RA-5(10): Correlate Scanning Information

RA-5(10) requires you to correlate outputs from your vulnerability scanning tools so you can identify chained attack paths, specifically multi-vulnerability and multi-hop vectors, not isolated findings. Operationalize it by aggregating scan data, normalizing asset identity, mapping vulnerabilities to exploit paths, and producing repeatable evidence that correlation happens and drives remediation. ¹

Key takeaways:

• Correlation means “connect the dots” across scan results to surface attack paths, not just a list of CVEs. ¹
• You need a defined procedure, an owner, and recurring artifacts that prove correlation and action. ¹
• Evidence should show inputs (scans), correlation logic/output (attack paths), and outcomes (tickets, prioritization, fixes). ¹

RA-5(10): correlate scanning information requirement is a maturity step inside vulnerability management. Many programs can prove they run scanners; fewer can prove they interpret results in a way that reflects how real attacks happen. The control asks you to correlate outputs from vulnerability scanning tools to determine whether combinations of weaknesses enable multi-vulnerability chains and multi-hop movement through your environment. ¹

For a Compliance Officer, CCO, or GRC lead, the fastest path to “audit-ready” is to translate this into an operating rhythm: define which scan outputs you ingest, how you normalize and link them to assets and business services, what correlation method you use to identify attack vectors, and how those correlated outputs change prioritization and remediation work. You also need evidence that this happens repeatedly, not as a one-time exercise before an assessment.

This page gives requirement-level implementation guidance you can hand to security operations with clear acceptance criteria, artifacts to retain, and the audit questions you should pre-answer.

Regulatory text

Requirement (excerpt): “Correlate the output from vulnerability scanning tools to determine the presence of multi-vulnerability and multi-hop attack vectors.” ¹

What the operator must do: You must take results from vulnerability scanning tools and analyze them together so you can identify attack paths that depend on (a) multiple vulnerabilities on one asset or across assets, and/or (b) an attacker moving from one system to another (multi-hop). Your program should show that correlation is a defined activity with documented inputs, outputs, and follow-through, not an informal “analyst intuition” step. ¹

Plain-English interpretation

Correlation, in practice, means answering: “If an attacker starts here, what sequence of weaknesses and reachable systems could lead to material impact?” You are looking for patterns like:

• A vulnerable internet-facing host plus weak internal segmentation plus a privilege escalation weakness on a reachable server.
• A single asset with multiple weaknesses that become critical only when combined (for example, exposure plus misconfiguration plus an outdated component).

This control does not require a specific tool. It requires an outcome: you can demonstrate that you connect scan outputs to identify chained exploitation and lateral movement paths, then use that to drive prioritization and remediation. ¹

Who it applies to (entity and operational context)

RA-5(10) is relevant to:

• Federal information systems subject to NIST SP 800-53 control baselines. ²
• Contractor systems handling federal data, including environments where vulnerability scanning is part of contractual or authorization expectations. ¹

Operationally, this applies wherever you have:

• Multiple scanners or multiple scan modalities (network, host, container, cloud posture, web app).
• Complex environments where “critical” depends on reachability, identity, and privilege paths (hybrid networks, segmented enclaves, multi-account cloud).

Third-party context: if third parties operate components of your environment (managed infrastructure, SaaS with customer-managed components, outsourced app operations), you still need correlated visibility across what you scan directly and what you ingest from third parties. The control is about your ability to see attack paths in your system boundary. ¹

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

Use this as an implementation procedure with clear handoffs.

1) Assign control ownership and define the boundary

• Name an owner (often Vulnerability Management lead; GRC co-owns evidence quality).
• Define the system boundary and asset classes in scope (endpoints, servers, network devices, cloud resources, containers, applications).
• Document which scan tools produce “authoritative” data for each asset class.

Deliverable: RA-5(10) procedure section in your vulnerability management SOP that states scope, owner, and cadence of correlation activity. ¹

2) Aggregate scan outputs into a correlation-ready dataset

You cannot correlate what you cannot reliably join.

