IR-4(7): Insider Threats — Intra-organization Coordination

To meet the ir-4(7): insider threats — intra-organization coordination requirement, you must run insider-threat incident handling as a coordinated, cross-functional capability, with defined roles, handoffs, and information-sharing across internal entities you specify. Operationalize it by naming required stakeholders, formalizing an insider incident playbook, and retaining evidence of coordinated execution. ¹

Key takeaways:

• Define which internal entities participate in insider-threat incident handling, then document responsibilities and handoffs. ¹
• Build insider-specific incident workflows that integrate HR, Legal, Security, and mission/business leadership, not just SOC/IT. ¹
• Keep auditable proof: playbooks, coordination matrices, case logs, and after-action items tied to insider scenarios. ¹

IR-4(7) sits in the NIST SP 800-53 Incident Response family and targets a specific failure mode: insider-threat incidents often stall or become risky when teams act in silos. Security may see suspicious activity first, HR may hold performance or conduct context, Legal must manage privilege and litigation risk, and Privacy may need to evaluate regulated data exposure. If those groups do not coordinate under a single incident handling capability, you get inconsistent decision-making, delayed containment, broken chain-of-custody, and unnecessary employee relations harm.

The control requirement is short, but the operational expectation is concrete: you must coordinate insider-threat incident handling across the internal organizational entities you define. The phrase “includes the following organizational entities” is a parameterized list in your control implementation. Your job as a CCO, GRC lead, or security compliance owner is to (1) pick the right entities for your environment, (2) define how coordination works in practice, and (3) retain evidence that the coordination happens for real cases and exercises. ¹

This page gives you requirement-level implementation guidance you can execute quickly, with an emphasis on artifacts and audit readiness.

Regulatory text

Requirement (excerpt): “Coordinate an incident handling capability for insider threats that includes the following organizational entities {{ insert: param, ir-04.07_odp }}.” ¹

What the operator must do

1. Define the internal entities that must participate in insider-threat incident handling (the parameter list).
2. Coordinate the capability so those entities have agreed roles, communications paths, and decision authority during insider incidents.
3. Make it operational, meaning the coordination model is embedded in playbooks, escalation paths, case tracking, and post-incident review, not just an org chart. ¹

Plain-English interpretation

IR-4(7) requires a single, coordinated insider-threat incident handling motion across your organization. Security cannot “run it alone.” You need a defined set of internal partners and a repeatable way to:

• identify and triage insider indicators,
• decide on containment actions (especially where employee access is involved),
• preserve evidence appropriately,
• manage HR/employee relations and legal risk,
• communicate to leadership on a need-to-know basis,
• close out cases with documented lessons learned. ¹

This control does not require you to name a specific set of entities in the standard; it requires you to specify them for your organization and then coordinate accordingly. That parameter list becomes the test basis in an assessment. ¹

Who it applies to

Entity scope

• Federal information systems implementing NIST SP 800-53 controls. ¹
• Contractor systems handling federal data where NIST SP 800-53 is in scope contractually or via overlay requirements. ¹

Operational context where it matters most

• Environments with privileged access (admins, developers, SRE, security engineers).
• Regulated or sensitive data handling (customer data, government data, controlled unclassified information).
• High-velocity access changes (contractors, M&A integration, frequent onboarding/offboarding).
• Distributed organizations where HR, Legal, and Security operate regionally.

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

Step 1: Set the insider coordination boundary (your parameter list)

Create and approve your list of required “organizational entities” for insider-threat incident handling. Typical inclusions:

• Information Security / SOC / Incident Response
• HR / Employee Relations
• Legal (employment counsel + investigations support)
• Privacy (if personal data could be involved)
• IT Operations / IAM (access changes, device management)
• Physical Security (badge access, facilities incidents)
• Compliance / Ethics hotline team (if applicable)
• Business unit leadership (only for decision points)

Deliverable: Insider Threat IR Coordination Matrix (RACI + escalation contacts + decision rights).

