The entity implements logical access security software, infrastructure, and architectures
To meet the the entity implements logical access security software, infrastructure, and architectures requirement (SOC 2 TSC-CC6.1), you must deploy and operate an access control stack (identity provider, MFA, authorization, network segmentation, logging) that consistently enforces who can access which systems, from where, and under what conditions, and you must be able to prove it with repeatable evidence. Your fastest path is to standardize on an IAM architecture, map it to in-scope systems, and retain objective configuration and operational artifacts.
Key takeaways:
- You need an end-to-end logical access architecture (IAM + enforcement points + monitoring), not a set of ad hoc settings.
- Auditors will test both design (documented architecture and standards) and operating effectiveness (real configs, logs, and access outcomes).
- Evidence quality is the differentiator: screenshots, exports, policies-as-code, and access reviews must tie back to specific in-scope systems.
TSC-CC6.1 is a practical SOC 2 requirement: implement the software, infrastructure, and architecture that enforces logical access. For a CCO, GRC lead, or compliance owner, the work is less about writing a policy and more about proving the organization has a coherent access control design that actually runs day to day.
This requirement sits at the foundation of security and availability trust criteria because it governs how every user, administrator, service account, and workload reaches systems and data. In an audit, CC6.1 is rarely passed by intent alone. Your auditor will expect to see an IAM pattern (for workforce and admins), authorization controls at the application and data layers, network controls that prevent unnecessary lateral movement, and logging that supports detection and investigation.
Operationalizing CC6.1 quickly means: define your target logical access architecture, confirm what’s in scope, implement standard enforcement points (SSO/MFA, RBAC/ABAC, PAM, segmentation, centralized logs), and retain evidence that demonstrates consistent operation. If you manage third parties, include how they authenticate, what they can reach, and how you monitor those sessions.
Regulatory text
SOC 2 Trust Services Criteria – CC6.1 (excerpt): “The entity implements logical access security software, infrastructure, and architectures.” 1
Plain-English interpretation
You must have a real, implemented technical access control environment that:
- Authenticates identities (users and non-human accounts).
- Authorizes actions (what authenticated identities can do).
- Enforces boundaries (network and system segmentation; least privilege).
- Monitors and logs access (so you can detect and investigate inappropriate access).
Auditors typically interpret “software, infrastructure, and architectures” as: the control is not satisfied by policies alone. You need implemented tools and configurations that are consistently applied across in-scope systems, plus documentation that shows a deliberate architecture rather than a collection of exceptions.
Who it applies to (entity and operational context)
This applies to service organizations pursuing SOC 2 where systems process, store, or transmit customer data or support commitments in the report scope. Practically, it covers:
- Workforce users (employees, temps, contractors).
- Privileged users (admins, cloud console access, database admins).
- Service accounts and API keys.
- Third parties with access (support vendors, MSPs, incident response retainers).
- Production and non-production environments if they connect to, impact, or can be used to reach in-scope production assets.
If your SOC 2 scope includes a cloud environment, CC6.1 generally touches your identity provider, cloud IAM, endpoint management, VPN/zero trust access, CI/CD permissions, secrets management, and centralized logging.
What you actually need to do (step-by-step)
Use the steps below as an implementation checklist you can hand to IT/SecOps and then test as GRC.
1) Define scope and “access enforcement points”
- List in-scope systems (apps, databases, cloud accounts, clusters, code repos, ticketing, monitoring).
- For each system, identify the enforcement point:
- SSO/MFA via identity provider
- Local accounts (should be exceptions)
- Cloud IAM roles/policies
- Application RBAC/ABAC
- Network access control (VPN/ZTNA, security groups, firewalls)
Deliverable: a simple matrix that maps System → AuthN method → AuthZ model → Privileged path → Logs location.
2) Standardize authentication (SSO + MFA) and exceptions
- Establish an organizational standard: “All workforce access uses SSO; MFA required for interactive access; local accounts are break-glass only.”
- Implement SSO for SaaS and internal apps where feasible.
- For systems that cannot support SSO, implement compensating controls (strong password policy, MFA where possible, restricted network access, periodic access review).
Evidence focus: show configuration that MFA is enforced and show an exception register for systems that can’t comply yet.
3) Implement privileged access architecture (PAM and separation)
- Separate standard user accounts from admin accounts where admins exist.
- Control privileged elevation:
- Use PAM tooling or tightly controlled role assumption.
- Restrict who can grant access.
- Implement break-glass accounts with:
- Strong protection (stored securely)
- Defined use process
- Monitoring and post-use review
Auditor hangup to avoid: “Admins share credentials” or “everyone is a global admin during on-call.”
4) Implement authorization models (RBAC/ABAC) per system
- Define roles that map to job functions (engineering, support, finance, security).
- Ensure least privilege by default:
- New users land in baseline groups, not privileged groups.
- Access is granted through groups/roles, not individual assignments.
- For sensitive actions (export data, change auth settings), add step-up controls where your stack supports it (re-auth, approvals, stronger roles).
Evidence focus: role definitions, group membership exports, and examples of least-privilege role assignments.
5) Build network boundaries that support logical access claims
- Segment production administration paths:
- Admin consoles restricted by identity, device posture, and/or network
- Restrict inbound access to production:
- Allow-list where appropriate
- Private endpoints for internal services when feasible
- Limit lateral movement:
- Tight security group rules
- Separate subnets for tiers (app, data, management)
CC6.1 does not require a specific topology, but it does require architecture that enforces access boundaries in practice.
6) Centralize access logging and monitor for control failures
- Ensure logs exist for:
- Identity provider sign-ins and MFA challenges
- Privileged role assumptions / admin console logins
- Key systems (code repos, cloud control plane, databases where feasible)
- Centralize logs into your SIEM/log platform and define retention aligned to your program needs.
- Implement alerting for high-risk events (new admin, MFA disabled, unusual geo, impossible travel, access from unmanaged devices where available).
Evidence focus: log source list, sample events, alert rules, and tickets showing response.
7) Operationalize: joiner/mover/leaver + periodic access review
- Define the provisioning workflow (HRIS trigger or ticket-based).
- Define deprovisioning workflow and emergency termination.
- Run periodic access reviews for privileged roles and sensitive systems, document remediation.
Even though CC6.1 is “implements software/infrastructure/architecture,” auditors will still ask how access stays correct over time.
Required evidence and artifacts to retain
Maintain artifacts that prove both design and operation:
Design evidence (what you intended and built)
- Logical access architecture diagram(s): workforce access, privileged access, third-party access, service accounts
- IAM standards: SSO/MFA requirements, password policy where relevant, break-glass approach
- System-by-system access control matrix (System → AuthN/AuthZ/Privileged/Logging)
- Network segmentation overview for admin paths and production boundaries
Operating evidence (what is actually running)
- Identity provider configuration exports or screenshots showing MFA, conditional access, and SSO enforcement
- Group/role membership exports for key systems (privileged and sensitive roles)
- Samples of access provisioning and removal tickets (or automated workflow logs)
- SIEM/log platform proof: ingestion status, sample sign-in logs, sample privileged events
- Access review records (who reviewed, what changed, when)
Practical tip: favor exportable evidence (CSV/PDF/config snapshots) over “live screen share” proofs. Evidence should stand on its own months later.
Common exam/audit questions and hangups
Auditors often probe CC6.1 with questions like:
- “Show me the logical access architecture for the SOC 2 scope. Where is SSO enforced?”
- “Which systems allow local accounts? What compensating controls exist?”
- “How do you control privileged access in cloud consoles and production?”
- “Demonstrate that MFA is required for admins and remote access.”
- “Where do access logs go, and how do you know logging is complete for in-scope systems?”
- “How are third parties granted access, monitored, and removed?”
Common hangups:
- Scope drift: systems are “in scope” but not in the access control standard.
- Over-reliance on screenshots: no consistent exports, no timestamped configuration evidence.
- Service accounts: unclear ownership, long-lived keys, no review cadence.
Frequent implementation mistakes and how to avoid them
| Mistake | Why it fails CC6.1 | How to avoid it |
|---|---|---|
| “SSO for most apps” with exceptions unmanaged | Auditors test the exceptions | Maintain an exception register and add compensating controls per system |
| Shared admin accounts | No accountability and weak control design | Require named admin identities and role-based elevation |
| No clear separation of prod vs non-prod access | Increases lateral movement and privilege risk | Segment networks and restrict admin paths to prod |
| Logging exists but isn’t centralized | You can’t evidence monitoring and investigation | Define a log source baseline and test ingestion periodically |
| RBAC defined informally (“ask in Slack”) | Access is not consistently enforced | Use ticketed approvals or automated workflows tied to groups/roles |
Enforcement context and risk implications
No public enforcement cases were provided in the source catalog for this requirement. Practically, CC6.1 maps directly to the risk that drives customer security reviews: unauthorized access, privilege misuse, and inability to reconstruct access events after an incident.
