SC-26: Decoys

SC-26 requires you to place decoy components (for example, honeypots, honeytokens, decoy credentials, or decoy services) inside your systems so attackers are more likely to hit them first, and so you can detect, deflect, and analyze malicious activity. To operationalize it, define where decoys belong, instrument alerting and case handling, and retain evidence that the decoys are deployed, monitored, and producing actionable detections. ¹

Key takeaways:

• Deploy decoys intentionally: they must be plausible targets in your environment, not lab experiments. ¹
• Treat decoy hits as security incidents: route to SIEM/SOAR, investigate, and learn. ¹
• Keep audit-ready proof: architecture, deployment records, alert rules, and incident tickets tied to decoy events. ¹

The sc-26: decoys requirement is a practical detection and deception control: you add “bait” components inside your environment that are designed to attract malicious behavior, then you monitor and analyze what touches them. The control is not satisfied by a policy statement or a one-time proof-of-concept. Auditors and customer assessors typically look for three things: (1) decoys exist in production-relevant areas of the network, (2) security operations can detect and respond to decoy interactions, and (3) the organization learns from the observed attacker behavior and uses it to improve defenses. ¹

This page is written for a Compliance Officer, CCO, or GRC lead who needs to drive implementation without getting stuck in tool debates. You will find a plain-English interpretation, clear applicability guidance, a step-by-step implementation runbook, and an evidence bundle you can hand to an auditor. The goal is to help you translate SC-26 into owned tasks, measurable outcomes, and repeatable operations across security engineering and SOC workflows. ¹

Regulatory text

NIST SC-26 (Decoys) excerpt: “Include components within organizational systems specifically designed to be the target of malicious attacks for detecting, deflecting, and analyzing such attacks.” ¹

What the operator must do: You must deploy decoy components within your systems (not just documentation) and run them as part of security monitoring. The decoys should be positioned and configured so a real attacker is likely to probe or access them. You must also capture telemetry from decoy interactions and use it for detection, deflection, and analysis. ¹

Plain-English interpretation (what SC-26 is really asking for)

SC-26 expects a deception layer that increases attacker cost and improves defender visibility. A decoy can be:

• A decoy host/service that should never receive legitimate traffic
• A honeytoken (fake sensitive record, fake API key, fake S3 bucket name, fake document) that triggers an alert when opened or used
• Decoy credentials placed where only an attacker would look
• A decoy administrative interface or fake share that reveals enumeration and lateral movement attempts

The “compliance” outcome is simple: if an attacker pokes around, you have something they will touch that creates a high-signal alert and yields investigative data (source IP, method, tools, sequence of actions) you can feed into detection engineering and incident response. ¹

Who it applies to (entity and operational context)

SC-26 is commonly expected in:

• Federal information systems and their supporting environments
• Contractor systems handling federal data (including cloud and on-prem components that store, process, or transmit that data) ¹

Operationally, it applies where you can realistically deploy and monitor decoys:

• Corporate networks (AD, internal DNS, file shares)
• Cloud environments (IaaS/PaaS network segments, IAM, object storage, CI/CD)
• Production enclaves handling sensitive workloads, when decoys can be deployed safely and segregated

If you cannot deploy decoys in a given enclave due to safety or architectural constraints, document that as a scoped exception with compensating detection controls and explicit approval. SC-26 is about deployed components, so “we plan to” is not a defensible posture. ¹

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

Use this as your implementation runbook.

1) Create a control card (owner, objective, cadence, exceptions)

Write a one-page “control card” that a SOC lead can execute and a GRC reviewer can test. Include:

• Objective: detect/deflect/analyze malicious activity using decoys
• Owner: Security Engineering (build) and SOC/IR (operate)
• Trigger events: new environment, major network change, new high-value asset class
• Operating cadence: health checks, alert tuning, coverage reviews
• Exception rules: where decoys are disallowed, who approves, compensating controls ¹

This control-card pattern is also the fastest way to close the common audit gap: “no one owns it.” ¹

2) Define decoy types and placement strategy

Build a short placement standard that answers:

• What are your “high-interest” attacker paths (identity systems, admin tooling, shared storage, CI/CD secrets)?
• Where can you place decoys to maximize signal and minimize business impact?
• What is “plausible” in your environment (naming conventions, OS versions, share names)?