Step 2: Define coordination rules that prevent chaos

Write coordination rules that teams can follow under pressure:

• Trigger criteria: what events require insider workflow (examples: anomalous data access by employee, suspicious admin actions, policy-violating downloads, credible hotline allegation).
• Authority model: who can suspend accounts, pull devices, or place legal hold; who must approve.
• Information-sharing: what HR can share with Security, what Security can share with HR, and how to handle privileged Legal advice.
• Confidentiality model: need-to-know distribution lists; restrict internal chatter; document who receives what.
• Evidence handling: logging sources, chain-of-custody expectations, and system-of-record for case notes.

Deliverable: Insider Incident Handling SOP that is explicitly cross-functional. ¹

Step 3: Build the insider-specific playbooks and handoffs

Add insider-focused playbooks under your incident response program, aligned to your entity list:

• Data exfiltration suspicion (employee or contractor)
• Privilege misuse (admin, developer, security engineer)
• Sabotage / integrity attack (deleting logs, altering configs)
• Collusion with third parties (employee sharing credentials with a third party)

Each playbook should include:

• intake channel(s) and minimum data required,
• triage checklist,
• required cross-functional notifications (who, when),
• decision points and approvals,
• containment actions with HR/Legal coordination,
• documentation requirements for every step.

Deliverable: Playbook pack + notification templates (email/Slack ticket language) + decision log template.

Step 4: Establish a system-of-record and workflow

Pick one system-of-record for insider cases (ticketing, GRC workflow, or a case management tool) and enforce:

• unique case IDs,
• role-based access to case data,
• mandatory fields for cross-functional coordination (HR consulted? Legal consulted? access disabled by whom?),
• attachment of evidence links (SIEM alerts, EDR triage, IAM logs),
• closure criteria and review steps.

This is where Daydream typically fits cleanly: teams map IR-4(7) to a named owner, documented procedures, and recurring evidence artifacts so you can answer assessors with one control record and consistent attachments. ¹

Step 5: Prove it works (exercises + real-case retrospectives)

Run insider coordination through:

• tabletop exercises built around insider scenarios,
• post-incident reviews for any real insider allegation or confirmed insider incident,
• periodic access reviews to validate coordination triggers tie into IAM actions.

Retain proof that coordination happened: meeting notes, incident timeline, approvals, and follow-up actions assigned to owners.

Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Assessors commonly accept a mix of design evidence (what you planned) and operating evidence (what you did). Keep these artifacts current and accessible:

Design evidence

• IR-4(7) control write-up: scope, entities list, and how coordination is performed. ¹
• Insider Threat IR Coordination Matrix (RACI + contacts + alternates).
• Insider incident SOP with escalation paths and approvals.
• Playbooks for top insider scenarios.
• Access control for case system (roles/permissions description).

Operating evidence

• Case records showing cross-functional participation (sanitized if needed).
• Decision logs (who approved account disablement, device seizure, legal hold).
• Communication records (notifications to HR/Legal/Privacy per playbook).
• After-action reports with tracked corrective actions.
• Training or briefing records for entities named in the parameter list.

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

Questions you should be ready to answer

• “Which organizational entities are included for IR-4(7), and where is that documented?” ¹
• “Show a recent insider case (or exercise) where HR/Legal/Security coordinated. What was the timeline?”
• “Who has authority to suspend access, and how do you prevent unilateral action without HR/Legal context?”
• “How do you handle confidentiality and attorney-client privilege in case records?”
• “Where do you record decisions and approvals?”

Hangups that cause findings

• The entity list exists but is not reflected in workflows (no evidence of HR/Legal involvement).
• Case tracking is scattered across email, chat, and multiple ticket systems.
• Containment actions occur without documented approvals.
• Over-sharing case details broadly creates privacy and employee relations risk.