From a risk lens, control failure modes tend to cluster around:
- Privileged access sprawl (too many admins, too many paths to prod)
- Weak authentication (no MFA, inconsistent SSO)
- Blind spots in logging (no identity logs, no cloud control plane logs)
A practical 30/60/90-day execution plan
Days 0–30: Baseline and evidence-ready architecture
- Confirm SOC 2 scope systems and build the access control matrix.
- Publish minimum access standards: SSO/MFA, privileged separation, break-glass, logging baseline.
- Inventory privileged roles across identity provider, cloud IAM, and critical SaaS.
- Start evidence collection: IdP MFA settings, conditional access policies, role exports, initial diagrams.
Days 31–60: Implement enforcement points and reduce exceptions
- Roll SSO/MFA to remaining high-risk apps and admin consoles.
- Establish PAM or formal privileged elevation pattern (role assumption, approval workflow).
- Segment admin access paths to production (ZTNA/VPN, allow-lists, security groups).
- Centralize identity and cloud control plane logs; confirm ingestion with sample queries.
Days 61–90: Prove operating effectiveness
- Run an access review for privileged roles and remediate findings.
- Test joiner/mover/leaver workflows with sampled tickets or automation logs.
- Create an auditor-ready evidence pack:
- Architecture diagrams
- Config exports
- Access review record
- Logging proof and sample alerts/tickets
- If you’re using Daydream to manage your SOC 2 program, map each artifact to CC6.1 so evidence is continuously collected and doesn’t turn into a quarter-end scramble.
Frequently Asked Questions
Does CC6.1 require a specific tool like an identity provider or PAM?
CC6.1 does not prescribe tools, but auditors expect implemented software and infrastructure that reliably enforces access controls. If you don’t use a centralized identity provider or privileged access pattern, you need strong compensating controls and strong evidence.
We have a few legacy systems without SSO. Can we still pass?
Yes, if you document the exception, restrict access (network and accounts), and prove periodic review and monitoring. Auditors usually focus on whether exceptions are managed and shrinking, not whether they exist.
What counts as “architecture” evidence?
Provide diagrams and a system-by-system matrix that show where authentication happens, where authorization is enforced, how privileged access works, and where logs go. The architecture must match real configurations you can export or screenshot.
Are service accounts part of logical access under CC6.1?
Yes. Service accounts, API keys, and automation identities are logical access paths and should have ownership, least privilege, secure credential storage, and monitoring.
How do third parties fit into CC6.1?
Any third party with access to your systems must authenticate through your defined access architecture where possible, have least-privilege permissions, and be logged and removable through a controlled offboarding process.
What is the fastest way to get audit-ready evidence?
Standardize on a small set of enforcement points (IdP, cloud IAM roles, centralized logging) and collect exports on a predictable cadence. Store artifacts in a control-centric repository (including Daydream if you use it) with clear mapping to CC6.1.
Related compliance topics
- 2025 SEC Marketing Rule Examination Focus Areas
- Access and identity controls
- Access Control (AC)
- Access control and identity discipline
- Access control management
Footnotes
Frequently Asked Questions
Does CC6.1 require a specific tool like an identity provider or PAM?
CC6.1 does not prescribe tools, but auditors expect implemented software and infrastructure that reliably enforces access controls. If you don’t use a centralized identity provider or privileged access pattern, you need strong compensating controls and strong evidence.
We have a few legacy systems without SSO. Can we still pass?
Yes, if you document the exception, restrict access (network and accounts), and prove periodic review and monitoring. Auditors usually focus on whether exceptions are managed and shrinking, not whether they exist.
What counts as “architecture” evidence?
Provide diagrams and a system-by-system matrix that show where authentication happens, where authorization is enforced, how privileged access works, and where logs go. The architecture must match real configurations you can export or screenshot.
Are service accounts part of logical access under CC6.1?
Yes. Service accounts, API keys, and automation identities are logical access paths and should have ownership, least privilege, secure credential storage, and monitoring.
How do third parties fit into CC6.1?
Any third party with access to your systems must authenticate through your defined access architecture where possible, have least-privilege permissions, and be logged and removable through a controlled offboarding process.
What is the fastest way to get audit-ready evidence?
Standardize on a small set of enforcement points (IdP, cloud IAM roles, centralized logging) and collect exports on a predictable cadence. Store artifacts in a control-centric repository (including Daydream if you use it) with clear mapping to CC6.1.
Operationalize this requirement
Map requirement text to controls, owners, evidence, and review workflows inside Daydream.
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