MP-6(8): Remote Purging or Wiping of Information

MP-6(8) requires you to have a tested, authorized capability to remotely purge or wipe organizational information from defined device types and situations (for example, lost or stolen endpoints, or devices leaving authorized control). Operationalize it by scoping in-scope assets, selecting a remote wipe method per platform, defining trigger conditions, and retaining execution logs as evidence ¹.

Key takeaways:

• Define exactly which devices and storage locations must support remote purge/wipe, then make it enforceable through endpoint management.
• Treat remote wipe as an incident-capable process with approvals, triggers, and audit logging, not a one-off IT task.
• Evidence is the control: you need logs, configurations, and test results that show the capability works in your environment.

The mp-6(8): remote purging or wiping of information requirement sits in the NIST SP 800-53 Media Protection family and focuses on a very practical risk: sensitive data remaining on devices you no longer physically control. That includes common cases like lost laptops, stolen phones, terminated users who keep a device, or equipment shipped for repair. If you cannot remotely purge or wipe, your containment options shrink to “hope encryption holds” and “wait for the device to show up,” which is not an operational plan.

This requirement is also easy to “paper comply” with and still fail an assessment. Auditors typically look for proof you can execute remote wipe across all in-scope platforms, that you have defined conditions under which you will do it, and that you can show logs or tickets demonstrating both successful tests and real events. The control is medium severity in many baselines, but its impact can be high if regulated data is involved, because remote wipe is one of the few compensating actions that works when a device is gone.

This page gives requirement-level implementation guidance you can hand to IT/SecOps and then defend during an exam.

Regulatory text

Requirement (verbatim excerpt): “Provide the capability to purge or wipe information from {{ insert: param, mp-06.08_odp.01 }} {{ insert: param, mp-06.08_odp.02 }}.” ²

Operator interpretation: You must be able to remotely remove organizational information from the defined categories of systems/media in scope for your environment and the defined situations that trigger the action. The placeholders in the excerpt indicate your organization specifies the parameters (the “from where” and the “under what conditions”) in your system policy and implementation standard ¹.

Plain-English interpretation

• “Capability” means more than owning a tool. It means remote wipe/purge is technically possible on your actual fleet, is enabled, and can be executed quickly by authorized staff.
• “Remote” means you can initiate the purge/wipe without physical access to the device.
• “Purge or wipe” means you are removing data to a degree appropriate for the risk and platform. In practice, endpoint “wipe” often resets or deletes managed content; “purge” is commonly treated as stronger sanitization. Your policy should define what you mean on each platform and what you treat as acceptable for your threat model.

Who it applies to

Entity scope

• Federal information systems and contractor systems handling federal data that are implementing NIST SP 800-53 controls as part of an authorization boundary or customer requirement ³.

Operational scope (what environments usually include)

You should scope MP-6(8) to any endpoint or media where:

• Organizational data is stored locally (files, cached email, offline sync folders, local databases).
• The device can leave your physical control (mobile devices, laptops, removable storage used with endpoints, field equipment).
• A third party may gain access through repair, resale, return, or reassignment flows.

A practical scoping rule: if your IR plan contemplates “lost/stolen device” as a scenario, that device class should be evaluated for remote wipe.

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

Step 1: Set the parameters you must meet (the “ODP” decisions)

Write down, in a short standard, the two missing parameters implied by the control text ²:

1. From what assets will you remotely purge/wipe information?
   Example categories: corporate-managed laptops, corporate-managed mobile phones, virtual desktops with local cache, rugged/IoT endpoints with local storage.
2. Under what conditions will you remotely purge/wipe?
   Common conditions: confirmed lost/stolen, user termination with non-return, device non-compliance beyond threshold, device leaving geo boundary, suspected compromise where containment requires wipe.

Make these parameters testable. “As needed” is not testable.

Step 2: Assign ownership and restrict authority

Remote wiping is a high-impact action. Define:

• Control owner: typically Endpoint Management lead or SecOps manager.
• Approvers: HR + Security for terminations, Security for theft/compromise, IT for break/fix returns.
• Authorized executors: a small group with privileged access in the endpoint management platform.
• Separation of duties: request/approve/execute should not all sit with one person for routine cases.

Step 3: Implement technical capability by platform

Build a platform matrix and ensure each row has a working remote wipe action.

Minimum platform matrix (example)

Platform	Management plane	Wipe method	Scope of wipe	Proof you need
Windows/macOS laptops	Endpoint management/MDM	Remote wipe / reset; managed data wipe	Whole device or managed data	Policy + device group config + execution logs
iOS/Android	MDM	Device wipe; selective wipe	Prefer managed container for BYOD; full wipe for corporate-owned	MDM command logs + device status
Removable media	Endpoint DLP or encryption mgmt	Not always remotely wipeable	Prevent write + crypto erase keys if supported	Design decision + compensating controls

For classes where remote wipe is not technically feasible, document the decision and implement compensating controls (for example, full-disk encryption with key escrow plus rapid account/token revocation). MP-6(8) expects a “capability,” so treat exceptions as formal risk acceptances with documented rationale ³.

Step 4: Create triggers and a runbook tied to real workflows

Write a one-page runbook with:

• Intake paths: Service desk ticket category, SOC incident type, HR termination checklist, third-party return/RMA process.
• Verification steps: confirm asset ID, last check-in time, user identity, case reason, and approval.
• Execution steps: send wipe command, confirm receipt, confirm completion, and record outcome.
• Fallback steps: if the device is offline, queue wipe; revoke credentials; disable tokens; escalate if device later checks in.

Make sure the runbook covers “offline” devices. That is where teams get stuck in audits.

