The entity monitors system components and the operation of those components for anomalies

To meet the the entity monitors system components and the operation of those components for anomalies requirement (SOC 2 TSC-CC7.2), you must run continuous or scheduled monitoring over in-scope infrastructure, applications, and security tooling, detect anomalous behavior, and prove you review, investigate, and resolve alerts. Operationalize this by defining monitoring scope, alert thresholds, triage workflows, and retaining repeatable evidence of ongoing operation.

Key takeaways:

• Monitoring must cover both system components (assets) and their operation (behavior, performance, security signals).
• Auditors test design and operating effectiveness: defined alerts, consistent triage, and provable follow-through.
• Evidence wins SOC 2: logs, alert rules, tickets, review attestations, and monitoring coverage maps.

CC7.2 is a requirement about detection: you need to know when your systems behave “off baseline” and be able to show you noticed, investigated, and responded. Auditors will not accept “we have a SIEM” as a control by itself. They test whether monitoring meaningfully covers your SOC 2 scope, whether alerts are tuned to the risks of your environment, and whether people consistently act on the signals.

This requirement usually breaks down in real programs for two reasons. First, monitoring is deployed unevenly: production has decent telemetry, while identity systems, endpoints, build pipelines, and key third parties are blind spots. Second, teams can’t prove operations: alerts fire, someone looks, but there is no durable record of review decisions, investigation steps, and closure. CC7.2 expects both detection capability and operational discipline.

Use this page as implementation guidance to turn CC7.2 into a tight, testable control: define scope and anomaly categories, instrument your environment, set alert logic, route alerts to accountable responders, require documented investigation outcomes, and retain artifacts that a SOC 2 auditor can reperform.

Regulatory text

SOC 2 Trust Services Criteria (CC7.2): “The entity monitors system components and the operation of those components for anomalies.” ¹

What an operator must do: implement monitoring that (1) covers in-scope components (cloud accounts, hosts, containers, databases, network boundaries, SaaS admin planes, security tools) and (2) detects anomalous operation (unexpected access patterns, configuration drift, unusual resource usage, service failures, suspicious network flows). Then, show that alerts are reviewed, investigated, and resolved in a repeatable way with retained evidence.

Plain-English interpretation (what auditors mean by “anomalies”)

“Anomalies” are deviations from expected behavior that could indicate security incidents, control failures, or reliability risks. For SOC 2, auditors commonly expect you to monitor at least:

• Security anomalies: unusual login locations, impossible travel, privilege escalation, repeated authentication failures, suspicious API usage, malware/EDR detections, WAF spikes, unexpected outbound connections.
• Availability/operational anomalies: error-rate spikes, latency increases, saturation (CPU/memory/disk), failed backups, job queue backlogs, certificate expiry, critical dependency failures.
• Integrity anomalies: unexpected data changes, schema changes, unauthorized deployments, configuration drift in infrastructure-as-code managed resources.
• Monitoring integrity: missing logs, disabled agents, dropped telemetry, alert pipeline outages (because “no alerts” can be a monitoring failure).

Auditors focus on whether your monitoring is aligned to risks in your system description and whether it’s consistently operated.

Who it applies to (entity and operational context)

Applies to: service organizations undergoing SOC 2 examinations for the Trust Services Criteria. ¹

Operational scope: everything in the SOC 2 boundary, including:

• Production infrastructure (cloud, on-prem, network/security groups, load balancers, compute, storage)
• Applications and APIs (auth flows, error handling, critical endpoints)
• Identity and access (IdP, SSO, MFA, privileged roles, admin consoles)
• CI/CD and code hosting (build runners, signing, secrets, deployment workflows)
• Security stack (SIEM/log management, EDR, vulnerability scanning, WAF, CSPM)
• Key third-party dependencies where you rely on their operation (SaaS platforms, managed databases), at least to the extent you monitor health/status, security notices, and integration failures

If you claim CC7.2 is “not applicable,” expect pushback. Monitoring is a baseline expectation for any in-scope system that processes, stores, or transmits customer data.