Frequent implementation mistakes and how to avoid them

Mistake	Why it fails IR-4(7)	Fix that works
Listing “Security” only as the entity	No intra-organization coordination	Add HR, Legal, Privacy, IAM/IT Ops, Physical Security as applicable and document handoffs. 1
Treating insider events as standard malware incidents	Insider cases require HR/legal process and different containment rules	Create insider-specific playbooks with explicit approvals and evidence handling.
No decision log	Assessors can’t verify coordination occurred	Require documented approvals for key actions in the case system-of-record.
Letting “informal chats” substitute for process	Hard to prove and easy to mis-handle	Use templates and required workflow fields; attach chat transcripts only when appropriate.
Over-involving business leaders early	Increases rumor and retaliation risk	Use need-to-know rules; bring leadership in only at defined decision points.

Enforcement context and risk implications

No public enforcement cases were provided in the source catalog for this requirement, so you should treat IR-4(7) primarily as an assessment and operational resilience expectation under NIST SP 800-53. ¹

Practically, weak intra-organization coordination increases:

• investigation errors (lost evidence, inconsistent narratives),
• legal exposure (improper monitoring, mishandled employee data),
• delayed containment (access not disabled promptly or disabled without approvals),
• reputational harm if insider incidents spill into public reporting.

Practical 30/60/90-day execution plan

First 30 days (stabilize and define)

• Name the IR-4(7) control owner and back-up owner.
• Draft and approve the entity list for insider-threat incident handling (the parameter list) and a simple RACI.
• Select the system-of-record for insider cases and restrict access.
• Publish a one-page insider incident escalation guide: who to page, what to collect, what not to do.

By 60 days (operationalize workflows)

• Finalize insider SOP + playbooks with HR/Legal/Privacy sign-off.
• Implement required workflow fields (HR consulted, Legal consulted, approvals captured).
• Create standard templates: decision log, legal hold request, access suspension request, insider case closure memo.
• Run one tabletop using an insider scenario and capture minutes and action items.

By 90 days (prove repeatability)

• Close tabletop action items and update playbooks.
• Run a second exercise or a targeted walk-through focused on evidence handling and approvals.
• Build an audit-ready evidence packet in Daydream (or your GRC repository): control narrative, entity list, playbooks, and at least one exercise/case record showing coordination. ¹

Frequently Asked Questions

Which “organizational entities” should I include for IR-4(7)?

Include the groups that must act or approve actions in insider cases, usually Security/IR, HR, Legal, and IAM/IT Ops, plus Privacy and Physical Security where relevant. Document the final list formally because that list becomes what assessors test. ¹

Do I need a standalone Insider Threat Program to satisfy IR-4(7)?

The control requires coordinated incident handling for insider threats, not a separate enterprise program by name. Many organizations meet it by adding insider-specific playbooks and a cross-functional coordination model under incident response. ¹

How do we coordinate with Legal without exposing privileged advice in tickets?

Keep legal advice in privileged channels and record non-privileged outcomes in the case system (for example, “Legal approved legal hold” plus timestamp and approver). Restrict case access and use a decision log structure that does not capture attorney work product.

What evidence is strongest in an audit?

Auditors want proof the named entities actually coordinate, so provide a completed tabletop package or a redacted case file with documented handoffs, approvals, and after-action items. Pair that with the SOP, RACI, and playbooks. ¹

Can HR or Legal refuse to participate due to workload?

They can set operating constraints, but the control expectation is coordination across the entities you specify. If participation is conditional, write those rules into the SOP (for example, on-call rotation, severity thresholds) and show that the model works in exercises. ¹

How does this interact with third parties or contractors?

Insider incidents often involve contractors, so ensure your entity list and playbooks cover coordination for contractor offboarding, access suspension, and device retrieval. If a third party manages IAM or endpoints, add them to the incident communications plan as an external dependency while keeping IR-4(7) focused on intra-organization coordination. ¹

Footnotes

1. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON