COSO Principle 6: The entity specifies objectives with sufficient clarity to enable identification and assessment of risks

A SOC 2 program fails quietly when objectives are vague. If your objectives read like slogans (“secure customer data,” “high availability”), your risk assessment becomes a brainstorming exercise, and auditors struggle to see how risks were identified, prioritized, and addressed. COSO Principle 6 fixes that by forcing clarity: objectives must be specific enough that a reasonable operator can ask, “What could stop us from achieving this?” and produce a consistent, complete list of risks and controls.

For a Compliance Officer, CCO, or GRC lead, the fastest path is to treat Principle 6 as an “objective-to-risk traceability” requirement. You are building an objective inventory for the in-scope system, defining acceptance criteria (metrics, thresholds, or required outcomes), assigning accountable owners, and establishing a review cadence. Then you use those objectives as the backbone of your risk register and control mapping. The practical win: your SOC 2 narrative becomes coherent. Your control evidence becomes easier to collect because it aligns to objectives that were formally defined and approved ¹.

Regulatory text

Requirement (SOC 2 / Trust Services Criteria): “COSO Principle 6: The entity specifies objectives with sufficient clarity to enable identification and assessment of risks” ¹.

Operator interpretation: You must define objectives clearly enough that risks can be identified and assessed against them. In practice, that means:

• Objectives exist for the in-scope system and supporting processes.
• Objectives are expressed in language that supports consistent risk identification (different teams should identify largely the same risks from the same objective).
• Objectives are used as an input to the risk assessment, not stored as shelfware ¹.

Plain-English interpretation (what auditors are really testing)

Auditors are testing whether your risk assessment has a stable anchor. They want to see that:

1. You know what you are trying to achieve for the in-scope system (confidentiality, security operations, availability commitments, privacy commitments, etc., as applicable to your SOC 2 scope).
2. Your objectives are concrete enough to evaluate “risk of not meeting objective.”
3. Your risks and controls trace back to those objectives in a way that makes sense and can be re-performed.

If your objectives are unclear, you will see downstream failures: inconsistent risk ratings, controls that don’t map to meaningful outcomes, and evidence that proves activity but not purpose.

Who it applies to (entity and operational context)

Applies to: Service organizations undergoing SOC 2 examinations against the AICPA Trust Services Criteria ¹.

Operational scope: This is not limited to the compliance function. Principle 6 touches:

• Executive leadership (objective approval and prioritization)
• Product/engineering (system objectives, roadmap commitments, reliability goals)
• Security (security objectives, security risk assessment inputs)
• IT/operations (availability, incident response, change management objectives)
• Finance/legal (reporting/compliance obligations that affect the service)
• Third-party management (objectives that depend on third parties, such as cloud availability or subprocessor controls)

Where it shows up most: Any area where you make commitments to customers (contractual SLAs, security commitments in policies, or SOC 2 system description statements). If those commitments exist, you need aligned objectives with clear success criteria.

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

Step 1: Define the “in-scope system objective hierarchy”

Create an objective hierarchy with three layers:

1. Top-level service objectives (what the service must achieve for customers)
2. Supporting operational objectives (what internal teams must achieve to deliver the service)
3. Compliance/reporting objectives (what you must do to meet commitments and obligations relevant to the SOC 2 scope)

Keep the list short enough to manage, but complete enough to cover your system description and commitments.

Output: “Objective Register” for the SOC 2 in-scope system.

Step 2: Add clarity fields to every objective (make it testable)

For each objective, add fields that remove ambiguity:

Field	What “good” looks like	Example (availability-themed)
Scope	Names the system/process and boundaries	“Customer-facing API and auth service in production”
Outcome	States what must be true	“Service processes requests reliably”
Success criteria	Measurable criteria or verifiable conditions	“Defined SLO/SLA targets documented in customer commitments”
Owner	Single accountable role	“Head of SRE”
Dependencies	Key third parties or internal systems	“Cloud hosting provider, monitoring platform”
Review trigger	What forces a re-evaluation	“Major architecture change, new SLA, incident trend”

You do not need to publish all metrics publicly; you do need internal clarity that supports risk identification.

Step 3: Validate alignment to commitments (system description, contracts, policies)

Do a reconciliation exercise:

• Pull customer-facing commitments from contracts, security addenda, policy statements, and your SOC 2 system description draft.
• Confirm each commitment maps to at least one objective.
• Confirm each objective maps to at least one commitment or internal necessity for delivering the service.

Common audit failure this prevents: objectives that are disconnected from the system description, leading to risks and controls that feel arbitrary.

Step 4: Run a structured risk identification workshop per objective

Use each objective as a prompt:

• “What could prevent us from achieving this objective?”
• “What could cause us to fail a customer commitment tied to this objective?”
• “What third-party dependency could break this objective?”
• “What changes (people/process/technology) could degrade performance against this objective?”

Document risks in a risk register with a clear link back to the objective.

Tip: Keep a rule that every risk must reference at least one objective. If it can’t, the risk statement is probably too vague or not in scope.

Step 5: Assess risks consistently and link to controls

For each risk:

• Define inherent risk factors (impact areas, likely threat sources, dependency criticality).
• Rate risk using your chosen method (qualitative scales are acceptable if defined).
• Identify existing controls and control owners.
• Decide whether residual risk is acceptable; document the rationale.

Then map controls back to objectives and risks. This creates a three-way traceability chain: Objective → Risk → Control → Evidence.

Step 6: Establish governance: approval, communication, and review

Principle 6 is not “write once.” Set governance so it operates:

• Approval: Document who approved objectives (executive sponsor, risk committee, or equivalent).
• Communication: Publish objectives internally where operators can find them (GRC tool, internal wiki, policy portal).
• Review: Review objectives when triggers occur (new products, major incidents, major third-party changes) and on a scheduled cadence.

Step 7: Operationalize evidence collection (make audits easy)

For each objective, decide what evidence proves it is defined and used:

• Meeting minutes showing objectives reviewed/approved
• Risk assessment artifacts referencing objectives
• Updated objective register with version history
• Control mapping exports showing objective-risk-control linkage

If you use Daydream, configure the objective register as a controlled artifact with owners, review tasks, and direct links to controls and evidence requests. That turns Principle 6 into a repeatable workflow instead of a quarterly scramble.

Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Keep artifacts that prove design (objectives are clear) and operation (you use them to identify/assess risks):

1. Objective Register (version-controlled)
   • Objectives, scope statements, owners, success criteria, dependencies, review triggers
2. Approval records
   • Sign-off email, ticket approval, or governance meeting minutes
3. Risk assessment package
   • Risk register with objective references
   • Risk scoring methodology definition
   • Workshop notes or risk identification logs
4. Traceability mapping
   • Objective-to-risk mapping
   • Risk-to-control mapping
   • Control-to-evidence mapping
5. Change history
   • Diffs or logs showing objective updates after major changes/incidents
6. Communication proof
   • Internal publication link, training/enablement notes, or attestation that relevant owners reviewed objectives

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

Auditors tend to press on these points:

• “Show me the objectives for the in-scope system.” If your objectives are only at the corporate level, you will have a gap.
• “How do you know these objectives are clear enough?” Have success criteria and scope boundaries documented.
• “Prove risks were identified from objectives.” Your risk register should reference objectives directly.
• “What changes trigger an objective update?” If you can’t articulate triggers, objectives look stale.
• “Where do third parties appear in your objectives and risks?” If you depend on cloud/SaaS providers, objectives should acknowledge dependencies and risks should reflect them.

Frequent implementation mistakes and how to avoid them

1. Mistake: Writing vague objectives that cannot fail in a defined way

   • Fix: Add “success criteria” and “scope boundary” fields. If you can’t describe failure modes, you can’t identify risks.