A practical starting map:

• Identity: decoy service accounts, decoy OAuth apps, decoy privileged group names (monitored for access attempts)
• Endpoints/servers: 1–2 decoy hosts per major segment with common ports enabled, no production dependencies
• Data: honeytokens in “sensitive-looking” shares, decoy database entries, decoy customer export files
• Cloud: decoy access keys and bucket names, decoy secrets in non-production repos with alerting tied to any use

The design goal is high-confidence alerts: any access to a decoy should be suspicious by definition. ¹

3) Engineer safe isolation and controls

Decoys must not become a pivot point. Require:

• Network segmentation and restrictive egress
• No trust relationships from decoy systems into production
• No real credentials on decoy hosts
• Hardened logging and time sync
• Change control for decoy configuration updates

Treat decoy infrastructure like a monitored sensor. If the decoy can reach sensitive systems, you created risk while trying to reduce it. ¹

4) Instrument telemetry and alerting (SIEM/SOAR-ready)

For each decoy type, define:

• Event sources (host logs, cloud audit logs, application logs)
• Alert logic (what constitutes a “hit”)
• Routing (SIEM rule, SOAR playbook, paging thresholds)
• Context enrichment (asset tags, user identity, geo/IP intel where available)

Minimum expectation for audits: a decoy hit creates a ticket and an investigation trail. Keep alert rules versioned and change-controlled. ¹

5) Define incident handling for decoy hits

Write a short SOP that SOC analysts can follow:

• Triage checklist: confirm decoy asset, determine initial access vector, check adjacent systems
• Containment criteria: isolate source host, revoke session, rotate suspected credentials
• Escalation: when to declare an incident vs. suspicious activity
• Lessons learned: detection updates, control gaps, intel write-up

Decoys are only valuable if the organization responds consistently. ¹

6) Run recurring control health checks

On a recurring basis, verify:

• Decoys are still deployed and reachable to attackers (from the attacker’s likely vantage point)
• Logging is flowing end-to-end into the SIEM
• Alerts still fire and create tickets
• False positives are tracked and tuned

Track findings to closure with due dates and validation notes. This is where teams tend to fail: decoys drift, logging breaks, and nobody notices until an audit. ¹

7) Decide how you will document “deflecting” and “analyzing”

SC-26 includes “deflecting” and “analyzing,” so capture:

• Deflection: attacker time wasted, blocked paths, sinkholed traffic, or containment actions triggered by decoy hits
• Analysis: TTP summaries, detection rule updates, threat intel notes, post-incident reports

You do not need to promise outcomes. You need repeatable process and evidence that the decoy program produces security-relevant analysis. ¹

Required evidence and artifacts to retain (audit-ready bundle)

Keep evidence in a single “SC-26 Decoys” folder with immutable timestamps where possible.

Design and governance

• SC-26 control card (owner, scope, cadence, exceptions) ¹
• Decoy placement standard / architecture diagram showing segments and decoy types
• Risk acceptance / exception approvals for excluded areas

Build and configuration

• Deployment records (IaC commits, CMDB entries, cloud resource inventory exports)
• Decoy configuration baselines (sanitized) and change tickets
• Network segmentation controls for decoy systems (security group rules, firewall rules)

Operations

• SIEM alert rules and routing proof (rule IDs, notification paths)
• Sample alerts and linked tickets showing triage steps
• Health check results and remediation tracking to closure ¹

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

Expect these questions in assessments mapped to NIST SP 800-53:

1. “Show me the decoys.” Provide inventory plus a diagram and proof they exist in relevant environments.
2. “How do you know they’re monitored?” Demonstrate log flow and alert generation from a test event.
3. “Who owns this control?” Produce the control card and on-call/queue routing.
4. “What happens when a decoy triggers?” Walk through the SOP and show a closed ticket.
5. “How do you prevent decoys from creating risk?” Show isolation/segmentation and hardening decisions. ¹

Frequent implementation mistakes (and how to avoid them)

• Mistake: decoys in a lab VLAN only. Fix: place decoys where attackers operate (identity, admin paths, cloud). Document scope and rationale.
• Mistake: no alert-to-ticket linkage. Fix: require every decoy alert to open a case; test it and keep the evidence.
• Mistake: decoy assets look fake. Fix: follow your naming conventions and “normal” service mix, but keep isolation strict.
• Mistake: logging breaks after changes. Fix: include decoy telemetry checks in monitoring and change management gates.
• Mistake: uncontrolled honeytokens create noise. Fix: maintain a registry of honeytokens, where they live, and what should trigger. ¹

Enforcement context and risk implications

No public enforcement cases were provided in the source catalog for this requirement, so this page does not cite enforcement actions. Practically, SC-26 still matters in audits and customer diligence because it is a “prove it’s operating” control: assessors will ask for deployed components, working alerts, and operational follow-through rather than policy language. ¹

Practical execution plan (30/60/90-day)

Use this plan as a management cadence. Adjust scope based on system criticality and engineering capacity.

First 30 days (stand up the control)

• Assign owners across Security Engineering and SOC; publish the SC-26 control card. ¹
• Choose initial decoy patterns (identity, one network segment, one cloud account/subscription).
• Deploy a small set of decoys with strict isolation.
• Build SIEM alerts and create the decoy-hit SOP.
• Generate a test decoy hit and retain ticketed evidence.

Days 31–60 (expand coverage and stabilize operations)

• Expand decoy placement to additional segments and high-value pathways.
• Build a decoy inventory/registry (assets, honeytokens, owners, logging sources).
• Tune alerts and define severity mapping for decoy interactions.
• Add recurring health checks with tracked remediation. ¹

Days 61–90 (make it auditable and repeatable)

• Formalize exception handling for enclaves where decoys are not feasible.
• Integrate decoy outcomes into detection engineering: rule updates, intel notes, post-incident learnings.
• Run a tabletop or purple-team exercise that includes decoy interactions; retain results as evidence.
• Package the evidence bundle for audit: design, deployment proof, alerts, tickets, health checks. ¹

Where Daydream fits: If your bottleneck is proving consistent operation (ownership, cadence, and evidence), Daydream’s requirement control cards, minimum evidence bundles, and recurring control health checks align directly with how SC-26 tends to be assessed. Use it to keep decoy deployment and monitoring evidence continuously audit-ready instead of rebuilding proof during questionnaires. ¹

Frequently Asked Questions

Do decoys have to be honeypots, or can they be honeytokens?

SC-26 requires components designed to be targets for detecting, deflecting, and analyzing attacks, so honeytokens can satisfy the intent if they are deployed in systems and generate monitored detections. Keep clear inventory and alerting evidence tied to the tokens. ¹

Can we scope decoys out of production to avoid risk?

You can scope selectively, but you must document exceptions and show compensating monitoring for excluded areas. Assessors typically expect decoys where they would realistically catch attacker behavior, which often includes production-adjacent identity and admin paths. ¹

What evidence is most persuasive to an auditor for SC-26?

Provide proof of deployment (inventory and configuration), proof of monitoring (SIEM rules and alert routing), and proof of response (tickets and investigation notes from a test hit or real event). Package it as a single evidence bundle with ownership and cadence. ¹

How do we prevent decoys from becoming an attacker pivot point?

Isolate decoys with segmentation, restrict egress, and avoid any trust paths into sensitive systems. Treat them as sensors and keep them tightly controlled through change management. ¹

What do we do if decoy alerts generate too much noise?

Noise usually means the decoy is in a place with legitimate access or the trigger condition is too broad. Adjust placement to areas that should never be touched, tighten alert logic, and keep a registry so teams do not accidentally interact with honeytokens during routine work. ¹

Who should own SC-26: decoys requirement in a mature program?

Security Engineering typically owns design and deployment, while the SOC/IR team owns monitoring and response workflows. GRC should own the control card, evidence standards, and health-check cadence so the control remains auditable. ¹

Footnotes

1. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 OSCAL JSON