Step 5: Test the capability and record results

Build a repeatable test that proves:

• A device in each in-scope class can be issued a remote wipe/purge command.
• The command is logged centrally.
• Completion status is observable.
• Post-wipe access to organizational data is not possible (spot-check with a test dataset).

Run tests after major platform changes (MDM migration, OS version policy shifts) and after onboarding new device types.

Step 6: Operational monitoring and governance

You want alerting for:

• Devices that have not checked in recently (wipe may not reach them).
• Wipe command failures.
• Unauthorized wipe attempts (privileged action monitoring).

Daydream (or any GRC system) becomes useful here as the control system of record: map MP-6(8) to the owner, the runbook, and the recurring evidence set so audits do not turn into log archaeology.

Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Keep evidence that proves design, enablement, and execution:

1. Policy/standard with parameters defining in-scope assets and trigger conditions ².
2. Platform configuration artifacts
   • Screenshots or exports showing device groups, wipe permissions, and roles.
   • Privileged access assignments for wipe authority.
3. Runbook / SOP for remote purge/wipe, including approvals and fallback actions.
4. Test records
   • Test plan, devices used, dates, results, and log extracts.
5. Operational records
   • Tickets/incident records for wipe events (including failed attempts and follow-up).
   • MDM/endpoint management logs showing command issuance and completion.
6. Exception/risk acceptance records for device classes where remote wipe is infeasible, with compensating controls ³.

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

Auditors tend to ask:

• “Show me which endpoints are in scope for MP-6(8), and where that is defined.”
• “Demonstrate a remote wipe on a test device and show the log trail.”
• “How do you prevent an admin from wiping devices without authorization?”
• “What happens if the device is offline for weeks?”
• “How do you handle BYOD, especially selective wipe vs full wipe?”
• “Do third parties ever hold your devices for repair, and what is the wipe requirement before handoff?”

Hangup patterns:

• Tool is present, but not enabled for all fleets. One platform is managed well; another is unmanaged “temporarily.”
• No evidence of testing. Teams rely on vendor docs rather than their own test logs.
• Ambiguous triggers. “When necessary” does not show control operation.

Frequent implementation mistakes and how to avoid them

1. Mistake: Treating remote wipe as the same as account disablement.
   Fix: Make wipe a discrete step with its own approval and evidence, tied to incidents and terminations.

2. Mistake: Scoping only corporate-owned mobiles, ignoring laptops or specialty endpoints.
   Fix: Build and maintain the platform matrix; tie it to your asset inventory.

3. Mistake: No plan for offline endpoints.
   Fix: Define queued wipe behavior plus compensating actions (credential revocation, conditional access blocks) until the wipe completes.

4. Mistake: Over-broad wipe permissions.
   Fix: Narrow the executor group; log and review privileged wipe actions.

5. Mistake: Incomplete documentation for exceptions.
   Fix: Record the technical limitation, why it exists, and what you do instead. Tie it to risk acceptance.

Enforcement context and risk implications

No public enforcement cases were provided in the supplied source catalog for this requirement. Practically, MP-6(8) failures show up as incident impact multipliers: a lost device becomes a reportable event more often when you cannot show prompt containment actions, and auditors often treat the inability to remotely purge/wipe as evidence that endpoint controls are not operating as designed ³.

A practical 30/60/90-day execution plan

First 30 days (foundation)

• Define in-scope device classes and wipe trigger conditions in a short standard ².
• Assign owners, approvers, and executors; restrict wipe permissions.
• Draft the remote wipe runbook and wire it into Service Desk and SOC intake.

Next 60 days (implement + prove)

• Validate remote wipe works per platform; close gaps where devices are unmanaged.
• Create a test dataset and run a controlled wipe test for each device class.
• Set up centralized log capture for wipe commands and outcomes.

By 90 days (operationalize + audit-ready)

• Run a tabletop for lost/stolen and termination-with-non-return scenarios, then update the runbook.
• Implement monitoring for wipe failures and stale device check-ins.
• Put evidence collection on a schedule in your GRC system (for example, Daydream): latest configs, latest tests, and a running list of wipe events and exceptions.

Frequently Asked Questions

Does MP-6(8) require full device wipe, or is selective wipe acceptable?

The control requires a capability to purge or wipe information, and your policy defines what that means for each platform ². Selective wipe can be acceptable if it reliably removes organizational data for that device type and you can prove it through testing.

What if the device is offline and never receives the wipe command?

Your procedure should include queued wipe plus compensating actions, such as immediate credential revocation and access blocks, until the device checks in. Document how you track “wipe pending” status and what escalation occurs if the device stays offline.

How do we handle BYOD without wiping personal data?

Use an MDM approach that supports managed containers or work profiles, then define “organizational data wipe” as the required action for BYOD. Keep evidence that the selective wipe removes corporate apps/data while leaving personal content intact.

Are removable drives covered by MP-6(8)?

If organizational data can be stored on them, they are part of your media risk and should be evaluated for scope. If you cannot remotely wipe a removable drive, document that limitation and implement compensating controls (for example, encryption and strict handling procedures) with a recorded exception ³.

What evidence is most persuasive in an audit?

Command logs that show a remote wipe was issued and completed on a real device class, plus a test record demonstrating the same in a controlled scenario. Pair that with the policy parameters and the runbook so the auditor can trace requirement to execution ².

Who should be allowed to execute remote wipes?

Limit execution to a small privileged group and require documented approvals based on trigger conditions. Auditors will look for both technical restriction (role-based access) and procedural governance (ticket/incident approval trail).

Footnotes

1. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5

2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON

3. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5