IR-7(1): Automation Support for Availability of Information and Support

To meet the ir-7(1): automation support for availability of information and support requirement, you must use automation to keep incident response (IR) playbooks, contacts, tooling access, and supporting data continuously available to responders, even during outages or high-load events. Operationalize it by defining “what must stay available,” automating publication and access, and proving it with repeatable evidence. ¹

Key takeaways:

• Define the IR “availability baseline” (critical IR information, tools, roles, and access paths) and treat it like a production service.
• Implement automation for distribution, access, redundancy, and verification, not a static binder in a shared drive.
• Build audit-ready evidence: configuration, access logs, backup/replication proof, and recurring availability tests.

IR-7(1) is a practical requirement disguised as a single sentence. If your IR process depends on a wiki that goes down during an incident, a spreadsheet that only one person can access, or a tool that requires a VPN that fails under stress, your response capability degrades at the exact time you need it most. IR-7(1) pushes you to solve that failure mode with automation: the information and support responders need must remain available, and availability must not depend on manual steps or a single human.

This requirement is easiest to implement when you treat incident response enablement as a product: you define the minimum viable set of artifacts responders need, you design automated distribution and resilient access to those artifacts, and you continuously verify availability through testing and monitoring. You also document ownership and evidence so an assessor can validate the control without reading tea leaves.

This page gives requirement-level guidance you can execute quickly: scope, design choices, step-by-step implementation, and the evidence set to retain for assessments aligned to NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5. ²

Regulatory text

Requirement (excerpt): “Increase the availability of incident response information and support using {{ insert: param, ir-07.01_odp }}.” ¹

What the operator must do

• Identify “incident response information and support” that responders rely on (playbooks, contact trees, escalation paths, system diagrams, tooling runbooks, credentials/access procedures, communication templates).
• Use automation to increase availability of that information/support. In practice, this means automated publishing, replication, backup, access provisioning, and automated checks that confirm responders can still reach critical IR resources under degraded conditions.
• Make it assessable: an auditor should be able to see what you automated, how you know it works, and how you maintain it. ¹

Plain-English interpretation

IR-7(1) expects you to remove “single points of failure” in your incident response enablement by using automation. The test is simple: if a security incident disrupts normal systems, can responders still quickly access the instructions, contacts, tooling, and data they need to contain and investigate?

This is not satisfied by “we have an IR policy” or “we have playbooks.” It is satisfied when:

• responders can access IR materials through resilient, pre-provisioned channels,
• key IR tooling remains reachable (or has a fallback),
• access is controlled and logged, and
• you regularly verify all of the above with repeatable checks and tests. ²

Who it applies to

Entities

• Federal information systems and
• Contractor systems handling federal data (for example, environments aligned to FedRAMP or FISMA-driven programs). ¹

Operational context

• Security operations / incident response teams (SOC, CSIRT)
• IT operations teams that support IR (identity, endpoint, network, cloud)
• GRC teams who must show assessors that IR enablement works under stress
• Third parties involved in response (IR retainer, managed detection, cloud providers), where their portals, contacts, and procedures become part of your “IR support” surface

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

Step 1: Define your “IR availability baseline”

Create a short list of what must be available during an incident. Keep it tight and testable.

Minimum baseline (typical)

• IR plan + top playbooks (ransomware, BEC, data exfiltration, insider threat)
• 24/7 contact roster and escalation matrix (including third parties)
• “Break glass” procedures (how to get admin access if IAM is degraded)
• Evidence handling guidance (chain of custody, log sources list)
• Communication templates (internal, customer, regulator where applicable)
• Tooling runbooks (EDR isolation steps, cloud containment steps, SIEM queries)

Output artifact: “IR Availability Baseline” one-pager owned by the IR lead with system-of-record locations.

Step 2: Choose an automation pattern that survives common failure modes

Map likely incident conditions to availability controls.

Failure mode	Automation support you implement	What to show an auditor
Primary documentation platform is down	Automated replication to a secondary repo and offline export	Replication config + export job logs
IAM/VPN problems block access	Pre-provisioned emergency access group and alternate access path	Access group config + quarterly access review
High-load incident floods communications	Automated paging/on-call routing with escalation	On-call schedule config + paging test evidence
Primary IR tooling unavailable	Pre-defined fallback tooling and automated provisioning	Runbook + provisioning logs

Keep the emphasis on automation: scheduled jobs, infrastructure-as-code, automated entitlement workflows, automated tests, and monitoring alerts.

Step 3: Implement automated distribution and resiliency for IR content

Practical options that assess well:

• Version-controlled IR runbooks with automated publishing (for example, repo → read-only portal).
• Automated backups/replication of the IR knowledge base to a second environment/tenant.
• Offline availability for a minimal set (exported “go kit” encrypted package) produced by a scheduled job, not a manual quarterly task.

Guardrails:

• Encrypt exports.
• Restrict access by role.
• Log access to sensitive IR materials (contacts, break-glass steps).

Step 4: Automate access provisioning for responders (including surge support)

During incidents you may need extra responders fast. Manual access tickets slow containment.

Implement:

• Pre-approved responder roles (SOC Tier 2/3, Incident Commander, Forensics).
• Automated group-based access to IR repositories and tools.
• Break-glass accounts with hardened controls and monitored use, tied to an incident ID.

Evidence target: you can demonstrate a responder can be added quickly, access is time-bound, and access is logged.

Step 5: Automate “IR support” readiness checks

Availability is not a document claim. Prove it continuously.