Minimum joining keys you should standardize:

• Asset identifier (hostname, instance ID, resource ID, container image digest where applicable)
• Network attributes (IP, VPC/VNET, subnet, security group/ACL references)
• Application/service tags (service name, environment, data sensitivity tag if you have it)
• Vulnerability identifiers (CVE, plugin ID, package name/version)

Practical note: If you have multiple tools reporting the same asset differently, correlation will fail quietly. Make asset identity reconciliation an explicit step, not an assumption.

Deliverable: Data dictionary that shows the fields you rely on for correlation and where each field comes from (scanner A, CMDB, cloud inventory, EDR). ¹

3) Normalize and deduplicate findings

• Normalize severity scoring fields into a consistent internal representation (keep raw scanner values as well).
• Deduplicate identical findings across scanners.
• Handle “stale” findings by tracking scan timestamp and last-seen date.

Deliverable: A repeatable normalization job (SIEM/SOAR pipeline, vulnerability platform rules, or scripted ETL) with change control and run logs.

4) Perform correlation to identify multi-vulnerability and multi-hop vectors

Correlation methods that satisfy the requirement typically combine:

• Reachability analysis: Can a vulnerable asset be reached from attacker entry points (internet, partner network, user subnet)?
• Chaining logic: Do findings on Asset A enable access to Asset B (credential exposure, remote execution, weak segmentation)?
• Privilege/path context: Does the chain lead to higher privilege or sensitive data stores?

Concrete outputs to generate each cycle:

• A list of candidate attack paths with involved assets and vulnerabilities.
• A “choke point” view (assets that appear repeatedly across paths).
• A remediation priority list driven by path risk, not single CVSS-style severity alone.

Deliverable: Correlation report or dashboard export showing at least one multi-vulnerability chain and one multi-hop path within scope, with traceable inputs back to scans. ¹

5) Route correlated outputs into remediation workflows

Correlation is only credible if it changes work:

• Create tickets that reference the attack path ID (or equivalent) and list all contributing findings.
• Assign owners by asset/service.
• Track remediation as “path closed” (all prerequisites removed) rather than “one CVE closed.”

Deliverable: Ticket samples showing correlated path-driven remediation, plus a short decision record for exceptions (risk acceptance) when a path cannot be closed quickly.

6) Validate and tune correlation quality

• Run analyst review on a sample of paths: confirm the joins are correct and not false correlations.
• Capture false positives and update correlation rules or asset identity mappings.
• Document tuning changes under change management.

Deliverable: Monthly (or assessment-period) tuning notes and approvals; these are strong audit artifacts because they show operational control, not shelfware.

Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Keep artifacts that prove inputs, process, and outcomes:

Core evidence bundle

• RA-5(10) implementation procedure (SOP/runbook) with owner and defined correlation method. ¹
• Tool inventory of vulnerability scanning sources feeding correlation (names, scope, data types).
• Correlation outputs (reports/dashboards/exports) showing multi-vulnerability and multi-hop attack vectors identified. ¹
• Work tracking evidence: tickets/boards linking correlated paths to remediation actions.
• Exception/risk acceptance records tied to specific paths, with approval and review notes.
• Run logs or job execution evidence showing correlation occurs on a recurring basis (job history, workflow runs, scheduled report snapshots).

Evidence quality checklist (what auditors look for)

• Traceability from correlated path back to raw scan outputs.
• Clear identification of assets and boundaries.
• Proof that correlated findings drive prioritization and remediation decisions.

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

Expect questions like:

• “Show me how you determine multi-hop attack vectors from scan results.” ¹
• “Which tools feed correlation, and how do you reconcile asset identity across them?”
• “Provide an example where correlation changed priority compared to the scanner’s default severity.”
• “How do you ensure correlation happens consistently and is not analyst-dependent?”
• “How do you handle third-party operated components inside the boundary?”

Hangups that stall assessments:

• You can show scans, but you cannot show a correlation output artifact.
• Correlation exists only as ad hoc analyst notes with no repeatable method.
• Asset inventory mismatches make it impossible to prove chains reliably.

Frequent implementation mistakes and how to avoid them

1. Mistake: Treating correlation as “export to spreadsheet and eyeball it.”
   Fix: Write a short, enforceable procedure and produce a recurring artifact (dashboard export, report snapshot, or saved query output) tied to a schedule.