2. Mistake: Treating objectives as generic corporate OKRs

   • Fix: Create system-specific objectives for the SOC 2 in-scope boundary. Corporate goals do not substitute for system objectives.

3. Mistake: Risk register does not trace back to objectives

   • Fix: Make “objective reference” a required field in the risk register. Reject risks that cannot map.

4. Mistake: Objectives ignore third-party dependencies

   • Fix: Add a dependency field to each objective and require third-party risk considerations for critical dependencies.

5. Mistake: Evidence shows activity, not intent

   • Fix: Keep approval and review artifacts. Auditors need to see governance, not just documents.

Enforcement context and risk implications

SOC 2 is an attestation framework, so Principle 6 failures typically surface as examination findings: incomplete risk assessment, weak control mapping, or an inability to support management’s assertions with evidence ¹. The business risk is practical: unclear objectives produce unclear priorities. That increases the chance of control gaps in areas customers care about (security commitments, availability expectations, and incident handling).

Practical 30/60/90-day execution plan

Days 1–30: Define and approve objectives (foundation)

• Confirm SOC 2 scope boundary (systems, locations, teams, third parties).
• Build the first version of the Objective Register for the in-scope system.
• Add clarity fields: scope, success criteria, owner, dependencies, review triggers.
• Hold a working session with Security, Engineering, Ops, and Legal to validate alignment to customer commitments.
• Obtain documented approval from the accountable executive or governance forum.

Exit criteria: Approved Objective Register published internally with owners assigned.

Days 31–60: Drive risk identification and traceability

• Run objective-based risk identification sessions with process owners.
• Update risk register so every risk maps to an objective.
• Rate risks using your defined methodology and document rationale.
• Map existing controls to risks and objectives; identify gaps and create remediation tickets.

Exit criteria: Objective → Risk → Control mapping exists, with owners and statuses.

Days 61–90: Prove operation and build the audit package

• Implement reporting: objective changes, open high risks, remediation progress.
• Collect operating evidence that objectives are reviewed and used (meeting notes, tickets, updated register).
• Run an internal “auditor walkthrough” using a sample objective and trace it through to evidence.
• Tighten documentation where the walkthrough fails.

Exit criteria: A complete, re-performable evidence trail for Principle 6 ready for the SOC 2 examiner.

Frequently Asked Questions

Do objectives need to be measurable to satisfy COSO Principle 6?

They need enough clarity to support consistent risk identification and assessment ¹. If you cannot define success criteria in a verifiable way, your risks and controls will look subjective.

Can we reuse company OKRs as our SOC 2 objectives?

You can reference them, but you still need objectives scoped to the SOC 2 in-scope system and its commitments. Auditors typically expect objectives that match the system boundary described in your SOC 2 narrative ¹.

How do we handle objectives that depend on third parties (cloud, SaaS, subprocessors)?

Put the dependency directly into the objective record and ensure the related risks cover third-party failure modes. Then map to third-party due diligence, monitoring controls, and contractual commitments as applicable.

What’s the minimum evidence an auditor will accept for Principle 6?

An objective register with owners and success criteria, documented approval, and a risk register that clearly references those objectives ¹. If you can’t show the linkage, auditors may treat objectives as non-operational.

How often should we review objectives?

Review on change triggers (new products, major incidents, material architecture changes, major third-party changes) and on a scheduled cadence you can consistently execute. The cadence matters less than proving the process runs and updates are recorded.

Our objectives are clear, but our risk register is messy. What should we fix first?

Fix traceability first: require every risk to map to one or more objectives, then normalize risk statements and scoring. A clean objective-to-risk linkage makes control mapping and evidence collection faster.

Related compliance topics

• 2025 SEC Marketing Rule Examination Focus Areas
• Access and identity controls
• Access Control (AC)
• Access control and identity discipline
• Access control management

Footnotes

1. AICPA TSC 2017