What you actually need to do (step-by-step)

1) Define monitoring scope and map it to your SOC 2 boundary

Create a Monitoring Coverage Map that lists:

• In-scope systems/components (by environment: prod, staging if relevant)
• Telemetry sources (logs, metrics, traces, security events)
• Where telemetry is stored (SIEM/log platform)
• Primary anomaly types expected per component
• Alert destinations and owners

Practical tip: auditors like a single table that ties assets → signals → alerts → response path.

2) Establish minimum telemetry requirements (“you can’t alert on what you don’t collect”)

Document baseline telemetry by component type, for example:

• Cloud control plane: admin activity logs, policy/role changes, key management events
• Application: auth events, authorization failures, high-risk actions, service errors
• Network edge: WAF events, ingress/egress anomalies, DDoS signals (if applicable)
• Endpoints/servers: EDR events, privileged commands, agent health
• Data stores: access logs, failed auth, backup status, replication/health alerts

Include a requirement for time synchronization and log integrity expectations (e.g., centralized logging, restricted access), because anomaly detection becomes unreliable otherwise.

3) Define “anomaly” categories and alert logic you will run

Create an Alert Catalog with:

• Alert name and description (what it detects)
• Severity and triage SLA target (your internal target)
• Data source(s)
• Trigger condition and threshold logic
• False positive notes and tuning approach
• Required responder actions (what to check, what to document)

Keep it tight. A smaller set of high-signal alerts that are consistently handled beats a sprawling catalog nobody trusts.

4) Implement routing, escalation, and on-call accountability

Your monitoring is only as good as alert handling. Implement:

• A central intake (ticketing system, incident tool, or case management queue)
• Owner mapping by alert type (Security, SRE/Infra, App team)
• Escalation path for high-severity alerts
• Backup coverage (so alerts don’t sit unreviewed)

If you use a SOC provider or a third party MDR, document the handoffs and show how you track “provider saw it” to “you decided and closed it.”

5) Standardize triage and investigation documentation

Define a lightweight Triage Playbook:

• Validate alert authenticity (is telemetry missing? is this a test?)
• Scope impact (which systems/users/data?)
• Containment steps (if applicable)
• Root cause / contributing factors
• Resolution and closure rationale
• Control improvements (new alert, tuning, additional logging)

Auditors test whether alert reviews are consistent, not heroic.

6) Prove ongoing operation with recurring reviews

Add a recurring control activity:

• Periodic review of alert trends (noise, gaps, repeat offenders)
• Review of monitoring coverage (new services, changed architecture)
• Verification that logging agents and pipelines are healthy

This is where teams often fail CC7.2: monitoring exists, but governance doesn’t keep pace with change.

7) Document the control design and retain operating evidence

SOC 2 is evidence-driven. Your control narrative should state what you monitor, how you detect anomalies, who responds, and what records you retain. The backend guidance aligns with a practical “document control design and retain operating evidence” approach. ¹

Where Daydream fits naturally: Daydream can help you maintain a clean control narrative, map monitoring coverage to scope, and package recurring evidence (alert samples, tickets, review records) so audits don’t turn into log archaeology.

Required evidence and artifacts to retain

Keep artifacts that show both coverage and operation:

Design artifacts

• Monitoring/Logging Policy or Standard (scope, minimum telemetry, retention expectations)
• Monitoring Coverage Map (assets → telemetry → alerts → owners)
• Alert Catalog (rules, severity, routing, tuning notes)
• Incident/Triage Playbooks (security and operations)

Operating effectiveness evidence

• Alert samples with timestamps and full context (screenshot/export acceptable)
• Linked tickets/cases showing triage, investigation notes, and closure
• On-call schedules or routing rules (proof alerts reach owners)
• Review records: periodic monitoring review notes, tuning decisions, action items
• Evidence of monitoring pipeline health (agent coverage reports, ingestion health checks)

Retention length is usually handled in your broader logging/retention control; for CC7.2, focus on having enough history to cover the audit period and demonstrate consistent operation.

Common exam/audit questions and hangups

Auditors frequently ask:

• “Show me a list of in-scope components and how each is monitored.”
• “Which anomalies are you detecting for identity, cloud control plane, and production application?”
• “Give me samples of alerts and the investigations for the audit period.”
• “How do you ensure alerts are reviewed when the primary responder is out?”
• “How do you tune alerts and track improvements?”

