decision.
- Define evidence checklist and create the repository structure (where artifacts will live).
Days 31–60 (Near-term)
- Stand up the environment with isolation and access controls.
- Implement baseline logging and a reset mechanism.
- Write scenario cards for your most common incident types; pilot one scenario with core responders.
- Produce your first evidence bundle end-to-end.
Days 61–90 (Operationalize)
- Expand scenario coverage and include cross-functional participants (IT ops, cloud, comms).
- Formalize after-action reviews and corrective action tracking.
- Add recurring evidence collection into your GRC calendar and audit prep routine.
Frequently Asked Questions
Does a table-top exercise satisfy ir-2(2): automated training environments requirement?
Usually no. IR-2(2) calls for a training environment, which implies responders can execute actions in a system that generates realistic signals, not only discuss a scenario. 1
Can we use a third-party cyber range instead of building our own lab?
Yes, if it is available to your responders, supports your scenarios, and you can export sufficient evidence (run reports, logs, attendance) for assessment. Document roles and responsibilities so ownership is clear. 1
Do we need production-like data in the environment to be compliant?
No. Avoid production data and secrets. Use synthetic or sanitized datasets and document your data handling rules for the training environment. 1
What is the minimum “automation” an assessor will accept?
Automation should at least cover repeatable scenario execution and observable outputs (alerts, logs, tickets). If every exercise is hand-waved with no technical artifacts, expect pushback. 1
Who should own IR-2(2) in a shared-responsibility setup (SOC + cloud platform team)?
Put primary ownership with the incident response function, and assign the platform team explicit responsibilities for environment hosting, access, and logging. Capture this split in the implementation procedure and evidence plan. 1
What evidence is most persuasive in an audit?
A complete packet for at least one exercise: environment description, scenario card, attendance, system outputs (log exports/screenshots), incident tickets created during the run, and after-action items tracked to closure. 1
Footnotes
Frequently Asked Questions
Does a table-top exercise satisfy ir-2(2): automated training environments requirement?
Usually no. IR-2(2) calls for a training environment, which implies responders can execute actions in a system that generates realistic signals, not only discuss a scenario. (Source: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON)
Can we use a third-party cyber range instead of building our own lab?
Yes, if it is available to your responders, supports your scenarios, and you can export sufficient evidence (run reports, logs, attendance) for assessment. Document roles and responsibilities so ownership is clear. (Source: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON)
Do we need production-like data in the environment to be compliant?
No. Avoid production data and secrets. Use synthetic or sanitized datasets and document your data handling rules for the training environment. (Source: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON)
What is the minimum “automation” an assessor will accept?
Automation should at least cover repeatable scenario execution and observable outputs (alerts, logs, tickets). If every exercise is hand-waved with no technical artifacts, expect pushback. (Source: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON)
Who should own IR-2(2) in a shared-responsibility setup (SOC + cloud platform team)?
Put primary ownership with the incident response function, and assign the platform team explicit responsibilities for environment hosting, access, and logging. Capture this split in the implementation procedure and evidence plan. (Source: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON)
What evidence is most persuasive in an audit?
A complete packet for at least one exercise: environment description, scenario card, attendance, system outputs (log exports/screenshots), incident tickets created during the run, and after-action items tracked to closure. (Source: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON)
Operationalize this requirement
Map requirement text to controls, owners, evidence, and review workflows inside Daydream.
See Daydream