2. Mistake: Correlating only within a single scanner.
   Fix: The requirement says “tools” and focuses on attack vectors. Pull in adjacent sources that enable hop logic (network exposure data, identity/privilege context, cloud security groups) where available, and document what you use. ¹

3. Mistake: No asset identity strategy.
   Fix: Define authoritative keys per asset class and document collision rules (for example, what wins when hostname conflicts with cloud instance ID).

4. Mistake: Outputs don’t drive remediation.
   Fix: Require at least one “path ticket” per cycle and track path closure. Auditors accept imperfect correlation faster than correlation that never changes action.

Enforcement context and risk implications

No public enforcement cases were provided in the source catalog for this requirement, so you should treat RA-5(10) primarily as an assessment and authorization readiness expectation rather than a control with a specific enforcement storyline in this dataset.

Risk-wise, the operational failure mode is predictable: teams remediate “top CVEs” while leaving viable attack chains intact because no one connected reachability, identity, and segmentation context. That gap increases the chance that you miss the path an attacker actually uses, especially in environments with mixed cloud/network controls and shared services.

Practical 30/60/90-day execution plan

Use this as an execution plan you can run without promising a specific completion date.

First 30 days (Immediate stabilization)

• Name the RA-5(10) owner and publish the one-page procedure: inputs, correlation method, outputs, and where artifacts live. ¹
• Inventory scan data sources and define authoritative asset identity keys by asset class.
• Produce your first correlation artifact (even if manual): one multi-vulnerability chain and one multi-hop path with traceable scan evidence. ¹
• Create remediation tickets tied to the identified path(s).

Days 31–60 (Make it repeatable)

• Implement normalization/dedup rules and document them.
• Stand up a recurring report/export and a simple run log (scheduled job history or monthly snapshot).
• Add a “path-based prioritization” field in ticketing so you can show that correlation changed priority.

Days 61–90 (Make it resilient and auditable)

• Add quality review: sample a subset of correlated paths and document false-correlation fixes.
• Formalize exception handling for paths you cannot close quickly (risk acceptance with review triggers).
• Run a tabletop with Security and GRC: pick one path and walk from raw scan evidence → correlation output → ticket → remediation verification.

How Daydream fits (without changing your tools)

If you already scan, your bottleneck is usually coordination and evidence: who owns correlation, where artifacts live, and how you prove it happened consistently. Daydream can act as the control system of record by mapping RA-5(10) to a named owner, a documented procedure, and a recurring evidence checklist so you walk into assessments with complete, time-ordered artifacts instead of scrambling across tools. ¹

Frequently Asked Questions

What counts as “correlate scanning information” for RA-5(10)?

You need to combine scan outputs to identify multi-vulnerability chains and multi-hop paths, then produce an artifact that shows those paths and their source findings. A simple list of high-severity CVEs is not correlation under this requirement. ¹

Do we need a dedicated attack path modeling tool?

No specific tool is required by the text. You do need a repeatable method and evidence that you determined the presence of multi-vulnerability and multi-hop attack vectors from scan outputs. ¹

Can we satisfy this if we only have one vulnerability scanner?

Possibly, if you can still demonstrate correlation across outputs within that tool (for example, relating multiple findings across assets and network context) and produce an artifact that shows multi-hop vectors. If multi-hop analysis needs data your scanner doesn’t provide, document what additional sources you ingest. ¹

What evidence is strongest for auditors?

A saved correlation report/dashboard export tied to a run log, plus tickets that reference the correlated path and show remediation follow-through. Auditors respond well to traceability from raw scan results to a path narrative. ¹

How do we handle third-party components in our boundary?

Treat third-party operated components as in-scope assets where you have responsibility, and ingest whatever scan outputs or attestations you can obtain. Your correlation output should still represent end-to-end paths through the boundary you control or are accountable for. ¹

What if correlation outputs are noisy or contain false paths?

Keep the tuning notes as evidence of active management. Document why a path was invalid (bad asset join, unreachable segment, decommissioned host) and what rule or inventory fix you made to prevent recurrence.

Footnotes

1. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON

2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5