Create automated checks such as:

• Monitoring that the IR portal/repo is reachable externally (where appropriate) and internally.
• Synthetic tests that validate responders can authenticate to critical IR systems.
• Scheduled validation that critical phone numbers/on-call routes are active (test pages with documented outcomes).
• Automated verification that offline IR “go kit” was generated recently and stored in the right place.

Step 6: Operationalize governance: ownership, cadence, and exceptions

Assign a control owner and create a simple operating procedure:

• who reviews baseline content changes,
• who approves access role changes,
• how often you test availability, and
• how you document and accept exceptions (for example, a legacy system with no automation hooks yet).

If you run Daydream for GRC, map IR-7(1) to a named owner, link the operating procedure, and set recurring evidence tasks so the control doesn’t become a yearly scramble.

Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Keep evidence that demonstrates design, implementation, and ongoing operation:

Core artifacts

• IR Availability Baseline (what must remain available; where it lives; who owns it)
• IR tooling and documentation architecture diagram (primary + fallback paths)
• SOP: “Maintain IR Availability Automation” (how jobs run, who responds to failures)

Automation evidence (examples)

• Screenshots/exports of:
  • replication/backup job configurations,
  • CI/CD pipeline that publishes runbooks,
  • scheduled offline export job configuration,
  • monitoring checks and alert rules.
• System logs showing:
  • successful completion of replication/export jobs,
  • access logs to IR repositories,
  • break-glass account usage tied to an incident/ticket.

Testing evidence

• Table of periodic “IR availability checks” with date, tester, pass/fail, and corrective actions
• One sample incident exercise record showing responders accessed the fallback path successfully

Governance evidence

• RACI (or equivalent ownership document)
• Access review records for responder groups
• Exception register entries, if any

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

Assessors tend to probe the same areas:

1. “What does ‘incident response information and support’ mean here?”
   Have your baseline list ready and mapped to systems-of-record.

2. “Where is the automation?”
   If your answer is “we trained people,” expect a gap. Show jobs, pipelines, monitoring, and automated access workflows. ¹

3. “How do you know it’s available during a real outage?”
   Show tests that simulate loss of the primary platform, plus evidence the fallback path works.

4. “Who maintains this and how do changes get controlled?”
   Show ownership, change control linkages, and evidence of periodic checks.

Frequent implementation mistakes and how to avoid them

• Mistake: Storing IR runbooks only inside the primary corporate wiki.
  Fix: replicate to a separate system/tenant and generate an offline encrypted “go kit” automatically.

• Mistake: Break-glass access exists on paper, but no one can execute it quickly.
  Fix: pre-provision groups, test authentication paths, and require incident-linked approvals and logging.

• Mistake: Automation exists, but no one monitors it.
  Fix: alert on failed replication/export jobs and treat failures like production incidents.

• Mistake: Over-scoping the baseline.
  Fix: start with the minimum responders need in the first hour; expand after you can prove availability.

Enforcement context and risk implications

No public enforcement cases were provided in the source catalog for this requirement, so this page does not cite specific enforcement outcomes.

Operational risk is still clear: if IR information and support are unavailable during an incident, containment slows, business impact grows, and post-incident reporting becomes harder because evidence handling degrades. IR-7(1) reduces that risk by making availability a designed property with automated support. ²

A practical 30/60/90-day execution plan

Use this phased plan without attaching hard calendar promises.

First 30 days (Immediate stabilization)

• Name the control owner and approvers (IR lead + IAM + GRC).
• Publish the IR Availability Baseline one-pager.
• Identify primary and fallback locations for IR runbooks and contact trees.
• Stand up one automated replication/export mechanism for the baseline artifacts.
• Define the first set of automated readiness checks (reachability + authentication).

By 60 days (Automation hardening)

• Implement role-based, automated access provisioning for responder groups.
• Add break-glass workflow controls (logging, approvals, monitoring).
• Add monitoring and alerting for replication/export job failures.
• Run a tabletop or technical exercise that explicitly validates fallback access, then capture evidence.

By 90 days (Prove repeatability)

• Expand coverage to additional playbooks and critical tooling runbooks.
• Convert lessons learned into updated automation and checks.
• Establish recurring evidence collection in your GRC workflow (Daydream or equivalent): job logs, access review records, test results, and exception register updates.

Frequently Asked Questions

What counts as “automation support” for IR-7(1)?

Automation support means systems-driven mechanisms such as scheduled replication, automated publishing pipelines, automated access provisioning, and automated availability checks. Manual “someone exports a PDF sometimes” rarely satisfies the intent. ¹

Do we need an offline “go kit” to comply?

The control does not mandate a specific method, but offline access is a strong mitigation for documentation or identity outages. If you skip offline access, be ready to show an alternative that survives realistic incident conditions. ²

How do we scope “incident response information and support” without boiling the ocean?

Start with what responders need in the first hour: contacts, escalation, top playbooks, break-glass procedures, and key containment runbooks. Treat everything else as backlog and expand after you can show availability for the baseline.

How should third parties fit into IR-7(1)?

If you depend on a third party for response support (MDR portal, IR retainer hotline, cloud provider escalation), include their contacts and access paths in your baseline. Add redundancy where feasible, such as alternate contact methods and documented escalation routes.

What evidence is most persuasive in an audit?

Configuration evidence (replication jobs, pipelines, monitoring rules), operational logs showing successful runs, and records of periodic availability tests usually resolve audit questions quickly. Pair evidence to the baseline so the assessor can trace coverage end to end.

How can Daydream help operationalize this requirement without turning it into a paperwork exercise?

Use Daydream to assign a single accountable owner, document the automation procedure, and schedule recurring evidence requests (job logs, access reviews, test results). The goal is consistent proof of operation, not a one-time narrative.

Footnotes

1. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON

2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5