Common hangup: you can produce alerts, but can’t show who reviewed them and what decision was made.

Frequent implementation mistakes (and how to avoid them)

1. Monitoring only uptime/performance

   • Fix: include security-relevant anomalies (privilege, access, configuration changes) alongside availability signals.

2. No documented scope

   • Fix: maintain a monitoring coverage map tied to your SOC 2 system boundary. Update it during change management.

3. Alert noise leads to ignored alerts

   • Fix: severity tiers, tuning records, and “disable with justification” workflows. Keep an audit trail.

4. Investigations happen in chat

   • Fix: require a ticket/case for meaningful alerts. Link supporting logs and decisions.

5. Blind spots in identity and CI/CD

   • Fix: treat IdP, source control, and deployment systems as first-class monitored components.

Risk implications (what failure looks like)

If you can’t demonstrate anomaly monitoring, the practical risk is delayed detection of compromise, misconfiguration, or operational failures. In a SOC 2 context, the audit risk is a control exception because the auditor can’t validate operating effectiveness even if you believe monitoring exists.

30/60/90-day execution plan

Days 1–30: Define scope, minimum telemetry, and evidence approach

• Confirm SOC 2 boundary and list in-scope components.
• Build the Monitoring Coverage Map (first draft).
• Decide where alerts and investigations will be recorded (ticketing/incident tool).
• Draft the control narrative for CC7.2 and align owners (Security, SRE, IT).

Deliverables: coverage map v1, control narrative v1, evidence collection approach.

Days 31–60: Implement high-signal alerts and consistent triage

• Implement or refine logging from priority systems (IdP, cloud control plane, production apps).
• Create the Alert Catalog for the highest-risk anomalies.
• Stand up routing, on-call ownership, and escalation rules.
• Start generating tickets for alert investigations; require closure notes.

Deliverables: alert catalog v1, sample alert-to-ticket evidence, triage playbooks.

Days 61–90: Prove operating effectiveness and harden for audit

• Run recurring monitoring reviews (noise, gaps, coverage drift).
• Tune thresholds; document changes and rationale.
• Validate monitoring pipeline health (agents, ingestion, alert delivery).
• Package evidence for the audit period (representative samples by alert type and severity).

Deliverables: monitoring review records, tuned alert rules, audit-ready evidence bundle (Daydream can package this cleanly).

Frequently Asked Questions

What counts as a “system component” for CC7.2?

Any in-scope asset that supports your SOC 2 system boundary, including cloud accounts, hosts, containers, databases, identity systems, CI/CD, and security tooling. If it can fail or be abused in a way that affects commitments, it belongs in monitoring scope. ¹

Do we need a SIEM to satisfy this requirement?

No specific tool is mandated, but you must collect signals, detect anomalies, and retain evidence of review and response. Many teams use a SIEM or centralized logging plus alerting, but auditors care about coverage and operation more than branding. ¹

How do we show “operation” of monitoring, not just that alerts exist?

Provide alert samples tied to tickets/cases with timestamps, triage notes, decisions, and closure outcomes. Add periodic review records that show you evaluate monitoring health and tune rules. ¹

What if we outsource monitoring to an MDR or SOC provider?

Document the provider’s responsibilities and your internal responsibilities, then retain evidence of handoff and closure. Auditors still expect you to show governance: you reviewed material findings and ensured resolution. ¹

We have lots of alerts but no one documents investigations. How do we fix this quickly?

Start by requiring tickets for high-severity alerts and a minimum investigation template (scope, action taken, closure reason). Then expand documentation to additional alert categories once the workflow is stable.

How often should we review monitoring coverage as systems change?

Tie coverage review to change management for new services and material architecture changes, and hold a recurring monitoring governance review to catch drift. Document both the trigger-based updates and the recurring review outcomes.

Related compliance topics

• 2025 SEC Marketing Rule Examination Focus Areas
• Access and identity controls
• Access Control (AC)
• Access control and identity discipline
• Access control management

Footnotes

1. AICPA TSC 2017